Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12259/34359
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMotiekaitis, Ramunas
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-25T07:43:50Z
dc.date.available2017-04-25T07:43:50Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn2345-0223
dc.identifier.urihttps://eltalpykla.vdu.lt/1/34359
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1515/ijas-2015-0004
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12259/34359-
dc.description.abstractIn this article, invoking some terms of phenomenology and general principles of structural semiotics, I critically examine and reveal some aporetic aspects of Nishitani’s interpretation of Buddhist concept of sūnyatā presented in his seminal work Religion and Nothingness. My critics are directed to deeply ingrained claims among scholars of a “rejection of any form of dualism” and “non-substantial philosophy” as unique characteristics of the Kyoto school or “logic of the East”. My arguments are based on examining how linguistic differentiating articulation and narrative rendering that perform a fundamental role in human cognition are at work in definition of “emptiness” (sūnyatā) too. Thus emptiness is not completely empty; being certain philosophical identity it can be articulated only by differentiation from other identities, and thus different is included in it. Nishitani needed logocentric modes of thought, as a dialectical (m)other for constructing his sūnyatā ontology. Accordingly, the realms that are considered to be secondary or derivative (i.e. sensual and rational, or linguistic representations) appear to be the condition for constituting the primary (suchness of things, sūnyatā). Considering universal mechanisms of the articulation of values I am also asking whether sūnyatā paradigm indeed is so fundamentally different from Western paradigms centered on idea, God, or a rational subject as Nishitani wants to think. Since we find a clear hierarchical differentiation into truth and illusion, authentic and inauthentic modes of thought and time, and initial and derivative ontological realms, features of “strong thought” (in sense of Vattimo) are evident in his work. I am also suggesting, that possibly by considering not sūnyatā or “idea” but human languages as a universal “house of being”, we would be able to “empty” discourses of radical difference and uniqueness, and in this way become post-nationalistically modern. Philosophy, in order not to turn into a onesided ideology, should reflect on its mythological and narratological conditions, i.e. dances on certain semiotic axes. From such a perspective, the gravitational trajectory of human thought, longing for conjunction with the absolute, defined either as God or as sūnyatā, will seem similar rather than different.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational journal of areas studies, 2015, vol. 10, iss. 1, 69-83en_US
dc.rightsLaisvai prieinamas internete (DE GRUYTER OPEN)lt_LT
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.subjectSemioticsen_US
dc.subjectBuddhismen_US
dc.subjectŚūnyatāen_US
dc.subjectDifferentiationen_US
dc.subjectDialecticsen_US
dc.subjectIntentionalityen_US
dc.titleEmptying Śūnyatā: a critical reading of nishitani’s religion and nothingnessen_US
dc.typeStraipsnis / Article
dc.subject.udc2 Religija / Religion
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
item.grantfulltextopen-
Appears in Collections:International Journal of Area Studies 2015, vol. 10, iss. 1
Files in This Item:
Show simple item record
Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats
Export to Other Non-XML Formats


CORE Recommender

Page view(s)

20
checked on Jun 6, 2021

Download(s)

80
checked on Jun 6, 2021

Google ScholarTM

Check


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons