In this article relationships between totalitarian propaganda in Lithuanian literature are analyzed from functional and symbolic perspectives. The emphasis is on critical, mimetic, mythographical, model and falsification function of propoganda evident in the official Lithuanian soviet literature from 1940 to 1953. Two types of propoganda are singled out in the article, the ideological and the pragmatic. Since Soviet propoganda emphasized in particular the pragmatic purposes of systematic persuasion, ideological beliefs and routine public propoganda were more important to writers and propagandists than creative thinking about the tasks of literature or the need to engage in persuasion. Most writers of the totalitarian period simply imitated the more effective rhetorical models or patterns and disguises, competing among themselves in matters of loyalty to the regime in power. In the case of Stalinist propoganda, mimesis had not only persuasive but first of all ritualistic puposes, akin to games played in accordance with very strict rules. At the same time, Soviet propagandists and litterateurs had be careful to remember what type of propoganda campaign was being waged by the party's official institutions, first of all by the party leader himself (Stalin), also the Central commitee of the Communist party and the Party Congress. Thus mimetic propoganda required that one followthree kinds of rules: ideological, campaign-relatedand creative. By contrast, genuinely autonomous literature follows only its own mimetic tradicions and seeks to perform its own inherent tasks. The creative function of Soviet propoganda literature can be defined by two different processes, persuasive mythography and artist creativity.[...].

The purpose of the article is to show the status of deliberative democracy and the conditions for its development in the period of mass propaganda, self-spectaclization, market media and production of information warfare. The paper does not discuss other contemporary political challenges for deliberative democracy, such as secret diplomacy, or politics of forcing to negotiation and recognition. These are very important questions, but the purpose is to considerate the communicative fields, arenas, scenes, related problems of the Real and simulations, propaganda and democracy. For us, important is how deliberative recognition differs from suggested understanding, or from the ideological interpellation, or from engineering of consent? The article highlights the attitude towards the importance of alternative narratives, and polymorphism of the development of deliberative democracy. Multiplication of differences creates a market advantage over a simple propaganda and counter-propaganda, and in the same time, supports development of scenes and imitations instead of supporting democratic arenas. Deliberative democracy is motivated to distinguish politics from the political arena, and simulations from the real alternatives. The article is guided by the situation of the changed status of the propaganda. Propaganda has turned from a mobilizing factor into a pejorative object, a critique which approves simulation of the real. Reasonable deliberation presumes some level of a participatory liberation. Technologies of participatory liberation are, for example, sending agitators, making provocative performances, detournement and creative rebuilding of political arenas. Participatory liberation could be based on the same issues as propaganda, it does not presuppose open, public deliberations. Scenes, the spectacles of the society need skills of consumption but not critical deliberation. [...]

The article presents a comparison of the functions of rhetoric, poetry, logic, propaganda and corresponding Soviet examples. The relationships between rhetoric, public and political lies are discussed. The article analyses the ontology of the lie and its cultural forms: falsifications, imitations, fabrication, etc. A dynamic proportion between public lie, truth, and critique is necessary for the development of the human being. Discussion of the changing proportion makes it possible to enlarge the conception of the “dialectics of enlightenment”, or the ideas of T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer. Different cultures of a lie, varieties of genres, opening of alternatives, and creation of a multiplicity of interests are necessary conditions for political lies. Another condition for a political lie is real publicity but not under the control of the party. The article maintains that a quasi-political lie characterises the Soviet Union, where the real politics exists only in the margins. Totalitarian imitations of truth and science did not leave room for creative lies, nor for their critique, or for the development of a social or humanities-orientated truth. For the analysis of Soviet quasi-political rhetoric, three models were used: Stalinist ecstatic conspirology, N. Khrushchev’s instrumental milinarism of everyday life, and L. Brezhnev’s ritual formalism. Special attention is paid to the Soviet circular and to the nomenclature’s phenomenon of double-speaking. “Soviets” – or councils, were chosen as the main example of the rhetoric of the lie. It is maintained that Bolshevik’s or Leninist soviets and the title “Soviet” Union falsified the content and seeking of councils. The article juxtaposes early workers’ understanding of the functions of the soviet as an autonomous institution of self-government and direct actions, and the development of their skills and experiences. [...]