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SECURITY STRATEGIES IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY: POST-2015 GOVERNMENT CHANGE

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SUMMARY

Contemporary risks and threats to state security are no longer limited to military power but are multicomplex in their form and effect, permeating national borders and requiring global cooperation. International institutions recognise sustainable development as the key to global security, which calls for balance between the aspects of environment, equity, and economy in policy formation. Canada as one of the most influential countries in the world show aspirations in the elimination of global risks and the construction of international security, especially after the change to its executive body in 2015, signifying a turn towards more multilateral approach. This paper aims to reveal Canada’s reliance on multilateral institutions, as well as diplomacy and economic incentives as its preferred method of international action. The research should adequately portray concrete actions of Canada and provide a basis of reflection on whether such methods are successful for their sought goals.

The object of the research is security and sustainable development strategies in contemporary Canadian foreign policy. The goal of the research is to analyse Canada’s foreign policy security and sustainable development strategies in the contexts of geopolitics, environment, and economy.

This paper employed analysis on scientific literature to build theoretical framework for research. To reveal security and sustainable development strategies in Canadian foreign policy, document analysis was used with Global Affairs Canada acting as the main source of information. Comparative analysis was employed in testing three presumptions that were revealed in this paper about the strategies, as well as emphasising similarities and differences between them.

The research shown that security strategies in Canadian foreign policy are heavily reliant on international institutions for providing framework for policy formation as well as playing an arbitrary in international relations. Such position is long-lasting as long as international system remains of not bipolar nature. Furthermore, employed security strategies do coincide to certain extent with all the UN 17 SDGs. While geopolitical strategy is most broad of them all, proving Canada’s ambition to perceive global action as the exercise of its sovereignty, environmental and economic strategies are complementary to each other. In addition, Canada’s methods of action are based on foreign policy of restraint, preferring diplomacy and economic incentives as the main tool for institutionalisation of interdependence, both bilateral and multilateral.
SANTRAUKA

Šiandieniniame pasaulyje rizikos ir grėsmės samprata valstybių saugumui neapsiriboja karine galia, bet yra daugiau funkcijų dėl savo formos ir efekto, polinkio prasiskverbti pro valstybių sienas bei išsiaukti bendradarbiavimą globaliu mastu. Todėl globalus saugumas tarptautinių institucijų dėka buvo pradėtas asocijuoti su darniu vystymusi – sąvoka, kuri apibūdina politikos formavimą siekiant subalansuoti aplinkosauginius, socialinės lygybės bei ekonominius aspektus. Kanada kaip viena įtakingiausių šalių, rodo ambiciją eliminuoti globalias rizikas ir užtikrinti tarptautinį saugumą, kurio siekia labiau daugiašaliu principu po vyriausybės pokyčio 2015 m. Darbe siekiama įrodyti Kanados sprendimų priklausomybę nuo daugiašalių institucijų, taip pat ir diplomatiją bei ekonomines paskatas kaip valstybės propaguojamas veikimo formas tarptautiniuose santykiuose. Tyrimas turėtų adekvačiai pavaizduoti konkrečius Kanados veiksmus bei suteikti pagrindų apmąstymams ar tokie metodai yra sėkmingi siekiamų tikslų atžvilgiu.

Tyrimo objektas yra saugumo ir darnaus vystymosi strategijos šiuolaikinėje Kanados užsienio politikoje. Tyrimo tikslas yra išanalizuoti saugumo ir darnaus vystymosi strategijas, vyraujančias Kanados užsienio politikoje, atvejose skirtuose kontekstuose – geopolitikosje, aplinkosaugosje ir ekonomikosje.


Darbe atliekamas tyrimas parodė, jog saugumo strategijos Kanados užsienio politikoje yra stipriai priklausomos nuo tarptautinių institucijų kaip tarptautinio teisėjo ir jų suteikiamų gairių politikos formavimui. Tokia pozicija yra ilgalaikė toli, kol tarptautinė sistema išlieka ne dvipolės tipo. Taip pat Kanados naudojamos saugumo strategijos glaudžiai sutampa su visomis Jungtinių Tautų skelbiamomis 17 darnaus vystymosi strategijų. Geopolitinė Kanados strategija apima plačiausią rizikų ratą, taip įrodant Kanados ambiciją suprasti pasaulinį veikimą kaip jos suvereniteto pareigą, o aplinkosauginė ir ekonominė strategijos yra papildančios viena kitą. Taip pat Kanados veikimo metodai tarptautiniuose santykiuose yra paremti sąmoningu savo užsienio politikos apribojimu,
kuomet tarpusavio priklausomybės institucionalizavimui pasiekti yra naudojama diplomatija ir ekonominės paskatos.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADCD – Anti-dumping and countervailing duties
ASEAN – The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CAF – Canadian Armed Forces
CARICOM – Caribbean Community
CDIA – Canadian direct investment abroad
CPTPP – Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
EU – European Union
FTA – Free trade agreement
GHG – Greenhouse gas
MERCOSUR – Southern Common Market
NAFTA – North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO – Non-governmental organisation
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SDG – Sustainable development goals
SEMA – Special Economic Measures Act
TPP – Trans-Pacific Partnership
U.S. – United States
UN – United Nations
UNA – United Nations Act
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
INTRODUCTION

Long gone are the days when security in international relations was understood in a simple, physical, territorial way. No longer do states seek security only via military methods. Nowadays, in evermore globalizing world security can be understood as multicomplex term, achieved not only through military but also by diplomatic methods, and encompassing different dimensions like geopolitics, sovereignty, environment, economy, society. These dimensions are almost always to certain degree addressed by states in their foreign policy, and has become both the motive and the foundation of foreign policy, depending on the state in question and its values. Decisions made at global level produce strong consequences for local populations, and likewise, local practises generate consequences which carry impact in distant regions.\(^1\) Attempts on a national-only level are just not enough to address border-permeable risks. In fact, environmental, economic and societal security have become so dominant in international relations since the end of the XX century that United Nations put it under the umbrella of sustainable development, which seeks the balance between economic prosperity, equity and ecology in order to preserve the rights of both the present and future generations.

Sustainable development has become one of the most sought after objectives of states, but is plagued with ignorance and interpretations by states when beneficial due to the nature of methods in addressing the issue – global cooperation and pulling certain weight on their own. Some find the weight to be unevenly balanced and call for justice based on past sins and progress, while the others are keen on maintaining status quo as far as the current international system goes. Regardless, sustainable development has become one of the leading topics when it comes to state security as it is today, and deserves an emphasis when speaking about security in international relations as it is often cited in foreign policies. In order to achieve security and sustainable development, states form strategies in their foreign policy which are used internationally to ensure own interests. Of course, the understanding of security differ state-by-state, and it is usually based on particular state’s national identity and the contemporary decision-makers, responsible for the policy making at home.

Canada as an international actor is quite influential to international system. Its international weight is underpinned by its membership to influential forums such as the Group of Seven and OECD, and military alliance NATO. The state is not a hegemon like the United States but resides right next to it and is somewhat overshadowed by it, though Canada’s dependency on its bigger neighbour can hardly be denied. Regardless, Canada does possess its own voice and doesn’t lack ambition when it comes to foreign policy, emphasising elimination of global risks and the building of international

security as a core responsibility to the Government of Canada in its National Security Policy. Security and sustainable development strategies in Canadian foreign policy are important to analyse because they have a global effect. Not only do they influence states via bilateral relations but also shape an ever-changing international system. After all, Canada is the co-creator of institutional and legal framework upon which the post-war international system was built. And an increasing multipolarity and raising number of international organisations allow non-hegemon states like Canada exert its influence more freely, as opposed to during the times of bipolar system of the XX century. Nowadays, diplomatic measures are just as useful as the military. Thus it is important to underline the strengths and weaknesses of Canada’s security strategies, and what international effect they may have. In this paper the most emphasis is put on Canada’s security strategies in the context of geopolitics, environment and economy, as the risks in these sectors are considered by the World Economic Forum to be the most threatening due to their impact and/or their likelihood.

Novelty and relevance of the topic. The year of 2015 in Canada was the beginning of the “long awaited change,” initiated by the results of Canadian federal election that put Canada’s Liberal Party as runners of the parliament with majority of the seats allocated to them, and the party’s leader – Justin Trudeau – as the Prime Minister of Canada and the face of the country. From conservatives to liberals, this change is not only visual but is also based on a new ideological approach, and, as Justin Trudeau had put himself, “returning back to compassionate and constructive” voice that Canada had been losing over 10 prior years. With the new leader taking the reins in 2015, Canada has turned unilateral approach, favoured by the previous government, to multilateralism, has favoured even more free movement of trade, less interventive military operations and has taken a bigger part in participation to resolve global ecological and humanitarian crises. Such policy is best illustrated with the new reliance on United Nations (with bombing missions against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant coming to an end and more funding coming to UN efforts to conflict resolution), the Trans-Pacific Partnership, bringing in war refugees from the Middle East, ratification of the Paris agreement.

The question of Canadian foreign policy since Justin Trudeau became the Prime Minister lacks research in the academic field, with University of Ottawa’s Centre for International Policy Studies in 2015 releasing an analysis titled “Towards 2030: Building Canada's Engagement with Global Sustainable Development” focusing on reflections of development tendencies in XXI century.
and recommendations for the future, and John W. McArthur’s oral presentation “Aligning Canadian Engagement with the Global Sustainable Development Challenge” providing suggestions as well, mainly focused on societal challenges.

Academic literature on Canada’s foreign policy exist, but it does not analyse its strategies in the context of its readiness in tackling contemporary global risks. The School of Public Policy of University of Galgary in 2017 released a report titled “Trends in International Security and Trade”, focusing on Canada’s trade and market opportunities, and risks associated with them in the near future. But the report deals with only a fraction of Canada’s foreign policy – trade. A student Rowan A. Laird released a research paper titled “Dropping F-Bombs: Canadian Feminist Foreign Policy from Harper to Trudeau and Beyond” in 2018, focusing on feminist aspect of Canada’s foreign policy and its comparison between Trudeau’s cabinet and its predecessor Harper. Similarly, comparisons and contrasts of Trudeau’s foreign policy with its predecessor dominate in Richrd Nimijean’s article “Introduction: Is Canada back? Brand Canada in a turbulent world” in Canadian Foreign Policy Journal Vol. 24, 2018, but they are based on Justin Trudeau’s and his party’s promises during the 2015 election campaign, and the execution of the said promises. Similarly, Amelia Hadfield’s article “Maple Leaf Zeitgeist? Assessing Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Policy Changes” in the Round Table Vol. 106, 2017 evaluates Trudeau’s election campaign, his cabinet formation and changes in policies both domestic and foreign. All these works do slightly touch Trudeau’s foreign policy, but they fail to tackle what the author is trying to achieve with this paper – showcase Canada’s security strategies during Trudeau’s tenure with no intention of comparison to its predecessors.

An in-depth analysis of Canadian foreign policy and the country’s role in international system after 1989 is done in Marcin Gabrys’ and Tomasz Soroka’s 2017 monograph “Canada as a Selective Power”, in which the scholars analyse the shift of Canada’s ideology in its foreign policy based on its actions, with the intention of painting Canada’s role in the international system. Similarly, Norman Hillmer’s and Philippe Legasse’s 2018 monograph “Justin Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy” deals with Canada’s role in the international system, just with more emphasis put on the personality of Justin Trudeau rather than the Canada as a whole. These monographs do somewhat coincide with what this paper is trying to achieve, but at the same time this paper is different insofar it does not solely focus on the Canada’s role in contemporary international system, as well as having different methodology. This paper is trying to paint Canada’s strategies in tackling contemporary global risks, and what kind of influence it has on other states as a result.

David McDonough’s edited monograph titled “Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats” was released in 2012 with the initiative of research institutes for the strengthening of Canada’s foreign relations. The monograph does focus on the strategic analysis of Canada’s national security concerns, resulting in 14 chapters, and offers a broad range of
approaches on how to improve Canada’s strategy to national and international security threats in the post–9/11 world. And while the monograph does take into account security threats as does this paper, the monograph itself identifies Canada’s national values and security threats on the basis of Canada’s national identity with the intention of improving them, whereas this paper focuses on the global risks that are articulated by the global community and Canada’s readiness and strategies in addressing them. The paper does not concern itself with ‘improving’ Canada’s foreign policy but rather shedding the light on the strengths and weaknesses of Canada’s security strategies in contemporary world. In addition, this paper provides the most up-to-date information regarding Canada’s foreign policy compared to the ones mentioned above, and is due to be released in 2019, the same year Canada will hold new federal elections and form new government. Thus this paper shall provide legitimate enough strategies undertaken by the Trudeau cabinet.

**Research problem.** At the top of a state’s priority list is security and sustainable development, which can be both a motive and/or a result behind the state’s foreign policy. As Canada is one of the most powerful countries in the world – not a hegemon, but an influential state nonetheless – and has experienced a shift in ideology with the arrival of Justin Trudeau cabinet in 2015, it is necessary to set a framework of its contemporary security and sustainable development strategies, thus allowing us to see what kind of impact the strategies have on the international system and influence on other states.

**The object of the research.** Security and sustainable development strategies in contemporary Canadian foreign policy.

**The goal of the research.** To analyse Canada’s foreign policy security and sustainable development strategies in the contexts of geopolitics, environment, and economy.

**The tasks of the research:**

1) To explain the security factor in state’s policy formation, define the main goals and strategies of sustainable development, and provide neoliberal point of view to international relations;

2) To analyse security and sustainable development strategies in Canadian foreign policy in the contexts of geopolitical, environmental and economic security through document analysis;

3) To provide analysis of the coexistence of geopolitical, environmental and economic security strategies in Canadian foreign policy via the use of comparative analysis and comparison;

4) To evaluate strengths and weaknesses of Canada’s security and sustainable strategies in contemporary international system.

**H1:** Canada’s security strategies are heavily reliant on multilateral institutions, whether it is for interstate cooperation through institutional framework or policy guidelines promoted by multilateral organs.
**H2:** In its relations with other states, Canada’s actions are more in line with the methods of diplomacy and economic incentives (carrots) rather than its military power and coercive actions (sticks).

**Research methods.** This paper relies on scientific literature, document analysis, and comparative analysis.

First and foremost, *analysis on scientific literature* is done to build the foundation of this paper. Among the topics of interest were the evolution of risk and threat to better comprehend contemporary sources of insecurity for states. The relevance of security in state’s policy formation was also emphasized in the analysis, as well as the politicization of sustainable development via the reports from the United Nations. Such analysis has helped paint possible goals and methods of states in pursuit of security in their foreign policy. In addition, ideas of neoliberalism were analysed to better frame international actions in security theme.

Secondly, *document analysis* was employed in finding out Canada’s security strategies in its foreign policy. The source of information is official website of Global Affairs Canada – a legitimate institution of Canadian government responsible for the state’s foreign policy and diplomatic relations. Although it acted as the main source of information, at times attention was diverted to the writings of other institutions of contemporary government. Of such occurrences it was always written in this paper in their respective places. The analysis was divided into three categories based on their type: geopolitics, environment, economy. Such decision was taken based on the most dangerous risks due to their potential damage and/or likelihood in contemporary world. During the document analysis emphasis was put on tangible actions rather than rhetoric. More about document analysis can be found at subsection 2.1 titled *Research methodology*.

Finally, *comparative analysis* is done in finding out links between different security strategies in Canada’s foreign policy, as well as in testing three presumptions that were revealed in the paper. Analysis is done on geopolitical, environmental, and economic security strategies in Canadian foreign policy, which was done previously via *document analysis*. Such comparison helps this paper evaluate security strategies, do conclusions about their execution and emphasise their strengths and weaknesses.

**Literature and sources.** In order to build theoretical framework for this paper, both the writings of scholars and reports from international organisations were employed. Among most cited scholars in this paper are security experts Anthony Giddens, D. S. L. Jarvis, Ulrich Beck, Barry Buzan. A lot of influence this paper has also taken from the writings of Ole Waever for the analysis of state security and salient existential threats. Robert Keohane, Georg Sorensen, among others, has helped paint neoliberalism framework for this paper, whereas various United Nations reports were used in emphasising and legitimating sustainable development in international relations.
The research part of this paper relies on primary sources supplied by Global Affairs Canada, including free trade agreements, annual spending reports, legislation acts, and etc., as well as relevant documents supplied by different institutions of the same government.

**Structure of the paper.** This paper consists of introduction, two main sections, conclusions, recommendations, list of literature and sources. The first section is divided into four subsections, each devoted to building theoretical background for the paper. The four subsections deal with the concept of threat and risk, security in state’s policy formation, sustainable development goals and strategies, neoliberalism in international relations school of thought, respectively. The second section of the paper is dedicated to the security strategies in Canadian foreign policy. The section is fragmented into five subsections. The first one deals with the methodology of the research, the following three subsections are dedicated to geopolitical, environmental, and economic security strategies of the state, respectively. The fifth subsection is composed of the comparative analysis of the coexistence of security strategies in Canadian foreign policy. The paper ends with summarized conclusions and recommendations.

The structure of the paper consists of three parts. In the first part the concepts of threat and risk are explained, their isolation through five different sectors and the effects they have on the formation of state’s policy. The first part ends with a look at sustainable development goals and strategies, possible challenges of their implementation. The second part consists of document analysis of security and sustainable development strategies in Canadian foreign policy. The last part is made of obtained conclusions from the research and recommendations for the future.

**Main Concepts:**

**Existential threat:** an entity or an object that is perceived by a state to be threatening to its existence – sovereignty, legitimacy, security.

**Security strategy:** a set of conscious, planned and sustainable actions with an objective to tackle the issue of an existential threat undertaken by a state.

**Geopolitics:** geographical or foreign political changes, and/or actions undertaken by foreign actors which carry the implication of a possible change to a state’s sovereignty.

**Environment:** matters involving climate change, natural resources, extreme weather events, natural and man-made disasters, biodiversity, which may pose serious consequences for the generations of the present and/or future, and therefore require a present international action.

**Economy:** processes involving interstate trade, import safeguards, foreign direct investment, as well as economic sanctions on international actors.
1. THE CONCEPTS OF SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN STATES’ POLICIES

This section is dedicated to the concepts of threat and risk, explaining the problems that states face, and how the said problems have evolved with modernization in the XX century. Also, security factor in the formation of state’s policy is discussed, five different sectors of security and certain criteria that do make a problem a matter of security is underlined. Emphasis is put on the process of securitization – the process of elevating a certain problem to a political agenda. Afterwards, the paper discusses UN proposed 17 Sustainable Development Goals and possible strategies in achieving the proposed goals. This section ends with a dedication to international relations and foreign policy as seen by neoliberal institutionalism and complex interdependence, including a homage to classical liberalism, from which its neo counterpart has morphed.

“Therefore those who win every battle are not really skilful – those who render others’ armies helpless without fighting are the best of all”6 – is a quote from the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, whose teachings about outsmarting one’s opponents from the book “The Art of War” have been incorporated by many up to current times – from military to sports and even politics. The same quote can be applied to the link between security and risks, with the security being attributed with the task of avoiding an altercation with possible risks through preparation and knowledge, thus eliminating threats and risks without direct contact with them.

1.1 The concepts of threat and risk

In Merriam-Webster dictionary, the term threat is defined as 1) “an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage”, 2) “one that threatens”, and 3) “an indication of something impending”,7 whereas the term risk is defined as 1) “someone or something that creates or suggests a hazard” and 2) “the chance that an investment (such as a stock or commodity) will lose value”.8

To highlight the various forms in which risks come into our lives, sociologist Anthony Giddens in 1998 at London School of Economy and Political Science asked the following question: “What do the following have in common: BSE (mad cow disease); the troubles at Lloyds; the Nick Leeson affair; global warming; drinking red wine; declining sperm counts?”9 The general opinion of possible risks and benefits associated with the subjects above has shifted due to modernisation. The

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questions show the impact that global advancements in science and technology have had on our lives. Because of technology and science, risks in the form of unintended consequences for the environment, as well as our health and wellbeing have emerged as a threat to society.\textsuperscript{10} Contemporary risks might be financial, technological, environmental, medical, personal, local, national and global – all of which can be read upon in newspapers, from terrorist attacks to international conflicts, to economic recessions, to side-effects of a particular medicine and etc.\textsuperscript{11} The threats might come from outside just as much as from within the state, with opponent’s foreign policy or even its strategic doctrine being the prime example of it.\textsuperscript{12} The latter might manifest into or at least set a precedent for a security dilemma, thus creating for a state an ever-lasting and highly taxing risk from outside its borders.

When speaking of global risks of XXI century, we must highlight the potential danger associated with risks and separate them from hazards of the past. By analysing Ulrich Beck, Darryl S.L. Jarvis claims that historical hazards such as various plights, famine and natural disasters have been rolled back or even ameliorated entirely by industrial society, the same society which has given us a new variety of risks.\textsuperscript{13} The new risks are caused, according to Beck, by conscious actions of society, whereas the hazards are uncontrollable occurrences, which can be suppressed or avoided due to science and technology.\textsuperscript{14} In other words, society’s aim for maximum gains and elimination of hazards has made itself transform into industrial society and, as a result of technological and scientific advancements, gave birth to global risks that can hardly be insured. Those risks include nuclear, chemical, genetic and ecological mega-hazards.

When speaking of insurance factor, Beck gives the following example: “If a fire breaks out, the fire brigade comes; if a traffic accident occurs, the insurance plays.” However, this example does not apply to the sheer destructive power of nuclear power plants, which cannot be simply resolved.\textsuperscript{15} History has shown us with the Chernobyl disaster that a complete resolution of such nuclear accident is out of the question and the only answer to it is to take extreme measures in order to limit the damages in the aftermath as much as possible. And yet, the consequences of the accident are still felt

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{15} Ibid, p. 11.
\end{thebibliography}
to this day, 30 years later. With ever advancing science and technologies, protection is paradoxically diminishing as the danger grows.\textsuperscript{16}

However, the reality is not as grim as it might appear from reading the subsection above. States take extra precautions and rely on various actions in specific sectors to avoid accidents such as Chernobyl and, most importantly, remain secure from threats and risks. The effect of security factor in a state is described in the subsection below.

1.2 Security factor in state’s policy formation

All states seek security, it is the basic goal of theirs. With security comes certainty and freedom. And the more power a state has, the more secure it can feel. As Kenneth N. Waltz puts it, security empowers states to act freely and provides them with a wide variety of choices regarding their own foreign policy formation.\textsuperscript{17} However, security is not a synonym for power as it was during the World Wars in the past. In the post-Cold War world, security has become more multifaceted and complex.\textsuperscript{18} As Barry Buzzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde declare: “Security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object. The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them.”

The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or take special powers, to handle existential threats. Traditionally, by saying “security”, a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development.\textsuperscript{19} However, the term \textit{existential threat} should not be mixed with a universal standard to what threatens an individual human life.\textsuperscript{20} The question of existential threat will vary greatly depending on the referent object,\textsuperscript{21} therefore international security is distinguished to five different sectors: political security, military security, economic security, societal security, environmental security.\textsuperscript{22}

Political security. In this sector, existential threats are usually defined in terms of the state’s sovereignty or ideology. The questioning of recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority is considered as an existential threat to sovereignty.\textsuperscript{23} This also applies to supranational organizations,
which require member states to integrate specific common rules and laws. In such case, it is not impossible for a conflict to arise, since the integration can be interpreted as a threat to the state’s sovereignty. Paradoxically, the state’s failure to fully submit to integration can be seen as a political threat to the organization itself.

**Military security.** This sector encompasses the state itself as well as its military. Military security assures the state’s ability to protect its citizens. And any threat to the state’s military can be interpreted as an existential threat, except in the cases of the state’s military being called upon to support world order activities abroad, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. Military security is warranted through arms production or arms deals with other states, thus increasing own arms arsenal and potential military power.

**Economic security.** It is hard to pin down exactly what economic threats are due to the competitive setting in which many economic actors participate in. But during economic crises, states do make the conscious choice of determining those existential threats to economic security and, as a result, choose to “save” them. Economic security determines the state’s latent power – raw economic potential – which can be extracted to and invested to military prowess when competing with other states.

**Societal security.** Societal threats are considered to be large scale collective identities, such as nations and religions. They evolve in accordance to internal and external developments, and may become liable due to the nature of identities and one’s perspective to its social status in the society. Regardless, societal security remains to be a factor in contemporary prevalent conflicts and may easily lead to politics of discrimination and exclusion.

**Environmental security.** Existential threats in this sector are ecological problems, such as global warming, greenhouse gas emissions, decaying layer of ozone and etc., which heavily influence global security with droughts and rising sea levels all over the world. The periphery countries that are unable to cope with these changes might cause chaos through mass migrations, consequently putting societal security at risk for both recipient and consignor. Therefore, when challenged with natural disasters and such, they require assistance from more advanced countries, regardless of the geographical proximity between a helper and recipient.

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Each of these sectors are important for state’s policy formation and are usually intertwined together in conflicts. What helps resolve them is the process of securitization, which assists in formulating existential threats and justifies taking extreme measures against them. Formulated by Ole Weaver, *Securitization is a process initiated by state’s elites, usually through rhetoric, to elevate the severity of a problem or development, thus transforming it into an existential threat.* However, the power of constructing the security issue should not be done by a single person, otherwise there would be no difference between the speech act and the subjective perception and interpretation of the security threat.

Another variable to securitization is the audience’s reaction. The audience has a choice of accepting or declining the proposed securitization of a problem, and only with the audience’s consent can the extraordinary measures, which include breaching of regular political procedures, be justified. A similar process just on a grander scale is Barry Buzan’s *macro-securitization*, which aims to include other states to try to eradicate the problem, thus making an issue a global one. A perfect example of *macro-securitization* is U.S.’s ‘War on Terror’, which forced other states to choose a side (Bush’s “you are with us or against us” ultimatum) and join U.S. in the ‘War on Terror’. Terrorism has been securitized into a very resonating and existential threat despite the fact that there are way less victims from terrorism than from road crashes, for example, thus showing the effects of securitization, or in this case, macro-securitization. Similar to securitization just working the other way round is *de-securitization*, which aims to demote the severity of a problem, making it not as important.

Successful resolution of existential problems is vital when speaking of a state and its policy. United Nations have underlined 17 sustainable development goals, which should help states remain secure by taking certain measures to achieve them. More about sustainable development is written in the subsection below.

### 1.3 Sustainable development goals and strategies

Sustainable development is best understood as it was described by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (UNCED) in the document *Our Common Future* in

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1987: “Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” With the document, the groundwork for future global cooperation was set. The report was followed by UNCED's *Earth Summit* in 1992, in which international community came to an agreement on climate change and biodiversity, followed by World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, in which commitment to sustainable development was reaffirmed. 10 years later, in 2012, at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), international community of 192 states renewed their commitment to sustainable development once again by adopting non-binding resolution *The future we want.* In 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted a new resolution titled *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* – a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity, in which *The 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets* were outlined to help states create a prosperous future for themselves and their descendants.

**1 Diagram.** The 17 Sustainable Development Goals.

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<td>10. Reduced Inequalities</td>
<td>11. Sustainable Cities and Communities</td>
<td>12. Responsible Consumption and Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Climate Action</td>
<td>14. Life Below Water</td>
<td>15. Life on Land</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Peace, Justice and Strong institutions</td>
<td>17. Partnerships for the Goals</td>
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**Source:** created by the author based on *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (2015).
To reach set targets, states have to adopt certain measurements in their policies, thus creating a strategy. “A sustainable development strategy is defined as a coordinated, participatory and iterative process of thoughts and actions to achieve economic, environmental and social objectives in a balanced and integrated manner at the national and local levels. The process encompasses situation analysis, formulation of policies and action plans, implementation, monitoring and regular review. It is a cyclical and interactive process of planning, participation and action in which the emphasis is on managing progress towards sustainability goals rather than producing a “plan” as an end product.”

A strategy should consist of a combination of long term orientation, medium term objective and short term action. But due to the loose nature of non-binding resolution that leaves space for interpretations, some states tend to exercise their freedom of overlooking certain regulations if it best suits their needs. Strategies of Small Island Developing States focus on economic and societal development, while neglecting environmental. Similar trends can be spotted in the policies of the world powers, with U.S., for example, not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and threatening to withdraw from the Paris Agreement due to potential relative losses compared to those of other countries being too high.

When considering ecology part of sustainable development, there are two strategies to address the environmental risks. As articulated in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, countries should seek the mitigation of climate change – to minimize the causes of climate change, such as the limitation of greenhouse gas emissions – and the adaptation to climate change – to adapt to the effects caused by the climate change, such as the appropriate management of water resources, protection and rehabilitation of areas affected by droughts and desertification, and etc. Adaptation is seen as an answer to the vulnerability of associated with anticipated negative impacts of climate change; and together with mitigation, the overall answer to the environmental threat of climate change. The importance of adaptation to climate change is further strengthened with the ever increasing process and effect of modernisation of societies.

Scientific and technological development has made it possible to increasingly exploit limited natural resources, and thus has led to the accumulation of harmful emissions and non-decomposable

wastes.\textsuperscript{50} With further modernisation in the contemporary world, attempts for a more effective mitigation of climate change might be present in states’ policies, though severely restricted and limited due to the prioritized importance of economic development, which fundamentally go against the preservation and protection of natural resources. It is safe to assume that the effects of climate change and other environmental threats will only be augmented with time, and together with it – the role of adaptation to the climate change.

2 Diagram. Three pillars of Sustainable Development and three associated conflicts.

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\end{center}

\textbf{Source:} D. R. Godschalk. Land Use Planning Challenges: Coping with Conflicts in Visions of Sustainable Development and Livable Communities. P. 6,\textsuperscript{51} customized by the author.

There are many factors upon which a state's sustainable development strategy depends: “<…> economic circumstances, constitutional arrangements, political practises, administrative traditions, institutional capacities, established divisions of responsibility among ministries and the specific juncture at which the country started the process, as well as explicit decisions about how to engage with the national Sustainable Development strategy challenge.”\textsuperscript{52} And even though sustainable development strategy implementation might be entangled with intrastate as well as interstate conflicts, it has become an accepted meta-narrative, shifting from being a variable to being the parameter of the debate.\textsuperscript{53} No longer is it left in policy formation margins but has become the focal point of policy agenda.

There are a number of international relations theories that each offer a unique perspective to the developments of relations between states. This paper recognises the theory of neoliberalism as the most suitable for this research, and thus provides theoretical background of its main ideas in the subsection below, with some attention to its predecessor – classical liberalism.

1.4 Classical liberalism and neoliberalism in international relations

Neoliberalism in international relations has emerged as liberals’ response to the criticism towards their ideas from realists and the sudden popularity of neorealism during the Cold War. The theory was developed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, and shares certain similarities with neorealism. In fact, some scholars go as far as calling both neoliberalism and neorealism as basically the same theory. Ole Waever has termed the similarity as neo-neo synthesis, which became possible the moment liberalism and realism had morphed into their respective neo versions. Both neo theories do have important similarities: recognition of anarchic international system, states as the most important and rational actors, and the value of international institutions in serving the needs of the states. But the author of this paper recognises neoliberalism as different enough to warrant a more in-depth look into the theory. Although at first, underlining the main ideas of its predecessor – liberalism – is necessary as well, to gain a better understanding of neoliberalism point of view towards international relations. Thus, the following two sub-subsections are dedicated to liberalism and neoliberalism, respectively.

1.4.1 Classical liberalism and Kant’s perpetual peace

Classical liberalism has its roots in the writings of such historical philosophers as Hugo Grotius, John Locke, Immanuel Kant. Grotius wrote that every man should help each other, and any man unwilling to supply help to another with the means to do so should be accused of violating the law of human society. This law is not something tangible but is based on moral principles and human fellowship, and can be transferred from individual level to state level. Locke went even further, claiming that the rights of states are an extension of their individuals. The right to life and liberty represent political independence, whereas the right to property – territorial integrity, thus providing the liberal foundation of international law. The respect of rights of individuals and states

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56 Csajko, K. D. Hugo Grotius and the liberal tradition. 1987. Portland State University. Available at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4720&context=open_access_etds
are vital to liberals. Because only constitutional states which establish and enforce the rule of law, can be capable of dealing with other states in accordance with norms and mutual toleration.\footnote{Jackson, R. H. Jackson, R. Sorensen, G. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches. 2012. Oxford: Oxford University Press.}

Transporting a bit further in time, Kant emphasised three pillars of perpetual peace among states – democracy, international organisations, and economic interdependence.\footnote{Russett, B. Liberalism. In Dunne, T. Kurki, M. Smith, S., eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd Edition, 2013. Oxford: Oxford University Press.} All of these pillars, working in isolation as well as in uniform, are an important part to international peace. Not only that, but the peace itself strengthens the institutions that are responsible for its upkeep. It is a two-way effect that is thought by liberals to be of the most importance. Deriving from Kant’s framework, liberals believe in the rational qualities of individuals, have faith in the progress of life, and are convinced that humans, despite their self-interest, are able to cooperate and construct a more peaceful and harmonious society.\footnote{Ibid.} To further analyse these points, individuals act as rational creatures and, since states are an extension of individuals, mutual norms and rules in the form of international law are inevitable. According to Jeremy Bentham, it is only rational for constitutional states to adhere to international law in their foreign policy.\footnote{Jackson, Jackson, Sorensen, Op. Cit. p.101.}

The second point – faith in progress – might sound nice but it also brings certain concerns. Jackson, Jackson and Sorensen raise the following questions regarding liberal progress: “How much progress? Scientific and technological for sure, but also social and political? What are the limits of progress? Are there any limits? Progress for whom? A small number of liberal countries or the entire world?”\footnote{Jackson, Jackson, Sorensen, Op. Cit. p.101.} It is true that progress is seen as rational and only logical in the development of human species. But there comes a time when progress in one sphere of area is a direct regress in another. Arguably, the world environment has never been in a worse state and that is due to the progress in economy and advancements in technology. And it is hard to believe that any further progress in economy in the context of its scale will have any other effect but damage to the ever-deteriorating environment, unless properly addressed. As for the third point – belief in cooperation despite self-interest – it separates liberals and their belief in absolute gains from realists and their relative gains.
The Kantian idea of perpetual peace is strengthened by the decreased number of conflicts in XX century. When the number of autocracies decreased and democracies increased, when memberships to international organisations increased, and when interstate economic ties increased as well, the number of battle-deaths from interstate, internationalised internal and internal battle types have all seen massive drops. Of course, an argument can be made for correlation is not necessarily causation. After all, technological advancements have introduced deadlier and less forgiving tools, such as WMD. Regardless, the Kantian principles did have a positive effect on the reduced amount of conflicts, and continues to do so by conscious decisions taken by states. The more influence Kantian principles have on states, the less resources they allocate to military sector. Obviously, the less resources in the sector mean less military development and less interstate conflicts, though it may also compromise police and peacekeeping missions.

But Kantian principles are not some sort of panacea and are severely limited when applied to states that are not so democratic. As Bruce Russett declares, democracies do not fight other democracies but they do quarrel with autocracies and anocracies, including a frequent use of force. According to him, there is little evidence to conclude that democracies are more peaceful in general unless the relations are strictly between two democracies. An argument erupts between liberals

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67 Ibid.
about the approach to apply towards states that are not democratic – respect their liberty of self-determination or try to show them the way of democracy?

Georg Sorensen has emphasised two different strategies of liberal foreign policy, terming them Liberalism of Imposition and Liberalism of Restraint.\(^6^8\) Liberalism of Imposition is imperialistic insofar as it seeks the expansion of liberal principles and to directly influence foreign state with values of the home state; whereas Liberalism of Restraint might be best described as liberal as it emphasizes pluralism, noninterventionism, respect for others, cooperation on equal terms.\(^6^9\) One is aggressive while the other one is passive in their methods of application. The debate between the two strategies is multifaced and complex. Restraint is more in line with democratic values but may lead to quiet acceptance of massive human suffering, whereas imposition in its essence is somewhat illiberal and illegitimate in the context of self-determination.\(^7^0\) It is evident that different countries choose different strategies, with the former more advocated among smaller and less powerful states whereas the latter among bigger, with ambitions of hegemony.

From liberal values written above and as a result of the criticism of realism, neoliberalism has formed into a theory, emphasizing, most of all, international institutionalism and complex interdependence, of which more is written in the sub-subsection below.

**1.4.2 Neoliberalism and complex interdependence**

Neoliberal institutionalism adopted certain characteristics of its realist counterpart, including the articulation of relative state power and competing state interests as being of the utmost importance in the world politics, but at the same time forming new conclusions about the role of international institutions in the interstate practises.\(^7^1\) The idea that self-interest of states has just too much influence on their decisions to sometimes reach consensus has led to the neoliberal analysis of interdependence and the scenarios during which the interdependence is the most salient, as opposed to broken negotiations. The emergence of interdependence is recognised as only natural due to the anarchic system of international relations, which has left a vacuum that is being filled with human-created processes and institutions.\(^7^2\) However, it is also important to emphasize that states remain the most important actors, as international organisations are seen only as a tool at their disposal.

If looked at in what scenarios or under what circumstances interdependence is sought after instead of relative gains, Keohane somewhat emphasizes the effect of polarity of international system

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\(^6^9\) Ibid.

\(^7^0\) Jackson, Jackson, Sorensen, Op. Cit. p.128.


on the outcome. According to him, relative gains will always be more salient between two major actors, as the outcome might shift power relationship.\textsuperscript{73} Therefore, \textbf{interdependence in bipolar international system is less frequent. But in a multipolar and/or unipolar system, power dynamics are not so important, thus allowing more room for interdependence and absolute gains.} In addition, contemporary agendas such as climate change and interstate trade are global in scale due to globalisation and technological advancements, and warrants cooperation as otherwise the competitional advantage might be lost.

The changed circumstances have also meant that neglecting cooperation and interdependence has become too costly for states. As stated by U.S. political scientist Richard Rosercrance, we no longer live in times where the possession of territory and ample natural resources are the key to greatness; nowadays, highly qualified labour force, access to information, and financial capital are the keys to success.\textsuperscript{74} These keys are volatile insofar they depend on open borders and democratic institutions, and any conflict, military or other, involving state of interest might have grim repercussions for its appeal in regards to contemporary keys to success. It includes superpower states like the United States, for which the costs of bilateral “arm-twisting” would be too great despite its vast pool of resources.\textsuperscript{75}

The process of complex interdependence is important because it provides transparency and eliminates the unknown. Perhaps the best example of destructive effect a lack of interdependence may have can be showcased by game theory’s \textit{prisoner’s dilemma}. Under a scenario where no significant cooperation between two states exist, there forms a void of knowledge about each other’s intentions that may lead to an arms race, as was between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War. Eventually, it becomes rational to induce cooperation when a state perceives the payoff from it to be greater than the continued race.\textsuperscript{76} But because of the lack of information, a contending state might perceive that the opponent is playing another strategy, therefore abstain from offering cooperation and thus continuing the arms race.\textsuperscript{77} Here comes international institutions, which become a medium of communication between the member states and provide transparency, thus eliminating the unknown and creating a terrain of mutual interests for parties.

International institutions help states negotiate mutually beneficial agreements because of guaranteed payoff structures that have formed from repeated interactions and reciprocity.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{73} Keohane, Op. Cit. p. 2.
\textsuperscript{74} Jackson, Jackson, Sorensen, Op. Cit. p. 106.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
Furthermore, success of cooperation is advanced due to increased number of interested parties that are not limited to states. For example, in the context of energy security issue, under the conditions of complex interdependence, among states the players include energy NGOs, environmental groups, lobbying groups, multinational energy corporations, so the result might be not so self-centred. And most importantly, interstate cooperation in one area, especially in free movement of goods, services, and capital, might greatly facilitate cooperation in other areas between the same states. Under neutral conditions between states, they might be unwilling to cooperate on environmental or societal risks. But because of the existing practise of economic cooperation and the interest to preserve that cooperation, possibilities for cooperation in new areas arise.

It is important to emphasize the importance of the role of institutions in interstate cooperation. While realists agree with the need of states to cooperate and/or form alliances according to the balance of power, neoliberalism goes even further insofar they institutionalise cooperation. Under such relations, states comply with the norms and rules embodied in institutions, both in good times and bad, and go as far as even relinquishing part of their sovereignty and autonomy over important policy areas. It somewhat signifies the ever-diminishing role of a state as single unitary actor in international relations. It can be argued that this relinquishment of authority to institutions provides states with more security. After all, under complex interdependence, states become more concerned with ‘low’ politics of welfare and less with ‘high’ politics of national security. That is, because of the changed international relations environment (at least among democratic states), physical security from threats like military are already somewhat guaranteed and given compared to the times of the past. So the agenda of interstate cooperation involves questions that are more prevalent for bigger masses of populations, such as social security, economic flourishment, human rights and etc. According to Keohane and Nye, international organisations and conferences sometimes provide opportunities for de facto or active coalitions of national groups within and across governments that may even supersede the state’s argument of ‘national interest’. The cooperation is not only limited to states but also to various organisations and coalitions, both in the process of forming a policy and in the execution of policy.

But the role of states is still the most important in international relations even under the complex interdependence conditions. It is true the actions of a state are limited by certain institutions, but the state itself holds a leash over the same institutions. Of course, the degree of influence states

possess over institutions differ state by state based on relative state power and finances. The permanent Security Council members of the UN will always have the most influence as long as the current structural hierarchy will remain in the organisation, just as the U.S. will never not be the deciding factor of NATO as long as it finances the lion’s share of the organisation’s defence expenditure.\(^{84}\) Consequently, neoliberal research programme known as principal–agent theory has emerged, which examines how states as principals delegate tasks and authority to international institutions which serve as their independent representative – agent – within particular issue areas.\(^ {85}\) “Because differences arise between what states want as principals and what institutions do as agents, states simultaneously develop mechanisms for controlling organizational influence and autonomy.”\(^ {86}\) However, although in the initial stage states as principals may have a strong position over its agent, over time, due to institutional and policy reforms, in the longer run transform their own positions in unanticipated and undesired way.\(^ {87}\) It signifies many opinions and interests of principals that all are grouped and united under one agent institution. Eventually, the delegated power of agency morphs into a policy that principals have to implement, though it is more prevalent in supranational institutions.

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Historically, the minimization of the threat and risk factor in the form of insurance from unconscious hazards has always been in the best interest of states. But technological advancements, which did give partial or even complete resolution to the hazards, have also led to a new variety of risks – risks, created by conscious actions of people, so dangerous that no possible insurance can redeem potential losses to the humanity and damage to the environment. In other words, they are an existential threat to a state, whose elite group raise the issue with its public to justify the taking of extreme measures in order to gain security and/or remain secure from the threats. The same existential threats can be present to a number of different states, thus becoming the catalyst for interstate cooperation.

Nowadays, a universal understanding (because of the securitization process committed by the world leaders over the years) exists that the Earth is strictly limited in its resources and opportunities. An existential threat to the whole world. As a result, UN have declared the 17


Sustainable Development Goals, which should help more than 192 states welcome a better tomorrow. The states are encouraged to reach economic, societal and environmental objectives in a balanced matter through strategic planning and action. But because of the anarchic international system, some states prefer to overlook certain aspects of the sustainable development regulations if they find it to be more endangering to their sovereignty.

However, neoliberal institutionalism sees international institutions and interstate cooperation as the vital ingredients of long-lasting peace and progress. Built upon the foundation of Kantian’s principles and influenced by the criticism of the theory of realism, neoliberalism emphasizes the rationality of states and good nature of people, and believe in idealistic world. Although power dynamics are taken into account, they are not recognised as the deciding factor as long as the polarity of international system is multipolar, and international institutions remain the desired judges of international norms and principles. Mutual interests and values are respected, both from good will and from the fear of reciprocity, and absolute gains are sought after. Under complex interdependence, civil society is elevated and international system involves coalitions and alliances that permeates national borders, including NGOs, transnational corporations, other interest groups and etc. And while democracies are more peaceful between each other, there is little evidence to suggest they are more peaceful in general as the likelihood of democracies quarrelling with autocracies or anocracies remain high.
2. SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

This section is dedicated to the introduction of qualitative research done in this paper. The purpose for the method of document analysis is expressed, as well as all the variables that help frame this particular research. The need of research for the case of Canada is briefly described below, as well as the results of the research and possible implications that do arise with the new findings.

**Reason for the case of Canada.** Canada is one of the most influential countries in the world economics wise, belonging to such influential international forums as *Group of Seven* and *Group of Twenty*. But the Harper government, which ruled Canada from 2006 to 2015, was rather impotent and timid in the world arena, and instead focused on isolationist foreign policy, which had little effect to the states around. With Justin Trudeau becoming the leader of the government in 2015, for the first time in ten years, Canada and what looks to be its reinvigorated foreign policy has become a subject of global interest. The research is necessary to ascertain how Canada copes with international risks, and whether its strategies have an effect on international order. Therefore it is necessary to analyse security and sustainable development strategies in Canadian foreign policy, and what effects as well as potential implications they might create for other states.

This paper emphasises three areas of security – geopolitical, environmental and economic. While military and economic prowess have been historically emphasised as the most important to state survival, environmental aspect is known to be neglected. However, ever deteriorating situation of the world’s environment for the sake of economic prosperity forces states to pay more attention to the issue of diminishing natural resources. Not only do the effects of environmental scarcity exploit the possibility of progress for future generations but may also cause armed interstate conflicts for the generation of the present. The case of Canada is appealing because: a) Canada appears to be a beacon of liberal ideas in the world that sees the rise of nationalistic tendencies; b) the non-existent language barrier due to English being one of the two official languages of the country, thus allowing to take an in-depth look at its policy; c) the question at hand is recent and policy research in Canadian foreign policy lacks empirical research, which is absolutely vital for the connection between abstract theories and real-world politics.

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89 Ibid, p. 198.
2.1 Research methodology

Analysis is done based on a research on one country – Canada. The purpose of the research is to ascertain security strategies in Canadian foreign policy in three different contexts: 1) geopolitics; 2) environment; 3) economy. Therefore, this section is divided into three subsections, each analysing the mentioned dimensions in Canada’s foreign policy. These three particular dimensions were chosen as best portraying the nature of contemporary global risks due to their impact and/or likelihood, as articulated by the World Economic Forum. A case can also be made about societal security. However, this paper is of opinion that societal risks are fairly limited to Canada at local level, and the implications of societal risks for Canada’s security are somewhat encompassed enough in the contexts of geopolitics, environment, and economy, for example mass migration or humanitarian insecurity in failing states are connected with the security contexts of geopolitics and environment in this paper.

To reach the purpose of finding out Canadian security and sustainable development strategies in its foreign policy, a research method of document analysis is used. It encompasses the analysis of Canadian foreign policy through official writings and documents of Global Affairs Canada on its official website. Global Affairs Canada is a legitimate source of information as it is a department of Canadian government and is responsible for the country’s diplomatic and consular relations, and international development. However, in some cases, source of information is other departments of contemporary Canadian government, or even international organisation that Canada cooperates with. Regardless, in both cases the different source of information is emphasised in its respective place, and the departure from Global Affairs Canada website is made either due to its lack of expertise for a certain question (for example, environment-related policies) or due to limited information (for example, not painting the whole picture of international organisation-related practises).

Regarding the context of geopolitics, it encompasses both political and military security, and include matters of Canada’s foreign policy legitimacy, ideology, sovereignty, participation in international treaties, military, arms deals and etc, if it is defined and emphasized by its elite group (the government) as an existential threat. World Economic Forum in its 2017 Global Risks Report has put emphasis on the following geopolitical risks due to their impact and/or likelihood: weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks, interstate conflict, failure of national governance, failure of regional or global governance, state collapse or crisis. The paper recognizes these variables as the most important in geopolitical security strategy. Therefore, it is important to legitimately display concrete actions taken by Canadian government on WMD, as well as show what kind of support, if

any, Canada provides to failing states, portray military actions on foreign ground as well as the ways to stop terrorism. To do so, the following analysis criteria have been formulated in determining geopolitical security strategy:

1) Stance on weapons of mass destruction;
2) Support for fragile states or other problematic zones;
3) Military action priorities;
4) Means to counter terrorism.

**4 Diagram.** Geopolitical security strategy criteria.

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Environment encompasses ecology, natural resources and threats to them, natural disasters, climate change, biodiversity, and include matters of Canada’s foreign policy legitimacy, ideology, sovereignty, participation in international treaties and organizations, and etc. World Economic Forum in its *2018 Global Risks Report* has underlined the following environmental risks due to their impact and/or likelihood: extreme weather events, natural disasters, failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation, man-made environmental disasters, biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse. By using the mentioned report as a guidance, the following analysis criteria have been formulated to ascertain environmental security strategy:

1) Canada’s international action on climate change;
2) Support for states suffering from extreme weather events and natural disasters;
3) Recognition of and international action against man-made environmental disasters;
4) Preservation of international biodiversity and ecosystem.

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The formulated criteria should help paint a legitimate picture of Canadian environmental strategy by displaying concrete actions taken by Canadian government on climate-change. It should also show what kind of support, if any, Canada provides to states suffering from disasters that were caused by natural events, portray stance and actions against man-made disasters, as well as depict the methods of safeguarding biodiversity.

When it comes to economy, priority is given to interstate trade, import safeguards, foreign direct investment, as well as economic sanctions, and include matters of Canada’s foreign policy legitimacy, ideology, sovereignty, participation in international treaties and organizations, and etc. The preceding points are recognized to be in accordance to two of the four Global Affairs Canada priorities (strengthening the rules-based international order; pursuing a progressive trade agenda). They are also important variables to the concern expressed by World Economic Forum about the rise of protectionist trade, and may have direct effects in addressing sustainable development goals, such as no poverty, gender equality, decent work and etc. Therefore, the following analysis criteria have been formulated to shed the light on economic security strategy:

1) Canada’s international free trade agreements;
2) Canadian foreign direct investment abroad;
3) Anti-dumping and countervailing duties;
4) Economic sanctions on international actors.

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6 Diagram. Economic security strategy criteria.

The criteria written above should comprehensively show Canada’s position and actions when it comes to international trade. It should also portray the state’s involvement in national economies abroad, underline sensitive sectors of economy at home, as well as elaborate on Canada’s use of economy as a stick against other states.

The timeframe for the research is November 4, 2015 – present. The start of the timeframe is the day on which the current Canadian administration was sworn in and began its governance. The timeframe should adequately represent the actions and tendencies of Canadian government, and fulfill the object of the research.

2.2 Canadian geopolitical security strategy as defined by Global Affairs Canada

To evaluate Canadian geopolitical security strategy as it is presented on Global Affairs Canada website, a manual navigation through the website was done in order to attain the most up to date information. It is important to note that contributors of the information to the website regarding Canada’s actions on the topics of interest are not exclusive to Global Affairs Canada department, but also includes the following departments or agencies of the contemporary government: Public Safety Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. Regardless of contributing department, they are all part of Trudeau cabinet. Nonetheless, all the information is gathered from Global Affairs Canada website, where official actions of Canadian foreign policy can be found.
2.2.1 Canada’s stance on weapons of mass destruction

To find out Canada’s stance on WMD, sections of the website which had information on nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, as well as information on weapons of mass destruction on more abstract level, were analysed. More attention is given to tangible actions regarding the weapons of mass destruction (Table 1).

1 Table. Canada’s stance on WMD.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of WMD</th>
<th>National stance</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WMD in general</td>
<td>Non-proliferation and counter-proliferation;</td>
<td>WMD Threat Reduction Program, participation in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative, assistance in the implementation of the UNSCR 1540;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons</td>
<td>Non-proliferation and disarmament;</td>
<td>Participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, cooperation with international partners and organizations, signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, advocate of Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, participant of disarmament negotiations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical weapons</td>
<td>Non-proliferation and destruction;</td>
<td>Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention, assistance to other states with its implementation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological weapons</td>
<td>Non-proliferation.</td>
<td>Participation in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, assistance to other states with its implementation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: created by the author.

WMD in the hands of terrorist organizations and states of proliferation are recognized as posing a serious threat. The presented data is based on the different types of WMD to showcase the similarity and contrast between the stance on them. The position of non-proliferation of all types of WMD dominates as a uniform decision. In addition, certain stance (disarmament, destruction and etc.) is present based on the specific type of weapon, depending on commitments via international treaties. Canada participates in different types of partnerships and conventions each for a different type of WMD. It has Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Reduction Program (WMD TRP), dedicated to assuring national and global security against WMD, and through it supports other
initiatives in the fight against WMD. The most attention by Canada is given to nuclear weapons, signified by the sheer amount of commitments regarding non-proliferation and disarmament of them.

Two treaties dedicated to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons – Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) – have not yet been finalized. The former is responsible for banning all nuclear explosions. It has been ratified by Canada, but the treaty is not in effect due to the lack of ratifications from other treaty members. Canada understands this treaty as an important step towards denuclearisation of global world but lacks initiative in the pursuit of its ratification by other states. As for FMCT, the treaty is still in negotiation process and hasn’t been drafted yet, but its focus is the prohibition of production of fissile material, both in civilian and military use, used for giving the weapons their explosive power. Despite the early stages of the treaty, Canada proposes recommendations to the treaty in order to advance its drafting.97 This shows Canada’s willingness to restrict the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, including any possible production in its own territory. But this willingness can be debatable as Canada has one of the largest stocks of highly enriched uranium – one of the fissile materials its production Canada seeks to prohibit.98 Although Canada doesn’t produce the material itself, the state’s practise of importing and using it as a fuel for nuclear research reactors doesn’t help its cause in prohibiting its production, although it has been moving towards low-enriched uranium as an alternative;99 perhaps in preparation for FMCT.

It is also worth noting that Canada gives a great attention to the assistance work to other states in their quest to meet their own commitments for non-proliferation of WMD. Via WMD TRP, Canada helps other countries with the ability to address biological threats; has assisted with the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia, Libya and Syria.100 Canada also participates in multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises, designed to tackle illicit trafficking of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials. The threat of WMD in the hands of terrorist groups is recognized as posing a serious danger.

Analysis of Canada’s stance on WMD provides a great example of international organizations being used as a tool to fulfil the state’s individual purpose. Although the topic of WMD usually correlates with collective purpose, Canada is still heavily relying on organizations for continuous non-proliferation of WMD. As Canada has no WMD itself and has obligations not to

acquire them, it is best of its interest to make sure that no other country possesses them as well, otherwise the threat to its existence would pose a much greater danger. In addition, Canada provides assistance to other countries which seek the disarmament of their WMD arsenal. If countries do not comply with non-proliferation commitments, Canada is ready to exercise economic sanctions against them in a collective manner with other allies, as is the case against Iran and North Korea.\textsuperscript{101} Though more about Canada’s assistance to failing states is written in the subsection below.

\textbf{2.2.2 Canada’s support for fragile states}

Another important variable of Canada’s geopolitical security strategy is its support to fragile states. Through the manual navigation of Global Affairs Canada website, the information on Canada’s peacekeeping missions, humanitarian aid, conflict resolution and international assistance was searched. Emphasis was put on the financial expenditure of Canada’s international assistance through either multilateral or bilateral institutions, with Global Affairs Canada’s annual Statistical Report on International Assistance working as a source of information for all the expenditure of all types of financial aid to foreign countries in the period of 2015-2016 through either bilateral or multilateral institutions (Chart 1). Exactly the same research for the paper was done twice more, first a year later for the period of 2016-2017 (Chart 2), and a subsequent half a year later for the period of 2017-2018 (Chart 3) – the time period for which the newest data existed. All the findings were compared to each other to underline the recent tendency of Canada’s support for fragile states.

\textbf{1 Chart}. All aid expenditures through bilateral and multilateral institutions in the period of 2015-2016 (in millions of Canadian dollars).

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{All aid expenditures through bilateral and multilateral institutions in the period of 2015-2016 (in millions of Canadian dollars).}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Source}: created by the author.

More than 2/3 of the all types of aid expenditure to fragile and conflict-affected states in 2015-2016 have come through bilateral institutions, whereas little less than 1/3 – through multilateral institutions. The top recipients include Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Ghana, Pakistan, Jordan, Ukraine, Syria and so on. Most of the aid goes to the continent of Africa, followed by Asia and so forth.

2 Chart. All aid expenditures through bilateral and multilateral institutions in the period of 2016-2017 (in millions of Canadian dollars).

For the period of 2016-2017, aid expenditure through multilateral institutions slightly shrunk, but overall increased minimally due to bigger reliance on bilateral methods. Now, about 3/4 of all types of aid expenditure to fragile and conflict-affected states in 2016-2017 have come through bilateral institutions, meanwhile about 1/4 – through multilateral institutions. The top recipients in order include Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Jordan, Haiti, Mali, Tanzania, Syria and so on. Most of the aid still goes to the continent of Africa, followed by Asia, Americas, Middle East, Eastern Europe. Percentage wise of the total aid, the biggest aid increase was given to Middle East, Asia, whereas the aid for Africa, Americas and Eastern Europe slightly decreased.102

As for the fiscal year of 2017-2018, total aid to foreign countries saw a steady increase from the previous year. Percentage wise, the difference of aid through multilateral and bilateral institutions has remained the same as in 2016-2017. But while comparing the amount of all types of aid to foreign countries from 2015-2016 period to 2017-2018 period, in absolute numbers the expenditure through multilateral institutions has remained roughly the same, whereas through bilateral institutions it has increased roughly by $675 million Canadian dollars, signifying Canada’s recent tendency to focus on direct cooperation with foreign states rather than multilateral institutions. During this period, the biggest recipients of Canadian aid remain Afghanistan and Ethiopia, followed by Tanzania, Mali, Nigeria, Jordan, Bangladesh, and so on.

Most of the funds to fragile states are dedicated to development programs, which focus on agricultural and economic growth, education, reduction of social inequalities. A lot of emphasis is put on the issue of gender inequality, with Canada launching National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 (the Action Plan) to advance women, peace and security agenda. To address the issue of violence and security instability, in 2016 Canada launched new Peace and Stabilization Operations program (PSOPs) to provide security and create space for dialogue in fragile states. It is intended to work in partnership with international community in the assistance of local societies to build peace and stability. It is important to note that the aid towards fragile states is in line with sustainable development goals, as is signified by already mentioned women empowerment as well as Canada’s financed projects to advocate for climate smart agriculture in Central America, climate risk management in Africa, and etc. For climate-sensitive projects Canada has plans to dedicate a total of $2.65 billion Canadian dollars in the period of 2015-2021, with $801 million Canadian dollars having already donated.103

Although Canada assists fragile states through multilateral organizations, it does not solely rely on them. The amount of funds dedicated through bilateral institutions show that Canada is ready to take initiative in global governance. It is supported by the Action Plan, which was created as a response to UNSCR 1325, which address women’s challenges as well as potential in global peace and security.\(^{104}\) It appears that advocacy for gender equality might become a major part of Trudeau administration identity, as it is also one of the 17 UN Sustainable Development goals. And despite the less part of funds coming through multilateral institutions, and the tendency to possibly rely on them less by focusing more and more on bilateral institutions, Canada’s reliance on multilateral means still remains quite significant as with the issue of WMD. Canada and its PSOPs recognizes UN as the biggest platform to spread its voice on the initiatives like UN reforms for peace sustainability, sustainable development goals and civilian protection from armed conflicts.

Analysis of Canada’s assistance to fragile or failing states gives ground for the basis that Canada’s geopolitical security strategy is trying to eradicate a problem at its source; Canada is trying to deal with the causes of the threat rather than the consequences. Fragile states which for reasons such as terrorism, civil war, poor governance and etc. become the source of poverty, unsafety, human rights violations and, possibly, the catalyst for the emergence of extremist groups. Nonetheless, the aftermath of fragile states is not ignored, as it is supported by more than 40,000 Syrian refugees resettled by Canada from November 4, 2015 to January 29, 2017.\(^{105}\) As for Canada’s fight against another phenomenon linked with fragile states – terrorism – it is elaborated in the subsection below.

2.2.3 Canada’s means to countering terrorism

Third variable of Canada’s geopolitical security strategy is its mechanism to counter terrorism. Through manual navigation on Global Affairs Canada website, the search for information regarding terrorist groups was done. During the search, the author was redirected from Global Affairs Canada website to the website of Public Safety Canada, which is department of Canada, with responsibility to protect Canadians and maintain their security. During the search for information about countering terrorism, emphasis was put on foreign rather than domestic policy (Chart 4).


Canada recognizes a total of 55 terrorist entities, with all of them being listed on Global Affairs Canada website. In this paper, the terrorist groups were grouped by the author, depending on the region in which they operate, to underline the geographical distance of the threat. The grouping of Transnational encompasses terrorist groups that operate across several regions, e.g. Islamic State which has carried out attacks in Middle East, Asia and Europe. Canada’s list of terrorist entities is reviewed every two years, with the last review having been done on November 21st, 2018, and the last entity – HASAM operating in Egypt – added to the list on February 11th, 2019.

Most of the terrorist organizations operate in Asia, Middle East and Africa. Part of them were created to overthrow local government and/or establish their own governance, whereas others to remove Western influence from their region. The result of the said terrorists has included kidnapping and death of Canadian citizens – a direct attack against Canada. Only few organizations operate on European and American soil. The two terrorist entities that operate in North America are Canadian, and although they themselves did not carry out attacks, they have participated in the acts of intimidation and fund sending to organizations with links to Hamas – a foreign terrorist group.

Locally, Canada has established Kanishka Project and Community Resilience Fund, both designed to fund research projects that analyses extremism and radicalization, as well as taken extra measures to assure the safety of commercial aerial flights. Globally, Canada participates in Global Coalition to Counter Daesh – an international community, which encompasses over 60 countries and organizations, to defeat Islamic State. In February 2016, Canada introduced a new strategy to counter Daesh with an investment of $1.6 billion over three years for the Middle East region ($840 million in

**Source:** Created by the author.
humanitarian assistance, $270 million in development assistance, $145 million in stabilization and security assistance, and $305 million in military assistance).106

The allocation of funds to counter Daesh coupled with the huge amount of financial aid to help fragile states rebuild indicate an approach by Canadian government that advocates for inclusive and sustainable local governance. Such point is strengthened by the ceased Canadian air strike operations in Syria in 2016, focusing on supplementation of surveillance and Canadian Armed Forces training local security forces instead.107 This approach seems only logical considering the direct threats to Canadians posed by terrorist groups in the danger zone. With less Canadian personnel participating near the threat zones, the risk to their lives lessens. Also, the motive behind the creation of some terrorist entities (to counter the Western influence) loses its value on terrorist part, though it can be argued that Canada supplying the training for local forces can be seen as threatening enough from the terrorists’ point of view. Nevertheless, the approach shown by Canada to counter Daesh appears to be safer for its own citizens, empowering for local communities and beneficial for the host states. Just like with the assistance to fragile states, Canada’s strategy against terrorism is concentrated on the eradication of its causes rather than consequences. More about the Canadian Armed Forces is written in the subsection below, concerning on their spheres of priority in the world arena.

2.2.4 Canada’s military action priorities

A look at Canadian Armed Forces is also necessary in ascertaining geopolitical security strategy. Global Affairs Canada website redirects to National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces website, which provides the information of all active and ongoing CAF operations. Through manual navigation, all the ongoing CAF operations were analysed, with more emphasis put on the operations that carry implications of addressing geopolitical threats (Chart 5). If none of the tasks of a mission address a geopolitical issue (e.g. bettering military cooperation between two states, tackling illegal trafficking at sea, and etc.) then the mission was grouped with other operations.

If at least one of the tasks of a mission does address a geopolitical issue (e.g. providing training for local forces of a fragile state, and etc.), the mission was grouped with geopolitical operations. Furthermore, all geopolitical operations were divided into three additional subcategories: unilateral for the missions that are organized by Canada alone, bilateral for the missions that exclusively concern only Canada and one other country, multilateral for the missions that are in cooperation with multiple countries and/or through international organizations.

107 Ibid.
20 out of a total of 32 active Canadian military missions were found to carry the implications of a risk to geopolitical security. Out of 20, 2 operations concern Canada alone as forces of no other country participate in the organization process of the operation, though they may participate in the operations itself as invited guests. 3 out of 20 geopolitical operations concern only Canada and another single state. The rest of geopolitical operations encompass CAF missions in cooperation with multiple states through international organizations under their mandate or under the leadership of a single state with a number of partners.

All of Canada’s unilateral operations raises the issue of a threat to Canada’s sovereignty. At least one of the objectives of the said missions is to maintain Canada’s sovereignty and make sure of its security in the near future. Up to the year of 2017, operation NUNALIVUT, which was an annual operation, “asserted Canada’s sovereignty over its northernmost regions” and protected the country in the Arctic region. The same objective dominated in two other CAF unilateral operations – operations NUNAKPUT and NANOOK. However, in 2018 both operation NUNALIVUT and NUNAKPUT were terminated, and their objectives transferred to still active operation NANOOK. Unlike NANOOK, the only other active unilateral operation LIMPID does not focus exclusively on the Arctic, with the operation being that of a surveillance all around Canada’s territory, seeking to

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Source: created by the author.

detect threats to the country’s security as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{109} Although the participation of foreign ally in the said missions is possible, it is not emphasized as a significant nuance. These missions show the biggest geopolitical concern of Canada in the region. Whereas the risk of fragile states, terrorism and WMD seem distant due to them being attributed to countries far in the east, the question of the Arctic and Canada’s sovereignty because of it is ever important due to the sheer closeness and possible losses in an unwelcome turn of events. Therefore, unilateral operations in the Arctic are seen to be necessary to maintain the security at present and guarantee a better preparation for the future.

\textit{Bilateral} and \textit{Multilateral operations} also raise the issue of a threat to Canada’s sovereignty, however the threat here is not as close as with the \textit{unilateral operations}. Most of the former missions seek to train local forces in fragile states, as well as provide equipment or humanitarian aid, and/or advocate for the human rights. Through operation NABERUS, Canadian military trains its counterparts from Niger, so the latter would be capable enough to counter terrorism in their region on their own.\textsuperscript{110} Similar case is with the operation UNIFIER, which is designed to provide tactical soldier training to Ukrainian forces and development to Ukraine itself.\textsuperscript{111} Only in the minority of missions do CAF risk of getting into close proximity of the danger, as is the case with operation ARTEMIS, through which CAF, in cooperation with allies, help directly fight terrorism in Middle Eastern waters.\textsuperscript{112}

Canada’s approach to military operations against geopolitical threats appear to be inclusive and supportive. In cooperation with organizations or foreign countries themselves, Canada mostly participates in training operations, trying to promote local governance and put the responsibility of directly fighting the threat of terrorism (or any other type of entity that threatens the sovereignty of the locals) on local forces. As a result, not only does Canada ensure the relative safety of its forces (compared with the alternative of participating in direct confrontation with the threat) but also strengthens the means and ways in achieving peace in zones of troubled regions. It also helps build bilateral connection between two countries and promotes multilateral global governance through organizations. Although, when it comes to the geopolitical security in its own region, Canada expresses the threat that might manifest in the north and north only. Annual operations are organized to address the issue in the north and prepare for a possible crisis manifestation.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-naberius.page. Last accessed: 2017/12/02.
\item \textsuperscript{111} National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad/op-unifier.page. Last accessed: 2017/12/02.
\item \textsuperscript{112} National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-artemis.page. Last accessed: 2017/12/02.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
It is also important to note that among 12 other operations, of which 9 are unilateral and involve only Canada, and remaining 3 are of bilateral nature, the most frequent common denominator is environment related operations. For example, under operation LENTUS CAF responds to natural disasters such as forest fires, avalanches, and etc. in the territory of Canada.\textsuperscript{113} They have little impact on geopolitical situation of the world, as thus arguably signified by 0 out of 12 other operations being of multilateral nature. It means Canada emphasizes multilateral military cooperation only for geopolitical threats that are of quite some geographical distance from it.

Canadian geopolitical security strategy is heavily focused on supportive and inclusive actions. It underlines the importance of local communities and their forces addressing the issue in their region themselves, and therefore Canada seeks to assist and train the said local population. Such position is present in fragile states, for which Canada provides humanitarian aid, as well as, via its military, provides necessary training to counter terrorism and address the threat to regional peace. And such position appears to be dominating in Canada’s strategy to address geopolitical threats. Geopolitical threats are seen not as isolated threats, but as interconnected; fragile states and their failed governance creates the incentive for violation to human rights, become a perfect environment for the emergence of terrorist groups, which themselves might seek to obtain WMD. Therefore, Canada tries to eradicate the problem at its core – tries to help rebuild fragile states and restore peaceful governance true training. At the same time, Canada promotes peace, the human rights, local governance, and emphasizes women empowerment. Most of Canada’s active military operations are of multilateral nature, involving cooperation between many states under the mandate of international organisations, such as NATO or UN. As for the area close to its territory and the Arctic, Canada prefers to act alone and only seldom does it invite other states as guests to its unilateral operations in the North American area.

Another important dimension to state security on a global level is the environment. Although the effects of ever deteriorating environment might not be relatively fatal at this very moment, the implications of danger it has for the future if not properly addressed are severe. As for Canada’s environmental security strategy in its foreign policy, it is analysed in the section below.

2.3 Canadian environmental security strategy as defined by Global Affairs Canada

To evaluate Canadian environmental security strategy as it is presented on Global Affairs Canada website, a manual navigation through the website was done in order to attain the most up to

date information. It is important to note that contributors of the information to the website regarding Canada’s actions on the topics of interest are not exclusive to Global Affairs Canada, but also includes the following departments or agencies of the contemporary government: Canadian Heritage, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Department of Justice, Environment and Climate Change Canada, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, Public Safety Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Regardless of contributing department, they are all part of Trudeau cabinet. Nonetheless, all the information is gathered from Global Affairs Canada website, where official actions of Canadian foreign policy can be found.

2.3.1 Canada’s international action on climate change

To find out Canada’s actions on the question of climate change, sections of the website which had information on mitigation of and adaptation to the climate change were analysed. More attention is given to tangible actions that can be tracked and measured over time. Because of the nature of international agreements to tackle climate change requiring states to adopt certain measures on a state level, Canada’s action on climate change on a national level is also analysed (Diagram 7).

7 Diagram. Canada’s national action on climate change.

The Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change is Canada’s answer to the question of climate change on a national level. Presented diagram showcases concrete goals
and actions undertaken to tackle the issue of climate change within the territory of Canada. The actions are based on the framework and have set targets. All but two actions are aimed at the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere – the cause of climate change. Only two actions (climate-resilient infrastructure and support for indigenous communities) are aimed at the effects of the climate change when speaking of Canada’s plan within the state. Some goals and actions in part are directly related but must be separated due to the difference between them as a whole.

A number of methods can be recognized in Canada’s attempt to reduce GHG emissions inside the country. The dominating factor is energy, which is recognized to be either wasteful due to inefficiency or produced in not the cleanest way. Therefore, Canada seeks to build and renovate buildings with a more energy-friendly structure. In addition, the government aims to completely phase out coal-fired electricity and increase the production of electricity from non-emitting sources to 90% by 2030.\(^\text{114}\) Likewise, to tackle the 37% of total national GHG emissions coming from industry sector, the government, through investments, aims to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector by 40-45% by 2025.\(^\text{115}\)

Attention is also given to the management of GHG that are already released into the atmosphere. The government has a plan to enhance forests and national parks, making them even a greater sinkhole for GHG, and thus increasing the state’s capacity to mitigate climate change. Interestingly, though, only two goals of adaptation to the climate change at the national level is articulated. The government aims to strengthen infrastructure to better withstand the natural disasters. More importantly, Indigenous Peoples are recognized as the party of interest due to their unique circumstances and less able methods to adapt to changing climate. Therefore, the government, through community-based initiatives, seeks to build their capacity for adaptation to the possible effects of climate change.

The goals and actions written above are part of an international political agenda towards sustainable development in the world. They fall under UN the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement, for which Canada advocates on an international level (Diagram 8).

Diagram. Canada’s international action on climate change.

Source: created by the author.

Eighth diagram showcases Canada’s answer to the question of climate change on an international level. Most of these consist of international treaties, which propagate interstate cooperation to reach set goals and targets for the sake of common interest. Canada’s role in safeguarding biodiversity, and providing support for states suffering from natural disasters and/or extreme weather events – both of which are the effects of climate change – are not analysed in this subsection but in the subsections below. The action of funding the construction of energy-friendly infrastructure in developing countries is analysed in this subsection due to the action tackling the cause of climate change.

Like majority of states, Canada is ratifier of both the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement treaties, aimed to promote more environmentally-friendly planet through non-binding measures. The treaties are not the solution to the problem of climate change, but a tutorial towards the solution and assurance of the common input towards it. Canada’s participation in both treaties shows the country’s agenda for, above all, participation in global politics, interstate cooperation, saving the environment. Canada also recognizes that not all states are equally able to tackle the issue of climate change. As a result, in 2015 Canada has promised to aid developing countries by providing $2.65 billion over 5 years to sectors such as clean technology and renewable energy, climate-smart agriculture, sustainable forest and water management, and climate-risk resilience mostly through multilateral means and mobilized private-sector.116

The data also shows that Canada is concerned with the Arctic region. The effect of climate change has made transportation to the Arctic more accessible and, as a result, more prone to environmental risks. Through the Arctic Council, Canada participates in an intergovernmental forum together with seven other states and six Arctic indigenous groups. In cooperation with other members, Canada’s concerns include sustainable development and environmental protection in the North.117 Similarly, Canada is a member of Antarctic Treaty and subsequent Madrid Protocol, which articulate Antarctica as a peaceful region and a natural reserve, and not an object of international discord. The Antarctic Environmental Protection Act, which assigns responsibility to Canada’s institutions in regards to activities in the Arctic, is the result of the Madrid Protocol.118

The analysed data about Canada’s actions on climate change shows the country’s reliance on international institutions and agreements to provide the framework for actions on a national level. Not only that, but Canada is also showing leadership when it comes to accommodating necessary policies to tackle the issue of climate change. The government recognizes both the causes and the effects of this crisis, and in turn seeks its mitigation and adaptation to it mostly through funding and investments to necessary sectors. In addition, The Arctic region, which is a sensitive subject for Canada due to close geographical proximity to it, has promoted a special intergovernmental cooperation, though only in the form of forum so far. As for the states that are less capable to deal with the mitigation of the climate change, Canada funds certain sectors in developing countries to limit GHG emissions. As for Canada’s strategy in supporting the states dealing with the aftereffects of climate change, that is written in the subsection below.

2.3.2 Canada’s support for developing states suffering from natural disasters and extreme weather events

Important variable to a developed country’s environmental security strategy in its foreign policy is the support for developing countries, which are not capable to deal with the effects of climate change on their own. Therefore, through manual navigation on Global Affairs Canada website, Canada’s support for states suffering from natural disasters and extreme weather events is analysed. Information on Canada’s foreign humanitarian aid, response to environmental crises abroad, response to crises caused by the climate change is of the most importance in this subsection. Canada’s assistance to developing countries with the adaptation to climate change is presented below by showing a total number of foreign humanitarian aid projects organized via four funds – the Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund (EDAF), the Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Fund (CHAF),

118 Ibid.
the Canadian Foodgrains Bank Food Assistance Fund (Foodgrains fund), the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) – undertaken by Canadian government (Table 2).

2 Table. Canada’s participation in humanitarian aid funds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of fund</th>
<th>Establisher (and the year of the establishment)</th>
<th>Number of projects (and analysed time frame) in response to:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Foodgrains Bank Food Assistance Fund</td>
<td>Churches and church agencies with the encouragement of the government of Canada (1983)</td>
<td>32 (August 2016 – present)</td>
<td>43 (August 2016 – present)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: created by the author.

The information presented in the table above was gathered after analysing each particular fund and the projects that were organized under those funds. Humanitarian aid projects, under each particular fund, which were an answer to a crisis caused by extreme weather events and/or natural disasters are grouped under projects in response to climate change. Humanitarian aid projects, under each particular fund, which were an answer to a crisis caused by reasons other than extreme weather events and/or natural disasters, are grouped under projects in response to other reasons. The intention of this grouping is to showcase the difference of quantity of humanitarian aid support granted by Canadian government because of the climate change in contrast to other reasons, such as civil unrest, virus outbreak, refugee movement due to political reasons, and etc.

EDAF is Canada’s response to sudden small and medium humanitarian crises. It is administered by the Canadian Red Cross Society. The projects in this fund are limited to financial support to the third party – IFRC, which is responsible to organizing the physical part of the humanitarian aid. Since Trudeau’s cabinet took office, 101 projects were dedicated to fight the effects
of climate change, most of which came in the form of extreme weather events and natural disasters, such as floods, typhoons, cyclones and earthquakes. A small amount of projects are designed to diminish the damage caused by anticipated natural disaster, as was the case with Typhoon Haima in Philippines in October 2017. The timeframe of Canada’s support for a single EDAF project ranges from 3 to 12 months. As a comparison, less than one-third of total amount of projects were dedicated to reasons other than the ones caused by climate change.

CHAF is Canada’s response to smaller-scale, rapid-onset crises. The physical part of the humanitarian aid response is executed by the members of the Humanitarian Coalition, consisting of non-governmental organizations which are present in 154 countries worldwide. Canada’s role in this fund is limited to the financial support, which amounts to 75% of total budget. Out of 36 total projects executed under CHAF, 31 projects were as a response to climate change effects, mostly floods.

Foodgrains fund represents Canada’s support to developing countries facing problems limited to food and nutrition. Just like with IFRC and CHAF, Canada’s input to Foodgrains fund is strictly financial, whereas the physical part of the task is organized by 15 Canadian churches and church-based agencies. 32 projects under Foodgrains fund are dedicated to address the effects of climate change, mostly droughts, as opposed to 43 projects dedicated to reasons other than climate change, such as food scarcity for internally displaced, malnutrition practises, and etc.

CERF is Canada’s response to the need of rapid humanitarian relief by people suffering from natural disasters and armed conflicts. The fund was created by the United Nations and encompasses donations from UN member states, private donors, regional governments. Canada is among the top six donors of the fund, which prioritizes quick response to crises as well as support to underfunded emergencies. However, Canada’s yearly donations to the fund since 2015 has stayed around the same amount – around $22millions – and are lower to those of pre-Trudeau era. Information on specific projects financed by Canada is unavailable as the distribution of CERF money is left to the responsibility of the UN. Although, Canada does have a seat in 18-member Advisory Group of CERF.

In addition to funds listed above, Canada also has Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), consisting of Canadian Armed Forces and civilian experts. It is a unilateral project that was designed to help foreign countries respond to natural disasters and emergencies when the local

capacity is unable to deal with a crisis, after a submitted request by a victim country or an international organization. However, since its inception in 1998, DART have undergone only 7 missions, with the last one happening in the spring of 2015 under Harper government. There has been no DART missions under Trudeau cabinet.

Majority of Canada’s humanitarian aid is focused to countries suffering from natural disasters and extreme weather events. Humanitarian aid for reasons such as civil unrest and population migration plays a second fiddle in Canada’s foreign policy. Only through one aid framework – Foodgrains fund – does Canada finance humanitarian aid for reasons other than the climate change, but the difference is minimal, thus signifying an exception rather than a rule. It is also important to note that Canada’s support is transmitted through third parties. That is, Canada does not exercise hands-on approach and prefers to supply humanitarian aid to developing countries in need only through the financial transactions. Part of that is because the humanitarian aid projects that Canada participates in was created by either intergovernmental organizations – UN – or non-governmental organizations – IFRC, Humanitarian Coalition, Canadian church and church agencies. Although the latter two organizations did have and still do have a major support, both financial and ideological, of Canada. The only humanitarian aid operation that is conducted by Canada unilaterally is DART, which can be interpreted as ineffective due to its extremely low amount of missions, of which none were executed under the Trudeau government to this day.

Disasters of different kind to natural ones are man-made. Unlike the natural disasters which are the effect of climate change, man-made disasters are those that facilitate the climate change. Therefore, it is important to analyse Canada’s response to them, which can be found in the subsection below.

2.3.3 Canada’s recognition of and action against man-made disasters

Canada’s recognition of and action against man-made environmental damage and disasters was searched for by a manual navigation on Global Affairs Canada website. However, no information could be found on pollutions like oil spills and radioactive contamination, which have an effect on the environment and facilitate climate change. Via the use of automated search function on the website, the task was diverted to a website of Transport Canada – a department within government of Canada that is responsible for policies concerning policies of transportation of the country. Since the objective of the research is security strategy in foreign policy, and Canada has a vast access to oceans, and a lot of pollution concerning the environment happens in the waters, Vessel Pollution and

Dangerous Chemicals Regulations under Canada’s Shipping Act was analysed in an attempt to find concrete acts of pollution that the country recognizes (Diagram 9).

9 Diagram. Polluting substances in ocean vessels.

The logic behind the criteria of the diagram above is to showcase different sources of pollution that Canadian government recognize. They apply to both national and foreign vessels in the exclusive economic zone of Canada. Some polluting substances like oil and garbage are pretty self-explanatory. As for the more ambiguous ones: greywater stands for drainage from sinks, bath tubs and etc.; organotin compound in anti-foul system refers to any kind of surface paint or a device of the vessel, used to prevent the unwanted attachment of organisms to the vessel, that might become a biocide; other pollutants refer to marine pollutants in general that can be jettisoned by a vessel or a person on board.

The regulations seek to avoid any chance of environmental damage caused by a vessel by articulating, for example, a capacity at which oil tankers can legally carry oil. In other words, regulations seek to eliminate or at least limit the conditions prerequisite for an environmental disaster. The requirements of regulations were not set unilaterally by Canada but are incorporated based on International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). Likewise is the case with other recognized pollutant factors, such as anti-foul system, which must comply with IMO’s Anti-fouling Systems Convention. Not

all processes of pollutions are strictly prohibited as certain discharges of the mentioned substances are authorized under certain circumstances.

Besides ensuring that conditions for environmental damage are limited or eliminated, Canada oversees the waters that no events of pollution are present. Through National Aerial Surveillance Program, Canada monitors, besides other things, pollution in its waters. In addition, Canada’s environmental monitoring of coastal waters include satellite imagery under the Integrated Satellite Tracking of Pollution program. The monitoring is dedicated to the quick response to a possible pollution event as opposed to the regulations, which seek to avoid such cases as a whole. In addition, in 2016 Canada released its Ocean Protection Plan with an ambition to invest $1.5 billion over five years in coastal protections. However, the plan lacks tangible actions and cannot be the legitimate source of information regarding Canada’s stance on man-made disasters.

Canada’s actions against man-made pollution is based on international conventions, as is the case with its reliance on IMO to protect Canadian waters. Canada seeks to limit both the causes of pollution (or rather the conditions that facilitate pollution events) and its aftereffects. This strategy is concerned with man-made pollution in oceans only. The lack of address to terrestrial man-made pollution by Canadian government as far as its foreign policy go is prevalent across Global Affairs Canada website. The last sentence does not apply to Canada’s strategy to preserve biodiversity, which is elaborated in the subsection below.

2.3.4 Canada’s preservation of biodiversity and ecosystem

To find out Canada’s strategy on the issue of diminishing biodiversity and ecosystem, manual navigation of Global Affairs Canada website was used. However, the attention was redirected to websites of other departments of Canadian government, which possessed information on the protection of ecosystem – terrestrial and marine. Information of interest was found on websites contributed by Canadian Food Inspection Agency, dedicated to the protection of foods, animals and plants, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada, responsible for Canada’s interests in oceans and inland waters; both institutions are under the jurisdiction of government of Canada. More attention is given to tangible actions that can be tracked and measured over time (Table 3).
3 Table. Biodiversity preservation strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of ecosystem</th>
<th>Membership of</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine life</td>
<td>Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMO); economics-centred</td>
<td>Cooperated management of fisheries; restriction of illegal, unreported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organisations, such as Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.</td>
<td>and unregulated fishing; surveillance and restriction of illegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>practises; knowledge and practise sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetlands</td>
<td>Ramsar Convention.</td>
<td>37 Ramsar sites in Canada, protected by assigned institution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birds</td>
<td>Western Hemisphere Shorebird Reserve Network; Important Bird Area Program.</td>
<td>Science-based protection of bird sites and habitats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural and cultivated plants</td>
<td>International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC); North American Plant Protection Organisation (NAPPO).</td>
<td>Common approach to the prevention of plant pests; an international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>forum for science-based protection of agricultural, forest and other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>plant resources, while facilitating trade.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: created by the author.

The information about Canada’s role in protecting biodiversity and ecosystem was divided into four categories, based on the type of the ecosystem it seeks to protect. It was done so to sharpen the different methods chosen by the Canadian government in an attempt resolve this issue; the methods are reflected in the outcome column of the table, which either signify end result of the undertaken methods or an ongoing one. The column membership of of the table marks Canada’s membership in international organisations, which were in part or in whole created to tackle the issue of diminishing certain type of ecosystem.

Perhaps the most attention by Canada is given to the marine ecosystem. Canada recognizes that unsustainable fishing practises causes major damage to marine habitats.\textsuperscript{126} As a result, the country cooperates with other states through numerous regional fishing organizations. It also shares knowledge and practises in economics-centred organisations like OECD. As for practical means, Canada monitors and applies restrictions to illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing practises. Similar pattern is present in the strategy to preserve plants; Canada participates in intergovernmental organisations, through which it coordinates policies for plant pest control and discuss relevant

science-based information. It is also important to note that one of the goals of NAPPO is to facilitate trade\textsuperscript{127}, which might be somewhat conflicting with the goal of biodiversity of plants protection.

Wetlands and birds are part of Canada’s agenda in ecosystem protection, however these sectors are somewhat dwarfed in comparison to marine and plant ecosystems. It might be because wetlands and birds offer much less opportunity for economic development. Nonetheless, Ramsar Convention has resulted in Canada declaring 37 specific sites, of which are national parks, national wildlife areas, migratory bird sanctuaries, and etc., of international importance, thus naming them Ramsar sites. They are protected from factors like pollution and overuse, and are managed by assigned institutions. Similarly, Canada protects bird habitats through knowledge sharing in intergovernmental organisations, which don’t offer any more international cooperation than that.

International organisations dominate in Canada’s international action to preserve endangered ecosystem and biodiversity. Through organisations Canada shares and applies science-based information at home. However, somewhat worrying sign is Canada’s role of biodiversity protection in organisations like OECD and NAPPO. A place for forum to discuss scarce wildlife is always welcome, but the mentioned organisations are economics-driven – an eternal enemy of environmental security. OECD and NAPPO might compromise the efforts for the protection of biodiversity by prioritising the extraction of profits. It is also important to note that Canada does not see the loss of biodiversity as an effect of climate change. The diminishing ecosystem, or at least the threat of it, is attributed more to human error (poor management of fisheries, pollution and overuse of wetlands).

Canadian environmental security strategy is focused on both the causes and possible consequences of threatening factors. Methods that eliminate or at least limit the conditions necessary for environmental damage to occur are sought, while at the same time strategy that limits implicated damages is promoted. This stance is extremely prevalent in Canada’s fight against climate change. It recognizes the unrecoverable damage done to the environment and tries to adapt to the new conditions, while at the same time seeking mitigation of any new possible danger. The same approach is used in support for developing states, where both climate change driving and resulting factors are addressed. However, participation in organisations like OECD and NAPPO in the context of biodiversity preservation is slightly conflicting, since the organizations have an economic-driven agenda. It shows the signs that Canada is concerned with the environment, but to the certain extent for as long as it does not limit economic profits.

As for economic aspect of state security, it is often held in high regard due to empowering implications it has towards both the policy makers and the public. It is also not seldom when economy

is prioritised above environment, because the benefits of the former come much quicker. As for Canada’s economic security in its foreign policy, more is written in the section below.

2.4 Canadian economic security strategy as defined by Global Affairs Canada

To evaluate Canada’s economic security strategy as it is presented by Global Affairs Canada, a manual navigation through the institution’s website was done in order to attain the most up to date information. While collecting valuable information, websites of other departments or agencies of the government were also used, including Justice Law, Office of the Chief Economist, Canada Border Services Agency. Nonetheless, all the sources of information are recognised to be legitimate as they are official medium of communication of the contemporary government and its released legislative acts.

2.4.1 Canada’s international free trade agreements

To learn about Canada’s international agreements that facilitate interstate trade via reduced tariffs, sections of the website which had information on trade and agreements in general were analysed. Attention was diverted to each individual case of free trade agreement (FTA), in order to paint the scope of Canada’s trade relations through agreements. After the analysis of all international trade agreements Canada participates in, a contrast emerged between bilateral and multilateral FTAs, and their level of activity (Chart 6). Agreements are categorised according to the number of parties participating in them: bilateral for the FTAs concerning Canada and another single country, and multilateral for the FTAs concerning Canada and multiple other countries. In addition, both categories were sub-categorised even further based on the status of agreements. Being negotiated denotes FTAs that are at the initial stage of agreement discussion or negotiation, signed denotes FTAs that have already been agreed upon by the parties but awaiting ratification, ratified denotes FTAs that have already been ratified and in force.
6 Chart. Canada’s international free trade agreements.

![Diagram showing types of FTAs: being negotiated, signed, ratified. Bilateral agreements: 9 being negotiated, 6 signed, 11 ratified. Multilateral agreements: 6 being negotiated, 4 signed, 1 being ratified.](chart)

Source: created by the author.

It was found out that currently, Canada participates in a total of 31 FTAs, 20 of which are bilateral and the remaining 11 – multilateral. When it comes to bilateral trade agreements, majority of them are already active and in force. However, there is an ambition to start bilateral economic cooperation with nine other countries, pending further success in negotiations. There are no bilateral agreements awaiting ratification. As for multilateral FTAs, there are 6 blocs of countries with which facilitated trade is ongoing. 1 other bloc awaits ratification, whereas 4 other blocs are at the stage of negotiations. The numbers in chart show that it is easier to negotiate and finalise trade agreements with individual countries, where Canada can one-on-one work out differences and sensitive areas of bilateral trade. Opposed to that are multilateral FTAs, which do attract the attention of Canada. But due to the fact that they encompass multiple states each with their own agendas, it is much harder to find a common ground which would create a free trade area with uniform rules and regulations suitable for all parties, though possible.

The oldest ratified bilateral free trade agreement of Canada dates back to 1989, when Canada together with U.S. began their cooperation on economic front. It is somewhat symbolic that the closest neighbour of Canada became the first facilitated trade partner, with this cooperation remaining relevant to this day, though slightly altered. In 1994, the bilateral trade agreement was superseded by multilateral trade agreement called NAFTA, involving Canada, U.S. and Mexico. Its goal, among others, was the establishment of a framework for further regional cooperation and integration.\(^{128}\) It signifies the idea of liberalism, which elevates economic relationship above all, thus ruling any possible quarrel between the trading partners as practically impossible due to costly potential losses.

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from the lost trade. The success of NAFTA is signified by its longevity lasting up to this day, though its days are limited. A successive FTA to NAFTA by its parties has already been agreed upon, pending signature and ratification. Built upon NAFTA’s framework, new FTA between Canada, U.S. and Mexico will address, in addition, contemporary security concerns, including: increased percentage of production made nationally, more equal across all countries and better in general conditions for workers, environmental commitments, women empowerment and gender equality provisions.\textsuperscript{129} Although the first of the mentioned provisions do indicate signs of trade protectionism since there is an attempt increase production at home at the expense of imports, the rest of the provisions somewhat address UN goals for sustainable development, such as gender equality, decent work and working conditions, climate action.

Among Canada’s ratified bilateral FTAs, most of them include countries from the Americas. Outside the Americas, Canada has ongoing bilateral trade agreements with South Korea, Israel, Jordan, Ukraine. They are not only economic deals but also have goals of other kind. Jordan is recognised as a peace facilitator in the Middle East region, thus with FTA Canada tries to help Jordan with its capacity in continuing to be so. As for the FTA with Korea, Canada attempts to promote, among other things, sustainable development. And while majority of ratified bilateral FTAs are with the states in the Americas, 8 of the total 9 bilateral FTAs that are being negotiated are with the states outside the Americas, with the only exception being Dominican Republic. It somewhat shows Canada’s ambition to act and use its influence more globally, as is the case with FTA negotiations with China, which started in 2016. But not all ambitions come to fruition, as is the case with bilateral FTA negotiations with Turkey, and with Thailand. When it comes to the former, trade talks had started in 2010, but not much progress had been reached since the last meeting was held in Ankara in 2013.\textsuperscript{130} Similar script followed with Thailand, when the trade talks between the two halted in 2015. The exception is, though, that in 2017 Canada started multilateral FTA talks with ASEAN states, which include Thailand. A possible explanation for such turn of events is that Canada’s FTA objectives might have too many differences when put directly in contrast with one other state’s objectives, but the difference might shrink to non-relevant when compared with the objectives of many other states, as is the case with the example of FTA talks with ASEAN countries.

When it comes to multilateral FTAs, they are harder to agree upon, as evidenced by the amount of negotiations in contrast to ratifications of the agreements. Interestingly, ratified multilateral FTAs are NAFTA, Canada-European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Iceland, Lichtenstein,

Norway, Switzerland), Canada-EU, and CPTPP, with the latter coming into force in December 2018. As for the multilateral FTAs that are not in force yet, they include TPP, which is pending ratification only, as well as Canada-Mercosur and Canada-ASEAN, which are being negotiated, and stalled negotiations with CARICOM. The status of these agreements prove that it is easier to find the consensus with countries that are the closest (U.S., Mexico), and with those of similar values (EU, EFTA), since they all can be considered of the liberal west nowadays. But attempts are being made to broaden the horizons and include countries from further regions, countries that are not so close culture-wise. However, the success of these attempts is not guaranteed. And although TPP is in the most advanced stages when it comes to its realisation, separated from the implementation only by the lack of ratification, it is doubtful the agreement will come into force as the United States is reluctant to endorse the agreement, and the second version of the agreement – CPTPP – has come into force just recently as a substitute for the TPP. As for Canada’s deal with CARICOM countries, FTA negotiations stalled due to the differences in the objectives of the parties. The latter fact proves that Canada has a hard time finding common ground with countries that are geographically further away. Considering Canada’s tendency to add certain labour and environmental provisions, among other things, to its FTA deals, a possible cause of the deadlock might be just those provisions.

It is also important to note that all Canada’s international FTAs start with the following: “The Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations with respect to each other under the WTO Agreement and other agreements to which such Parties are party,” or a similar kind of sentence emphasising the role of the World Trade Organisation. It shows Canada’s belief in intergovernmental institutions as a legitimate arbitrator in case of an international dispute, a source of framework for trade and/or other kind, and paints the institutions as important actors in the international system. In addition, Canada tries to add provisions in its FTAs that are emphasised by the UN, such as the ones that have implications for sustainable development. However, Canada’s economic ties with foreign states are not limited to FTAs. Another important variable is foreign direct investment, of which is more written in the subsection below.

2.4.2 Canadian foreign direct investment abroad

Although not as impactful as FTA, FDI shows a country’s economic priority areas abroad and might be a precondition for a possible FTA in the future. It shows where investors from Canada have their financial stakes abroad, which have an impact on Canada at home. Thus, it is important to analyse to which countries Canada dedicates the most direct investment. The task was achieved

through manual navigation on Global Affairs Canada website on topics like trade, FDI agreements. Attention was diverted to the Office of the Chief Economist – a subdivision of Global Affairs Canada, which documents statistics on the amount of Canadian direct investment abroad in stocks over the years. A huge difference of the amount of Canadian investment assets between different regions emerged, and their tendency in the 2007-2017 timeframe (Chart 7). The following numbers were taken and rounded from Canada’s annual reports on trade and investment, for the years of 2007, 2013, 2015, 2017. The amounts are in millions of Canadian dollars.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>$311</td>
<td>$468</td>
<td>$638</td>
<td>$686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South America</td>
<td>$22</td>
<td>$37</td>
<td>$57</td>
<td>$56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>$148</td>
<td>$197</td>
<td>$271</td>
<td>$288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Oceania</td>
<td>$30</td>
<td>$95</td>
<td>$74</td>
<td>$84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>$2</td>
<td>$4</td>
<td>$7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: created by the author.

The chart was created to emphasize the stark difference between the regions that attract Canadian investors. The most stocks are held in North America, with their total value more than doubling in the last 10 years, reaching $686,000,000. A similar increase percentage-wise of Canadian stocks was documented in Europe, though their amount is still well behind the North American. Canadian stocks in Asia and Oceania remain relatively low, though they do have tendency to rise. Stocks in Central and South America have stalled in the last 5 years, whereas stocks in Africa are quite non-existent.

It is important to note that the leading state holding most of the stocks of Canadian investors is U.S., totalling $505,000,000 in 2017. Stocks in Mexico reach only $15,000,000, while the remaining amount is spread mostly among some of the Caribbean islands. Geographic proximity is no doubt a big factor for so many investments in the North America region, especially U.S. The
investments are also facilitated by the NAFTA, which includes provisions for fair and equal investments in the territories of the parties.\textsuperscript{132} But despite the agreement, Mexico remains quite low attraction. The reason for that might also be a huge difference in development. U.S. is the strongest economy in the world with huge market, so no wonder Canadian investors are attracted to it. Whereas Mexico has difficulties with crime and technologic advancement at home and cannot compete with the U.S. when it comes to the strength of economy, thus signalling less safe foreign investment environment despite cheaper labour market.

In Central and South America, Chile holds the most Canadian investments in stocks, worth $17,000,000 in 2017. However, the investments in Chile have slightly dropped compared to 2013. Canada encourages investments in Chile through bilateral FTA that came into force in 1997. Interestingly, in 2017 the FTA was amended to include corporate social responsibility, including gender equality, which goes hand in hand with Canada’s proclaimed role of women empowerment in its policies. The treaty also emphasises the encouragement to implement OECD guidelines in an attempt to increase social responsibility between the investors.\textsuperscript{133} Canadian investments in Brazil are second-highest, barely though. But they have been steadily decreasing since 2013, from $16,000,000 to $12,000,000 in 2017. Canada and Brazil have no FTA or investment protection deal, though they are in negotiations in a multilateral FTA involving Mercosur. Overall, investments in South and Central America have been decreasing and/or stagnating, with the exception of 2007-2013 period. It is mostly due to lack of Canada’s initiative to assure investment protection through agreements in the region, bar few exceptions like Chile and Panama. But it can also mean that Canada is unwilling to back down on certain valuable principles involving sustainable development, as was the case with stalled negotiations of FTA with CARICOM.

When it comes to Europe, most attractive countries for Canadian investments are United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Netherlands. Investments in the mentioned countries have been increasing quite significantly, whereas other countries – not so much. In fact, in 2017 these three countries hosted $214,000,000 of Canadian investments in stocks, whereas the remaining region only $74,000,000. Canada has no bilateral investment-related treaties with the mentioned countries, as opposed to countries like Russia, Poland, Romania. However, the new FTA with EU – a political union that covers most of the region – is designed to provide more protection for investments and

access to each other’s markets, thus signalling a possible increase of Canadian investments in the region in the future. Relatively high amount of investments in the region up to now are also due to the fact that Europe is considered part of the western world values-wise, and an important part of transatlantic alliance. Although, incoming Brexit might have an impact on Canadian investments in the United Kingdom.

When it comes to investments in Asia and Oceania, there has been quite an increase percentage-wise, though the total amount is still dwarfed compared to North America and Europe. Regardless, Canada recognises market opportunities in the east, as evidenced by an influx of agreements with the states in the east. China, Hong Kong and Mongolia became parties to bilateral investment promotion and protection agreements with Canada in 2014, 2016 and 2017, respectively. And other states that are among leaders in the region with Canadian investments – Australia, Japan, Singapore – are all covered by TPP that is pending ratification. In addition, there are ongoing negotiations with countries like India, Bahrain, Qatar for the promotion and protection of investments. However, bilateral agreements alone do not ensure the increase of investments, as evidenced by Jordan or Lebanon, but are a step in the right direction and a tool for the spread of interest via conditions. As for Africa, investments there are scarce due to internal problems of the states. Most investments are concentrated in South Africa, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, Ivory Coast, with which Canada recently made bilateral agreements for the promotion and protection of FDI, with the exception of South Africa. It is doubtful that CDIA will increase significantly in the region in the near future, despite the recent agreements.

When it comes to its own market, Canada applies certain anti-dumping and countervailing duties to balance its market with both domestic and foreign suppliers. About those duties more is written in the subsection below.

2.4.3 Canada’s anti-dumping and countervailing duties

Anti-dumping and countervailing duties are considered the safeguard of balanced markets. Without the duties, Canada might risk exposing its own market to cheaper commodities from foreign countries, either due to mechanically increased prices abroad in comparison to home market or because of subsidiaries of foreign government. Although cheaper at first, the foreign commodities might push out local producers from the market and, as a result of the foreign dominance in the market, increase the prices. It is important to understand which sectors Canada considers to be the most sensitive to the foreign suppliers, and which countries Canada recognises to be more prone to

the appliance of subsidiaries to certain spheres of production. Therefore, a search was done on Global Affairs Canada website for the database of enforced anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Attention was diverted to Canada Border Service Agency website, a federal agency responsible for border and customs activities.

It was found out that Canada applies many countervailing and anti-dumping duties, targeted at specific products from certain countries of origin. To emphasize which countries pose the biggest danger to Canada’s national market in terms of dumping and foreign subsidies, cases of anti-dumping and countervailing duties are grouped together based on the country it is applied against, while at the same time separating countervailing and anti-dumping duties to emphasize the difference in number of their application (Chart 8). One case involves one type of product from one country, instead of one type of product from multiple countries with the same duty. It is done so to emphasize individual countries, which are considered to be the most threatening within the context of national Canadian market imbalance. Countries associated with less than 5 cases of ADCD are not distinguished but rather grouped together under other cases, indicating the number of cases not covered by the rest of the countries, and not the number of countries with cases uncovered.

**8 Chart.** Number of ADCD cases against specific countries.

![Chart 8](image-url)

**Source:** created by the author.

Canada enforces 25 different anti-dumping duties and 22 countervailing duties against certain imports from China. 12 different Korean imports are additionally taxed because of anti-
dumping, and 1 because of countervailing. Imports from India are taxed with anti-dumping and countervailing duties for 4 and 3 subjected goods, respectively. 5 Anti-dumping duties and 1 countervailing duty is enforced against Turkey, 4 anti-dumping duties and 2 countervailing duty against imports from Vietnam. 5 imports from Taiwan are also taxed with anti-dumping duties. Remaining 40 anti-dumping duties are applied against mostly countries from Europe and Asia, whereas 3 remaining countervailing duties – against Oman, Pakistan and the EU. There are no ADCD applied against countries from South America, with the exception of Brazil, and Africa. Most of the duties are for raw or processed materials, such as copper tube, refined sugar, silicon metal, and etc.

China is an undisputed leader when it comes to dumping and subsidies. The anti-dumping duty can go as high as 341.4% of the export price, as is the case with carbon and alloy steel line pipe from China. The vast number of ADCD against Chinese imports show Chinese government’s willingness to flood Canadian market with its own production. No other country is recognised by Canada to be providing so many subsidies and thus creating an unfair advantage for its own businesses. Despite this fact, Canada seeks for a bigger cooperation with Chinese market, as is evidenced by ongoing talks in regards to a possible Canada-China FTA. It is logical, considering Canada imports more than 3 times as much as it exports to China, and the difference is still rising to China’s favour over the past 5 years.\(^{135}\) However, anti-dumping and countervailing provisions might cause some difficulties for the parties to agree upon.

South Korea, despite relatively moderate amount of dumping and currently a single manifestation of subsidies, is a party to bilateral FTA with Canada, in force since 2015. The agreement provides the option of anti-dumping and countervailing duties as a tool for trade remedy, as is governed by WTO rules and obligations, following investigations.\(^{136}\) Since the start of this millennium, Canada had started 16 investigations against Korean imports in regards to ADCD, 12 of which were ruled as injury causing thus calling for enforcement of duties, while 4 were ruled as not threatening to local industry thus not calling for duties, as was the case with cold-rolled steel sheet products from Korea.\(^{137}\) This example together with FTA distinguishes ADCD as a suitable tool for the upkeeping of balance of national markets and industries. Of course, they have to be in line with WTO, as is articulated in the agreements. This is yet another example of Canada using international organisations as a legitimate arbitration and source of framework to interstate relations.

Other countries against which Canada applies ADCD are not as prone to dumping and subsidies as two analysed above. They have attributes similar to already analysed countries, so no further analysis of them is necessary. They are included in the chart above to emphasize which countries are recognised by Canada to be most threatening to its national industries. However, it is important to give attention to Canada-Chile FTA and its chapter on ADCD. Under the agreement, both countries are reciprocally exempted from the application of anti-dumping duties against each other’s goods. Not even investigations into possible cases of anti-dumping are allowed. However, the same chapter in later articles indicates a possibility, under exceptional circumstances, for the application of ADCD against each other’s goods, as long as the duties are in line with WTO. The wording of exceptional circumstances is quite subjective and can be used as an excuse to apply ADCD in the future. Still, this FTA is significantly different, proving Canada’s conscious decision-making in deciding which trading partners it considers to be completely safe to its national industries (Chile), while others are not held in such high regard with articles on possible trade remedies in the form of ADCD (parties to TPP, South Korea). No country comes close to China’s amounts of dumping and subsidies, so it would be hard to imagine Canada not articulating trade remedies and ADCD in its ongoing FTA negotiations with China.

These findings also show that Canada’s reasoning for the application of ADCD are strictly based on economic reasoning. They are not applied on all imports from a country or its specific sector, but they are rather based on price at home and abroad of the specific commodity from a foreign country. ADCDs are also not strictly based on the efficiency, or lack of it, of the local industries. The possibility of enforcing those duties are articulated in most of the FTAs that Canada is a party of, and the fairness of the duties are left for the WTO to investigate. As for economic coercion against targeted states, more is written in the subsection below.

2.4.4 Canada’s application of economic sanctions on international actors

To find out Canada’s application of economic sanctions on international actors, Global Affairs Canada was navigated manually, as well as an analysis of sanctions-related acts and regulations was done on Justice Laws website – a database for Canada’s legislative acts – in order to attain the most accurate and up to date information. It was found out that Canada enacts economic sanctions under three different acts: 1) United Nations Act (UNA), which follows binding decisions passed by UNSC; 2) Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA), which allows Canada to impose sanctions either unilaterally or in concert with other states; 3) Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign

Officials Act, also known as Sergei Magnitsky Law, allowing to impose sanctions on foreign nationals. Since the object is international actors, the paper concentrates on the first two acts and the regulations made under them, because the third act strictly involves foreign nationals who are not necessarily decision-makers of states, and thus not international actors.

When analysing economic sanctions imposed under UNA and SEMA regulations, different variety of sanctions emerged that Canada applies against number of states. A chart was created to emphasize which particular sanctions are more prone to be used by Canada against international actors (Chart 9). The types of sanctions that Canada imposes were separated into 4 different categories based on the nature of their prohibition: 1) Arms embargo denotes sanctions against any kind of dealing or facilitation of dealing related to arms, weapons, or other military equipment; 2) Export and import restrictions denotes prohibition of the export and import of certain goods, or their limitation, excluding arms and related goods; 3) Asset freeze denotes prohibition of property and/or financial transactions of any kind, including supply of financial services, unless specified as exception in regulations for the purposes of humanitarian help and/or etc.; 4) Technical assistance prohibition denotes restriction of supplying technical assistance, help, training or information of any kind to the party in question or for its benefit. In addition, each type of sanction was further separated into two categories, based on the act under which it was imposed. The number of each type of sanctions currently imposed by Canada refer to the number of states or non-state actors targeted by them. Non-state actors are terrorist groups or persons related to terrorism, which in the chart are grouped together based on the number of regulations made regarding terrorist entities under UNA or SEMA.

9 Chart. Number of sanctions applied under UNA and SEMA.

Source: created by the author.
It was found out that the most common economic sanction applied on foreign international actors by Canada is asset freeze against entities or individuals of subjects, or their associates as articulated in regulations. A total of 24 international actors are impaired by this, with 14 of those coming from UNSC initiative. 17 states or non-state actors were the targets of Canada’s technical assistance prohibition, with 10 of those being organised by UNSC and remaining 7 by Canada. 16 international actors are affected by Canada’s arms embargo, 11 of which came from UNSC’s initiative, whereas the remaining 5 – from Canada’s initiative or solidarity with strategic allies. Export and import restrictions make up the least amount of sanctions, with 3 coming from UNSC’s initiative and 6 from Canada or its solidarity with allies.

These statistics show that most of the sanctions against international actors come from the decisions of UNSC, and Canada has little choice but to follow its decisions as they are legally binding. They reflect UNSC’s inclination to apply asset freeze the most, which can be pinpointed to certain individuals or entities of actors in question, thus having less collateral damage for populations as a whole. Arms embargo is also quite popular, which eliminates accessibility of arms or transactions in regards to them. It might also have an effect on Canada’s national economy in terms of arms sales, however here values of peace lie higher than economy. Export and import restrictions are seldom initiated by UNSC because they have too many implications of limitation of national sovereignty on member states. Canada on its own or in association with allies decide under SEMA’s regulations on limitations of exporting and importing to actors in question, as is the case with sanctions of Iran, which includes Canada’s list of 41 goods prohibited from being sold and/or shipped to Iran, its nationals or for the purposes of business being carried or operated in Iran. When following its own initiative or association of states it identifies with, Canada is also the most prone in using asset freeze sanctions. It also somewhat underlines types of conflicts related to contemporary world, as well as the meaning of financial transactions in today’s globalized world.

It is also important to note that one international actor in most cases receives multiple economic sanctions. The numbers in chart above encompass only 22 international actors – 20 states and 2 terrorist entities (1 for Al-Qaida and Taliban, 1 for the rest of entities associated with terrorism, as per regulations under UNA). States like South Sudan and Yemen receive one type of sanction form Canada (asset freeze in both cases), whereas North Korea and Iran receives all 4 of them. Of course, their potency differ on each state, based on the reasoning of sanctions. And the potency might alter based on progress of the state in question towards certain conditions. If a foreign state, against which sanctions are applied, moves towards the right direction regarding its policy, certain sanctions are repealed.

Canada’s use of economic sanctions can be described as a tool of collective action. Even if a sanction is enacted not on UNSC’s initiative through United Nations Act, Canada regardless organises joint action together with strategic allies, as is the case with asset freeze against Venezuela, which it organised in concert with United States. There are no cases of Canada using sanctions completely alone without orchestrating it with other states. In addition, on top of sanctions initiated by UNSC under UNA on foreign states, there are 3 states on which Canada imposed additional sanctions under SEMA – South Sudan, North Korea, Iran.

Economic sanctions imposed by Canada are also quite flexible insofar their application is not strictly limited to a state in question as a whole, but might encompass only parts of a state or certain entities associated with it. In the case of export limitation and technical help to Ukraine, the sanctions apply only for goods and services to annexed Crimea region of Ukraine, and asset freeze only to individuals and entities with the association to Donetsk’s and Luhansk’s People’s Republics. The sanctions imposed by Canada are also not absolute insofar they might have exceptions. Canada applies, among other things, arms embargo on Myanmar, but allows exports of non-lethal military equipment for the purpose of humanitarian, protective or human rights monitoring use.

The case of Ukraine also shows Canada’s willingness to show political leadership as far as advocacy for peace goes. Canada, despite lack of action of UNSC due to Russia’s right to veto any decision it might find improper, imposes sanctions on its own will under SEMA on both Russia and Ukraine for the violations of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. In addition, in its regulations of sanctions against Ukraine, Canada emphasizes Crimea to be the region of Ukraine as is recognised by the international law.

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Canada’s approach to security is heavily reliant on multilateral institutions. Be it a framework of a certain policy at home, cooperation in supplying humanitarian aid or joint decision on common practises, the country recognizes the success of collective action in insuring its interests are met. Majority of Canadian security strategy consists of uniform action with members of international organizations and treaties. Globally responsible, Canada supplies help for failing states as well as assists developing states in their fight against climate change through both

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intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, mostly by financing their projects. And if a bilateral action is taken, it follows the priorities set by multilateral institutions anyway. In addition, international organisations are used as a platform to further Canada’s own agenda on a global level and as a pretext to avoid direct confrontation with issues at hand, signified by the reliance on third parties to supply physical part of humanitarian aid. As for the practise to address security risks unilaterally, economic related actions are global in scope, whereas geopolitical related – limited to immediate neighbourhood.

The undertaken Canada’s security strategy approach in its foreign policy also correlates with a number of the *UN 17 Sustainable Development Goals*. Security strategies, be it geopolitical, environmental, or economic, all appear to have incorporated many aspects of policies suggested by international organizations and focuses on the long-term orientation, and medium-term objective. At the same time, the strategies do not solely rely on international organizations as the sole enforcer. In its free trade agreements, Canada adds provisions relating to sustainable development, such as gender equality and social responsibility, thus showing unilateral ambition. In addition, Canada emphasises direct threat to its sovereignty through the implication of a possible threat to the Arctic, which remains an important part of Canada’s identity. And Canada’s unilateral military operations to assure the safety of the Arctic, as well as underlined importance of the zone to Canada’s sovereignty, creates an incentive of a possible heated geopolitical crisis in the region in the future. As for the environmental issues that are not covered by international organizations, Canada might struggle to address them since they require solidarity on a global scale, though attempts are made by Canada to address the environmental aspect through provisions in free trade agreements. In addition, environmental concerns in the Arctic have prompted the establishment of the Arctic Council in Ottawa in 1996, signifying that Canada is keen to seek new international cooperation for questions that might exclusively concern it alone.
3. THE COEXISTENCE OF SECURITY STRATEGIES IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

This section attempts to paint the coexistence of different types of security strategies, which were analysed in the second chapter of this paper, within the same foreign policy. Thus, the section is dedicated to comparative analysis and comparison of geopolitical, environmental, and economic security strategies in Canadian foreign policy. The comparison allows to reveal relationships between the uniformity, difference, identity and similarity of objects. In other words, comparative analysis is a legitimate tool in revealing whether the foreign policy is of strategic nature, encompassing well thought and goal-oriented strategies, or whether they appear lacking in the results the methods seem to work towards. Comparative analysis is applicable to both discovery as well as verification cases, and allows to differentiate causal conditions. Accordingly, comparative analysis in this paper tests the validity of three presumptions that emerged from document analysis of geopolitical, environmental and economic security strategies done above. The presumptions are as follow, and will be analysed in their respective subchapters below: 1) Canada’s security strategies are based on norms and rules embodied in international institutions; 2) interdependence is sought in the nature of restraint as opposed to imposition, focusing on diplomacy and soft power; 3) UN 17 Sustainable Development Goals are incorporated to security strategies to a high degree.

Such presumptions are also in line with the analysis of the scientific literature that was done in this paper. The first presumption should adequately portray the forms of interdependence Canada has with other states in its security strategies, as well as the level of willingness of Canada to relinquish part of its sovereignty. The second presumption should show the state’s nature of actions in international arena. The third presumption should check how salient highly important UN 17 SDGs are prevalent in Canada’s security strategies. Upon these presumptions, all three security strategies – geopolitical, environmental, economic – will be analysed in unity, and conclusions will be made based on their similarities and differences, and possible implications.

3.1 International institutions in Canada’s security strategies

International organisations are a dominating factor in Canada’s security strategies. As to what extent they contribute to security of Canada, it will be relieved through comparative analysis of the results of the document analysis done in the second section.

Canada’s geopolitical security strategy employs international organisations in a number of ways. Intergovernmental cooperation is seen as the only appropriate way in addressing highly impactful threats such as WMD and terrorism. In fact, all of Canada’s efforts rely on international institutions in non-proliferation of WMD, and in many cases, total elimination of them. Participation in treaties such as Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Chemical Weapons Convention underscore Canada’s will to preserve current rules, while its advocacy for new treaties such as Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty show the state’s leadership in implementing even further control on the threat of WMD. Intergovernmental organisations such as NATO and UN are also key influencers of Canadian Armed Forces multilateral missions, which happen in geographically more distant areas. However, for geopolitical threats that are geographically closer, Canada does not employ international organisations as much, as is the case with CAF operations in the Arctic or around Canada’s area. Less reliance on international organisations is also exemplified by Canada’s financial support to fragile states, with an increased share of funds going through bilateral channels in the past two years accounting from 2/3 of total funds in 2015-2016 to 3/4 of total funds in 2017-2018.

The role of intergovernmental organisations is also vital in Canada’s environmental security strategy. Actions designed to limit polluting substances released at home follow the institutionalised frameworks such as the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Likewise, preservation of biodiversity as well as action against man-made pollutions also follow the practises of such intergovernmental organisations as OECD and IMO. However, when it comes to assistance to states suffering from environment-related problems, Canada heavily relies on the role of NGOs. Canada employs four different funds dedicated to supplying humanitarian aid to states in need, most of which consist of states in African and Asian regions suffering from environment-related problems. Three out of four of those funds heavily rely on NGOs, which provide the help while Canada’s input is limited to finances only. The remaining fund is organized by UN with Canada alongside other states acting as donors, signifying reliance on intergovernmental organisation as well, just not as significant.

Canada’s economic security strategy is heavily influenced by intergovernmental organisations, as all FTAs follow the guidelines of WTO. But when it comes to the member parties of the trade agreements, Canada seeks institutionalisation of trade with both single states as well as collective groups. In other words, FTA are sought and institutionalised with individual states such as Chile and Japan, as well as regional organisations such as EU and ASEAN. Similarly, guidelines of WTO also apply to anti-dumping and countervailing duties against other states, showing high reliance on the intergovernmental organisation. Such point is further strengthened by Canada’s employed United Nations Act, under which the state follows the lead of UNSC and thus applies economic
sanctions against international actors, most notably foreign states. However, in cases where UNSC does not come to an agreement in regards to application of economic sanctions, and/or Canada is of more harsh opinion as opposed to the UNSC, there is an alternative which Canada exercises. Economic sanctions under SEMA and its application either in addition to UNA or just as an alternative proves Canada’s leadership in applying sanctions that are not necessarily sanctioned by UNSC. In a number of cases, Canada applies economic sanctions through both acts, showing both the obligation to the intergovernmental organisation and the international law, as well as the duty to show principle position in international arena by its own choice.

The security strategies in Canadian foreign policy undoubtedly rely the most on intergovernmental institutions. Most prominently, it is for policy guidelines that provide a framework for action. And considering the globalised nature of today’s risks, it is quite logical that Canada chooses to tackle WMD, terrorism, climate change, trade protectionism and etc. in unity with other states, since the risks permeate national borders and are global in scale. For global risks, intergovernmental organisations provide common rules for all member states and act as arbitrary for foul play. And most importantly, in many cases, the foul play is caused by non-state actors, thus unified position and action of a group of states against such perpetrators is best carried under the single banner of intergovernmental institution.

Another reasoning for high reliance on international institutions is that they provide information from all over the world and are a great source of knowledge and expertise from areas geographically distant from Canada itself. Such point is exemplified by active operations of Canadian Armed Forces. Majority of missions CAF participates in abroad are under the mandate of intergovernmental organisations such as NATO and UN, whereas operations in the Arctic region and close to its own national borders are of Canada’s own mandate and of unilateral nature, only seldom inviting partner states. It is logical insofar Canada considers its own immediate neighbourhood as its territorial integrity, and any other not necessarily welcome presence of foreign forces might be considered as too harmful to its own sovereignty. Thus by organising CAF operations around its neighbourhood on its own and on foreign, more distant areas under the mandate of international organisations, Canada preserves its relatively unique sovereignty over its own neighbourhood while acting as a global player on international stage. Of course, the lack of military presence of international organisations in Canada’s neighbourhood might backfire in a case where a grave military danger arises for Canada’s territory and joint trained forces in the area are required, but such a scenario is highly unlikely as the state and the whole region remains relatively safe.

It is also important to emphasise the low presence of NGOs in Canada’s security strategies. Almost all of the reliance of Canada in its security strategies is exclusive to intergovernmental organisations, with the exception of NGOs acting as principal agents in supplying the physical part
of humanitarian help for the foreign states in need. As it is, Canada acts as financial donor to NGOs which provide help to foreign states, including those that suffer from environmental tragedies and/or are considered to be failing states. Of course, intergovernmental organisations are not exactly ignored regarding this question as part of the total support to failing states still go through multilateral institutions and there is a UN organised fund for the same issue that Canada participates in. Regardless, the difference of scale of the two and recent tendency to use bilateral channels more – which includes NGOs – for humanitarian aid show Canada’s preference of the NGOs in supplying humanitarian help to states in need. An argument can be made that NGOs are less bureaucratic and more victim-state focused, thus guaranteeing a better help. Similarly, NGOs tend to focus more on nations and general populations as opposed to distributing the funds to states which themselves distribute the funds. And considering the weak state system of the recipient countries, the help in some cases might not even reach the general populations. Thus by working with NGOs, Canada makes sure that the vital needs of the people in the face of humanitarian crisis are somewhat addressed.

If a method Canada’s actions in its security strategies can be polarised to either the nature of restraint or the nature of imposition, this paper is of the presumption that Canada acts more in line with the former. More of it is written in the subsection below.

### 3.2 Security strategies based on the nature of restraint

This paper makes a presumption that Canada’s foreign policy is of the nature of restraint, propagating diplomacy, incentives, the right to self-determination instead of making threats, using hard power, military force or any other restriction. The presumption is tested via comparison of the nature of actions of Canada’s security strategies. And although the high reliance on international organisations, their rules and norms, and frameworks is present in Canada’s security strategies, as evidenced in the subsection below – which is a strong argument in itself for Canada’s preference for actions of restraint in its foreign policy – this subsection focuses on attributes of security strategies that are a bit more isolated and tangible in an attempt to further strengthen the presumption.

Geopolitical security strategy of Canada involves, among other things, the use of military and economic prowess. However, the method of their use is highly sensitive to foreign states. In its foreign state-building and local capacity empowerment missions, CAF are strictly limited to supportive role involving the training of local forces. For example, Operation IMPACT, which supports Global Coalition Against Daesh as well as NATO in Iraq, is based on defeating the terrorist organisation via the training of Iraqi forces, including military, combat, intelligence, which would
empower local forces in their capacity to upkeep the security of the region on their own.\textsuperscript{144} The operation involved aerial bombings of specific targets, but such task was terminated in 2016. Similarly, Canada’s support to fragile states involves financial help to the recipient in sectors such as education, agriculture, health system, and etc. As for values that are closely associated with the western hemisphere, such as gender equality, as is evidenced with Canada’s \textit{National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security}, it involves raising awareness for the discrimination of women in the recipient state, organising discussions on the integration of women, cooperating with women’s organisations, and etc. These actions exemplify Canada’s reliance on diplomacy and inclusive governance as a form of action in its geopolitical security strategy.

As for the nature of action of Canada’s environmental security strategy, they are a bit harder to pinpoint in this paper’s offered polarisation between restraint and imposition, as most of the efforts are done at national level, although they are integrated within the frameworks and the expertise of international organisation. Regardless, one area of subject worth of analysis is Canada’s support to states suffering from environment-related risks, which involves financial help to the states in need. Canada supplies only finances, as their use and the role of providing the help is dedicated to either UN or other NGOs, based on the fund. The employment of organisations in distributing the financial help somewhat safeguards Canada from linking the support with the policy decisions of the recipient state, thus guaranteeing the funds will reach regardless. The only program that Canada unilaterally employs for supporting states suffering from environment-related risks is Disaster Assistance Response Team, which hasn’t been deployed since 2015. These points, although limited due to their scale, exemplify Canada’s reliance in its environmental security strategy on support that is not based on imposition.

Economic security strategy of Canada is conflicting in terms of restraint-imposition debate insofar it propagates freer markets but doesn’t shy away from slapping economic sanctions. The sheer amount of countries with which Canada has some sort of FTA, either direct or collective, emphasise its actions of restraint, bearing in mind that Canada is inclined to add certain measures in its FTAs in an attempt to change environmental and/or social standard regulations of the partner state. The partner state gains access to the market of Canada but at the same time succumbs to its own market homogenisation regulations-wise as with that of Canada’s. This economic-incentives based interdependence by Canada is of particular importance in the eastern hemisphere, where work-related regulations involving social justice and environment-friendliness are not as strict as with those of western standards. By offering its own market, Canada, besides gaining economic advantage via new

market, also leaves its mark on the changes of the partner state’s market standards. However, the fact that Canada also imposes sanctions does exemplify that the country also applies method of imposition. An argument can be made that Canada is a strict abider of the international law, and via its UNA it enforces economic sanctions that were legally sanctioned by UNSC. Regardless, it doesn’t change the fact that in addition to UNA, Canada uses SEMA, under which Canada applies economic sanctions both in addition to UNA as well as instead of it, depending on its perceived effectiveness of UNSC decision. The sanctions on international actors are linked with certain policies of theirs, which until altered, will warrant coercive actions imposed by Canada as long as they are in line with the international law.

Canada’s security strategies are based on the nature of restraint, propagating the empowerment of local capacity via financial help, supplying training as well as interlinking via trade agreements. Via its supportive action in fragile or victim states, Canada also spreads its values and beliefs to local communities and policy-makers, plants the idea of a type of state that Canada itself would like to see in the future of the country, and quite probably undertake with in economic relationship or at least assure its capacity to preserve peace. Canada does not appear to impose some sort of sanctions or make threats of using force if they would not alter their policies. Instead, the decision of change is left to the states themselves with Canada offering only incentives and supportive actions. Similarly, access to Canada’s market is offered via FTAs to states in order for them to become more socially responsible and environmentally friendly. Of course, Canada’s goal is not only to change the foreign markets but to also gain access to them as well. But via such advocacy, Canada shows its ambition of a global player in a self-controlled way, preferring restraint and showing respect for self-determination rather than imposition.

In addition, via FTAs Canada institutionalises interdependence which, besides immediate changes to foreign markets via certain regulations emphasised above, also builds the foundation for further possible cooperation in the future on questions other than trade or economy, as do neoliberals emphasise. And the success of the further cooperation will be assured through rationality of states, since they will believe that possible losses from the lack of cooperation will be too grave. As to why would Canada seek interdependence based on the method of diplomacy and self-determination with countries who are not democracies; whose values and standards to human rights and other important questions are of such stark difference to those of Canada’s, an argument could be made that the interdependence is understood by Canada to be the most effective method of changing the said standards; instead of threatening potential partner state, Canada understands that by perhaps seeking changes in albeit slower but more controlled way, the changes will be more lasting and sustainable as they will be induced by self-determination rather than fear of threat.
Another institutionalised form of interdependence is international organisations, which do call for actions of restraint. Although not overly stressed in this subchapter, Canada’s reliance on international organisations somewhat assures more than not that Canada applies the method of restraint in its security strategies. The structure and hierarchy of international organisations makes sure that member states act within the rules and norms of the international law, which in itself is a guarantor in more cases than not that diplomacy in international relations will prevail. However, cases like UNSC sanctioned economic sanctions, which Canada follows strictly, show that sometimes the organisations call for actions of imposition as well. Regardless, imposition induced by economic sanctions only remain an exception rather than a rule to Canada’s restraint-based nature of security strategies, which seek the empowerment of local capacity and cooperation via diplomacy, economic incentives and the respect to rules and norms of international arena.

This paper has made an argument in the first chapter that sustainable development, including UN 17 SDG have become a norm in international relations. Thus, the following subchapter will focus on Canada’s security strategies in relation to the said goals.

### 3.3 Incorporation of UN 17 Sustainable Development Goals in Canada’s security strategies

This paper presumes on the basis of document analysis done in the second chapter that security strategies of Canada coincide with the UN 17 SDGs. Thus, this subchapter is dedicated to comparative analysis of geopolitical, environmental and economic security strategies in the context of the mentioned goals. If the objective or targets of the UN 17 SDGs are addressed directly or indirectly in Canada’s security strategies, they are concluded to be coinciding. The goals were illustrated in the Diagram 1 *The 17 Sustainable Development Goals* of this paper, and are repeated below for the sake of convenience: 1) No Poverty; 2) Zero Hunger; 3) Good Health and Well-Being; 4) Quality Education; 5) Gender Equality; 6) Clean Water and Sanitation; 7) Affordable and Clean Energy; 8) Decent Work and Economic Growth; 9) Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure; 10) Reduced Inequalities; 11) Sustainable Cities and Communities; 12) Responsible Consumption and Production; 13) Climate Action; 14) Life Below Water; 15) Life on Land; 16) Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions; 17) Partnerships to Reach the Goal.

Canada’s geopolitical strategy focuses, among other things, on abiding to rules and norms of international institutions and the rule of law, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, training local capacity and state building, promoting women empowerment, protecting its borders and immediate neighbourhood. These areas of focus coincide directly with several SDGs: 5) Gender Equality; 10) Reduced Inequalities; 11) Sustainable Cities and Communities; 15) Peace, Justice and Strong
Institutions; 17) Partnerships to Reach the Goal. Via its support to fragile states, Canada addresses targets such as poverty reduction and resilience building to disasters, reduction of malnutrition and sustainable food production, reduction of maternal mortality, increase of education, support for clean water and sanitation, renewable energy, youth employment and education, facilitation of sustainable development, promotion of universal understanding of sustainable lifestyles, increase of adaptivity to climate-related disasters, which all are the objectives of the rest of the not mentioned in this paragraph UN 17 SDGs, with the exception of 14) Life Below Water, and 15) Life on Land. And even then Canada finances policy and administrative management of both forestry and fisheries in fragile states, which would be in line with the two last mentioned goals and their targets of the increase of the benefits for least developed countries from the sustainable use of marine sources, and promote sustainable forest management in developing countries, respectively. It is safe to conclude that Canada’s geopolitical strategy, in one way or another, addresses all of the UN 17 SDGs.

Canada’s environmental strategy, like Canada’s foreign policy as a whole, is centred on international dependence and cooperation, multilaterally building frameworks for environmental policies and integrating them at a national level. Such actions are in line with 7) Clean Energy; 16) Strong Institutions and 17) Partnerships. The Pan-Canadian Framework for Clean Growth, which was discussed in sub-subchapter 2.3.1, addresses the following goals: 6) Clean Water; 9) Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure; 11) Sustainable Cities; 12) Responsible Consumption and Production; 13) Climate Action. In addition, via its protection of biodiversity and ecosystems, environmental security strategy coincides with 14) Life Below Water, and 15) Life on Land goals. 1) No Poverty, and 2) Zero Hunger goals, among other things, are addressed in environmental strategy via Canada’s support to fragile states suffering from climate-related crisis, which include building the resilience and capacity of the poor for adaptation to climate change. As its name suggests, Canada’s environmental strategy coincides the most with the goals calling for climate action, protection of biodiversity, international cooperation and institutions.

Economic security strategy in Canada’s foreign policy strictly follows internationals norms and rules articulated by institutions. It recognises the rule of law, advocates for it, and seeks institutionalisation of free trade on a global scale. Such position coincides with 16) Strong Institutions, and 17) Partnerships goals, as well as 8) Decent Work and Economic Growth, and 9) Industry and Innovation. In addition, this paper emphasised the willingness of Canada to include sensitive societal and environmental regulations, such as women empowerment, protection of natural life and the environment as a whole, and etc., in order to alter foreign markets towards the standards

146 Ibid.
advocated by international institutions, including the UN. The regulations are in one way or another coinciding with the following SDGs: 5) Gender Equality, 10) Reducing Inequalities, 11) Sustainable Cities, 12) Sustainable Production and Consumption, 13) Climate Action, 14) Life Below Water, 15) Life on Land. And while targets of other SDGs are not so clearly articulated in Canada’s economic security strategy, there are some allusions to them. For example, in its free trade agreement with CPTPP states, there is recognition for investment in health and education sectors, which would work towards 3) Good Health, and 4) Quality Education goals, respectively.

As evidenced above, *UN 17 SDGs* are highly visible in Canada’s security strategies. The most common are goals that advocate for international cooperation and institutions, global peace based on the rule of law, climate action. These goals are somewhat a dominating trend throughout all analysed security strategies. The role of international institutions for Canada’s security cannot be emphasised enough, and those goals capture the essence of international cooperation. It is also important to note that there is not a single goal that does not coincide with any of the security strategies. Although there are some that are not so visible in environmental strategy, the same are more emphasised in economic strategy, and vice-versa. The fact that all goals are coinciding with security strategies to certain extent emphasises Canada’s role as a global player. The *UN 17 SDGs* are global insofar they seek to eradicate global players, and by integrating them in its foreign policy, Canada proves its legitimacy as a global player and perhaps a leader, though debatable considering the lack of information on their effectiveness.

Another point for Canada as a global player can be argued through its geopolitical security strategy encompassing all the *17 SDGs*. This paper argues that geopolitical security strategy involves a state’s sovereignty and legitimacy, and the fact that such strategy emphasises all mentioned goals in one way or another further advocates for Canada as a global player. It somewhat recognises Canada’s duty as an agent for sustainable development in the world, influencing through both individual and organisational means (considering its high reliance on international organisations) for the eradication of global problems, as recognised by the UN.

However, the uncertainty of their effectiveness, and thus the position of Canada as a global leader still stands. The fact that Canada’s security strategies heavily coincide with *UN 17 SDGs* are pleasing since it means the aspect of sustainable development is taken into account in foreign policies, but it also raises additional concerns. Is Canada security strategies so global as in they are heavily influenced by the UN, or is *UN 17 SDGs* so general and predictable that they are automatically addressed by states with at least suboptimal capacity. Regardless, this paper is more inclined to

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support the former point of Canada’s security strategies being of global nature due to them addressing global issues and advocating for high interdependence on international level, and the rule of law.

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Canada’s security strategies are based the most on interdependence via international organisations, which provide equal rules and norms for all, and build frameworks for policies to be implemented at home. It appears to be the main solution to global problems, through which more methods branch out in order to reach global security. International organisations also provide knowledge and expertise for Canada on issues that are present in geographically distant regions, and gives ability to participate in the decision-making process despite being far away. As for issues that are closer to its own neighbourhood, Canada’s reliance on its own efforts as opposed to multilateral ones is moderately higher. Such attribute can perhaps be explained through special sensitivity to its own territorial integrity. While global issues stemming from other continents are understood to be best understood by multiple decision-makers, the neighbourhood as well as the Arctic region is an indication of Canada’s as a single, unitary nation’s sovereignty, thus, first of all, Canada’s own unilateral advantage in the region must be assured.

Canada’s security strategies are built on the action of restraint, propagating the exertion of influence through methods such as self-determination and economic incentives rather than threats and military power. It is perhaps seen as the better of the two options, albeit slower, but more sustainable in the long term. Interdependence based on the nature of restraint can be seen as being based on mutual respect as opposed to fear, and might prove longer lasting as the respect and mutual history will outlive another possible change of policy of the partner state as soon as conditions for a change of heart would in theory be more beneficial. Although, method of imposition in Canada’s security strategies is salient insofar Canada’s economic sanctions are applied on foreign states.

Sustainable development is a vital trend in Canada’s security strategies. From policies at home to action abroad, the strategies are heavily coincided with those of UN 17 SDGs, proving even further reliance of Canada on international organisations as well as its significant role as a global player in international arena. Every single one of UN 17 SDGs is present in Canadian security strategies. And while some goals are not emphasised in environmental security strategy, they are in turn focused upon in economic strategy, and vice-versa, whereas geopolitical security strategy encompasses all of them. But their effectiveness remains a matter of debate and further analysis.
CONCLUSIONS

1. Having analysed the theoretical concept of risk and threat, it was found out that contemporary sources of the lack of state security are global in scale due to technological advancements and globalisation. Their tendency to encompass various forms of shape, including WMD, terrorism, climate change, economic stagnation, and their likelihood to permeate national borders forces state to cooperate and depend on each other in tackling the issues. Out of contemporary risks the term Sustainable Development has gained new traction in international system, which calls for balance between societal, economic and environmental development in policy formation. The term is so broad and all-encompassing that it can mean both everything and nothing at the same time, depending on the perception of a state in question. However, ambiguity is avoided with articulation by the United Nations and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals, which seek to construct sustainable living conditions for the present generation without exhausting resources of the generations that will follow. They provide set targets in various areas of policy formation and encourage states to integrate necessary policies both at home and abroad, and due to their significance, have become an integral part to the understanding of state security in contemporary world. And while the implementation of UN 17 SDGs might be unwelcome due to the perceived danger the strategic change of policies carry to state sovereignty, neoliberals argue that current lack of bipolarity in the international system enables states to cooperate more freely and aim for absolute gains instead of relative ones, thus avoiding the ignorance of the importance of sustainable development. Coupled with great reduction of uncertainty that international organisations provide for member states, institutions provide rules and norms for states to follow, thus assuring level playing field, and are key instrument in assuring that contemporary risks will be addressed by international actors according to their capabilities.

2. The document analysis of Canada’s security strategies in the contexts of geopolitics, environment, and economy has revealed that international cooperation dominates in Canada’s actions. Existing frameworks and guidelines are integrated in its policies, while at the same time seeking a further interdependence through the advocacy for new treaties for issues that have not yet been regulated enough on an international level. All three fields of security strategies – geopolitics, economy, environment – share the dependency on international institutions, thus confirming the first hypothesis of this paper that Canada relies on multilateral institutions for interstate cooperation through institutional framework and/or policy guidelines. Legally binding decisions of international organs are respected and, in certain cases, supported by additional acts of multilateral or bilateral nature in order to reach the desired goal. Multilateralism is a recurring theme in Canada’s security strategies and, even when it is not under the mandate of international organisations, ad hoc partnerships with strategic allies are formed to better cooperation with partners, diminish the costs of
operations, and remain active in global politics. Unilateral acts are rare and limited for action in the area that is of close geographic proximity to Canada’s own national borders, like the Arctic and its neighbourhood. Interstate relations of Canada do take into account sustainable development, either as primary, secondary, or even side objective.

3. Having analysed the coexistence of geopolitical, environmental, and economic security strategies in Canada’s foreign policy via comparative analysis and comparison, it was found out that the strategies are of interactive nature as they all take great influence from international institutions, and differ slightly case by case based on particular objectives. Most importantly, all three strategies share their ideological nature and desire to tackle global issues, and elevate sustainable development as ambition. The strategies are complementary to each other insofar environmental strategy focuses on environment-related goals and cooperation, economic strategy on economy-related goals and cooperation, while geopolitical strategy encompasses all of the goals of sustainable development to certain extent. In addition, in its method of action, security strategies are of the nature of restraint, propagating the use of diplomatic means, economic incentives, empowerment of local capacity. The only use of imposition in Canada’s security strategies is associated with economic sanctions it applies to a number of international actors for breaking international law. As such, coercive actions are an exception rather than a rule, as further evidenced by Canada’s military being limited mostly to missions of supportive and training nature. Therefore, the second hypothesis of Canada’s actions being more in line with the methods of diplomacy and economic incentives (carrots) rather than its military power and coercive actions (sticks) is confirmed.

4. The analysis done in this paper leads to believe that security strategies in Canada’s foreign policy are global in scale and responsive to contemporary tendencies in the international arena. The risks they try to address do require global interdependence by state and, in some cases, non-state actors. As it stands, current international system associated with the lack of bipolarity does remain favourable for such cooperation, therefore Canada’s strategies can prove to be long-lasting. However, an ever increasing global influence of the eastern hemisphere, including China and, to further extent, India, do have implications for a change of polarity of international system in the future, and with it a possible re-evaluation of costs and benefits of interstate cooperation on a global scale by some countries. Regardless, Canada does try to build cooperation with new states in the east, as is evidenced by new ambitions for free trade agreements and increased investing in the region. And bearing in mind that Canada has a tendency to add certain social and environmental regulations that are in line with sustainable development, it would not be too far-fetched to presume that Canada seeks to influence new markets with the standards of western countries, as well as with the values propagated by the United Nations. Of course, Canada’s willingness to enter into economic cooperation with states whose human rights standards are of questionable level can be criticised. But
it can be counter-argued that such cooperation is just a stepping stone towards the facilitation of homogenisation towards higher standards, including the human rights.

In addition, Canada’s cooperation with fragile states are sensitive to local communities and inclusive. By training local forces and empowering local capacity to preserve peace and prosperity in their region on their own merit, Canada achieves several things: it builds the foundation for a future, more dependant cooperation with the recipient country; increases the chances the peace in the region will be long-lasting; reduces the possibility of an emergence of terrorist or any other such organisation with inherent aggression towards the western states; increases the safety of its nationals and personnel by not putting them in harm’s way. The first point is of extreme importance to Canada, which acts as a global player, as evidenced by its reliance on international institutions and global issues. As such, bilateral relations built on trust and assistance go a long way even in multilateral formations, as Canada’s voice will be supported and strengthened by those it once helped.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

1. Canada is in need of a comprehensive and contemporary document on a national level – a national security strategy – which would form its long-term objectives and priorities in terms of security, and would act as a guidance for strategies of lesser kind. The document could consolidate Canada’s efforts in the execution of its security strategies by providing concrete vision that Canada seeks in current international system, allocating the share of resources towards each goal, delegating responsibility to state institutions, as well as anticipating results in certain timeframe. The last iteration of Canada’s national security strategy was released in the year of 2004 and can hardly be identified as sensitive to current times as the new forms of risk and threat to state security are ever-evolving and dynamic. Accordingly, the security strategies analysed in this paper had no reference to the 2004 national security strategy. The negligence of creating such document could prove to be a hinderance to Canada’s efforts in achieving its goals on both national and international level, due to non-existence of framework for strategies of lesser kind, less than optimal management of resources, lack of strategic continuity in its actions, possible competition between state institutions and overlap over their tasks, lack of measurement of the effectiveness of strategy in time.

2. A further research into the effectiveness of Canada’s security strategies in achieving sustainable development goals is necessary. This paper concluded that security strategies of Canada heavily coincide with the UN 17 SDGs. It somewhat symbolises the tendency of Canada to integrate policy frameworks from international institutions, as well as its necessity to play a key role in shaping those frameworks on international level. However, an uncertainty arises as to how effective are those strategies in achieving the UN 17SDGs. The latter have set multiple targets for each goal that they seek to reach in as late as 2030. And while problems may arise in trying to pin-point the effects of a single country towards the problem so global, regardless, a further analysis of Canada’s efforts for a specific goal or target of sustainable development could be analysed, and changes to the efforts over time according to the expected result as global progress, or lack of it, is made towards the targets. In other words, such research could show Canada’s ambition and preparedness in tackling global issues, and make a strong argument for Canada’s role international system as either a global player or a global leader.
LIST OF LITERATURE AND SOURCES

1. Literature

Monographs:


**Articles in periodic scientific journals:**


**Other scientific work:**

2. Sources

Reports:


Legal Acts:


Encyclopaedias and dictionaries:


Other:


