Žmogus ir žodis / Man and the Word, 2004, t. 6, nr. 4: Filosofija

In Western culture, not only in philosophy, nonhuman animals are (were) treated as deficient subjects, as inferior being. Phenomenology, which declared itself as the attention to the experience, where concerned (in Husserl's latest texts this is very evident) about the subjectivity of animals. This change of the attitude toward animals is concomitant with the enlargement of the understanding of the transcendental subjectivity itself: the constitutive side of the subject is not the only one; not less important is the corporeal side. In our lived corporeal experience animals manifest themselves as transcendental subjectivities. We grasp their transcendental subjectivity through the empathy, which is possible because of intersubjectivity - our analogous corporeality and analogous corporeal comportment. Of course, animals are different from human being; Husserl called them - animal subjects, in sense of "different from me". But this marginal subjectivity isn't a poor subjectivity. Moreover they makes us understanding our own animality, they enables us to unclose new dimensions of ourselves, of our world. This phenomenological attitude allows us to speak about the experience of the animals without the reduction to our own experience, because we recognise in it the same style to live the world.

The aim of this article is to present the Waldenfels' concept of strangeness phenomenology. There is a try to answer to the following questions - how the strangeness could be understood, what kind of relation conditions needs to the stranger and what a strangeness thinking should be. The article begins with Husserl's paradox definition of strangeness and through critics of strangeness ontology author tries to define the alternative way of thinking - the topography of strangeness. Further is questioned the western concept of dialog, which is grounded of symmetric relation, and analyzed possibilities and character of the asymmetric dialog with the stranger. And at the end the author tries to answer to the question, what a character must be phenomenology which phenomena is on the border of phenomenness.

This paper presents a phenomenological study of aesthetic experience. The author focuses on three well known phenomenological authors: Ingarden, Merleau-Ponty and Dufrenne, reviews their works and introduces their research on aesthetic experience. The author tries to answer questions such as: What is the basic structure of aesthetic experience? What, if anything, is unique in aesthetic experience, making it incomparable to any other type of experience? The author shows that aesthetic perception happens before any analysis by the mind; therefore, everything that we find in aesthetic experience is given immediately. According to the account defended in this paper, aesthetic perception and experience are closely related to aesthetic objects, which, as aesthetic objects, exist only for the perceiver. As part of the analysis of this aspect of aesthetic experience, the author describes and explores the differences between a work of art and that work as an aesthetic object

The subject of the article is the concept of duty in Kantian morality and Nietzsche's philosophy. For Kant as well as for Nietzsche duty has the form of autonomous imperative. The article concentrates on two interpretations of duty as based upon reason's authority over inclinations and as irrational Will to Power. Nietzsche opposed Kant's intention to base our undifferential equality as moral agents on categorical imperative. To conceive of morality in universal terms is to disregard basic differences between individuals.

Susitikimas iš principo netematizuojamas. Tai reiškia, kad neįmanoma prasmingai kalbėti apie susitikimą. "Apie" diskursas kalbantįjį visuomet paverčia pasakotoju, t.y. "simetrijos ašimi", o patį pasakojimo turinį - simetriška situacija, kurioje vaidmenis galima sukeisti vietomis. [...].