Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12259/36491
Type of publication: Magistro darbas / Master thesis
Field of Science: Teisė / Law
Author(s): Kišonaitė, Agnė
Title: Ar draudimas vedybų sutartimi iš anksto nustatyti vaiko gyvenamąją vietą po santuokos nutraukimo nepažeidžia sutarties laisvės principo?
Other Title: Does the prohibition of determining the place of residence of the child in advance in the nuptial agreement not violate the principle of freedom of contract?
Extent: 40 p.
Date: 6-Jun-2018
Event: Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas. Teisės fakultetas
Keywords: Vaiko gyvenamoji vieta;Santuokos nutraukimas;Vedybų sutartis;Sutarties laisvės principas;Child's place of residence;Divorce;Nuptial agreement;Freedom of contract
Abstract: Vedybų sutarties institutas suteikia galimybę sutuoktiniams apsaugoti ne tik savo turtą, bet ir teisėtus interesus. Civiliniuose įstatymuose įtvirtinta sutarties laisvė įgalina šią galimybę įgyvendinančias šalis savo nuožiūra nustatyti sutarties sąlygas. Tuo tarpu Lietuvos Respublikos civilinio kodekso 3.105 straipsnio 5 ir 6 punktai numato, jog negalioja vedybų sutarties sąlygos, kurios reglamentuoja sutuoktinių asmeninius neturtinius santykius arba nustato ar keičia sutuoktinių asmenines teises ir pareigas jų vaikams. Vadinasi, įstatymų leidėjas nenumato galimybės sutuoktiniams vedybų sutartyje aptarti vieną iš aktualiausių aspektų, sprendžiamų santuokos nutraukimo atveju – vaiko gyvenamąją vietą. Svarstytina, ar šis reguliavimas, suvaržantis sutuoktinių valios autonomiją, yra pagrįstas. Nors minėtas ribojimas yra siejamas su geriausių vaiko interesų samprata, tačiau pripažintina, jog praktikoje skyrybų bylose neretai labiausiai nukenčia vaikai. Todėl šiuo darbu yra siekiama išsiaiškinti, ar imperatyvus draudimas vedybų sutartimi nustatyti vaiko gyvenamąją vietą po santuokos nutraukimo nėra laikytinas sutarties laisvės principo pažeidimu. Pirmąja (įvadine) darbo dalimi skaitytojui atskleidžiama nagrinėjamos temos problematika. Antrojoje dalyje įvertinami vaiko gyvenamosios vietos nustatymo vedybų sutartimi privalumai. Atitinkamai trečiojoje darbo dalyje analizuojami šio reguliavimo trūkumai. Prieita prie išvados, jog imperatyvus draudimas laikytinas pagrįstu dėl siekio apsaugoti itin pažeidžiamus visuomenės narius – vaikus ir tokiu būdu ginti viešąjį interesą. Kita vertus, viešasis interesas turėtų egzistuoti pusiausvyroje su privataus subjekto teise. Todėl dėl sutuoktinių teisės į pagarbą privačiam šeimos gyvenimui įgyvendinimo bei poreikio sumažinti vaikų, įtraukiamų į teisminį procesą santuokos nutraukimo atveju, skaičių, minėtą ribojimą laikyti visiškai pagrįstu nebūtų teisinga. Svarstytina liberalesnio reglamentavimo vedybų sutarties turinio atžvilgiu galimybė, kuri suteiktų sutuoktiniams teisę vedybų sutartyje aptarti vaiko gyvenamąją vietą po santuokos nutraukimo ir tokiu būdu įgyvendinti sutarties laisvę. Tačiau, atsižvelgiant į ateities neapibrėžtumą bei ribotas žmogaus galimybes iš anksto numatyti vaiko poreikius, santuokos nutraukimo atveju teismui privalu patikrinti šio susitarimo atitiktį vaiko interesams, o nustačius prieštaravimą jiems - sutarties sąlygą pripažinti negaliojančia. Išnagrinėjus imperatyvaus draudimo vedybų sutartimi nustatyti vaiko gyvenamąją vietą po santuokos nutraukimo pagrįstumą ir atitiktį sutarties laisvės principui, pasiektas šio darbo tikslas.
In order to avoid unpleasant and difficult issues in the event of divorce, current or future spouses have the possibility to define them in the nuptial contract. Like any other contract, the principle of freedom of contract is to be considered as the basis of the nuptial contract, as the result of a party's will and autonomy. One of the main elements of the content of this principle entitles the entities to determine the content of the contract. Meanwhile, Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 3.105, items 5 and 6 provide that the terms of the nuptial contract governing the spouses' personal non-property personal relations or establish or change the spouses’ personal rights and obligations to their children are not applicable. Hence, the legislator does not provide for the possibility to the spouses, when concluding a nuptial contract, to discuss one of the most relevant aspects in the event of divorce – the child's place of residence. The question arises: does such regulation not violate the spouses' rights to establish, at their discretion, mutual rights and obligations in the contract? Although such a restriction may be related to the best interests of the child, it is recognized that in practice children are most affected by divorce. A more liberal approach to the concept of a nuptial contract would not only ensure the implementation of the principle of legal certainty in respect of the spouses, but would also enable the protection of the child against potential negative consequences both during the judicial process and in the event of the marriage termination. In this respect, these grounds for invalidity of the nuptial contract require a more detailed examination in the context of the implementation of the principle of freedom of contract. The institute of nuptial contracts is relatively new and does not have deep traditions in Lithuania. This results in a low level of the analysis of the topic and a lack of information. Although the role of the nuptial contract in the contract law or the terms of the nuptial contract have been analysed in Lithuania, the institute of nuptial contracts has not yet been analysed in the context of personal non-property marital relationship. Therefore, the aim of this master's thesis is to clarify the validity of the valid prohibition to establish the child's place of residence after the divorce in the nuptial contract, and its compliance to the principle of the freedom of contract. In the first chapter of this paper, after assessing the significance of determining the place of residence of a child, it is concluded that we can classify the solution to this issue as an integral part of the fundamental rights of the child, such as the right to adequate living conditions. It was also found that responsibility for the proper implementation of these rights first arises for the parents of the child, and only then for the state. In the second chapter, after analyzing the existing regulation, which does not provide for the possibility of defining the child's place of residence in the nuptial contract, the advantages of opposing regulation were distinguished. Many children are directly involved in the parental divorce proceedings. Due to the psychological effects and emotional experiences, this situation is seen negatively against the interests of the child. Meanwhile, a preliminary agreement in the nuptial contract would prevent a repeat of the duration on the issue of one marriage annulment. Moreover, in the first chapter, having identified the entities responsible for implementing the fundamental rights of the child, this chapter also analyzes the boundaries of the state's rights to regulate family relations and recognizes the right to respect for private family life in the international context. It has been determined that the state’s interference in private family life with regard to the situation in question cannot be considered reasonable and necessary, since it is not clear whether there will be a legal fact on the basis of which the aforementioned parental agreement (i.e. divorce) should be implemented. Finally, after analyzing the national legislation, it was found that the child's place of residence is and may be the subject of contractual relations in the legal system of Lithuania. Meanwhile, an analysis of foreign practice in this field has led to the conclusion that the recognition of regulation in foreign countries in relation to the content of the nuptial contract is more liberal than in the national law. In the third section of this work, in order to answer the question raised at work in a comprehensive manner, the problems of determining the child's place of residence in a nuptial contract are discussed. Following the analysis of the principle of freedom of contract, distinguishing the essential criteria on the basis of which the restriction of the freedom of contract may be justified. Application of these criteria to the situation in question shows that in order to prevent the violation of the interests of the child and thereby safeguarding the public interest, the restriction of the freedom to contract could be considered reasonable. Among other things, considering the limited human rationality to provide real opportunities for giving the suitable living conditions for the child, the criteria for future uncertainty should be considered as an obstacle to the child's place of residence by way of a preliminary agreement. In summarizing the conclusions, it became clear that the aim of protecting the public interest and the particularly vulnerable part of society – children – may be and can be a reason to restrict the freedom of contract, and the limited ability of a human to predict future events that imply the proper implementation of the agreement, implies a possible likelihood of violating the interests of the child. Therefore, in this viewpoint, the mandatory prohibition is considered to be reasonable. On the other hand, the public interest should exist in balance with the right of the private individual. Therefore, taking into account the need to preserve the boundaries of the state interference in private family relationships, to reduce the number of children involved in legal proceedings and to ensure the individual's right to respect for private family life, it is not correct to consider the aforementioned restriction as fully justified. In the light of the conclusions, ensuring the freedom of contract of the parents, we should consider the possibility of allowing the spouses to determine the child's place of residence after divorce in the nuptial contract in advance, however, in order to maximize the protection of the child's interests, it is necessary to oblige the court to review of this contract upon dissolution of the marriage, and upon establishing the inadequacy of the child's needs, to invalidate it. Identifying the shortcomings of the current regulation, which does not provide for the possibility of determining the child's place of residence after the divorce in the nuptial contract, accordingly, highlighting the advantages of the opposite regulation, all the tasks for this work have been implemented. In this way, answering the problem issue raised in the work and submitting a recommendation for a possible follow-up research, the aim of this master's thesis was achieved.
Internet: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12259/36491
Appears in Collections:2018 m. (TF mag.)

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