Gordon, John-Stewart

This chapter critiques the social-relational approach to moral status, specifically in the context of artificial intelligence and robotics. It argues against assessing the moral status of entities like social robots solely based on the nature of their social relationships with humans. Instead, it advocates for a properties-based approach, emphasizing inherent cognitive qualities such as rationality, intelligence, autonomy, and self-awareness. The critique is structured around five principal objections to the social-relational approach: its dependency on human recognition, neglect of intrinsic properties, anthropocentric bias, exclusion of nonsocial AI, and potential for exploitation. The chapter also includes a response to Moosavi's discussion of the paper clip-maximizer thought experiment and its relevance to the issue of moral status. The chapter concludes by recommending a shift towards a framework that recognizes entities' moral status based on species-independent, morally relevant criteria, suggesting that this approach is more inclusive and reliable for integrating intelligent machines into our moral community.

This paper reevaluates the concept of “interest” in moral status ascriptions, focusing on non-human animals. Most moral philosophers assert that entities with a moral status have interests that matter morally for their own sake. However, this paper argues that applyi ng the concept of “interest” to non-human animals is misleading and constitutes a categorical mistake. Higher-order reasoning and self-awareness, essential for having interests, are typically lacking in non-human animals. The paper critiques contemporary approaches, suggesting a reevaluation and reframing of theories to avoid anthropomorphism. It proposes using universally applicable terms like the capacity to feel pain or suffer (or sapience), rather than interests, to determine moral status.

In this paper, we delve into the significant impact of recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) on the future landscape of work. We discuss the looming possibility of mass unemployment triggered by AI and the societal repercussions of this transition. Despite the challenges this shift presents, we argue that it also unveils opportunities to mitigate social inequalities, combat global poverty, and empower individuals to follow their passions. Amidst this discussion, we also touch upon the existential question of the purpose of human life in a world where machines predominantly perform work. Additionally, we explore the contentious issue of the moral status and rights of AI entities, contemplating the scenario where machines evolve to become sapient and sentient. The paper concludes with a call to action, emphasizing the necessity to acknowledge these potential outcomes and proactively seek solutions, as part of an inevitable journey through the evolution of human society shared with intelligent machines.

Recent years have seen a growing interest in the ethics of sex robots, fuelled by the technology industry's ability to build better and better robots that can be used as sex toys (such as realdoll.com). Although the pros and cons of sex robots have been discussed for several years in the philosophy of technology, only a few contributions have focussed on child sex robots. None of these prior essays have examined a Kantian approach to the question of whether one should allow people to use child robots as sex toys. Accordingly, this article considers the possibility of using Kant either in support of or in opposition to child sex robots. The conclusion is that a Kantian approach yields inconclusive results and is therefore ill-equipped to solve this particular moral problem.

This paper considers relatively long-term possibilities for the future relationship between humans and superintelligent robots (SRs). The great technological developments in fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics and computer science have made it quite likely that we will see the advent of SRs towards the end of this century (or somewhat later). If SRs have a higher moral and legal status than typical adult human beings based on their greater psychological capacities, then they should also be entitled to human rights. However, even though SRs might be entitled to stronger moral and legal rights for this reason, it might nonetheless be necessary to limit their (otherwise justified) claims to avoid causing human beings to become extinct or endangered. The paper provides an argument in support of SRs' claims to human rights but also warns about the socio-political, moral and legal implications of taking such a step.