| Abstract: | Pagal Europos Sąjungos sutarties 5 straipsnį subsidiarumo principas reiškia, kad tose srityse, kurios nepriklauso Sąjungos išimtinei kompetencijai, ji ima veikti tik tada ir tik tokiu mastu, kai valstybės narės numatomo veiksmo tikslų negali deramai pasiekti centriniu, regioniniu ir vietiniu lygiu, o Sąjungos lygiu dėl numatomo veiksmo masto arba poveikio juos pasiekti būtų geriau. Sąjungos institucijos subsidiarumo principą taiko pagal Protokolą dėl subsidiarumo ir proporcingumo principų taikymo. Nacionaliniai parlamentai tame protokole nustatyta tvarka užtikrina, kad būtų laikomasi subsidiarumo principo. Lisabonos sutartimi buvo įvestos kelios naujovės, kurios stiprina nacionalinių parlamentų vaidmenį kontroliuojant subsidiarumo principo laikymąsį. Sutartyje numatyti du mechanizmai – vadinamosios „geltonoji“ ir „oranžinė kortelės“, kurių taikymas priklauso nuo pagrįstų nuomonių, kuriose daroma išvada, jog pasiūlymas pažeidžia subsidiarumo principą, skaičiaus. Pagal abu mechanizmus teisės akto projektas persvarstomas ir gali būti keičiamas arba atsiimamas. Šiuo darbu siekiama išnagrinėti de jure suteiktas galias nacionaliniams parlamentams ir įvertinti, ar jie de facto užtikrina subsidiarumo principo taikymą Europos Sąjungoje. Darbe, visų pirma, aptariami subsidiarumo principo taikymo užtikrinimo kriterijai, kurių visumai esant galima teigti, kad principas yra užtikrinamas. Toliau, išanalizavus esamą reglamentavimą, kuriuo nacionaliniams parlamentams suteikta kompetencija užtikrinti subsidiarumo principo taikymą, įvertinama ar parlamentai tinkamai naudojasi šia savo kompetencija ir ar esamas teisinis reguliavimas yra pakankamas, norint tinkamai užtikrinti subsidiarumo principo taikymą. Iškelta hipotezė, kad nacionaliniai parlamentai de facto neužtikrina subsidiarumo principo taikymo Europos Sąjungoje – pasitvirtino.
European Union law has a huge impact on Member States. In different areas, with the exception of those belonging to the European Union under the exclusive competence of the subsidiarity principle is intended not only to preserve the right of Member States to make decisions and take action, but also to legitimize the actions of the Union, if the projected scale and effects Member States can not achieve its goals. So, this principle has been included to the treaties of European to ensure that the powers are exercised as much as possible closer to the citizens. Therefore, the national parliaments in ensuring compliance with this principle, act like a fuse, protecting national sovereignty and the interests of citizens and reducing the democratic deficit in the European Union. The principle of subsidiarity was formally enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, where was decided to include this principle in Treaty establishing the European Community. European Community Treaty was supplemented by Protocol (No. 2) of subsidiarity and proportionality by Treaty of Amsterdam. According to the European Union Treaty, Article 5 paragraph 3 and Artictle 12 part B, national parliaments, using procedures set in Protocol (No. 2), ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. Under this procedure, the national parliaments or any national parliamentary chambers within eight weeks from the date of the draft legislation is submitted can send a reasoned opinion to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission stating why it considers that a particular project does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The subsidiarity control mechanism introduced by this Treaty enhances the role of national parliaments – now they can assess whether draft of legislative proposals match with the principle of subsidiarity. The Treaty provides two mechanisms – the so called “yellow” and “orange cards”. The application of those cards depends on number of the reasoned opinions, stating that the proposal violates the principle of subsidiarity. Under both mechanisms draft of legislative proposal should be reviewed and may be amended or withdrawn. According to the Protocol (No. 2) of subsidiarity and proportionality Article 8, the European Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of a legislative act. Member states can make a claim in accordance with the Article 230 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Furthermore, to facilitate the effective monitoring of the principle of subsidiarity, the national parliaments are encouraged to participate in information changes of legislation drafts and their compliance with the principle. The aim of this paper is to analyse the de jure powers granted to the national parliaments and to assess whether they de facto ensure the application of the principe of subsidiarity in the European Union. In ths paper, primarily, are discussed the criteria of the assurance of the principe of subsidiarity. Compliance with these criteria would mean that the subsidiarity principle is guaranteed. Further, this work provides analysis of the current regulation, which gives competence to the national parliaments to ensure the application of the principle of subsidiarity. After that, determining whether parliaments properly use their competence and whether the existing legal regulation is sufficient to ensure the proper application of the principle. The hypothesis, that the national parliaments de facto does not ensure the application of the principe of subsidiarity in European Union – has been confirmed. After study, there has been raised these subsidiarity assurance criteria: testing of performance, supervision, monitoring, evaluation (legal aspects), the ability to use force (to impose sanctions) and party (national parliament) activity in control. The early warning mechanism, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is the most prominent instrument in increasing influence of parliaments in ensuring the principe of subsidiarity. These instruments are: • National parliaments or any national parliamentary chambers within eight weeks from the date of the draft legislation is submitted can send a reasoned opinion to the European Union legislator stating why it considers that a particular project does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. • If one third or more of the total votes indicate a breach of subsidiarity through reasoned opinions, the so-called ‘yellow card procedure’ becomes effective. Then, the author of the draft legislative act needs to reconsider the proposal and provide renewed reasoning in the case that the proposal is sustained. • Within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure, a majority of votes by national parliaments on the breach of subsidiarity will trigger an ‘orange card procedure’. In this case, the sponsor of the draft legislative act has to renew its reasoning and a simple majority in either the European Parliament or the Council of Ministers suffices to reject the proposal. This work establishes that the national parliaments improperly use its competence in the ensuring the application of the principle of subsidiarity for the following reasons: • National parliaments participating in the ex ante control of the principe of subsidiarity are inactive. There is a large difference among member states of the reasoned opinions amounts. Furthermore, the 8 week deadline for the reasoned opinion is too short. • The parliaments has a different view on how should be understood and applied the principle of subsidiarity. Many parliaments justify their opinion in much broader view than the Protocol (No. 2) provides. They interpret the principle of subsidiarity in a political, not a legal point of view. It should be noted that this broader verification of the principle is not compatible with the designated function of parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty. • Limits of \"yellow card\" for the entire period from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has been achieved only twice. And both - unsuccessful. The Commission did not find that the law violates the subsidiarity principle. • Limits of “orange card” has not yet been reached. The existing legal regulation is not sufficient to ensure the proper application of the principle of subsidiarity, for the following reasons: • If limits of \"yellow” or “orange card” are reached, European Union legislator still has the discretion to decide for himself whether the principle of subsidiarity was really violated. So, the national parliaments, is only advisory in nature, they have no binding force. • There is no \"red card\" instrument, so there is no possibility to veto the European Union act. Parliaments do not have any significant power that could influence the legislation. • National parliaments are powerless to make an action in European Court of Justice themselves, if they consider that the existing European Union law violates the principe of subsidiarity. That makes member states, not national parliaments. |
