Valia Tomo Akviniečio kūrinyje "Apie Tiesą" ("De Veritate" Q. 22 aa. 1-7)

Abstract

Straipsnio tikslas – gilintis į Tomo Akviniečio filosofiją, kurioje yra analizuojamas ir žmogiškosios valios klausimas, išdėstytas jo kūrinyje “De Veritate”. Straipsnyje tiriamos autoriaus teksto ištraukos, aktualios norint suvokti visuminę žmogaus sampratą. Remiantis klasikine filosofija, nuosekliai tiriama pamatinė praktinė žmogaus galia, tai yra gėrio siekis. Aristotelio ir Akviniečio pozicija nurodo svarbų visuotinį tikslo principą. Straipsnyje yra perteikiamos Tomo Akviniečio įžvalgos laisvos valios, gėrio, žmogaus kilnumo ir atsakomybės klausimais

The aim of this article is to analyse the main texts of Thomas Aquinas on human will, from his work "De Veritate". Infact, all the Question 22 of this book is dedicated to the themes of will. In this article the attention is concentrated from the first untill the seventh part of the Question 22, that is entitled as "De appetitu boni", because Aquinas analyses here the seeking of good as a practical capacity of a human beeing. The major terms are presented at the beginning, in order to introduce the reader in the sphere of human will. „Appetite“ – this term is broadly used in the scholastic language and it means a seeking, a desire, an inclination of all that exists towards the ultimate purpose, towards good. The theory of appetite comes from Aristote. Aquinas proposes such a deffinition: "appetitus nihil aliud est quam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid" (I–II q.8 a.1). According to Aquinas, appetite is manifested in three different manners: a natural, a sensitive and a rational one, because each form has its own inclination ("quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio"). The „good“ is inquired in metaphysics and in ethics: metaphysics underlines the good as a transcendental quality of being; being ethics underlines the good as the aim of inclination. The „will“ (lat. "voluntas") is capability of human beeing to reach the purposes and realise them […]