The article seeks to touch upon the following problematic issues. The analysis of the treatment of a person’s idea in phenomenology raises several critical issues. Does phenomenological personalism have a clear reason to recognise essential differences predetermining the characteristics of person’s analysis? Why a “person-I” can not be equated with another “person-I”? What should it mean that, in phenomenology, a “person-I” is not a direct given characteristic of one’s nature, but owns an intellectual autonomous essence that allows to make a difference between oneself as a physical given and oneself as a “subject-I”? What are the key characteristics of the “subject-I”? And what is the supreme level of a person where a person shall act as a subject? May the module of the human dimension required by phenomenological personalism be just an elementary abstraction, unable to study in depth instinctual behaviours, the acquired habits, or the history of experiences which may be forgotten at one point, but remain relatively hidden in the “life-I” or the structure of a human person? Driven by the motive to identify the problem of the treatment of person in phenomenology, we find the related issues analysed by Husserl himself and the presented answers. More specifically, the idea of person in Husserl’s analysis is based on the impossibility of a discourse on person to be based on natural sciences whose objects of research are things, while whatever is related to the “own property” (propria proprietà) of a human being and untouched by anybody, is not reduced to a thing: instead, the sense of embodiment is constituted, or, in phenomenology, a “lived body”. From the obvious moment when the exclusivity of the human “individual being” is observed which defines his personality, his character, etc., as argued by Husserl, “It would be a total absurd to hope that the studies by means of an experimental psychophysical methodology of human being’s versatile involuntary perceptions and internal experiences, such as remembrance, righteousness, will, etc., and providing their factual-conceptual evaluation, could win the pride of scientific value”. The said argument disclosed a fact for contemporary psychology that it had been following a naturalistic methodology, and it was just by not ignoring a “natural” phenomenological analysis as an alternative to the said method and by looking for the “essence of essences” that it could overcome the psycho-physical determinism and to approach the individual “being” (individuelles Sein) of the mental dimension of an individual. 

Straipsnyje analizuojama žmogiškojo asmens struktūra Edith Stein filosofijoje. Pristatomos mąstytojos personalistinio ir antropologinio mąstymo įžvalgos. Akcentuojama fenomenologinio metodo reikšmė, apibrėžiant žmogiškąjį asmenį (apimant klasikinę jo struktūrą: kūną, sielą ir dvasią). Gilinamasi, ar, taikant šį metodą, asmens struktūra yra atpažįstama. Analizuojama, kokiu būdu prasmingai išgyvenama žmogiškoji patirtis apie žmogiškąjį asmenį.