Dalyvavimo principas Platono ir Aristotelio filosofijoje : ontologinis aspektas ir analogijos iškilimas
Author | Affiliation | |
---|---|---|
LT |
Date | Issue | Start Page | End Page |
---|---|---|---|
2013 | 48(76) | 47 | 63 |
Straipsnyje aptariama „dalyvavimo“ sąvokos kilmė, šios sąvokos vaidmuo Platono filosofijoje ir aristoteliška jos interpretacija, pabrėžiant ontologinį dalyvavimo sampratos aspektą, atveriantį iki mūsų dienų filosofijoje besitęsiančius ginčus dėl analogijos sampratos.
The article aims at the analysis of the notion of participation which is considered the main principle of unity of the universe in Platonic thought. The notion of participation (methexis), according to the Aristotelian tradition, is commonly hold to be of mathematic origin, meaning commensurability or proportion (analogy). The bond between participation and imitation (mimēsis) also allows seeing the origin of both notions in theatrical practice of Ancient Greece, with which Plato was closely affiliated. In Platonic philosophy the participation connects two levels of reality – that of an idea and that of a phenomenon. In the visible world a phenomenon or an appearance takes the place of an idea both from the ontological point of view – having its being (that it is) and essence (what it is) as participated in the being of an idea, whose essence actually is the essence and identity of a thing, and from the epistemological point of view – being knowable only because of its relationship with an idea. Both aspects are presented in the well known image of the “Platonic triangle” in the dialogue Phaedrus. In the article the ontological aspect of this relation is investigated. The history of philosophy knows the issue of participation mainly from Aristotle’s critique, presented in his Metaphysics. In this view participation is merely a synonym of imitation, used by Plato to express how we are able to give to a particular thing a common concept or a definition which at ones unites it with the similar things and separates it from the different ones. So, an “idea” in which a thing participates is merely a common concept and not a “separate” reality in the world. [...]