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Type of publication: Straipsnis recenzuojamoje užsienio tarptautinės konferencijos medžiagoje / Article in peer-reviewed foreign international conference proceedings (P1d)
Field of Science: Filosofija / Philosophy (H001)
Author(s): Budrytė, Edita
Title: The debate about the criterion of truth in the analytic aesthetics
Is part of: Revisions of modern aesthetics [elektroninis išteklius] : international scientific conference : proceedings : 26 - 28 June 2015, [Belgrade, Serbia] / edited by Miško Šuvaković, Vladimir Mako, Vladimir Stevanović. Belgrade : University of Belgrade – Faculty of architecture ; Society for aesthetics of architecture and visual arts Serbia (DEAVUS), 2015
Extent: p. 316-324
Date: 2015
Keywords: Critical pluralism;Critical monism;Interpretation;Criterion of truth;Work of art
ISBN: 9788679241443
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to explore the possibility of applying the criterion of truth in the critical pluralism. In the paper a question is being raised whether it is possible to reconcile the application of the truth criterion with the beliefs of critical pluralism? Critical pluralism claims that there may be more than one acceptable interpretation of the same work of art. Bivalent logic can be changed by many-valued model on the basis of which the interpretations would be seen as plausible, reasonable, valid, etc. rather than as true or false. However, a number of representatives of analytic aesthetics who wish to preserve the concept of the correct interpretation within critical pluralism are against this. We may conclude that all of these theoretical disputes arise because the nature of interpretation object and interpretation objectives are understood differently. Also there is still an unresolved question whether the interpretation objects have properties that are independent of interpretation. According to a constructivism approach, interpretation creates a new object or modifies its properties because the interpretation objects (especially if we speak about works of art) do not have a fixed nature. The advocates of the truth criterion argue that such an approach eliminates the identity of the work of art. In this case, there is no basis for the evaluation of interpretations, and there is the risk of falling into “anything goes” position. Therefore, the application of the truth criterion to evaluate the interpretations of works of art face major theoretical and practical challenges that will hardly ever be completely solved
Affiliation(s): Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas
Švietimo akademija
Appears in Collections:Universiteto mokslo publikacijos / University Research Publications

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