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Laikas ir kitas. Husserlis ir Levinas apie transcendenciją
Date Issued | Volume | Start Page | End Page |
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2005 | 40 | 149 | 161 |
URI | Access Rights |
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Straipsnis žurnalo svetainėje | Viso teksto dokumentas (atviroji prieiga) / Full Text Document (Open Access) |
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12259/40479 |
The aim of this article is the comparative analysis of Husserlís and Levinasí views on time and the transcendence of the Other. The article deals with the phenomenological notion of time and the flow of intentional lived-experience, and shows how the transcendence of the Other is implicated in it. Also, it analyses Levinasí reflections on time, death, and the feminine, in which the unknowable alterity of the Other is emphasised. Introducing the philosophy of Levinas, the phenomenological sources of it are frequently forgotten. Levinasí philosophy is apprehended as an undivided whole, and his view on phenomenology as solely negative. To the authorís thinking, Levinasí relation with phenomenology is more complicated than it can appear at first sight. Levinasí criticism of phenomenology is directed not against phenomenology itself, but against its identifying with the representational pattern of consciousness. The phenomenological description of living-time forms the notion of implicative intentionality, which abolishes the representational pattern of thought and opens the possibility of ethical relations with the other.