Straipsnyje analizuojamos Lietuvos geopolitinės orientacijos pakeitimo priežastys ir aplinkybės, bandoma išsiaiškinti, kokiais būdais Lietuva tikėjosi susi-grąžinti sostinę Vilnių. 1918–1940 m. Vilniaus klausimas buvo pagrindinė Lietuvos užsienio politikos problema, nulėmusi valstybės geopolitinę orientaciją. Iki 1925 m. Lietuva deklaravo orientaciją į Antantę ir Baltijos šalis, tačiau vėliau nukreipė žvilgsnį į SSRS ir Vokietiją, kurios taip pat turėjo teritorinių pretenzijų Lenkijai. Pasitelkus diplomatines, politines ir karines priemones buvo kuriami Vilniaus susigrąžinimo planai.

Straipsnyje tiriama, kaip ir kodėl Baltijos regione po I pasaulinio karo susikūrusios naujos, modernios valstybės tapo užkarda bolševikinės Rusijos ekspansijai į Europos gilumą. Nustatyta, kad ryškiausias bolševikų revoliucijos eksporto bandymas buvo 1923 m. mėginimas inspiruoti komunistinį perversmą Vokietijoje, į kurią ketinta permesti šimtatūkstantinę Raudonąją armiją, telktą prie SSRS vakarinių sienų, tikintis, kad Baltijos šalys ir Lenkija nesipriešindamos praleis ją į Vokietiją. Tačiau baltiečiai ir lenkai, atlaikę bolševikų spaudimą, nepasidavę grasinimams ir pažadams padėti, nesutiko jokiu, net užmaskuotu, būdu praleisti raudonarmiečių. Dėl tokios pozicijos, taip pat vokiečiams nerodant didesnio revoliucinio entuziazmo ši bolševikų avantiūra žlugo.

Straipsnyje analizuojamas katalikų dvasininkų diplomatinis darbas, siekiant Lietuvos nepriklausomybės Pirmojo pasaulinio karo metais. Akcentuojamos Šveicarijos lietuvių tautos tarybos, kurioje daugumą sudarė katalikų dvasininkai, derybos su Vokietija dėl nepriklausomos Lietuvos valstybės atkūrimo 1918 m. Detaliau aptariamos kunigų Konstantino Olšausko, Juozo Purickio diplomatinės misijos Europoje, atskleidžiami šių žmonių diplomatiniai gebėjimai. Straipsnyje diplomatijos požiūriu vertinamas kan. Kazimiero Prapuolenio darbas Romoje siekiant Lietuvos nepriklausomybės.

The history of world diplomacy tells the story of international relations between states or of the foreign policy of one state during various periods. A diplomat’s biography, usually mentioning his family (parents, spouse, children), is also a valuable part of diplomacy’s history. The portrait of a diplomat’s spouse is often sparse, overshadowed by the personality of the diplomat, even though it is the diplomat’s wife who, as the person accompanying the diplomat, is his first helper, witness, and judge. The history of Lithuania’s diplomatic service, active during the Soviet occupation, reveals the unique destinies of diplomats and the circumstances of their exceptional activities, which have already inspired several monographs, articles, and source publications. But a deeper look compels paying respectful attention as well to these diplomats’ wives and their fates during this tragic period of Lithuanian history. That is why this article surveys at least briefly the biographies and activities of Marija RadzevičiūtėŽadeikienė, Regina Kašubaitė-Budrienė, Elena Taraškevičiūtė-Gerutienė, Vincenta Matulaitytė-Lozoraitienė and Daniela d‘Ercole-Lozoraitis, Ona Galvydaitė-Bačkienė, Janina Čiurlytė-Simutienė, Halina Jonė Narusevičiūtė-Žmuidzinienė, Gražina Ežbieta Gustaitytė-Krivickienė, Bronė Mėginaitė- Klimienė, Ona Viburytė-Kajeckienė and Jozefina Rauktytė-Daužvardienė, Stefanija Gervinaitė-Balickienė. These ladies provided not only strong moral support to their husbands but also were instrumental financially in helping to maintain independent Lithuania‘s diplomatic posts during the years of soviet occupation.

The article analyses the trip of a famous Lithuanian military officer, politician and diplomat Kazys Škirpa to Kaunas soon after the USSR occupation in 1940. As all representatives, K. Škirpa was not sure about wthat was happening in Lithuania. There was a question if soviets would annex Lithuania and sovietize the country or if Lithuania as a protectorate state with possible cultural autonomy would be enough for them. That is why, when the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of the so called People’s government, Prof. Vincas Krėvė, invited K. Škirpa to Kaunas, he used this opportunity to not only speak with his new superior. In addition to this, he secretly met with people who were not only frustrated about things happenning in Lithuania but were also ready to actively resist the occupation. K. Škirpa suggested them wait till the upcoming war between USSR and Germany that was obvious to K. Škirpa because of his good relations with German officials. Active resistance without the help of any other country seemed kind of suicidal to K. Škirpa so he offered an idea of creating underground communications in Lithuania and avoiding direct confrontation with soviets. This trip was very important to K. Škirpa not only because it allowed him to share his first-look knowledge to other Lithuanian diplomats and some of German officials but because it made him believe his exceptional mission in Lithuania’s path to the freedom.

In early June of 1940 Lithuania‘s Foreign Minister Juozas Urbšys sent a telegram (No. 288) to Lithuania‘s missions abroad. The most often cited sentence from it is the last: “Should catastrophe strike us here, you are to regard Lozoraitis as the chief of our diplomatic service abroad, Klimas as the first deputy, and Šaulys as the second.” When the Soviets occupied Lithuania a few weeks later, this telegram fragment became the start of Lithuanian exile diplomacy. For more than six decades the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service (LDS ) was active abroad as the only remaining state institution of Lithuania. The telegram‘s last sentence, possibly just an afterthought, raises many questions even today. The archives of the diplomats themselves, recollections of their contemporaries, and Lithuanian historiography yield somewhat different versions of that telegram‘s text. Thus this article investigates the circumstances and motives surrounding the naming of the LDS Chief and his deputies as well as the problems involved in passing on these duties to others. Stasys Lozoraitis served as LDS Chief for more than 40 years. As his first deputy Petras Klimas was imprisoned and deported to Siberia, and the second, Dr. Jurgis Šaulys, died in 1948, Lozoraitis remained alone among the three persons mentioned in the telegram. The question of his succession and deputies was discussed several times in the ranks of the LDS itself. It was especially pressing in 1957 with the death of Povilas Žadeikis, Lithuania‘s envoy to Washington when Lozoraitis himself was slated to be his successor. But only in 1978 did Lozoraitis in a separate document name Dr. Stasys Antanas Bačkis as the LDS Chief‘s deputy and empower him to take over his duties in the case of his death.[...].

The aim of this article is to characterize and compare the politics and diplomacy of Sweden regarding the restoration of Lithuanian statehood in two different time periods: 1918-1921 and 1990- 1991. Swedish attitudes are analysed paying some but not very detailed attention to the politics of the other Nordic countries. The article is based upon archival research as well as upon analysis of Riksdag protocols, memoirs of diplomats, and Swedish periodicals. From a comparative analysis it becomes clear that Sweden took a very cautious attitude as to official de jure recognition of the Lithuanian Republic during both of these time periods. This depended on geopolitical reasons as well as on Swedish foreign policy pragmatism. But there were considerable efforts by Swedish diplomats to strengthen the factual statehood of Lithuania, especially in helping Lithuania join various international organizations. Membership in international organizations was held to be an important precondition for getting the Lithuanian Republic recognized internationally. During 1990-1991 the Swedish diplomatic presence in Lithuania, while unofficial and possible only under conditions controlled by the Soviet Union, was especially visible and in fact useful to Lithuania, even if Lithuanian politicians were unsatisfied with the delay of the official recognition. Social democrats (especially the well-known Swedish politician Hjalmar Branting) and liberals stood in favour of diplomatic and political help for Lithuania in 1918, while in 1990 the Lithuanian freedom movement was supported most visibly by conservative politicians. But only marginal politicians demanded immediate recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Lithuania. Public opinion was also influenced through the efforts of representatives of the different political forces mentioned during the relevant time periods. [...]

Akivaizdu, kad naujoji Kinijos Liaudies Respublikos „taikaus iškilimo“ strategija yra grindžiama vadinamosios „švelniosios“ galios aktyvinimu. Tokį pasirinkimą vienu ar kitu būdu lemia ne tik išorinės priežastys (pvz., vienpolė pasaulio tvarka, globalizacija, etc.), bet ir Kinijos kaip kylančios galios „prisistatymo“ tarptautinei bendruomenei strategija (įvaizdžio kūrimas) bei jos politinio lygmens savirefleksija (identiteto konstravimas). Straipsnyje tyrinėjami KLR kaip taikingos šalies, KLR kaip bendradarbiauti linkusio veikėjo, KLR kaip besivystančios šalies, KLR kaip socialistinės šalies su kiniškais bruožais ir KLR kaip autonomiško veikėjo profiliai bei KLR kaip silpno–stipraus veikėjo mentalitetas. Įvaizdžio kūrimas ir identiteto konstravimas Kinijos diplomatinėje-strateginėje realybėje yra glaudžiai susiję, vienas į kitą pereinantys reiškiniai, todėl, nagrinėjant jų ir naujosios KLR strategijos santykį, vartojama įvaizdžio-identiteto sąvokinė konstrukcija.