Lietuva Švedijos Baltijos politikoje 1917–1991 m. : nuo pripažinimo iki jo atnaujinimo : monografija
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2024 |
Monografijos tikslas yra išnagrinėti Lietuvos vaidmenį ir Lietuvos specifinių politinių problemų įtaką Švedijos Baltijos politikoje 1917–1991 m. Lietuvos veiksnys Švedijos politikoje Baltijos šalių atžvilgiu analizuojamas pasitelkiant intersubjektyvią dvišalių santykių perspektyvą, tiriami abiejų pusių - tiek Švedijos, tiek ir Lietuvos užsienio politikos ir diplomatijos - subjektyvūs požiūriai ir vertinimai, labiau išryškinant švediškąją perspektyvą. Monografijoje parodomi Švedijos siekiai palaikyti Baltijos valstybes, tačiau taip pat baimės ir abejonės, svyravimai tarp palankumo ir atsiribojimo Lietuvos atžvilgiu laikotarpiu tarp dviejų imperijų (carinės ir sovietinės) žlugimo. Tyrimui panaudota daug gausios iki šiol mokslinėje literatūroje nenaudotos Švedijos archyvų medžiagos.
The 20th century presented Sweden with increased chances to leave a notable impact on international politics. However, its role in establishing conditions for stability in the Eastern Baltic was considerably constrained. Up until 1992, Swedish foreign policy was characterised by a minimalistic and episodic regional solidarity, with a realist-egoist prioritisation of security interests. The independence of Lithuania, along with that of the other Baltic States, was recognised de jure by Sweden in 1921 following the collapse of the Tsarist Russian Empire. Geopolitical security interests and various factors played a significant role in this recognition. However, the principle of national self-determination, consistently championed by some social democrats, particularly their leader Hjalmar Branting, was also influential. Sweden, considering its limitations in resources and power, refrained from making commitments to support and strengthen the Baltic States during the ongoing great power competition in interwar Europe. As a result, Sweden declined to engage in substantial political cooperation with the Baltic States or to form a common union of states (the Scandinavian-Baltic bloc). Such commitments seemed too risky in the 1920s, given the potential threats from a resurgent Russian power and the already proven neutrality posture. Nevertheless, Sweden developed a keen interest in the independent Finland in the 1920s, viewing it as the most significant of the so-called Randstaat states. Strategists of Swedish foreign policy believed that Finnish independence could be maintained primarily if Finland refrained from forming an alliance with the Baltic countries, especially Poland. In the 1920s, both Swedish and Lithuanian positions aligned on Poland’s alliance with the other Baltic States, although for different reasons. The most serious attempt to form a union between Poland and Estonia, Latvia, and Finland—the Warsaw Treaty of 1922—was thwarted by a coordinated Swedish-Lithuanian diplomatic effort when the Finnish Parliament refused to ratify the treaty. During the 1920s, Swedish diplomacy, albeit inconsistently, began to support the idea of the so-called ‘Little Baltic Union’ (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) excluding Finland. This approach was somewhat advantageous for Lithuania, though not an optimal security option for the Eastern Baltic. Swedish foreign policy leaders were aware of this and distanced themselves from taking any definite position on the Baltic Union, instead focusing on the development of bilateral economic and cultural ties in the late 1920s. On the Vilnius and Klaipėda issues, Sweden actively engaged in the affairs of the League of Nations as a member and a participant in the Council of League. Concerning the Vilnius issue, the people of Sweden expressed moral support, but practical assistance was limited. Notably, substantial diplomatic support from Sweden to Lithuania materialised through the recognition of Lithuania’s control over the Klaipėda region and the rejection of Polish claims to exert influence over its administration or port management. The development of relations between Lithuania and Sweden was adversely affected, though not officially evident, by the assessments of the autocratic regime implemented in Lithuania after December 17, 1926. Swedish diplomats, particularly critical of A. Voldemaras’ domestic and foreign policies from 1927 to 1929, contributed to this negative influence. From 1930 onward, some signs of stabilisation within the regime were observed, accompanied by the adoption of a more moderate domestic and foreign policy. However, the reliance of the authoritarian regime on the military was consistently identified as its primary weakness.[...]
Recenzentai: prof. dr. Šarūnas Liekis (Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas); prof. dr. Vygantas Vareikis (Klaipėdos universitetas)
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2024-04-24 | 2024-04-24 | Prezidento Valdo Adamkaus biblioteka-muziejus (S. Daukanto g. 25, Kaunas) | LT |