| Abstract: | Prejudicinio sprendimo procedūra reikšminga, nes jungia valstybių narių nacionalinius teismus kartu su ESTT. Iš esmės ši priemonė skirta tam, kad būtų užtikrintas vienodas ES teisės aiškinimas ir taikymas.
SESV 267 straipsnyje nurodyta, kad teismai, kurių sprendimas toliau nebegali būti skundžiamas, turi kreiptis dėl prejudicinio sprendimo. Todėl darytina išvada, kad galutinės instancijos teismai turi ne tik teisę, bet ir pareigą, iškilus klausimui kreiptis į ESTT. Pasitaiko atvejų, kai šalių pateikti prašymai, bylą nagrinėjusio teismo, būna netenkinami ir atmetami. Todėl kyla klausimas, jei prašymą kreiptis dėl prejudicinio sprendimo atmeta galutinės instancijos teismas, kuris pagal SESV 267 straipsnį privalo jį pateikti ESTT, ar nėra pažeidžiama SESV 267 straipsnis kartu su ES teise.
Baigiamojo darbo tikslas yra nustatyti, ar nėra pažeidžiama ES teisė, kai nacionaliniai galutinės instancijos teismai atsisako kreiptis dėl prejudicinio sprendimo.
Teorinėje šio darbo dalyje yra formuojami nesikreipimo pagrindai, kuriems esant, galutinės instancijos teismas gali atsisakyti kreiptis dėl prejudicinio sprendimo, nepažeidžiant SESV 267 straipsnio. Tiriamoji darbo dalis yra skirta nustatyti, ar nacionaliniai galutinės instancijos teismai LR naudojasi atsisakymo kreiptis dėl prejudicinio sprendimo išlygomis, ar taiko jas teisingai ir kokia apimtimi. Taip pat, siekiama palyginti atsisakymo pagrindus, naudojamus bylų sprendimuose, kartu su teorinėje dalyje suformuotais pagrindais.
Atlikus tyrimą, prieita išvados, kad ESTT yra suformavęs išlygas, kuriomis remiantis, nacionalinis galutinės instancijos teismas gali atsisakyti kreiptis dėl prejudicinio sprendimo, todėl minėtų teismų pareiga numatyta SESV 267 straipsnyje nėra absoliuti, tačiau vertinant tiek LAT, tiek LVAT bylų sprendimus, galima teigti, kad teismai dalinai pažeidžia ES teisę, atsisakydami kreiptis dėl prejudicinio sprendimo.
The mechanism for a preliminary ruling is inseparable from the legal order of the European Union. This procedure is particularly important as it brings together the national courts of the Member States with the Court of Justice of the European Union. In essence, this measure is designed to ensure a uniform interpretation and application of EU law. Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that the courts whose decision may no longer be subject to appeal must make a reference for a preliminary ruling. It must therefore be concluded that courts of last instance have not only the right but also the obligation to refer the matter to the CJEU in the event of a question. There are cases where the applications submitted by the parties are not satisfied and rejected by the court hearing the case. The question therefore arises if the reference for a preliminary ruling is rejected by the court of last instance, which, under Article 267 TFEU, is required to submit it to the CJEU is there a breach of Article 267 TFEU in conjunction with EU law. The purpose of the final work is to establish whether there is a breach of EU law when national courts of last instance refuse to make a reference for a preliminary ruling. In view of the purpose of the work, the hypothesis is that the Court of Justice of the European Union has established certain cases on the basis of which the court of last instance may refuse to make a reference for a preliminary ruling, so that Lithuanian Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania do not infringe EU law by refusing to refer the CJEU for the interpretation or application of EU law. In order to verify the hypothesis raised, the theoretical part of that work forms grounds for non-recourse, in which the court of last instance may refuse to make a reference for a preliminary ruling, without prejudice to Article 267 TFEU. The aim is also to compare the grounds of refusal used in case-court decisions, together with the grounds formed in the theoretical part. The theoretical part of the work provides that the obligation laid down in Article 267 TFEU for the courts which the decision can not continue to be challenged, to make a reference for a preliminary ruling, is not absolute. An analysis of judgments and other sources of law in the CJEU shows that the CJEU has established cases in which the court of last instance may refuse to make a reference for a preliminary ruling. Exceptional cases: (1) Acte Clair Doctrine; 2) Acte éclairé doctrine; 3) If the questions are hypothetical or irrelevant to the case and do not affect the outcome of the dispute. The third case can be divided into more detailed cases, that is: (a) The question is hypothetical, advisory (there is no dispute); (b) The matter is irrelevant to the case and will not be relevant to the settlement of the dispute; (c) The case is not subject to EU legislation; (d) The question concerns the assessment of the factual data. 4 In the study part of the work, the analysis of the judgments of the Lithuanian Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania concluded, that the courts actively benefit from the reservations not to be addressed to the CJEU. This is supported by the fact that a total of 30 requests for a preliminary ruling were refused between 2018 and 2019 and only nine times the Lithuanian Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania brought an interpretation to the CJEU. The analysis of decisions refusing to apply to the CJEU has shown that the judgments analyzed do not always comply with and violate EU law. In the light of the judgments in cases which have applied the Acte Clair doctrine, it must be concluded that EU law and Article 267 TFEU are infringed, since the application of that doctrine in cases is superficial and the conditions for the application of the doctrine have not been fulfilled. Further analysis of the specificities of the application of the Acte éclairé doctrine in cases has shown that EU law is not infringed in this case, since the refusal of Lithuanian Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania to make a reference for a preliminary ruling is based on the judgments of the CJEU, which are directly referred to in the case and more or less but in response to the questions raised in the case, but it is clear that courts of final instance are more likely not to refer themselves to the CJEU. In cases where questions are irrelevant to a case or case not covered by EU law, the courts of Lithuanian Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania have made use of it, but the decisions do not always fully explain why the question referred for a preliminary ruling is irrelevant to the case or why the case does not use the EU legislation for which interpretation is sought. Consequently, those decisions which are not detailed call into question whether the courts have sufficiently penetrated the substance of the case, the facts and the legal problems which might indicate that European Union law is in breach of European Union law when it adopts its decision. Moreover, there are judgments in which the courts refuse to make a reference for a preliminary ruling, citing grounds for refusal which do not relate to the grounds for non-recourse put in place by the CJEU, which allow the refusal to make an application for an interpretation of EU law. In those circumstances and such judgments, it may be found that EU law is infringed and that the obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling provided in Article 267 TFEU is not respected. Finally, the investigation suggests that the hypothesis raised at the beginning of the work has been partially confirmed. It is concluded that the CJEU has entered into reservations on the basis of which a national court of last instance may refuse to make a reference for a preliminary ruling, so that the obligation imposed by those courts under Article 267 TFEU is not absolute, but it can be concluded from the assessment of the judgments in Lithuanian Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania cases that the courts partially infringe EU law by refusing to make a reference for a preliminary ruling. |
