Dislocating Globality

*Deterritorialization, Difference and Resistance*

*Edited by*

Šarūnas Paunksnis

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CHAPTER 13

Composite Monoculturalism in the Era of the Distribution of the New Global Imaginary

Gintautas Mažeikis

Abstract

This chapter is devoted to the following questions: what is a composite monoculture? How does it form structures and order things? What sort of new composite human do these structures and orders produce? The composite monoculture controls schemes of thinking and processes of desire through a super-marketization of society and the creation of a symbolically centralized democracy – how is this achieved? These questions are based on the presumption that production, distribution, and consumption are schematized practices of thinking, which form a system of persuasion; therefore, the article considers not only material, but also ideational products. With this in mind, the concept of production is separated into the following categories: universal, mass, monopolizing, totalitarian, global, and composite monocultural components. The concept of monoculturality signals a kind of production independent of the traditional capitalist production monopolists, small businesses, and state economies. Monoculturality concerns not only goods, but also demands, desires, and ideas; it makes unities of human beings. The article seeks to explain why people choose and trust symbols, names, pictures, and theories common to many countries, institutions, and groups, and why they like to be monads that eschew swarms of qualities. Monoculturality is considered a subaltern form that can be interpreted similarly to concepts such as Herbert Marcuse's one-dimensional man, Guy Debord's society of the spectacle, Jean Baudrillard's simulacra, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's desiring machines, and the global imaginary as theorized by Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay. Super-marketization is interpreted as the main principle for moulding life into a monoculture. It produces deserts of culture by spreading the same names, symbols, goods, and orders into large territories, which produces an illusion of diversity that hides the monoculturality lying at core of contemporary thinking and behaviour. However, anthropologists and new critical nomads see the diversity for what it is – an illusion – and see the potentially disastrous results of the growth of a composite monoculture and its super-marketization. These anthropologists and nomads seek to build new structures for understanding the world. This article underscores the importance of obscurity, self-othering, transgression, and creative disruptions as key means for providing unique cultural and life niches. The main thesis
here is that the dialectic of host-and-guest in the deinstitutionalized process of open organizations and through the dynamics of creative groups can help to resist the tendencies borne of monoculturality.

**Keywords**


1 **Monoculture in the Global Imaginary**

Monoculture is industrial principle of the contemporary imaginary that leads people around the globe to produce, distribute, and consume the same idols, symbols, names, and visuals. The global imaginary as a feature of contemporary ideology is produced and supplemented by similarly ordered practices of thinking, i.e. using the same schemes, names, quotes, and pictures that are produced and reproduced by many creative industries, universities, and other ‘cognitive’ companies. The concept of monoculture was first developed in the agricultural sphere as an economic solution to an ecological problem, without reference to ideas and practices of thinking. However, the critique of banana republics and the development of ecological research raised the problem of subaltern thinking as a challenge to monoculturality. Later the concept of monoculture was used in critical theories and inquiry as characteristic of contemporary consumer society and the cognitive state of the general human population.

I separate the concept of monoculture from a number of similarly titled ones. Marxist critics of monopolistic production (transnational monopolies) have focused on the conjunction between state power, great corporate interests, and the role ideologies play in supporting the hegemony of state-monopolistic capitalism. They interpret colonialism and symbolical (i.e. cultural) systems as expressions of the growth of national and transnational capital, and, in the end, as monopolistic and corporate imperialism. Prominent names associated with this Marxist angle include: Vladimir Lenin, Antonio Negri, David Harvey, Giovanni Arrighi, Ellen Wood, and Alex Callinicos.\(^1\) Lenin

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was deeply reductionist in his Marxist approach to the antagonistic relations of productive forces and productive relations and their influence on the unification of monopoly power and the state as a precondition of socialist revolution. Callinicos and others considered imperialism to be a network of elements such as political skill and flexible power. The first Marxist theories, including Lenin's understanding of class revolution and class consciousness, privileged control of monopolies over the complete destruction of mass production. In fact, they considered state monopolies and mass production, as well as the liberation of workers' time, to be the most effective and affordable means for achieving socialist goals. They largely ignored the possible uses of that free time and in general what such free time in a society of mass production might mean. Early Marxists and Leninists did not consider mass production and consumption to be core elements in understanding mass society, imperialism, and socioeconomic dependence. In contrast, liberal critics of mass society and mass production (e.g. Elias Canetti, Friedrich A. von Hayek, Karl Popper\(^2\)) paid special attention to the influence of industrial mass production on people's behaviour and thinking, particularly looking at the rise of new crowds and the power of crowd demands. They found that monopolistic production under control of mass-parties helps to organize authoritarian power, strengthen a regime's control, and generally promote totalitarian society. Their main examples are Nazi fascist and Soviet communist ideologies. In contrast to the critics of empires and masses, representatives of Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School, as well as the International Situationists, emphasized distinctly different elements. These theorists, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Guy Debord,\(^3\) argue that the growth of individualism, alienation, and the becoming-spectacle of society do not help liberate creative diversity; instead, they construct a one-dimensional society and seek control through the power of spectacle(s) and the distribution of images. Though similar to the take on monoculturality I will emphasize here, their arguments give less consideration (than mine) to the role of industrial compositions in the development of mass consumption, related leisure time,

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and the role of monoculturization in the cognitive spheres. The concept of monoculturality pursued here places particular emphasis on universities in the time of the global imaginary.

I am using the concept of a global imaginary similarly to how Mukhopadhyay considers globalization as an aggressive institutional imaginary: “globalization is also an imaginary that ferments people’s imagination.”4 I use the concept of fermentation of people's imagination in another way: as the making of multiple schemes of thinking and understanding through the acceptance of a composite monoculture as obviously given, i.e. as the real. The concept of a composite I take from contemporary industries and technologies; for example, the same concept is used in the food industry. In order to hide the influence of monocultures – e.g. one sort of crop – modern technologies create composites by blending a number of already monocultural products. Mukhopadhyay claims that global rumours spread stories about anonymous capital, universal law, and economic interdependences as inescapable fact. For instance, global rumours persuade us about the value of certain currencies, the power of some institutions, about the predestination of certain forms of political orientations as equally universal. The rumours produced by globalization – put differently, advanced stories for intellectuals – ferment consumers’ consciousness. These ‘global rumours’ as communicative action show a new tendency of industrial development of the same discourses – through new media and techniques of composition, through new states of false consciousness, and through false abstraction and lies people perpetrate on themselves such as the supposed equality and trust of Facebook friendships. Global friendship is the name of alienated communication between (globally) persuaded individuals. They perpetually demand new stories, and the stories are drawn from the same collection found in the legalized state of contemporary consciousness. The global imaginary and related informational processes, networks, and commodities, separate human beings from local social and psychic drama and deny the unique mastery needed for creating original visions; instead, it provides simulations according to monocultural schemes.

Thinking and acting in this ‘global' way generates pathologies and simulacrums, and hides what Marx and Habermas have called ‘real abstractions.’5 According to Marx, a real abstraction is the expression of essential human relations, as found, for example, in relationships of productivity, power, and love.

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Value derives from real abstractions, and is aptly described through discourses about the historical and industrial development of exchange. A good example of a simulacrum abstraction is money, because it imitates values and productive relations. We use money because it is a simple substitute for the difficulty of using real abstractions.

Globalization operates in a similar way: it deploys simplified ideas and seemingly diverse appearances that mask the otherwise homogenous nature of the real relationships. The notion of globalization is thus a shadow of the deterritorialized dynamics of contemporary capital and a composite of various monocultural activities. Monocultural schemes of thinking provoke special forms of confidence based on common mass production, world markets, related stereotypes, habitus, and traditions. Consumers of one-dimensional society (as theorized by Marcuse⁶) are peaceful and believe each other because they have no serious differences; they are not aliens or strangers to one another, because they share same purposes in life. This sort of trust hides scepticism and critical research, promotes tolerance of mistakes, aids in escape from dramatic betrayals, and arrests creative and spiritual development. Trust won by propaganda is necessary for the mobilization of the masses and for collective activities; e.g. the building of new factories and cities; sacrificing lives in revolutions and wars; supporting hegemonic regimes of power; and, maintaining structures of (re-)productive relations. However, contemporary corporations and related states do not even need propaganda; they do not like to build strong ideologies and related identities. For them it is enough to use monocultural products to build a superficial imitation of trust and promote the reproduction of desire.

The economic or industrial character of traditional monocultures unifies and standardizes human thinking, behaviour, expectations, and values in large territories, and has done so for a long time. A composite monoculture presupposes the same social and economic choices, which in turn have educational, cultural, and informational consequences. The supply of goods in supermarkets corresponds to the illusion of complexity in monocultural society. One does not see this centripetal effect by standing only in one big shop. Only long-term, sustained comparative analysis opens up a perspective on this global desert of cultural sameness that allows it to be fairly seen for what it is. The largely invisible transformation of the diverse life-world into a composite social desert is felt strongly by creative industry artists and produces, such as local writers and poets searching for new languages, readers, and sympathetic

audiences. Independent genealogists and builders of alternative houses of memory certainly note the effects of this transformation as well. The phenomenon of the simulacrum of the real as a new form of desert has been adeptly theorized by Jean Baudrillard and Slavoj Žižek, among others.  

The legal prohibitions on monopoly and states’ acts against illegal corporate treaties do not stop the growth and development of a composite monoculture and the subalternisation of small producers, system(s) of education, and politicians. In this respect, the example of monoculture in the sphere of contemporary industries and their relation to educational systems is telling. Unifying systems of education based on a Staatsexamen or a Unified State Exam support the growth of composite monoculturalty, related surveillance, and state control. This is as equally true in the social sciences and humanities as in other fields. The international system of quality assessment, correspondences to the Bologna process, marginalization of the non-commercial arts, and so forth, all aid the homogenizing tendency(s) within university systems. The paradox is that a composite monoculture, i.e. a simulacrum of multiplicity, builds invisible power, which exists in the mind of every consumer and penetrates into universities, the media, and NGOs. Its concomitant subalternisation occurs through the same schemes of imagination seemingly regardless of location or context. Flora Stormer Michaels, a writer and cultural critic, provides a strong critique of monoculture. She emphasizes the reduction of value thinking and value diversity to discourse repetition, mono-stories, and exchange value:

As the monoculture aligns our experiences and expectations with the economic story, our life together becomes more at risk. Just as biodiversity embodies many forms of life and signals of health of our ecosystems, value diversity embodies many ways of life and signals the health of our social systems. When we lose value diversity, we lose our ability to express ourselves outside the economic realm. We lose the “languages” we once spoke in distinct parts of our lives – the language of family and relationships, the language of the natural world, of art and spirituality, of health and education, of the public interest and the common good. We learn to substitute an economic language for all of it.  

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Michaels shows how people construct their own discourse, invisible structures, and orientations from the same few elements that we find in our everyday life, and how by doing this we create discursive monocultural prisons for ourselves. Antonio Negri develops the idea of multitude as a concept that opposes the unification of a new, invisible Empire. He argues that exchange value sponsors the destruction of multiplicities, which results in the loss of unique existential time and events. He criticizes the transformation of our situation-oriented use values into global (imagined, institutional, economical) equivalencies, or exchange value. Negri finds that universal values, transcendental barriers, and rules of discourse are principles for saving unities. Negri transforms Marx’s proletarian slogan into a demand for multiplicity and the free constituting of time:

‘Proletarians of all countries, unite’ is an injunction that today means: mix up races and cultures, constitute the multicoloured Orpheus who generates the common from the human. Break down all the transcendental barriers that prevent the singular from becoming common and that block the innovation of the eternal: that is what it means to take leave while constituting.9

Monocultural time seems to be the most invisible coercion in the contemporary monocultural experience. The simulacrum of supermarketable diversity helps to constitute this sameness of time. The development of united history, world history, and other monocultural stories, reduces the possibility of constituting unique times and events and historical marketing, reproducing the same world from different important events of oppressed small nations, groups, and persons. Negri declares the necessity of a revolution of time: liberation from the oppression of exchangeable history and manufactured events.

We cannot always promote exceptional diversity from out of material nature. There are not unlimited variations of roads because the qualities of the asphalt or bitumen necessary to build them are limited. However, the life-worlds of plants and animals differ from inorganic and nonlife worlds by virtue of competition, selection of useful mutations for local conditions, and evolution of diversity. Any meadow or swamp manifests diversity of plants and animals, depending on geography and places, and on eco-niches. Mutations happen not in abstract categories of species but between real living plants and animals in local areas. Human beings increase the variety of the world by the development of games, symbols, and modes of production and creation.

However, people destroy diversity by cultivating narrow, limited stories, and consuming recycled narratives. Productive concentration and creative dispersion are dialectics of human thinking. They are expressed by symbols, parables, myths, stories, religions, and ideologies. A revolution of time can happen in our thinking, but it can be resisted and even bested by ideas of universality, trust, and the global imaginary, which hide their technologies of composite monoculturality and systems of super-marketization.

2 The Principle of Super-Marketability in Monocultural Deserts

If super-marketability – an illusory complexity that hides otherwise simple composites – indeed determines our reality, what are the humanities in a monocultural sense? First, it is the exchangeable, marketable elements of histories, literary stories, performing and visual arts, and religion that pretend to be ‘universal’ in value systems and ‘global’ in terms of distribution. Global values replace universal ideas, super-marketization substitutes for institutional universalism, and distribution supplants analytical explanation. The dissemination of titles and quotes of ideas, and links and addresses of theories, correspond to a market of brands and the power of network interests. The pretense to universality in our time is translated into the global, i.e. it is everywhere recognizable and acceptable as the logic of advertising. Aristotle discussed rhetoric as other side of logic or philosophy, and determined it to be a potential danger. In our days rhetoric is supplanted by principles of advertisement, in which understanding the advertised ideas and images that surround us means to participate in equivalent value exchange. Super-marketability is the core of the contemporary monoculture of ideas, theories, and names, and it hides the other side of schools, museums, and colleges.

Monocultural development has catastrophic consequences for the supposedly unique local life of people. Global monoculturality produces a kind of cultural desert with a more intensive emptiness than ‘real,’ natural deserts because composite products and desiring machines coincide with the interests of capital and corresponding power. Žižek takes the concept of the desert of the real from the film *The Matrix*, in which one of the main characters, Morpheus, explains to Neo the principle of commodity diversity in the world of the imaginary and the matrix: it is only a desert of the real. Žižek applies the metaphor to the September 11 terrorist actions in New York, arguing that it takes such a terrifying, painful event to awaken the world to the truth that much of what we consider ‘real’ is in fact imaginary experience conditioned...
by Hollywood productions. However, my argument is that it is not only Hollywood and the largest creative industries, but the entire economic system of composite monoculture that produces this desert of reality.

Contemporary people with composite monocultural expectations and imaginary global illusions support the industrial development of mass production, unified stories, and global law, because they await spectacles and services. The cultural wasteland also exists as a worldview, and this is opposed to that of peoples belonging to natural deserts. The Saharan people, for example the Berbers, care about life and oasis. Their worries are very existential and they dream about gardens as in opposition to the Sahara. In contrast to this, monocultural people aggressively demand artificial goods of all sorts and look for the same type of products everywhere. The modern consumer of monocultural deserts is happy for market deterritorialization because it reduces costs. Local Sahara Berbers develop trust due to long, sustained existential research and they build belief through everyday dramas. In contrast, the people of monocultural deserts develop trust through consumption, and through the unconscious sacrificing of their energies for the profit of the biggest brands and enhanced attention to public spectacles.

Anthropologist Marshall Sahlins notes that local folklore, rites, and knowledge transform their forms and content not only for internal needs but also under the pressure of external economic, military, communicative, and ideological events. Originally the diffusion of experiences happens very slowly; for a long time the community is dubious, prone to misinterpretations (mutations of understanding), attempting new research, and seeking transformations according to local mythology, language, and life. Industrial development needs a more effective, faster system of providing projects as external factors. For this reason industrial countries use constructivist pressure: e.g. educational propaganda, social management, technological interventions, and forceful regulation of productive relations. The pressure could be exploited for the development of system functions as well as for building monopolies and monocultures. In both cases, contemporary corporate industries need another individual: a consumer of industry news, ready to accept new doses of info-drugs and adapt him- or herself for modernization in the simulacrum diversity, in the desert of the composite real.

Deleuze and Guattari understand and express multiplicity by way of several terms: e.g. the rhizome, molecular development, minor politics, explication of the folds of a monad, and the decentering of the subject. Deleuze developed

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the concept of multiplicity in the context of rethinking the Baroque. Similarly to the Renaissance thinkers Nicholus of Cusa and Giordano Bruno, Leibniz understood two forms of infinity: indeterminatum and infinitum. Infinitum is the ‘actual’ endlessness of God or Transcendence, and indeterminatum is potential which characterizes folds and repetitions. Spinoza added indeterminatum as the potential of immanence. Immanence presupposes that we could become very different as endless qualitative variations of God. The power of immanence is completely different from external or state power, which limits our potentiality and, I would say, replaces it (qua substitution). Monocultural networks exchange the immanence of individuals with illusions of external diversity and material repetitions of the same, which has different names and various ideological explanations.

Globalization from the point of view of autonomists and communitarians is coercive – a continuous and unfinished process, an indeterminatum of the same. On the one hand imaginary globalization justifies and excuses repetitions and the distribution of monoculture(s). On the other hand, the same logic of unfolded immanence shows the possibility for spreading heterogeneous diversity and uniqueness. However, the contradiction needs to be explained in terms other than those of mass industrial production. For this purpose I am using the concepts of (a) free accumulation of skills and cooperation (through cooperative and liberative education), transforming them into independent time and event; (b) building an open society of multiplicities, which does not coincide with Popper’s and George Soros’s use of the term ‘open society.’ Resisting monocultural society presupposes not only individual creativity and individual development of multiplicities, but also activism of social-cultural groups, and the use of open codes and sources that support heterogeneity (e.g. places, times, things, ideas, images, etc.). Open deinstitutionalized movements, nomadism, anonymous actions, and strategies of direct action are important, but insufficient. These forms of openness must be paired with a readiness to accept creative suggestions and alternations made by strangers, to embrace the possibility for dialogue between hosts and guests, and to appreciate the skills of guests and strangers. Heterogeneity is based on complex autonomy, a number of communicative actions of multiplicities, the cooperation of skills, and the accumulation of experiences. Multiple forms of heterogeneity destroy state-controlled education and monocultural illusions,


and produce a number of new conflicts that presuppose social-political changes in the state, but do not always help in the development of productive dialogue. On the contrary, the absence of free accumulation and cooperation of transformative or even everyday-revolutionary practices, the lack of creative unfolding of historical and territorial immanence, the growth of surveillance and control, and social fear, all support the construction of a composite monoculture, including the simulations of real dialogue(s). All previous class and social conflicts have been analysed through the perspective of the master-slave dialectic; however, other communicative strategies depend upon the dialectic of host-and-guest.

Leibniz remarked that the monad, e.g. the human soul, extracts itself as a diversity of folds (the explication of immanence or God), and only institutional requirements, courts, traditions, and power provide justifications for the origin of monocultures. Cornelius Castoriadis\textsuperscript{14} as well as Deleuze and Guattari consider human imagination and related creativity as originally ambivalent, spontaneous, and contradictory in relation to production and institutions. It is normal for human beings to imagine every moment differently and only free and equal communicative action could become the basis for public agreement. However, to develop an open society of multiplicities ripe for metamorphosis there must be the necessary power to resist monocultural tendencies, such as those embodied in monocultural rationality, which at once combines large markets, affordability, and efficiency together with consumer diversity. Social scientists have pointed to the dangers of institutional domination: state power, monopolies, big corporations, etc. However, they ignored the transformation of contemporary society into a diversity of banana republics, because only producers were considered neo-colonial – the roles played by sellers and the consumers were ignored. Thus, the new composite culture is characterized equally by the loss of key traits of heterogeneity: e.g., unique cooperation skills, a multiplicity of lifestyles; possibilities for the free constitution of time; and the free formation of a correspondence and adequacy between the order of commodities\textsuperscript{15} and orders of thinking.

Following Deleuzian philosophy I interpret human beings as swarms or clusters of subjective functions – aggregates of skills and communicative functions. Such a human being has multiple dependencies and possible relations to diverse institutions of power, as well as to hegemonic discourses and related cultural processes. In Leibniz the categories look like this: every monad has


\textsuperscript{15} It is parallel to the idea of order of things as the principle of thinking according to J. Baudrillard, \textit{The System of Objects}, Verso, London, 1996.
many folds and every fold can be explicated in different way so as to realize an endless number of possible worlds. However, the numbers of correspondences between possibilities provide only limited chances for the actualization of these possible worlds. Monopolistic and monocultural composite policy skips the opportunities to realize the manifest possibilities of your own world(s), deferring instead to an actualized world realized from a minimized set of possibilities meant to look as if it were the realization from a vast manifold. The rhizomatic multiplicity is falsified by composite products. So, rather than being decentered in a world of immanence, in composite monoculture a human being is centered in a cultural desert that orders thought and builds false trust for them.

3 The Politics of Recognisability and Trust

What is the difference between alienated bureaucracy and the simulation of friendship? The former does not have masks and exists as a separate world, as in Franz Kafka’s novel The Castle. The latter in a number of cases is just the effect of public communication. Facebook friendship is the same as the slogan: X World Company cares about us. If friendship is only an effect of imagination and communication, what therefore is trust? It is a question of the reality of abstraction. Any general concept could be a rational generalization and real abstraction in one case and simulation, spectacle, and play in another. To develop a concept of trust and to develop the concept of a simulacrum should be different and independent from the process of relationships, communication, and the development of thinking. But what does it mean to develop thinking or the dialectics of a concept if we are talking about mass consumer society? In a number of cases it means only the deployment of persuasion and an appeal to a common lifestyle.

For persuasion purposes, representatives of monocultures use advertisement, public relations instruments, and mythic stories about ‘the real,’ such as taste, style, happiness, the good, etc. And only because you trust one type of commodity, symbol, name, story, etc., you therefore trust another by principle of analogy, symbolic transfer, institutional or network relationship, branding, and so forth. Monoculturality presupposes seemingly endless possibilities for transfer of trust. In popular culture, for example, different signs are just slightly repackaged versions of otherwise common topics and styles. Their distribution, often in magazines and on websites, manages public trust. Through deterritorialization monocultures drop their dependencies on local conditions and instead express the will of anonymous corporate shareholders.
Corporations develop a new global imaginary in order to persuade consumers to trust, and with that trust they promote sales and consumption. Trust through advertisement, public relations, defence of consumer rights, and supporting of intensive consumption, hides irresponsibility, postcolonial pressure, and ideological hegemony. The experience of monoculture is exemplified well by a scenario in which the hegemonic framing of social structures via common cultural reference points are masked by mere personal preference acting as a supposed source of difference and variety. For example: ‘did you read the same book and watch the same film as I did? And do you share a similar opinion about them?’ A composite monoculture presupposes the existence of limited quantity groups who will ask the same question, but simply with different answers to insert which are drawn from the same pool of managed diversity.

The largest contemporary state institutions, corporations, and universities declare that any positive activism of human beings demands confidence and moral foundations. However, contemporary trust in the visible orders and experiences of media society is supported by market self-reference. The possibility to compare homogeneous similarities is the condition both producing and produced by the composite monoculture, instead of constituting an obscure otherness. Enlightenment and industrialization manifested themselves through the idea of comprehensibility, which entails homogeneity, in contrast to the production of new and otherwise obscure situations that every creative artist dreams of. Corporations, political parties, and state institutions try to use the power of common comprehensibility, universal enlightenment and human rights, and the transferability of services and demands, instead of thinking about the role of breaks, vagueness, dubiousness, and scepticism. In a number of cases, instead of developing critical thinking skills related research and real abstraction, supervisors – masters of coaching and leadership – persuade people to build collectives based on confidence and positive moral values which correspond to the law of the state and the interests of institutions. Seminars and public actions developed by the methods of business advisors, supervisors, and coaches look like New Age churches; but they stimulate and reinforce the masses’ trust through modes of persuasion akin to coaching. Take for example the Life Coaching movement, which follows some principles of Scientology\textsuperscript{16} and seeks to advise people on deep existential experiences and their sense of life. Contemporary, ‘advanced’ trust movements pretend to be mechanistic in a secular way, to open new horizons of life for people with ‘developed emotions’ and with the minimum number of critical

perspectives and skills to be guests. The contemporary monoculutural subject is everywhere a consumer and in some ways also a host: s/he has consumer rights and feels at home everywhere – s/he feels like a native, and never a guest. The development of trust supports a kind of anomy of the masses and abandons active civic participation, separating citizens (the masses) from ‘the agonal verification of truth’ and agitating them to be kitchen activists. House-trust groups develop skills for consuming news events with popular names, and trusting the production of newspapers, criminal information, and churches in order to escape from the work of critical thinking.

The situation in everyday life of Das Man (following Martin Heidegger’s concept) is the following: trust (Tr)=distrust (Dtr). The content of thinkable concepts is so impoverished, so empty, and so naïve that understanding is equal to incomprehension, or Tr=Dtr. The formula is based on Hegel’s dialectics. Hegel maintains that at the beginning the concept of being is almost the same as nonbeing. A more developed version of dialectics of the concept being/non-being was presented in Hegel’s Science of Logic: The opposites, being and non-being, are therefore in immediate union in it; or the beginning is their undifferentiated unity. The concept of being based on the simple abstraction of everyday life, on the everyday consumption of ideas and theories, is equal in its emptiness of content to nothing. Monocultural thinking stays in this ‘undifferentiated unity’ because everything could be replaced by anything else in any place in the world and at any time. For example, the content of supermarketable utterances depends only on interests of profit, habits of life, and everyday rhetoric, which in many cases coincides with corporate distribution of films, journals, seminars, and corresponding programs of colleges and universities. Beliefs about beauty in many cases depend on the persuasion of networks of galleries and ‘global’ influential interpretations. The same goes for the content of the ideas of the good, justice, and welfare. The values of the good depend on ideological and market-oriented state and corporate propaganda and the collection of necessary quotas. Trust in their interpretations is based on the influence of titles of responsible institutions; mostly these are located in the largest world cities or at least the capitals of nation-states.

Hegel emphasized that ontogenesis and phylogenesis, history and individual development, civilization and personal education, form the content

process of the concept. Historical and political analysis of social, class, and religious relations show that $T_{1} \neq T_{2}$. The first trust ($T_{1}$) is based on the naïve belief in friendship, love, the power of emotions, and on the myth of the heart or of gods; the second is based on individual genealogical investigations of roots, tendencies of cases, and the checking of rational arguments and scientific data. The first trust is equal to non-being or to an undifferentiated unity. Alternately, following Hegel, distrust is a negative concept, i.e. negation, and therefore it does not have any other content except refutation. In order to understand distrust positively one must translate it into corresponding terms: dubiousness, critique, irony, scepticism and so on, in order to develop the content of the distrust. Otherwise, the first experience of distrust is only the shadow of a naïve concept of trust, which together are an ‘undifferentiated unity’.

Francis Bacon introduced the method of induction and empirical research. It starts from the development of the critique of trust in five types of idols.\(^{19}\) *Idols of the Tribe* (*Idola tribus*) are blind orders, regularities, hierarchies, structures, and obligations. Believers in these types of idols trust mostly the words and rules coming from fathers and power. Followers of *Idols of the Cave* (*Idola specus*) prefer personal psychological attachments, involvements, and likes and dislikes, instead of methodological research or logical analysis; they prefer to be in Plato's cave rather than learning to see the Idea. Liberation of desires and sexual emancipation do not help to escape from the influence of *Idola specus* and sometimes even the inverse is true: consumer emancipation develops blindness and superstitions. *Idols of the Marketplace* (*Idola fori*) support confidence in rumours. The public trusts rumours; e.g. in our rumour of globalization, war propaganda is used in elections as an instrument of manipulation of the masses. However, Bacon's critical method does not explain the diversity of interpretations and necessity of competitive alternatives. As a Baroque thinker he believed in the ideals of universal ideas and one Truth, in the principles that help the development of authoritarian regimes, monopolies, new forms of empires, and in composite monoculture(s). He changed the logical method of considerations based on subject-predicate into a scientific ‘subject-object’ method; however here I suggest the ‘self-other’ approach for the explanation of interpersonal relationships. In order to resist the persuasion of monocultures we need to be critical in a different way than Bacon; we must not negate diversities and otherness as enlightened science does. *Idols of the Theatre* (*Idola theatri*) emphasize academic dogma, institutional tradition, and

images. The people populating Debord’s ‘society of the spectacle’ are updated versions of the people of Bacon’s theatre. Spectacle society is produced by huge modern industries. Pictures of good society and welfare mask deep dependencies and developed needs for getting more and cheaper products in order to hide the inability of individuals to constitute their own time and being. Consumers are happy to be cared for, and happy to stay culturally blind to their own predicament. Idols of the School (Idola schola) have trust placed in the hands of Party, the truth of nomenclature, and the experts on common education. It rewards blind trust in dogmas and their representatives. Some parts of the Enlightenment appeal to these idols, producing the power of colonial knowledge, cultivating modes of subalternisation, and as such later transforming society through corporate standardisation and state law.

Critical trust could be understood as a process of the concretization of distrust, through the development of alternatives, of play, ambiguities, of poetic experiences, and creative scepticism. The concrete content of inquiry, the unmasking of falsifications, and creative scepticism does not coincide with the undifferentiated content of naïve trust and market determinations. Critical trust and real or developed abstractions depend on a number of procedures of negation, research, investigations, and creative constitutions. Critical trust is open to the accumulation of experiences, and the making of creative events for long-term cooperation and metamorphosis, for example through everyday revolutions. In contrast, trust without critique becomes propaganda and serves the composite monoculture. Spectacle society and simulacra produce ideological, one-dimensional shadows which cover Tr, reducing it to an impoverished, even blind Tr=Dtr. This corporate spectacle ultimately serves market happiness:

It is all that is obscure and threatens to oppose the unprecedented happiness which we know this society offers to those who trust it, a happiness which greatly outweighs various insignificant risks and disappointments.21

Corporate, spectacle-driven confidence in idols, e.g. pop stars, brands, and publically recognizable schemes of apperception and awareness, characterizes monocultural thinking. The weakness of the method of idol critique is the belief in universalities as a character of truth. Confidence in givenness and

evidence, in experiments and inductions, helps to find new instruments of management, persuasion, manipulation, unification, standardization, and new technological solutions; but it does not explain the existential role of mistakes, obscenity, play, intertextualities, and other constitutions of the imaginary. Analytical procedures and the use of corresponding data do not support the growth of creative syntheses, related plays, carnival tricking, and therefore real qualitative diversity. Bacon did not develop dialectics and possibilities of conscious and radical metamorphosis, which is so important for the unique existential lives of individuals and their creative economies. Enlightenment and Western ideas of welfare, as well as colonial approaches to small nations and groups, destroy the field of free genealogies, multiplicities of memories and cultural niches. Thusly understood, composite monoculture was developed under enlightened modernization, and under science experiments, historical, health, and marketing research and its shadow. Immanuel Kant discovered the schemes of Intellect and Reason. Schemes of intellect are orders of apperception: how to connect our feelings and perceptions with concepts. Intellectual schemes act at a pre-reflective level, are spontaneous, and look like they are natural, producing the illusion of absence of development of apperceptions and feelings. According to many neuroscientists, intellectual schemes have to be verified and corrected by research and experiments. Ordinary scientists, e.g. Albert Einstein, criticize popular schemes of time and space and propose other more mature ones – in Einstein’s case, the more developed theory of Relativity. Another type of rule applies to the scheme(s) of Reason. The rules of reason are orders for understanding ideas and ideals (logical, stereotypical, practical, etc.) and can be analysed and criticized by using methods of mathematics, logic, analytics, dialectics, aesthetics, and so on. Following Kant’s ideals of enlightenment and Popper’s ideas of critical realism, we could maintain that trust is possible only after strong procedures of logical verification and falsification. However, Kant did not analyse socio-political, material, productive, and traumatic historical schemas, and neither did he discuss their destiny; and Popper did not care about the importance of trickstering. Contemporary philosophical, psychoanalytic, and especially marketing research shows that the schemas of human thinking and belief in reality depend on desires and satisfaction, pop cultural or advertisement clichés, on the language of our everyday practices and control of them, on the distribution of images and goods, and from super-marketization. The Frankfurt School scholars criticized the Enlightenment and its rational procedures as destructive in some instances. It is very important in this case to understand the

dialectics of myth and enlightenment, higher creativity and scientific research. The dialectic of enlightenment, as well as negative dialectics\(^{23}\) more generally, could help us both to develop and limit theories of universality and truth.

Contemporary sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, and urban studies, research and criticize schemes of social thinking and acting. They separate schemes of social orientation and movement. Social schemes are differently oriented for disabled, rich, lower, and middle classes; trajectories of thinking are supplied via a unified school system and through reading of the same collection of authors. Some trajectories and configurations of the imagination are hegemonic and depend on the interests of the biggest universities and museums; others’ demands follow an institutional request; others support social inequality and only imitate open walls for women, the disabled, foreigners, people of different race and ethnicity, and so forth.

Adorno and Horkheimer partly followed the conclusions of earlier Neo-Kantians, e.g. Ernst Cassirer and his theory of the symbolical forms of thinking. Human beings in their historical practices developed a number of culturally and historically different forms of thinking and practices: mythic, religious, magic, aesthetic, ideological, scientific, and linguistic.\(^{24}\) However, ideological ‘histories’ hide genealogies and the roles played by historical forms and schemes, and super-marketization transforms all of these forms of thinking into roles-commodities, i.e. into scenes. Super-marketable trust is trust in a scene, that is, in orders of commodities – not trust in the real. The origin of new propaganda is based not on the construction of long term confidences, but on the satisfaction of consumers’ desires for reproduction of the same mise-en-scene, goods, and services, only with a conditional sign of nonessential difference (for example, in names, or in packaging). Adorno criticized the Neo-Kantian approach for its historical investigations of schemes (e.g. Cassirer’s investigations). In *Negative Dialectics*, he proposes separate ideological and existential values of schemes. Adorno states about Kant’s philosophy:

I would almost be willing to say that idealism may be false when understood as an abstract system, as a scheme of knowledge that asserts itself once and for all. But I would insist that it is undoubtedly true as the index of a specific state of the self-consciousness of spirit and at the same time as a mediated stage in the history of thought, that is to say, one that


does not naively oppose itself to reality, a type of thought that had no precedent.  

Adorno tries to find an alternative to totalitarian thinking, to develop another type of thinking in opposition to the one that produced Auschwitz and the Holocaust, and, I would add, the Gulag. He believed in creative, unique choice and existential action. I think this Adornian attitude towards specific idealism could characterise that of many of Soviet dissidents. However, such idealism in the time of super-marketable roles and playing scenes destroys the possibility to accept and understand radical idealistic choice. An analysis of composite monocultural roles and scenes is important for the interpretation of idealist(ic) solutions. Strangeness, queerness, obscurity, and ambiguity are categories for new choices.

Cultural and creative industries produce idols (celebrities, for example), schemes and instructions for acting, roles, and scenes, but in a super-marketable, monocultural style. The repetition of diversities, emphasis on a global order, as well as invitations for trust and the seductive allure of changing roles, all characterise a number of contemporary simulacrum-idealists. What (or who) can resist these tendencies and is it necessary to resist them? Two answers prove especially illuminating: deepness and queerness. Deepness is based on long-term historical, hermeneutical, genealogical, anthropological, and sociological studies. Deepness rejects the superficiality of the market and the repetitions characteristic of composite monoculturalism. Queerness, or otherness, contradicts the empty trust that is equivalent to distrust. However, creative disruptions and the development of different trajectories are equally important for the development of super-marketable and composite monoculture. The difference is openness to disruptions and readiness to accept them, i.e. to be in dialogue. The other side of monocultures is the diversity of niches – variations of life which are characterized by an acceptable level of obscurity. The incomprehensibility of schemes and expressions is a sign of the absence of monocultural pressure, and shows the possibilities of consciously becoming other or, as I prefer call it, self-othering. However, there are questions about the absence of the significance of utterances, or, simply put, play. In order to separate the possible self-othering from an impossible version, or from the accidental play of signs, it is useful to apply the concept of transgression: the crossing of (legal, approved) borders. Liminality and transgression are two characteristics which open gates to other cultural and world niches, and to the other side of composite monoculture.

Destruction of trust through creative disruptions and transgressive self-othering could unsettle composite monoculture for some time and open possibilities for artificial, creative constituting of time and events. This happens, for example, through everyday revolutionary changes in lifestyles, or in the activities of groups and individuals, or through devoting oneself to deep studies, or through unexpected new relations and symbolic organizations. However, self-othering processes and the support of radical group dynamics do not provide necessarily the equivalent of a guest’s skills or the experience of an open dialogue with strangers or with members of other groups.

4 The Critique of Open Movements and the Dialectic of Host-and-Guest

Representatives of the ideas of global orders, world market systems, and similar ideologies seek to make universal rules, values, lifestyle standards, and schemes of thinking. They demand corresponding behaviour and corresponding visions everywhere, and so deny special local times and events, and the heterogeneity thereof, as unclear and perhaps dangerous. Contemporary global narratives and corresponding political forces destroy the skills necessary for accepting differences and the attitudes of host-and-guest. The new global imaginary and its corresponding discourses do not accept the dialectics of inside-outside. The whole world is presented as an inner case, where the biggest corporations and states are hosts and no one is the guest. Mukhopadhayya argues that the use of different broadcasting techniques, ideological 'spectacles,' and hiding under the shadow of imagined global processes has preserved the very concrete interests of the biggest corporations, banks, and their owners. He remarks that commodities are deterritorialized because companies find it easy to move their manufacturing from one cheap country to another. Following Debord and Deleuze, he maintains that:

Given that, that “capital” [would get] accumulated to the point where it becomes image” or “spectacle” is simply a matter of time. In its post-Marxist formulation, globalization is the culminating moment of this logic when commodity, freed from its erstwhile territorial underpinning, becomes autonomous and self-referential. Commodity deterritorialized is the “spectacle” universalized.26

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Mukhopadhyay analyzes globalization as a condition built upon the accumulation of cultural or symbolic capital. Billions of people believe in the existence of global processes and the importance of world corporations. They hone skills geared towards the main political, commercial, and communicational brands and services. For the majority of people, to be in the mainstream of news, sales, and consumption means simply being up-to-date. They do not analyse (let alone overcome) the origins of contemporary manufacturing and distribution in sameness because they essentially accept mass production: it is cheap, modular, coherent, and desirable. Belief in the global and commonly held story about the importance of being up-to-date has economic, political, and persuasive effects. Public desire for a composite monoculture supports the growth of cultural, social, and economic deserts and a feeling of ‘being-host’ to them. Monoculturalism regulates the new world (i.e. composite deserts) through ‘democratic voting’ and new international orders. New members of the EU and post-Soviet countries imagine social progress as full participation in the manufacturing of visual and auditory symbolic mainstreams (e.g. access to popular brands), and as the right to the cheap consumption of the products constituting those mainstream markets. Trust is the main ideology, and it is supported by tendencies towards symbolical centralization. Imagined and institutionalised global norms and schemes of thinking must help the monocultural practices of everyday life by propagating the same symbols even within different countries. Unique mastery, especially of social groups, is interpreted as something marginal – an expensive value – and perhaps as an experiment, but not as a mode of self-government. The largest companies try to develop and regulate the tastes and desires of consumers in order to market consumer demands; therefore, spontaneous uniqueness is considered exceptional, the purview of small and autonomous groups. Variations of composite monoculture substitute for the idea of deep development or immanent development. Precisely for this reason radical critics of contemporary capitalism emphasize not only the idea of heterogeneous diversity but to the development of immanent or various genealogical alternative-histories of ideas. They criticize old and new instruments of symbolical centralization, such as reification, and, conversely, re-idealization, i.e. the transforming of corporate orders of things into global ideals or models of acting. They also decry consumer fetishism and the production of mise-en-scène in the new light of world brands and large media corporations. These follow Marcuse’s analysis of different styles of public desublimation, or propaganda, fearing they may be part of the critique. Reification is the main instrument for transforming the global symbolical imaginary into concrete material things. It helps consumers make their own conclusions about actions and trust. Thus, the new composite monoculture
seeks to found a kind of new one-dimensional person – a composite subject with demands for an imaginary world order. Consumer-oriented industries produce a mass reification of central ideals and symbols, brands that reflect a symbolically centralised democracy, market tendencies, and corresponding human rights.

Who can resist the growth tendencies of supermarketable monocultures? A new composite subject of multiculturality? Perhaps different alternatives and interventions from social groups; perhaps the development of contemporary forms of different societies, such as open publicities and codes, open Wiki and other projects, autonomism, supporting the creative obscenity and disruptions, supporting the right to self-othering and the individual constituting of time, a critique of histories and opening new possibilities for competition and play within genealogies, and so forth. Of course, these are only speculations – dreams, based on contemporary philosophers’ and writers’ thoughts.

Contemporary critical authors have theorized a few types of open society. The most famous was described by Popper and later institutionally transformed by Soros. Both of them considered openness from the perspective of critical realism, and kept the concept limited, particularly in terms of social engineering as reflective participation in composite reality (composite product) for democratic needs. They consider democracy in a simple way, as representative power and as a developed list of human rights without deep critique, which manufactures the imaginary and symbolic orders. The best example of this interpretation of open society is Soros’s Open Society Foundation (OSF) and the activities of this institution in different countries. On the one hand OSF supports the sameness of democratic visions and spreads the collection of similar books in different countries; on the other hand, it does not care about native, marginal strangers or about the development of host-guest relationships. OSF helps develop the deepness and uniqueness of the same texts, which are recommended for many countries. It supports the growth of immanent diversity but does not help to escape from institutional monoculturalisation. For example, the popularization of Popper’s books throughout the world coincides with the market strategies of building one world with the same system of brands. Identical actions of similar democratic networks in different countries, and promotion of the same symbolical values, signs, and titles, create a condition of composite sameness. To watch globally popular Hollywood films with famous stars or to go to an institution providing democracy and to read books about it are similar actions: both are supported by governments, markets, the global imaginary, and tendencies of symbolical centralization.
However, there are many open projects that provide open codes and resources, open systems of self-education without any pre-knowledge, process, or diversity control, without knowing the obligatory list of the best thinkers, painters, writers, and without hegemonic wisdom generally. Examples of this are: Wiki, or Linux; Wikipedia and similar wikis; WikiLeaks and similar leaks; different public, open, and free universities; and spontaneous intellectual movements. They support the contradictory, rhizomatic development of multiplicities: spontaneous, competitive and anti-systemic. They also support tendencies towards creative disruption, growth of opposition(s), and the making of symbolical alternatives – all of which helps resist monoculturalization and symbolical mainstreams and supports the growth of creative group dynamics. New and deinstitutionalized open movements (i.e. different levels of openness) produce not only actions and mistakes, but also new creations and symbolical orders. Their sole insufficiency seems to be only the continuation of losing the dialectic of host-guest. For a long time the class struggle and master-slave dialectic covered human ideals and hid the role(s) of host and guest. Contemporary nomadism and anonymous movements support multiculturalism instead of developing the dialectic of host-guest. The ideas of open resources and free universities and schools presuppose but do not guarantee the minimisation of monocultural power and monological teaching. Open movements promote and facilitate the development of freely constituted times and places, knowledge, and cooperation skills; but they do not help to initiate communication with (new) strangers, because the feeling of being a guest is entirely absent. In my view, the tendencies of monoculturality cannot be destroyed only by the development of deinstitutionalized openness and through the support of creative group dynamics. Equally important is the elaboration of the ethical dimensions of dialectical host-guest relationships. Today the tendency to defend the hosts is supported by many nationalist groups. But who seeks to provide new levels of understanding, develop new relations, or renew support for guests? I think the dialectics of host-and-guest in the deinstitutionalized process of open organizations and creative group dynamics can help to resist the tendencies of the composite monoculturalism.

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