Religijos filosofija ir filosofinė praktika
| Author | Affiliation | |
|---|---|---|
LT |
| Date | Issue | Start Page | End Page |
|---|---|---|---|
2010 | 35(63) | 59 | 69 |
Du pagrindiniai žmogiškosios egzistencijos ramsčiai – religija ir filosofija, visada buvo ir tikriausiai liks esminės praktikos, kurios, viena vertus, struktūruoja, nuskaidrina svarbiausius ir apibrėžti galimus kontūrus, kita vertus, leidžia tuos kontūrus atšaukti, nutrinti ir ieškoti jų iš naujo. Religijos filosofija yra ypatingas diskursas ne tik todėl, kad jos „objektas“, jeigu jį suprasime kaip religinės praktikos turinį, nuolatos slepiasi, nepasiduoda objektyvavimo veiksmui, bet dar ir todėl, kad pati filosofija vien kaip diskursyvinė praktika nėra pati sau pakankama. Filosofijos istorijoje galima aptikti išsikristalizavusią tikrai ne vieną galimą religijos ir filosofijos santykio konfigūraciją: nuo absoliutaus bet kokio bendrumo neigimo iki visiško jų sutapatinimo, tačiau pats tas santykis visuomet išlieka probleminis.
The essential task of the philosophy of religion contains two main assumptions: it has to express an inexpressible content of religion and to avoid stagnation of philosophical discourse. Is it possible to retain religious consciousness in abstract and discursive philosophical thinking? It seems that we can do nothing to preserve religious content, but how; in this case, we are still able to speak about religion? Some traditions of philosophical conceptualizations of religion are crystallized in the history of philosophy, but their answers are often inadequate because there are too many terms and so little vitality in these explanations. As a pleasant exception in these traditions are the writings of the following philosophers: Blaise Pascal, Friedrich Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, Jacques Derrida and many others, who tried to avoid stagnation of philosophical thinking. The philosophy of religion appears as paradoxical thinking. On the one hand, a philosopher tries to express his understanding of religion in philosophical way by developing discursive structures. On the other hand, he tries to deconstruct, gives no pretensions for these structures and, therefore, tries to eliminate them. It seems as a kind of mental equilibration – self-destruction, which contains not only negative, but also positive aspects. The negative aspect could be understood as a potential “death” of thinking since philosophical thought cannot rise from the ruins of thinking. In such a way, philosophical discourse, as well as religious engagement, becomes impossible because the destroyed human soul cannot engage in anything. Then, what is a positive side of self-destruction? It can be described as a satisfied human position of no-self; a human has to think in the face of failure. Only such state of thinking could be called the practice of thinking or πράξις νοερά.[...].