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PERSPECTIVES OF AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN DEFENCE: CASE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN EU AND NATO

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Master thesis analyzes the Perspectives of an Independent European Defence, in the lens of cooperation between the EU and NATO. These two organizations build the main framework for the Euro – Trans - Atlantic security. However, current developments of PESCO had risen the questions about the future perspectives for more credible European defence, which will be ensured without the counting on the American security umbrella, which was in its turn provided through the NATO. Since, the lack of analysis about what kind of prospects, being it military, financial, or institutional resources, the EU possesses in order to provide the security independently, had been observed, presented research was suggested. The structure of the thesis enables to explore the issue in depth.

The research object was EU’s institutional, military and financial resources for an independent European defence, which allowed to investigate development of the CSDP and relations between the EU and NATO, to examine an institutional overlap of the EU and NATO, to compare the features of their operations/missions and finally to analyse institutional and resource capabilities for an independent European defence policy. In the investigation process two theoretical approaches, neorealism and neliberalism, have been utilized. They allowed investigate two main characteristics of the development of Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU, one is aspiration for balancing the US presence in the region and second – acceleration of cooperation between member states and distributing the part of sovereignty on the institution. To complete the research thoroughly discourse analysis of all collected, relevant policy documents from both organizations was applied. In the second section of the research, analysis of the primary and secondary resources was carried out, which provided an empirical background for the assertion that finally, the EU most probably will be able to strive more independent defence policy and if the tendencies are continued in the existed scope, member states will unite more efforts for a credible security framework.
Santrauka

List of Abbreviations

CSDP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
PESCO - Permanent Structured Cooperation
CARD - Common Annual Review
EDF - European Defence Fund
EDC - European Defence Community
WEU - Western European Union
EC - European Community
EPC - European Political Cooperation
EUFOR – EU Force
RDC - Democratic Republic of the Congo
PSC - Political and Security Committee
EUMC - European Union Military Committee
CIVCOM - Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
PMG - Politico-Military Group
CMPD - Management and Planning Directorate
EUMS - European Union Military Staff
HR/VP - High Representative/Vice President
EEAS - European External Action Service
EDA - European Defence Agency
LTR - Long Term Review
CMO - Crisis Management Operations
SHAPE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SFOR - Stabilisation Force
SME - Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
IOs - International Organizations
PSCD - Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence
TFEU - Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina
DSACEUR - NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
OHQ - Operation Headquarters
EUCE - European Union Command Element
JFC - Joint Force Command
AMISOM - African Union Mission on Somalia
WFP - World Food Programme
MAC - Mutual Assistance Clause
TEU - Treaty of the European Union
ESS - European Security Strategy
EUNAVFOR – European Union Naval Force Mission
EUMAM – Military Advisory Mission
EUAVSEC -European Union Aviation Security Mission
EUPOL – European Union Police Mission
ACO - Allied Command Operations
EU OPCEN - European Union Operations Centre
CTG - Counterterrorist Group
ENTRi - Europe’s New Training Initiative
EDIDP - European Defence Industrial Development Programme
CROC – Crisis Response Operation Core
MPCC - Military Planning and Conduct Capability
JSCC - Joint Support Coordination Cell
Introduction
The central contention of this research is the changing cooperative relationship between the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in a dynamic security environment. The establishment of the Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) in 2003 raised the questions about the readiness of the EU member states to share the autonomy on the security field and to build a European defence system that would be independent from the U.S. aid. As the facts showed, not every member state revealed readiness to distribute the sovereignty in the security realm. However, only 2016 brought credible changes in the defence policies (considering the enforcement of the PESCO). Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, refugee crisis and ambiguous policies of the U.S. newly-elected president Donald Trump pushed the EU member states to put steps forward for further military cooperation, which was reflected in the initiatives such as the EU Global Strategy, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), Common Annual Review (CARD) or the European Defence Fund (EDF).

Research Novelty: Despite the fact that all mentioned initiatives are newly negotiated and logically not hitherto learned scientifically, itself the phenomenon of an independent European defence, which counts couple of decades, is not still properly explored, especially in the lens of the cooperation or competitiveness with the NATO. Even if there is certain amount of papers on the EU–NATO balancing game, such as for instance, researcher Marianne Riddervold’s working paper, – “A Geopolitical Balancing Game? EU and NATO in the Fight Against Somali Piracy”¹, deep and consistent scientific research has not still been conducted on the topic of the perspectives of an independent European defence, in particular, the questions about the autonomy from the American support in the security field. For instance, according to Simon Smith and Carmen Gebhard, it is quite extraordinary that after almost 20 years since St. Malo Agreement, which established formal inter-organisational relations between the European Union (EU) (and its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), respectively) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), no special issue has yet been devoted to elaboration of interactions between them; especially due to the fact that the both organizations are fundamental to European and Transatlantic security.²

Research problem: Since it has been observed that there is a lack of analysis about what kind of prospects, being it military, financial, or institutional resources, the EU possesses in order to provide the security independently, performed thesis is an attempt to provide a research on the capabilities of the EU to conduct as civilian as well as military missions/operations independently

from the NATO and yield autonomy from the American defence umbrella. Hence, the key question raised in the present research is “to what extent the EU can provide own security?”

**Research Object:** EU’s institutional, military and financial resources for an independent European defence.

**Research Goal:** To explore the perspectives of an independent European Defence in the conditions of uncertain future of burden-sharing responsibility of the US within the NATO. In order to achieve the goal, following tasks are performed:

1. To investigate the CSDP through neorealist and neoliberal approaches;
2. To explore development of the CSDP and relations between the EU and NATO;
3. To examine an institutional overlap of the EU and NATO;
4. To compare features of NATO and EU operations/missions;
5. To analyse institutional and resource capabilities for an independent European defence policy;

Based on the explored literature and scientific findings following hypothesis can be suggested:

**H1:** EU will be able to provide own security, independently from the American aid, which is currently provided through NATO.

**H2:** EU will be able only to respond to humanitarian crises and failed states, but not to yield broader efforts to ensure European security militarily.

**Research methods:** To complete the research thoroughly discourse analysis of all collected, relevant policy documents from both organizations was applied. The research process was formulated with the use of both primary and secondary material. Wide range of sources was explored to explain the conceptual framework: from the ideas of early theorists to political scientists and officials, and also historical documents. For the EU related information, a combination of EU primary documents and secondary material was draw upon. The internet was widely used in search of these. The use of primary documents gave an insight of firsthand policy and from experts in the field. EU press releases, statements, policy documents, summit outcomes and treaties were widely explored. Secondary material on the EU’s foreign policy development and the EU in general were also extensively used.

Eventually, used data analysis techniques can be perceived as an ‘inductive content analysis’. The main advantage was certainly that it allowed to study the process which occurs over a long time, namely from 2003 to the present. As the aim of the thesis is to elaborate perspectives of an independent European defence, it demands a qualitative approach. Thus observing of relevant policy documents published by NATO and the EU concerning the CSDP is performed. Moreover, content analysis of these regulations has been conducted for elaborating the possibilities of an independent European defence, namely, the obligation of the member states to share military,
financial or informational resources if necessary. Further details about the methodologies of the presented research will be suggested in the first part of the thesis.

**Research Sources:** A wide range of theoretical and empirical sources were used to answer the research questions. Thesis brings together existing literature from a broad framework of IR theory, namely neorealism and neoliberalism. Materials from classical to prominent 21st century scholars, such as Keneth Waltz, Keohane, Joseph Nye, Posan, Pape, etc., have been elaborated. Two overarching theories were carefully scrutinised and the main contrasts were drawn out to provide the foundation for the inquiry of the research. Talking about the literature utilized in the practical part of the research, it contains legal regulations of the EU security policy, speeches of the EU officials, reports of the recent conferences or meetings on new initiatives about the defence cooperation, and various policy papers published by the leading scholars. One of the mostly utilised regulations is Treaty of Lisbon, from where several articles will be elaborated for deeper analysis of the changes that this treaty brought to the Union. Plus, the report, provided by the European Union Committee of the House of Lords, is performed as the provement of the hypothesis about France’s leader position in the organization and its ambitions to balance the US presence in the region. This report suggests positions of several officials from the EU, who were interviewed related to the EU’s operation in Somali. Additionally, electronic resources are widely applied in the thesis, for collecting primary data from the official web-site of the EU and NATO. Namely, European External Action Service’s official page was used for getting information about the current missions/operations of the EU and its military or civilian capabilities. Moreover, for gathering the data about the EU member states’ military resources, one of the most reliable ranking system – Global Fire Power was utilized. It calculates the overall amount of heavy armament of the countries, technical achievements in the military field; it also clarifies infrastructural, humanitarian and financial capabilities of the states and provides the rates of each country’s military potentials.

**Research structure:** Paper will consist of introduction, five chapters, and conclusion. First chapter will review two theoretical approaches of the research; it will undermine their main postulates and divergences. Second chapter will be focused on the historical development of the CSDP and relations of the EU and NATO after 2003. Third chapter will examine an institutional overlap of the EU and NATO meanwhile the fourth chapter will explore the features of NATO and EU operations/missions. These two chapters will provide the basis for analysing the institutional and resource capabilities of the EU, which is performed in the fifth chapter. In this section, the constraints and facilitators of further cooperation for an independent European defence policy will be elaborated. Namely, last chapter will focus on the strategic, material, political obstacles of the collaboration and also will emphasize the current developments in the institutional framework, which establishes fruitful basis for deeper cooperation.
1. THEORETICAL APPROACHES ON THE EUROPEAN COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

For over fifty years, Europe was primarily focused on the establishment of a common market and integration in low politics, meanwhile, common military ambitions were mainly ignored. This was largely due to the fact that security and defence have been always considered as a realm of state sovereignty, which made it difficult for Member States to reach agreement on the security and defence cooperation. However, while integration theorists, such as Ernst Haas, Andrew Moravcsik assumed that the EU would remain a civilian power, the post-Cold War period showed a significant progress in the field of common foreign and security policy. These tendencies suggested that Europe was not merely a civilian power, but had the ambition to project power abroad and contribute to the resolution of the ethnic conflicts and border disputes in its periphery and beyond.

The scope of that cooperation and thus success of EU military missions is still under the discussion, but the fact that the EU member states limited their sovereignty to some extent and created Common Foreign and Security or Defence Policies raised the questions how far they can go. Will it be entirely independent from an American support, provided through the NATO or it will be able to yield full-fledged military or civilian operations/missions and use only the recourses of own disposal. To reply to these questions, neorealism will be used in the performed thesis, however, as only this theoretical approach is unable to explain all aspects of the CSDP (namely, acceleration of the cooperation between member states in the defence field), neoliberalism will be also elaborated. Both of them will enable to define the perspectives of an independent European defence policy. Namely, neorealism will measure possibilities of balancing the US power, in particular, it will focus on relative gains meanwhile neoliberal approach will evaluate perspectives of further cooperation between the member states of the EU and will accentuate absolute gains. Such kind of approach will allow prove one of the above performed hypotheses.

Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are still regarded as one of the most important theories of international relations needed to analyse current events in that system. Even thought, these theories criticise each other for understanding global politics on many points, such as international co-operation, objectives of foreign, security policy, etc., both of them can contribute performed research and provide credible theoretical foundation of the thesis. Thus, in the following sub - chapters similarities and divergences of these theories, as the engine of the analytical part of the paper, will be elaborated and respectfully their explanation of the CSDP will be suggested.

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1. Neorealism and Balance of Power

Neorealism is one of the major theoretical paradigms in International Relations which asserts that the states are the key actors and essentially concerned with their security and a survival. Kenneth Waltz, one of main scholars responsible for expanding the ideas of structural realists, separated the internal factors of the international political systems from the external. He claimed that the anarchic universal framework was a power that designed the states which constitute the system. As indicated by him, the structure of the anarchic framework urges states to stress over security and take sufficient measures to accomplish it.4

Waltz’s publication, “Theory of International Politics“ (1979), describes international anarchy as creating fear and encourages states to maximise power, or to forge alliances and compete for survival, „... Nations could mutually enrich themselves by further dividing not just labour that goes into the production of goods but also some of the other tasks they perform, such as political management and military defence.”5

Waltz states that countries react divergently to anarchy. For this comparison, he uses an example of Belgian foreign policy and China’s external actions. As a small nation, with few resources, Belgium takes an institutional path by joining alliances and active participation in regional and international organisations, meanwhile, China is more inclined to secure its interests through unilateral initiatives which aspires to build up own military capability.6 This comparison brings the point of different arrangements of cooperation. Thus, according to Waltz, there are three main reservations of institutional engagement. Namely, some states may not consider the rules, meanwhile, some states attempt to maximise their power (obtain absolute gains), at the same time they are worried by the comparative (relative) gains of other countries, which may profit more from the cooperative endeavour. Plus, when joining an institution, the state’s national security must not be at risk.7

By the consideration of these engagements, the concept of balance of power emerges and plays main role while explaining the competition between super powers. As an international system is viewed completely and always anarchic, smaller powers dependably ascend in a re-adjusting of the framework structure. Since states are thought to be rational, it is to their greatest advantage to balance, they are relied upon to challenge dominions at the earliest opportunity. In nutshell, balance

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of power is one of the most significant contributions to neorealism. Precisely, this latter is incorporated in the performed thesis to explain the reasons of creation and development of EU’s common foreign and defence policy after the Cold War.

1.1.1. Neorealism on CSDP

Neorealism remains one of the key theories that explain the rise of the CSDP, however, with some limits. On one hand it attempts to portray development of the CSDP, as a temptation to secure itself in a unipolar system, created by the US and on the other hand, it is unable to explain continuity of the EU integration. The neorealist literature counts a wide range of hypotheses to explain and theorize emergence of the CSDP. However, three main paths are identified: bandwagoning, balancing and buck-passing.\(^8\)

The first strategy, bandwagoning has been one of the most popular explanations of the CSDP by neorealist scholars. It implies joining the dominant power or coalition in order to provide benefits, being it territorial gains, trade or the most important one – security. Precisely, this later variable was perceived as a main driver of the European states to alliance.

The second strategy, balancing, refers the states or group of states which try to unite the power against the hegemony or great power and to protect themselves. This thought became mostly popular after the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and later on, by the implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which deepened the cooperation in the foreign and security realm. Scholars have argued that Paris and London tried to prevent rising of Germany and initiated in-depth integration. However, Grieco, who was researching this field as well, stated in his articles on the Maastricht Treaty that this process, facilitated by the fear of the new powerful Germany, was bandwagoning rather than Balancing of power.\(^9\)

More, recently, balancing of power has moved from Germany to the US. Due to the uncertainty of the American military commitment to Europe, EU seeks to balance the US and integrate in the security field locally. This phenomenon was described as a “soft-balancing”.\(^10\)

The third strategy was buck-passing, which referred the states attempting to pass their responsibilities to other states to deal with great power. According to Jones, European states could have refused multilateral cooperation, pursued independent foreign and defence policies and opted

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to ‘free ride’ on the efforts of other states.\textsuperscript{11} However, that strategy would become impetus for a war without containing the rise of Germany.

Out of the above discussed three strategies, in the current environment, the second one, namely, balancing of power is mostly discussed as a possible explanation of the EU member states to strive own security independently. This later was for the most part bolstered by the neorealist researcher Posen, who contended that the development of the CSDP was an endeavor by Europeans to balance against the United States. Considering the EU state-like character, Posen questions why the EU should need its own resistance strategy if not to balance suggests various suppositions on CSDP. Namely, CSDP was perceived as a coherent portrayal of aspiring worldwide power, as methods for keeping up the eminence of states, for example, the UK and France, and as a means for managing local emergencies, for example, Bosnia.\textsuperscript{12}

Within the structuralists, debates have been conducted on the distinction between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ balancing. First one was supported by Posen, who opposing (with his thoughts on a military build-up against the US) to the idea of ‘soft balancing’, maintained by Pape.\textsuperscript{13} This last supporters that the Europeans, disappointed with past US unilateralist foreign policy and military activity, will probably balance the US through global establishments, monetary statecraft and strict interpretations of neutrality rather through a military develop. As indicated by him, the point of such balancing was not to scrutinize the dominion’s situation in the worldwide framework, however to defer and confound the expenses of using this power prevalently.\textsuperscript{14}

To sum up, neorealist approach of the CSDP is that the uncertainty of the US’s burden sharing responsibility towards Europe and emerged conflicts on the continent revealed the necessity of the creation of an independent defence policy, which in its turn would balance American power, maintain the prestige of certain member states such as the UK and France and would allow to deal with regional crises. However, there are certain aspects that the theory cannot explore entirely. Limitations will be discussed in the following sub-chapter.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Jones, S.G. (2007). \textit{The rise of European Security Cooperation}. Cambridge University Press. P.34
\end{itemize}
1.1.2. Limitations of Neorealism

Neorealism as a one of the prominent theoretical approach suggests profound explanations of world politics and related issues. However, as all theories, it also lacks universality and deserves critics to some degree. For instance as Robert Cox claimed inability to differentiate times and places is the major flaw in Waltz’s theory of neorealism. It is unable to explain auxiliary change, regardless of whether it originates from the idea of the performers (power chasing) or from the method of connection (power balancing). Furthermore, as Richard Ashley pointed out neorealists deny the recognition of global collectivist and the interest of human kind. They undermined the notion of state as actor whose interest and interactions shape the structure of international system. Moreover, neorealism disregards social consensus that may perhaps coordinate practices as well as distribution of resources.  

As for liberal institutionalists’ critics, Keohane accepts basic doctrine of the neorealist argument such as, the assumption that states act rationally, and the postulation that states seek power to affect other states, however, he argues that the concepts of states ‘maximizing power’ and states creating a ‘balance of power’ are in fact contradictory. Keohane affirms that states worried about self conservation do not look to boost their energy when they are not in risk. In addition, as indicated by him neorealism is especially powerless in thinking about change, particularly on the global political economy and residential structure of states.

Neorealism also fails to explain certain aspects of development of CSDP in the EU. It lacks profound arguments to prove that acceleration of the integration in the security field was an intention to balance the US. According to opponents of the neorealism it is difficult to explain why Europeans should want to balance a power that does not represent a threat to them and with which they are closely cooperating in many forefront such as NATO. However, answer of some realists to this puzzle has been to widen the concept of balancing to include ‘soft’ balancing. They argue that the crucial motivation for CSDP stems from a desire to constrain rather than actively counter the US. They bring the example of military operations in Africa that were conducted ‘autonomously’. Gegout claims that, with operation Artemis, France wanted the EU to balance the USA and that France primarily wished to prove the capacity of the EU to act without the USA.

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Since neo-realism in its pure form does not predict when balancing would happen, or who precisely would participate, it can be overthrown by a better theory. In fact, Kenneth Waltz himself argued that ‘international political theory deals with the pressures of structure on states, and not with how states will respond to the pressures’.\(^\text{19}\) Therefore, in the following sub-chapter, another theoretical approach, namely, neoliberal institutionalism will be applied to explain the development of the CSDP and its perspectives.

### 1.2. Neoliberal Institutionalism

Neoliberal institutionalism arose largely in response to neorealism. As the revised liberal theory, it argues that the states are coherent units and are the dominant actors in international relations, though, international organization are also taking an essential place in the relations between the states, and interdependence is rising. The key argument of scholars is that in international politics multiple channels can connect societies exceeding the conventional Westphalian system of states. It ranges from informal governmental ties to multinational corporations and organizations. They argue that there is not a hierarchy among issues, which means that multitude of different agendas come to the forefront, hence the line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurs. According to that theory the use of military force is not exercised when complex interdependence prevails. The idea is that between countries, in which a complex interdependence exists, the role of the military in resolving disputes is annulled. However, Keohane and Nye go on to state that the role of the military is in fact important in that alliance’s political and military relations with a rival bloc.\(^\text{20}\)

As discussed, the core of a neoliberal institutionalism is cooperation and interdependence, which means that national economies are closely tied into one another and creates a form of mutual dependence. It implies that states cooperate under anarchy, alike to realists, anarchy remains ‘constant’, but alternatively, interdependence and mutual interests have led states into a ‘condition of cooperation’.\(^\text{21}\) Neoliberal institutionalism has been accelerated by the end of the Cold War, while the EU expanded to include many states that formally fell under Soviet hegemony. The EU’s direction, as a lead example of a peacefully integrated union of states, is considered a key example of neoliberal institutionalism.

Keohane and Nye argued that interdependence, particularly economic interdependence, was an important feature of world politics. They recognized that cooperation is not an easy step and can lead to tension, but states could potentially benefit from cooperative strategies.\(^\text{22}\) In this sense,

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relative gains, supported by neorealists are replaced by the absolute gains. Duncan Snidal believes that absolute gains are likely to have maximum effect on cooperation.\textsuperscript{23} Institutionalists are also concerned about cheating, but they count on the institutions themselves. Institutions provide a coordinating mechanism to help states capture prospective gains from cooperation. In addition, organizations give a discretionary body that can provide states with data keeping states from deceiving. As clarified in the game theory, states look to amplify singular pay-offs, thus establishments offer a stage through which more noteworthy coordination and participation can be executed, therefore profiting the two parties.

Overall, neoliberal institutionalism emerged mainly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and obtained characteristics as of the pure liberal theory as well as of realism. It recognised the sovereignty of the states and their dominant position over the non-state actors, though, also emphasized the importance of the institutions as the players of arbitrary role, which prevent the states to cheat each other. Possibility of cooperation and acceleration of interdependence is key feature of that theory, which in its turn explains the development of the CSDP. This latter will be explored in the subsequent sub-chapter.

\section*{1.2.1. Neoliberalism on CSDP}

Various liberal perspectives on European security spread in the first decade after the end of the Cold War. They seek to explain the nature of national preferences. Even though, this paradigm allows in-depth look into the coordination and cooperation mainly in low politics sphere, accelerated collaboration into the field of security within the EU has still became a subject of active discussion among neoliberalists. According to Keohane, institutionalism pays a significant role in security relations as well. They help states to overcome the problem on uncertainty and diminish the weight of security dilemma.\textsuperscript{24} In the case of CSDP, neoliberals underline the impact of international institutions on national government. They argue that military planning and crisis management is an essential factor to explain endurance of cooperation, which in turns foster formal or informal rules. Some scholars, like Jones, assert that creation of common European defence policy increased prospects of mutual gains.\textsuperscript{25} Through, deeper integration they ensured decreasing of national costs, resolved the distribution problems and smaller members obtained more power through engagement. According to Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist framework\textsuperscript{26} the dynamics of European cooperation, in the realm of security, can be explained by processes of domestic preference.

formation within EU member states and by strategic bargaining among the governments of EU member states.

From liberal perspective there are three key principles that CSDP serves to. Firstly, it offers an instrument to shield themselves from regional or worldwide dangers, being it terrorist warfare, organized crime or fizzled states; Secondly CSDP grants to the US in lower-level military tasks; and thirdly, it permits member states to advance liberal plan – to secure and yield human rights.\(^{27}\)

As seen from these principals, self-protection was one of the main goals of creation of the CSDP. However, during first decade of the twenty-first century, the EU had difficulties to implement this object properly, and it was remaining mainly civilian instrument with limited human and capability power. Precisely, focus on the low-politics can be perceived as one of the main limits of the neoliberal institutionalism to explain the integration in the security field within the EU.

1.2.2. Limitations of Neoliberalism

There are a number of shortcomings with this theoretical approach. It assumes that states will choose to pursue prosperity over survival, also, they choose to follow long-term over short-term profits. However, it does not address what will happen if a state does not benefit from any long-term gains, it will be willing to sacrifice national interests or institutional obligations. Moreover, if a state no longer benefits from integration, it will remove itself from interdependence and cooperation or not. Based on this uncertainty, Oneal argued that it can deter a state from embarking on peaceful relations.\(^{28}\)

The real challenge of neoliberalism is the question of cooperation in the field of security and defence. According to Mearsheimer this approach largely ignores security issues and focuses solely on economic issues. He points out that neoliberalism neglects the major obstacle in cooperation, which is the concern on relative gain.\(^{29}\) Mearsheimer’s critiques of liberal institutionalism refers institutions‘ minimal influence on state behaviour and thus little prospect for promoting stability in a post Cold War world. He argues that actors establish such institutions only when they want the outcome which is predicted to be produced by that arrangement.\(^{30}\)

Mearsheimer points out three flaws with institutionalism. First is an assumption that states can accomplish shared approach that advantages to both included parties, and each of them look for total gains; Second refers to a postulation that security and political economy can be isolated from


each other; and third one stresses out an supposition that foundations settle the issue of deceiving by discouraging cheaters.\textsuperscript{31}

Over-arching point Mearsheimer makes is that relative gains do not make cooperation impossible, but that it poses an essential impediment to cooperation and as such institutionalist discourse needs to explain whether states can cooperate when they care about relative gains, or is cooperation only possible when states focus on absolute gains. If the latter is true, Mearsheimer asks do states ever really stop caring about relative gains.

Since, neoliberal institutionalism elaborates and explains an increased interdependence in low – politics, which in its turn makes conflicts and wars less predictable, the question about the emergence of the CSDP still remains under the debates. While neoliberals might assert that cooperation in the security field was dictated by an uncertain environment in the neighbourhood, by the desire to overcome problems jointly, the fact that decision-making process in the CSDP still remains intergovernmental emphasizes the limitation of the performed theory. However, as long as, both discussed theoretical approaches contain flaws regarding the explanation of the creation of the CSDP and its further development, they will be utilised together to answer the question imposed in the thesis. Therefore, in the following sub-chapter divergent and similar features of neorealism and neoliberalism will be elaborated in order to construct the framework for deeper analysis of the topic.

1.3. Divergence and Similarities between the Neorealism and Neoliberalism

The discussions amongst neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism have overwhelmed IR wrangle for a considerable length of time. The two schools of thought expect to characterize the international politics. These models have been fundamental for analysing the policymaking and the research within international relationsthe exploration inside universal relations.\textsuperscript{32} The debate is characterized by the disagreement over the issues such as: the nature and consequences of anarchy, international cooperation, relative versus absolute gains, etc. While for realists, survival within the anarchic international system is paramount, neoliberals count on the cooperation and distribution of labour. The main distinction between relative and absolute gains is the key-difference between neoliberals and neorealists. Neoliberals argue that to focus on relative gains is not profitable as interdependence ensures benefits for each entity. Mastanduno suggests that relative gains can be negative because they are favourable of protectionism and nationalism.\textsuperscript{33} To focus on distribution of benefit could affect the total benefit overall. However, neorealists believe that relative gain can hinder cooperation between states, as long as they are focused on the balance of powers, and seek to


obtain comparatively more benefits than any other entity. However, even though, neorealist and neoliberal theories include elements of divergence, these theories are more difficult to differentiate than realist and liberalist theories. Both groups of scholars agree that the international system is anarchic, without any central authority and world government, but they classify costs in a different way. Grieco recognizes that for both realists and neoliberals there is a common understanding of international anarchy, an absence of a common inter-state government\textsuperscript{34}. From the point of view of neorealists, there are no collective decisions, while neoliberals believe that, due to the interdependence, joint actions can reflect states’ common interests. Neorealists and neoliberals believe that international co-operation is possible but for neorealists, collaboration is hard to realise as the states are not looking for the same interests. Neorealists and neoliberals also agree on the fact that the main objectives of foreign policy are security and economic prosperity. However, Neorealists deem that security remains the first priority.

To sum up, an essential source of these divergences between neorealists and neoliberals is the unequal importance that each theory grants to economical and political aspects of international relations. It is desirable and foreseeable that balance of these variables eventually merges these theories into one paradigm. Hence, their application in the performed research is reasonable. As the question of the thesis is how far the EU can go in developing an independent defence policy, neorealism would help to define the possibilities of balancing the US in the region, and developing European resources in order not to count on the American burden sharing obligation (through NATO), which became quite uncertain after the election of new president. At the same time, neoliberalism would contribute the research through elaborating the perspectives of further cooperation between the member states in the field of security and defence. This combination creates a foundation for deeper investigation of the phenomenon such as the CSDP. Namely, on one hand, granting part of sovereignty to the organizations to take a responsibility on the common security is the reflection of the neoliberal assertions, meanwhile, the aspirations of certain member states of the EU, mainly France, to strive an independent defence policy from the USA, manifest the assumptions of the neorealism in terms of balancing power. Overall, two theoretical approaches enables to explore the perspectives of the deeper cooperation between member states, as well as to analyse an external environment and structure of the international system for possible scenario of an independent European defence.

1.4. Methodologies of the Research

Utilization of neoliberal and neorealist approaches enabled to complete the research thoroughly, namely, it established a framework for deeper analysis of empirical data, which is performed in the following chapters. In those sections, document analysis of official documents of the EU and NATO is widely used. The main criterion for the collected data was their relevance with the discussed topic. Namely, accents were made mostly on the primary resources, and certain interviews conducted by the European Union Committee of the House of Lords. This later performed the prove ment of the hypothesis that France was the main initiator of an independent military operation in Atalanta, and it was taking a leader position in balancing of the US presence in the region. Interviews were taken from the officials of the EU, who were questioned about the architects of implementation of the anti-piracy operation in Somali. Moreover, on the topic of an independent mission of the EU, the research (“A Geopolitical Balancing Game? EU and NATO in the Fight Against Somali Piracy”) conducted by Marianne worth to be mentioned. As a researcher at ARENA – Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, she is part of a research group studying External Dimension of European Political Order, her explanations of possible goals of an independent mission of the EU is even more considerable.

Apart from this author, publications of the director of the Europe in the World Programme at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels, Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, have been also widely explored and considered. One of the his main material used in this thesis is highly appreciated book - “Peace Without Money, War Without Americans”, which explores the new environment after the Cold War in Europe and the needs for more responsible policy from the EU, as the counting on the American resources does not seem prudent and pragmatic any more. As a prominent scholar in the field of the CSDP, his point of views on the perspective on the PESCO is also considerable and discussed in the present research. His assumptions about the EU’s global strategy also suggest valuable investigation in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. Precisely, the later version of the EU’s strategy – ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’ is evaluated in the thesis in order to explore the similarities and divergences between the strategic concepts of the EU and NATO and underline the challenges that exist during the collaborative actions of two organizations. Moreover, number of communiqués and reports are analysed in the paper for clarification the on-going tendencies in future prospects in the relationship between two institutions. One of the most significant documents in this term is Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals Endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016. Plus, as mentioned in the introduction, the legal documents such as treaties, take large place in the research. The most frequently explored document is Treaty of Lisbon that is also called Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, adopted in 2012.
In a nutshell, along with the primary data, number of researches, provided by the outstanding scholars have been critically analysed and considered. Overall, qualitative approach allowed explore statements, policy documents, summit outcomes treaties and scientific articles in order to become aware to the characteristics of the EU’s security and defence policy developments.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSDP AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND NATO

For long time the responsibility for crisis management was not acknowledged by the Europeans, as they were sure that the US would always be there to help them. It was perceived that even after the end of the Cold War the US would continue to assume responsibility for crisis management in Europe’s neighbourhood and provide the number of the forces. According to Prof. Sven Biscop, Europeans did not really feel responsibility for crisis management and they were sure that the US would always be there to help them out “… they saw this as the reward for their subservience to Washington in strategic matters: that even after the end of the cold War the US would continue to assume responsibility for crisis management in Europe’s neighbourhood and provide the bulk of the forces.” However, when the civil war burst in Yugoslavia in 1991, the US stated that this was not its fight. Thus, the ‘hour of Europe’ came and emerged the possibility to take a charge of crisis management itself. Even though, the EU met this challenge enthusiastically, the reality revealed lots of flaw and Europe failed spectacularly. All these defects pushed the member states to think about the improvement a credible defence policy. In parallel of these steps, the questions about the overlapping with the NATO have emerged. Precisely, in the following chapters the development of the EU’s common security and defence policy and relations between the EU and NATO will be reviewed and analysed.

2.1. Establishment of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy

Origins of Europe’s security and defence architecture back in the following years of the World War II. Earlier efforts were made in 1947 when the Treaty of Dunkirk between UK and France was signed as a European alliance and mutual assistance agreement after WWII. One year later it was transferred into the military Article 4 of the Treaty of Brussels which included the BeNeLux countries. In order to reach the treaty goals the Western Union Defence Organization was set up in 1948 with an allied European command structure under British Field Marshal Montgomery. In 1949, the United States and Canada joined the alliance and its mutual defence agreements through the North Atlantic Treaty with its Article 5 mutual defence clause which differed from the Brussels Treaty as it did not necessarily include military response. One year later, the European Defence Community (EDC), similar to European Coal and Steel Community, was proposed but failed ratification in the French parliament. In 1954, amendment of the Treaty of Brussels was adopted at the London and Paris Conferences which established the political Western European Union (WEU).

out of the earlier established Western Union Defence Organization and included West Germany and Italy.\textsuperscript{37}

Further development of the security cooperation was traced in the late 1960s, while the European Community (EC) began to explore ways to harmonise members’ foreign policies. As a result, at the Hague Summit, in 1969, European leaders instructed their foreign ministers to examine the feasibility of closer integration in the political domain and in response, the concept of European Political Cooperation (EPC) was presented in October 1970, in Davignon Report. This latter defined EPC’s objectives, and common actions, also listed specific processes, such as six-monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers and quarterly meetings for the Political Directors forming the Political Committee. Later on, EPC served as the foundation for the Common Foreign and Security Policy introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. With its entry into force on 1 November 1993, it created a single institutional framework, the European Union, based on three pillars, from which the second was the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Along with the CFSP, WEU continued existence and in 1992 adopted the Petersberg tasks, which included:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking;\textsuperscript{38}

The WEU itself had no standing army but depended on cooperation between its members. These so-called “Petersberg Tasks” were later on integrated into the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999). Plus, the post of the “High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy” was created which allowed the Union to speak with ‘one face and one voice’ on foreign policy matters. This year, at the Cologne European Council, Member States also reaffirmed the Union’s willingness to develop capabilities for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces. A primary development was the “Berlin Plus agreement” giving the EU, under certain conditions, access to NATO assets and capabilities. On the security policy development way, the most important event was adopting of the Lisbon Treaty, which was a cornerstone of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). By this treaty, all functions of the WEU have effectively been incorporated into the EU, and the WEU was closed down finally in 2011.\textsuperscript{39}

In a nutshell, a development of the European military and defence cooperation counts the years from the end of the World War II, though, in spite of certain attempts, until the beginning of


the twenty-first century, importance of the deeper collaboration in this field was mostly met reluctantly. If not pushing efforts made by couple of states (mainly France and UK), the reality even today would be much more different. However, while talking about the effectiveness of the cooperation, it is essential to incorporate more than two entities for increasing the common benefits for the organization’s member states, otherwise they might happen out of the advantages of the collaboration.

The policy area of defence is usually the domain of individual sovereign states. The major military alliance in Europe remains the intergovernmental North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which currently includes 22 EU member states together with five non-EU European countries: Iceland, Norway, Albania, Montenegro and Turkey as well as the United States and Canada. Although a serious concerns relating to national sovereignty and potential duplication of existing NATO structures, European defence integration has intensified in the beginning of the 21st century, bringing numerous CSDP operations and the establishment of a European Defence Agency (headed by the High Representative).40

The CSDP was officially launched at the Cologne European Council on June 1999. In the wake of the Yugoslav Wars, it was supposed to supply the European Union with the military force de frappe to sustain the critical and inconclusive CFSP. It was also a reaction to major changes in the structure of the post-Cold War international system, which urged European states to enhance their power projection capability and diminish their reliance on the United States.41

The evolution of the CSDP in the past fifteen years has encompassed three fundamental dimensions. First, the building up of the institutions and subsequent process of institutional reform, leading to the extension of bureaucratic structures and the creation of new ones. Second, the emergence of European strategic debate resulting in the adoption of the 2003 European Security Strategy (updated in 2008 and republished new one in 2016). Third, the operational experience gained by CSDP missions from 2003 onward. In March 2003, in fact, the EU launched its first military operation (EUFOR Concordia, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) using NATO assets under the Berlin Plus agreement, while the first autonomous CSDP military deployment came about only a few months later, in May 2003, with the launch of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RDC). Since then, the EU has intervened as a


crisis manager in many regions of the world (Africa, Asia, Caucasus Middle East and Western Balkans).  

One of the most fundamental dimensions of the CSDP is an advancement of its institutional framework, namely, in order to enable the European Union fully to assume its responsibilities for crisis management, the European Council in Nice, in 2000 decided to establish permanent political and military structures. For instance, Political and Security Committee (PSC) is a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping trail of the international situation, and assisting to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the CSDP. It prepares a rational EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. In parallel with the EUMC, the PSC is advised by a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This committee provides information, drafts recommendations, and suggests its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management. The Politico-Military Group (PMG) carries out preliminary work in the field of CSDP for the Political and Security Committee. It covers the political aspects of EU military and civil-military issues, including concepts, capabilities and operations and missions. The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) contributes to the objectives of the European External Action Service, the EU Common Security and Defence Policy and a more secure international environment by the political-strategic planning of CSDP civilian missions and military operations. As for the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) - they work under the direction of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and under the authority of the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) and it is the source of collective (multi-disciplinary) military expertise within the European External Action Service (EEAS). One of the main organs of EEAS is the European Defence Agency (EDA), which allows and facilitates defence cooperation among its Member States. In May 2017, following a Long Term Review (LTR) initiated by the Head of the Agency, Defence ministers agreed to empower EDA’s mission by strengthening its role in terms of intergovernmental capability planning and prioritisation in Europe. Additionally, credibility of the CSDP is provided by certain analytical and informational centres, among them is European Union Satellite Centre that supports the decision making in the field of CFSP/CSDP through the analysis of data from Earth observation satellites, set up in 2002 as a Council agency.

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under the operational direction of the High Representative, based in Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain, with an antenna in Brussels.43

To sum up, first decade of the twenty-first century was characterised by the active changes in the security and defence field within the EU. Adopting of strategic documents, creation of new agencies or committees allowed member states to take a responsibility on the regional threats jointly. However, certain cases (analysed below) put the credibility of CSDP under the doubt. On the one hand, uncertain position of the NATO to involve in the crises of Europe’s neighbourhood and on another hand some member states docile positions to integrate in the defence realm created the foundation for the debates about the future perspectives of an independent European security. Thus, in the subsequent chapter the tendencies of the EU – NATO will be characterised in order to define the challenges and prospects of mutual cooperation.

2.2. Relations between the EU and NATO

NATO is traditionally understood as the provider of a ‘hard’ security umbrella for Europe, which ensures the defence guarantee from allies, mostly from the US since an end of the World War II. The EU, as an economic giant has entered into the field of security relatively late, and is thus it was mainly perceived as the junior partner in the relationship. According to Manners, the EU is a normative power and its attempts to develop own security and defence policy is also dictated by the protection of the norms, European values, and therefore, the CSDP is mostly focused on civilian crisis rather than military ones.44 This has reinforced the dominant “Atlanticist” view that the CSDP is more “doing security” in the form of crisis management, while NATO has largely remained strategic reference for territorial defence in the area of expeditionary security operations.45 However, in reality, both organisations moved away from their traditional comfort zones from the late 1990s and led to academic discussion of organisational rivalry and competition.46

Since the set up of the EU’s ESDP in 1999, scholars have focused on the evolving and tension-ridden EU–NATO relationship. During the last decades, relations between two autonomous organizations become one of the most heavily institutionalized. Even though, EU–NATO relations provided fruitful cooperation during the early 2000s, recent developments have spread some doubts on the feasibility and effectiveness of this interorganizational partnership. In spite of the emergence of common security threats, being it fragility in the European neighbourhood, piracy, cyber warfare

or energy security, financial pressures to coordinate more effectively, have led both organizations to an uneasy co-existence. As a result, the current policy-oriented literature has also taken a pessimistic turn, even by previously enthusiastic supporters of closer EU–NATO relations.

2.2.1. Evolution of Relations and Reasons for Interaction

After the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954 and the integration of West Germany into NATO in 1955, an apparent division of labour was recognized: while hard security issues became the sphere of influence of NATO, the European Community focused on politico-economic integration and soft security during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, through this period direct interface between the staff of both organizations was explicitly impossible and, thus cooperation between two organizations literally did not exist. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union opened opportunities for European and transatlantic security organizations to enhance their tasks and enter into new policy fields. As a consequence, both organizations started reorientation and searching for new raison d’être. NATO focused on terrorism and multinational crimes, while the EU get involved in the construction of security and defence policy. Thus, the realms of their operating revealed similar. Therefore, the necessity of institutional arrangement of such overlapping emerged that was realised into Berlin Plus Agreement.

2.2.2. Berlin Plus Agreements

“Berlin Plus” was outlined at the 1999 NATO summit in Washington, D.C. Framework allows for consultations during crisis, and permits non-EU NATO members to contribute to EU-led operations.

The Berlin Plus agreement covers the exchange of arranged data under complementary security assurance rules; It also guarantees an access to NATO arranging capacities for EU-drove Crisis Management Operations (CMO); Plus, it assures an accessibility of NATO resources and capacities for EU-drove CMOs; masterminds EU - NATO meetings with regards to an EU-drove CMO making utilization of NATO resources and capacities; sets up an EU arranging cell at NATO headquarters (SHAPE) to help facilitate "Berlin Plus” missions, or those EU missions directed utilizing NATO assets. Moreover, it includes a small cell with regards to operational planning to the current EU Military Staff to direct conceivable EU missions without referring to NATO resources and, finally it welcomes NATO to station contact officers at the EU Military Staff to help guarantee

\textsuperscript{47}Williegen, N. (2015). The EU’s Relations with NATO and OSCE. The SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy. Volume 1. P.738
straightforwardness and close coordination amongst NATO and the EU. The EU also agreed to establish ad hoc “committees of contributors” for EU-led missions to give non-EU participants a function in operational decision-making. It also established regular NATO-EU meetings at ambassadorial and ministerial level, as well as regular meetings between the EU and non-EU European NATO members.

Up-to-date, the EU conducted two operations by the usage of Berlin Plus Agreement: EUFOR Concordia in 2003, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which the EU took over from NATO’s operation Allied Harmony, and deployed around 300 troops to provide security. It monitors the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Another operation carried out with the support of the NATO was EUFOR Althea, in 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following NATO’s decision at the 2004 Istanbul summit to suspend the mission of NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) by the end of the year, the EU commenced its own 7,000 troops strong mission. The goal was to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and to maintain a safe and secure environment. Yet, except of these operations Berlin Plus remains inactive. Lack of subsequent implementation of technically available recourses is largely due to a political stalemate arising from the so-called “participation problem”.

Partnership between the EU and NATO is widely understood by academics and practitioners to be a problematic. The constraints arise from the so-called “participation problem”. It implies on one hand a membership of Turkey in NATO but not in the EU and on the other hand Cyprus’ membership in the EU but not NATO. Institutional red lines arose and have remained in place since the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Namely, NATO member Turkey has been blocking any effort at establishing stronger cooperative ties between the alliance and the EU, mainly by denying Cypriot participation in EU–NATO meetings. In its turn Cyprus blocked Turkey within the EU in context of Turkey’s involvement in the European Defence Agency (EDA).

Specifically, this political deadlock hindered progress towards a more comprehensive and inter-organisational relationship between the two entities. However, apart from the mentioned

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49 The Ohrid Framework Agreement was the peace deal signed by the government of the Republic of Macedonia and ethnic Albanian representatives on 13 August 2001. The agreement ended the armed conflict between the National Liberation Army and the Macedonian security forces. http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/Ohrid%20Framework%20Agreement.pdf. Last Accessed on 11/03/2018
issues, both institutions still continue coordination in the spheres that concerns both of them. It might not be mutual military operations or missions but cooperation on the information, experience sharing level. Therefore, the subsequent chapter will analyse recent tendencies in the EU-NATO relations.

2.2.3. Current Tendencies in the EU and NATO Relations

Recent feature of the EU – NATO interaction is mainly defined by the declaration signed on 8 July 2016, by the Presidents of the European Council, president of the Commission and by the Secretary General (although importantly not the Member States themselves) of NATO. Joint Declaration states that the Euro-Atlantic community faces unprecedented challenges penetrating from the South and East and requires proper addresses. Document outlined seven concrete areas for deeper cooperation:

- countering hybrid threats;
- operational cooperation including at sea and on migration;
- cyber security and defence;
- defence capabilities;
- defence industry and research;
- exercises;
- supporting Eastern and Southern partners' capacity-building efforts.\(^{54}\)

Since its adoption, several steps have been taken for its implementation and progress report on these actions was released in June 2017. Regarding the performance of taken liabilities, the following specific activities have been highlighted in the document: Information on resilience requirements has been exchanged and the establishment of the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and its interaction with the newly create NATO Hybrid Analysis Cell was announced. This later was supposed to help to draw up a shared situational picture; Cooperation and coordination between Operations Sophia and Sea Guardian have been expanded through standard data sharing and strategic help; Furthermore, cooperation on preparing and training has been created with a view to fortify complementarities. Nearer association of separate crisis reaction groups and collaboration on digital activities was additionally advancing. Plus, close joint effort has been as well settled on ability empowering agents, for example, on institutionalization and on Military Aviation. Moreover, on guard industry and research, NATO and EU have set up a component for relations to further build up a discourse

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\(^{54}\) “EU and NATO cooperation to expand to new areas, including counter-terror; military mobility; women, peace and security.” 06/12/2017. Official Website of the EEAS. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36854/eu-and-nato-cooperation-expand-new-areas-including-counter-terror-military-mobility-women_en. Last Accessed: 20/03/2018
on mechanical perspectives, with centre around Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME); and finally, two-sided discourse has been upgraded through a merged routine with regards to abnormal state solicitations to applicable Ministerial meetings, the holding of formal and casual NAC-PSC gatherings and strengthened cross-briefings on issues of shared interest.\textsuperscript{55}

While the report was focused on implementation of the 42 proposals, framed into the Joint Declaration, next report on the opportunities how to expand cooperation was also announced. Meanwhile, discussing current tendencies in the NATO – EU relations, crisis in Ukraine is also worth to be mentioned as one of the most significant signs of the new global multipolar order. Namely, Ukrainian conflict illustrated how Germany has become the strongest US partner in Europe and to some extant replaced the UK in European security. However, German policymakers have also noted that the US became more unreliable partner in European security. According to one German official at the Munich Security Conference in February 2015 complained that “... because the stakes are so low for [the Americans], we never know where Washington will end up. It could escalate the sanctions and arm Ukraine now. But in a few years, it could reset the relationship to secure Russia’s cooperation on an unconnected issue, such as Islamic State\textsuperscript{56}.” In spite of the fact that Baltic States and Eastern European countries have required the deployment NATO military forces on the border areas, Crisis in Ukraine revealed that NATO is not the main institution where the Euro-Atlantic partners formulate and make policy responses. Therefore, Ukrainian conflict also invoked the questions about the future of the European security order.

All in all, interaction between the NATO and the EU counts several years. During last two years the collaboration has become more apparent and desired. However, the challenges that existed from the beginning still remain unsolved, being it participation issue or institutional overlaps. Precisely, this later issue will be reviewed and analysed in the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{55} Progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016. 14 June 2017.

3. INSTITUTIONAL OVERLAP OF THE EU AND NATO

On-going implementation of the initiatives rooted in the Lisbon Treaty, namely, ‘awakening’ of PESCO and creation of the EDF, accelerated the debates about the institutional overlap between the EU and NATO. Concept of institutional overlap, according to Stéphanie C Hofmann, involves three dimensions: common memberships, intersecting mandates and shared resources. However, the EU – NATO relation with common twenty-one members, common tasks and strategies, arguably satisfies all three dimensions. From an opening of the CSDP, interdependence of both international organizations (IOs) became a vivid, however, it resulted mostly in a division of labour trajectory, where NATO concentrated on military dimensions and while the EU primarily responsibility primarily for civilian elements of operations. Thus, both IOs maintained different understandings of security. However, changed by years and currently both consider the military and civilian element as essential components of the security concept.

In his influential article on interorganizational networking, Biermann suggested an ‘interorganizational network’ perspective for explaining the inception of collaborative networking between major Euro–Atlantic security institutions, such as the EU, NATO, Council of Europe, OSCE and the UN after the Cold War. According to him, the essential condition for cooperation between autonomous organizations lies in domain similarity, “.... domain similarity implies a shared issue-area with significant, though not total overlap of competences for meaningful cooperation”. This assumption means that Euro-Atlantic organizations move, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, towards the field of crisis management resulted in domain similarity and functional overlap or functional crossover. However, the case of the EU and NATO was much more apparent. EU’s decision to launch its own military dimension inevitably raised the question of its relationship with NATO. Institutionalization of the ESDP from 1999 onwards raised concerns among transatlantic security analysts. The most famous in this sense was Madeleine Albright’s article, which warned the Europeans not to duplicate, discriminate, or decouple (the notorious as ‘three D’s’) from NATO and its member states. This approach was strongly maintained by the UK and after the enlargement in 2004, by Poland and the majority of the Central and Eastern European Countries. On the other hand for France, closer NATO–EU relation was seen as a threat to EU autonomy.

All in all, creation and expanding ESDP created the foundation for vigorous discussion over the institutional overlap between two entities. While the neorealists were arguing that

emerging of the common security policy within the EU might have been the reflection of certain member states’ ambitions to empower the European status internationally, putting the division line between these two IOs became crucial. Therefore, in the following sub-chapter the features of the cooperation and rivalry of both organizations will be performed.

3.1. Features of the Cooperation and Rivalry

Considering the growth of the NATO–EU rivalries and problems at the political level and the EU’s own ambitions in the military field in recent years, literature has been marked by the doubts about the effectiveness and future viability of the relationship. Moreover, since both IOs share twenty-two member states and the security concepts, more and more tensions is onset. Existence of twenty-two common members creates the possibilities of to seek out the most favourable forum or own interests. Therefore, this tendency causes ‘fragmentation of security authority’. As Stephanie C. Hofmann distinguished, there are four diverse types on how double or single membership can influence the relation between the EU and NATO.

First is ‘turf wars’, which envisions a tense relationship characterized by the rivalry. It could be about competences, mandates, scope and reciprocity. Second is ‘obstructionism’ that happens while a state uses its single membership to hinder cooperation between two IOs. This is mainly regarding the Turkey-Cyprus conflict, which inter alia blocked number of formal meetings. Third refers to the ‘muddling through’, which implies that meetings are frequently postponed, delayed or obstructed by one of the two. This phenomenon in turn hampers cooperation. And, finally, fourth applies an ‘ignoring the politicians’. The issue is that experts ‘on the ground’ merely ignore Brussels’ bureaucratic gridlock. Those officials cooperate on a day-to-day basis without any top-down consent as their operations work is constrained due to political discord in Brussels. In a nutshell, the main obstacle that negatively affects inter-institutional efficiency is that single member states, considering the ‘unanimity’ principle of decision-making process, can veto significant resolutions. In this sense, except of Turkey-Cyprus conflict, France’s persistent position towards NATO is highlighted. It was exactly France and Cyprus that have blocked the proposals from the USA initiating that NATO would have access to EU civilian crisis management assets.

The problem of efficient cooperation became more relevant after the adoption of Lisbon Treaty. It enhances the Petersberg Tasks advanced the CSDP, which could duplicate, discriminate

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and decouple respectively NATO assets, members and the USA from Europe. Influence of the Lisbon Treaty was touchable in three ways. Specifically, it defined the EU’s strategic role and global orientation, the institutionally structured the CSDP, and established the procedural framework for capability progress under the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) responsibility. Treaty First, CSDP’s role was customized as the extended version of the Petersberg’s Tasks was adopted. It consisted the objectives such as Joint disarmament operations; Humanitarian and rescue tasks; Military advice and assistance tasks; Conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.

Second, the institutional arrangements have changed as the European Council was chaired by a full-time President and the European External Action Service (EEAS) has been established as a supporter of the activities of High Representative of the European Foreign and Security Policy. Third, it improved status of the EDA and introduced the Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PSCD), which has recently been activated as a means to harmonize, share and specialize the resources and capabilities of the member states. These changes, brought by Lisbon Treaty, distinction line between two entities made more blurring. Although the NATO still enjoys superiority, article 222 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) set out the ‘solidarity clause’ which has a lot crossing points with NATO’s Article 5. In particular, it states that in case of terrorist acts or man-made disasters, member states should support the victim country by the means on their disposal.

“The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: (a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; - protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; - assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;”

Then, enhanced tasks such as conflict prevention, military advice and assistance, which were already part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, even though did not necessarily consequence in competition, this explicit duplication of tasks could either result in better and more frequent consultations or into a ‘beauty contest’ between both IOs.

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On the issue of EU–NATO policy overlap the literature has emphasized three different perspectives. One group of authors has highlighted the possibilities for natural synergies between both organizations. Argument was that stronger EU efforts would reinforce NATO’s civilian capacities as well. A second view has foreseen an obvious division of labour. This view stressed out not only a division in terms responsibilities, such as high-intensity, military crisis management for NATO and low intensity civilian crisis management for the EU, but also highlighted geographic lines, namely, the EU would be concentrated on its own neighbourhood and Africa, while NATO focuses on Afghanistan, Central Asia, and emerging transatlantic security threats. As for the third group of scholars, they predicted even far-reaching potential for future cooperation, based on both organizations’ perception of similar security threats. These issues are anti-piracy efforts, concerns about cyber security, anti-terrorism activities and energy security. However, they also pointed out the possibility for rivalry in case there is not a clear scope of engagement from both sides.

To conclude, it should be stressed out the rivalry and cooperation between both IOs has always been in the core of the debates among the scholars. Some of them even highlighted clear incidents of open competition and lack of formal collaboration, namely, the decision to launch two similar and parallel anti-piracy operations in Africa. This latter will be analysed below, where the operation, reflecting the collaboration will be also explored in order to compare cooperation and rivalry tendencies. Meanwhile, it worth to mention that when political level remains dominated by a permanent deadlock, EU and NATO operational staffs have developed an informal and practical relationship that allows them to deliver towards their respective mandates effectively. This issue will be also touched in the subsequent chapters.

3.1.1. Operation EUFOR Althea

The military operation Althea was launched in 2004, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and maintained the safe and secure environment in the country. Commence of this operation was preceded by the decision of NATO to conclude its SFOR-operation and the adoption of the resolution 1575 by the UN Security Council which authorised the deployment of an EU force (EUFOR) in BiH. In the framework of Operation, the EU sent 7000 troops, to ensure implementation of a General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in BiH. Operation Althea was carried out with access to NATO assets and capabilities. It has been reconfigured four times, and entails the objectives on ensuring a capacity-building and training support to the AFBiH, to bolster BiH endeavours to keep up the protected and secure condition in BiH, to support BiH efforts

to maintain the safe and secure environment in BiH and to provide support the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH.\textsuperscript{70} It also maintains monitoring, advising and mentoring local authorities in countermine activities, military and civilian movement control of weapons, bullets and explosive substances, as well as the management of weapons and ammunition storage sites.

Operation Althea functions under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements. Operation Commander is General Sir Adrian John Bradshaw (UK) who is also NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). Strategic direction of the operation and political control is exercised by the EU's Political and Security, under the responsibility of the Council of the EU.\textsuperscript{71} As a hole, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) provides the Operation Headquarters (OHQ). European Union Command Element (EUCE), which is located at NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) at Naples, yields the necessary coordination for ensuring a Balkans regional approach and regarding the use of reserve, which are not covered under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements.

Althea was first project implemented under the Berlin Plus Arrangement. It reflected the first attempt to use NATO assets by the EU. The most passionate supporter of EUFOR Althea were Khavier Solana and the UK, for very different reasons. While Solana, maintained by the European Parliament, aimed to make a showcase of the EU’s distinct security and defence policy, the UK insisted that the operation would be aligned to NATO, and hence the US.\textsuperscript{72} For the EU, the stabilization and reconstruction of a multicultural and multi-ethnic community in BiH became a litmus test for the Union’s commitment to become a political and security actor that projects peace and stability across the entire continent. Whereas it refers to success of EUFOR Althea, internal effectiveness comes to the first place. As the analysis of success factors has shown, operation has been a successful in terms of internal goal attainment, as no violence along the ethnic lines has occurred since its presence in the country.\textsuperscript{73} However, CSDP operation recently failed to carry out an evaluation of the capacity building and training activities carried out by the member states, because of the six-month rotation of the EU staff. This indicates an underperformance in operational capacity, which eventually ended in NATO taking over the assessment process.

Plus, some authors even noted that Althea has proven the way how not to do it. Objections are that for 15 years, the EU achieved nothing credible and useful, as problems in Bosnia are no longer military. In contrary, they are political, ethnical, and economical, where it was essential to act.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{70} Official website of the NATO. Operation Althea. https://shape.nato.int/page39511625. Last Accessed on 13/03/2018
\textsuperscript{71} Official website of the EEAS. EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA). http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php. Last Accessed on 13/03/2018
\textsuperscript{73} Pulkó, I. (2016). Analysing the effectiveness of EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal on European Perspectives of the Western Balkans. Volume 8, Number 2 (15). P.13
All in all, cooperation between the NATO and the EU was reflected into the operation Althea. However, there are still inconsistencies about the results of the operation, one thing can be still highlighted, it is a notable example of this development of EU’s common defence policy. While there are assertions that this operation reflects power relations between nations with different strategic cultures, others claim that it enables states to learn collective operating and convergencing of interests. EUFOR Althea as the EU’s longest military operation was first product of the power politics of different coalitions.

3.1.2. Operation Atalanta

Presented chapter examines the EU’s decision to launch an independent maritime military mission to fight piracy on the Somali coast, instead of strengthening NATO’s humanitarian operation that was already operating in this area. The analysis proposes two explanations of such decision. The first one, which roots into the neorealist perspectives, is that France, who held the EU Presidency by that time, used an opportunity and create suitable geopolitical conditions to conduct an autonomous EU operation on the negotiation table. However, in terms of second opinion, EU member states supported the French suggestion only due to the legitimacy considerations of legal framework for proposed operation.

In 2008, Somali pirates were counting almost a half of all reported piracy incidents in the world, threatening to the important shipping lines going through the Suez Canal economically and strategically and hampering an aid to a million Somalis. As a first response, France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada unilaterally started escorting aid shipments in 2007. Later on, in October 2008 as a reflection of request from the UN Secretary General NATO, who had a Standing Maritime Group passing through the area, launched the humanitarian operation ‘Allied Provider’, which ended in December 2008. After three months, in March of 2009, NATO again launched an anti-piracy operation ‘Allied Protector’ composed of so-called Rotating Standing Maritime Groups. In August 2009, this latter has been replaced by the mission ‘Ocean Shield’. In addition to this operation, different countries, such as China and Russia, also launched unilateral anti-piracy missions. In the conditions of this geopolitical environment, categorized by an unprecedented level of different actors and coalitions, the EU also determined to initiate a naval military mission (called Atalanta) in the same theatre.75

The EU decided not to count on the Berlin Plus arrangement and instead of using NATO’s capabilities, it established operational headquarters in Northwood, UK. Atalanta is the EU’s first

naval military operation. It was initially scheduled for a year, but the mandate of this mission has extended gradually several times. Currently, it is dedicated to protect vessels chartered by the WFP, to yield safety of African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM) shipping, to contribute to the deterrence, constraint of demonstrations of piracy off the Somali coast and to monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia’ (Council of the European Union 2012).

Carried out under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Atalanta is an ‘intergovernmental ad-hoc operation’, and operational contributions are voluntary. Though, most EU member states have aided it militarily. But the question about its launch still remains puzzling. Specifically, the query lies in the reason, why the EU member states instead of focusing on expanding and strengthening already existed NATO mission, chose to focus their political and military resources against piracy through the EU. After all, there is limited amount of military resources that can be provided at any time.

As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, there are several explanations of such decision. In the presented paper accents will be made solely on two hypotheses provided by the neorealists. The first builds on the neo-realist concept of bandwagoning and second focuses on the relative gains.

3.1.3. Possible Explanation of the Puzzle

According to the bandwagonning concept of the neorealist approach, Atalanta was part of an agreed-upon strategic division of labour between the US/NATO. NATO was supposed to complete the tasks related to the ‘hard’ military actions, such as fighting piracy and protecting merchant shipping, meanwhile the EU would take over the ‘softer’ tasks, including the ensuring the safety of the World Food Programme (WFP) shipments. Moreover, one of the main purposes of the bandwagoning would be balancing regionally other great power, operating in the theatre, namely, China and Russia, who also showed strong strategic and economic interests in the area. This hypothesis suggests that rather than balancing, EU’s decision to launch the mission alone was serving the intention to strengthen the partnership with the US and complement its objectives. There is also a line of arguments that it was a EU’s intention to protect the US leadership against the rising power, such as China, which was attempting to compete the US over the Indian Ocean.

A second neorealist hypothesis focuses on the internal strategic game in the EU. In particular, France, as a holder of the EU presidency made more reluctant member states support an EU mission.\textsuperscript{80} With Atalanta, France stood out as a possible political mobilizer. Historically, it has a strong tradition of favouring European foreign policy cooperation outside the NATO framework. According to the 12th report, provided by the European Union Committee of the House of Lords, member states’ officials, on the question who suggested a naval EU mission in the first place, all referred to France. Here is presented an extract from the responses of the interviewees:

“...France raise(d) it within the EU. Because it was the French presidency, which was a big thing, and they wanted to move forward the CSDP...
...the French were the more active, because [...] it was the French presidency of the European Union’. Holding the presidency, France, together with Spain, quickly started working on establishing an EU military mission, ‘of doing it at a wider scale...
... it started with a whole lot of lobbying from the French, together also with the Spanish who had strong fishing interest...
...for the member states in favour of enhanced EU security and defence cooperation it was moreover ‘easy to choose this particular thing [...] because there are few risks involved for the military personnel’ compared to for instance a land-based operation...
...thus, for the member states in favour of increased EU military cooperation, this was a situation in which ‘something had to be done, and this was something that the EU could do...
...this was a chance to ‘show that we can. Here the EU had the opportunity to start something’ outside the NATO framework...”\textsuperscript{81}

To sum up, France, together with Spain, seem to have used the window of opportunity created by the rise of piracy, the UNSC’s call for action and the US’ support to suggest and put the EU option on the table. So far, there is little data to maintain the bandwagoning/division of labour hypothesis. Thus, the possibility that the geopolitical situation in 2008 was used as a chance by particular EU member states to strengthen EU’s foreign policy integration seems more relevant. However, the case of Atalanta has not been only attempt of France to highlight the importance of cooperation with the EU and put preference on the usage European capabilities rather than Atlantic. Specifically, invoking of the EU’s Mutual Assistance Clause in 2015 is another proof of this assertion. This later will be elaborated in the subsequent chapter.

3.2. Mutual Assistance Clause

Mutual assistance clause’ (MAC), incorporated into the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) was rarely discussed in academic sphere and thus little known to the public. However, following the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015 it became widely conversed by the scholars and officials. The case is that after the attacks French President François Hollande has invoked Article 42(7) of the TEU which refers the MAC.

Introduction of a mutual assistance clause in the Treaty framework of the European Union dates back to the process of establishing a Constitution for Europe (Article I-41(7)) and implies the obligation of the member states to assist the victim member states in terms of armed aggression on its territory.

**Article 42(7).** “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”.  

More frequently the wording of the MAC is compared with the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, according to analyst Rehrl, there are three main differences.

- **Motive:** Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is based on an armed attack against one or more NATO members, meanwhile an Article 42(7) can be invoked only in case of armed aggression. Subsequently an armed aggression does not necessarily mean an ‘imminent threat’ of an attack, but preventive countermeasures could be taken.

- **Area of responsibility:** Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty limits itself to Europe and North America, while the MAC refers to ‘its territory’ and therefore could be applicable world-widely due to the many overseas areas of the EU Member States.

- **Means:** While article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty refers to assistance to the parties of the treaty by the actions as it deems necessary, according to the Treaty of the European Union, the Member States are obliged to provide aid and assist by all the means in their power. Hence no limitations or excuses for Member States (except Denmark with its general opt-out for military CSDP), not to provide full assistance and aid if requested.”

From performed distinctions between these two article can be taken as a basis of the decision made by the French President to invoke the MAC and not Article 5 of the NATO. Apart from this, there is several strategic intentions behind this choice. First is that by that decision Member States became more obliged through the EU and thus acknowledged more responsibility of deeper integration locally. Plus, Member States were also under huge pressure to improve

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cooperation on EU internal security. Invoking mutual assistance has the EU intelligence cooperation, which before that occasion has remained bilateral, between individual countries, rather than European. Secondly, by invoking the mutual assistance clause within the EU rather than appealing to NATO for assistance, France stressed out its European approach to solving problems. For the EU Member States, this approach could have been taken to overcome deadlocks in past and current crises both internal (e.g. the Greek debt and EU refugee crises) and external (e.g. Ukraine/Crimea).  

To sum up, utilizing of the MAC by France could have been considered by the neorealists as an indication of balancing the US and extending the power of the EU globally. However, NATO, which can be perceived as a reflection of the American presence in the region, could also benefit from empowering the EU, considering the comments of Donald Trump, that the EU should get used to taking care of own problems. In order to achieve this object the EU needs to be able to take a responsibility on the expeditionary operations and conduct full-fledged missions without referring the NATO assets. For clarifying these possibilities, firstly, it would be reasonable to review the features of both IOs’ operations, strategic concepts, perceptions of the challenges, responses on the threats and conclude the characteristics that would be necessary for the EU to react European issues independently.

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4. FEATURES OF NATO AND EU OPERATIONS/MISSIONS

NATO and the EU have evolved their strategic landscape and relations since the end of the Cold War. While NATO’s collective defence guarantee remains at the core of the alliance, member states have taken steps toward political integration to develop a common foreign and defence policy and to manage security crises in the periphery. Since then, such evolution resulted generated some friction around threat assessment, defence institutions and military capabilities. Even though, most EU member states support close NATO-EU interactions, seeing the CSDP as a means to give themselves more options for dealing with future crises, particularly in cases the United States reveals reluctant to become involved, still remains on the stake. Traditionally certain number of member states, led by France, continues to favour more autonomous EU defence identity and hence, the elaboration of the features of specific security missions of NATO and the European Union seems to be relevant. Namely, what types of military forces are necessary for each of them, are the EU decision-making procedures compatible to ensure an adequate and timely response to emerging threats will be the topic of following chapters. Plus, strategic concepts of both IOs will be discussed in order to define the similarities of challenge perceptions and response characteristics.

4.1. NATO’s Strategic Concepts

Traditionally, after the collapse of the Soviet Unions, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction became the principal threats facing the allies. However, since 2010, after adoption of the new strategic concept more attention is given to new security challenges, such as cyber attacks, international terrorism, interruption of vital communication and energy transport routes (§7-15). Thus, NATO attempts to provide more capabilities needed for the prevention of cyber attacks. It also takes more responsibility in the field of energy security, entailing protection of vital infrastructure and shipment areas and lines.

One of the critical innovations of the new Strategic Concept is its increased attention to the development of civilian capabilities. In particular, integration of civilian and military instruments and deeper cooperation with various international entities, along with various non-governmental organizations (§21) emerged crucial. For ensuring the effectiveness of crisis management operations, NATO envisions to commit to the tasks such as reinforcement the exchange of intelligence, supporting the implementation of expeditionary operations, developing modest civilian crisis management capability and improve coordination with various civilian partners. 2010 strategy reconfirmed NATO’s role in arms control and non-proliferation. Plus, it also emphasized the
commitment to open door policy towards European democracies. It also directed more attention to partnerships.\(^\text{85}\)

All in all, after a decade from first adoption of Strategic Concept (1999), despite the remaining of the core principal (collective security), it has still changed slightly, specifically, in terms of widened area of threats. New tendencies of the international concerns have been reflected in the document, which in its turn requires multilateral commitment and efforts. In this sense the significance of the NTAO-EU interaction seems even more tangible. However, necessity of clear distinction and prevention of overlapping becomes higher, especially if the same definition of the challenges will be taken into account. Bellow the strategic concept of the EU will be examined.

### 4.2. EU Global Strategy

Strategic Concept is crucial for evaluating the threats, setting up the goals and meet to all existing and potential challenges; and then it is also essential to revaluate strategies on a regular basis in order to determine how it has been implemented and whether it was successful or does it needs replacement. Evidently, security strategies are important sites for the EU into existence as a security actor. However, until 2003 (European Security Strategy), EU did not have established such document and only after the invasion of Iraq it took steps for its creation. It was initiated by the High Representative Javier Solana. Since then, it was readopted in 2016. However, before this, the report on implementation the ESS was released (in 2008), though, it did not deserve much attention from decision-makers. Differed from this case, unveiling of a new global strategy on foreign and security policy for the EU immediately after the Brexit was be conceived as a pledge to remain together as a Union for the purposes of contributing to global security in a particular way.\(^\text{86}\)

First, EUGS introduces a new overall approach to foreign and security policy, read in the 2003. According to professor Sven Biscop, who is one of the prominent analysts of the European Foreign and Security Policy, noted prudently that the EUGS represents a return to Realpolitik. However, realpolitik should be understood in its original meaning, which was suggested by the German liberal Ludwig von Rochau in 1853 and implies a rejection of liberal utopianism, but not of liberal ideals themselves. “... it held out a vision of the future and a guide for how to get there, for how to achieve those ideals in a realistic way.”\(^\text{87}\) Strategy suggests five key objectives of the Union: those are security of the EU itself, the neighbourhood, how to deal with war and crisis, stable regional orders across the globe, and effective global governance.

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The way it envisions the pursuing first three priorities clearly reflects the features of real politics, especially, by emphasizing own security, the neighbourhood, and hard power, and no longer democratization. It is read in the preamble of the Strategy that the union “... will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield.”

Additionally, stabilizing the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa is no mean task, yet the EUGS achieves the right balance for it does not ignore the challenges in Asia. Second, democratization is no longer obligatory part of the package. The EU will sustain democracies where they emerge, and only in the case of positive example. In this sense, it only mentions Tunisia and Georgia as successful illustrations. However, concept has been brought for empowering civil dimensions of the fragile states, namely, increasing of the resilience of people and societies, by fighting poverty and inequality. Diminishing the scope of the ambition in terms of democratization is precisely the acceptance of reality. Third, there is a stronger awareness of the significance of a credible military instrument. As Mogherini points out, in an era of globalisation, geography is still important and the efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously meanwhile also contributing to cooperation with NATO.

As for the threats, considered by the EU, they are in consistency with the NATO and entails terrorism, cyber security, proliferation of the WMD. These tendencies will be discussed deeply below, where the similar perception of the challenges by both IOs is performed.

To sum up, it can be asserted that EU Global Strategy has been a new step towards the understanding of full responsibility for European defence. Despite the fact that first attempt to establish the frame of strategy counts more than a decade, EUGS can be perceived as the first truly deep and comprehensive document of supranational defence and security policy. It defines the key challenges of the institution, emphasises the threats, sets the goals for future operating and establishes the limitations for the EU’s primary interests that include mostly the MENA Region.

4.3. Similar Perception of Challenges

Functional relationship between the EU and NATO, and their strategic environment is mainly conditioned by very similar factors and challenges. This commonality is clearly seen in the strategic documents, assessed in the previous chapters. (NATO Strategic Concept 2010, European Union Global Strategy 2016). They revolve mostly around three principal issues: the West’s failing relationship with Russia, in particular after the case of Ukraine, since 2014; continued instability in

the Middle East, since 2011; and the steady threat posed by terrorism as in the region and as well as across the EU and NATO territories.

More recently, the Euro-Atlantic cooperation has also been tested by US president Donald Trump’s uncertain behaviour, and suspicious remarks. However, unpredictable nature of his foreign policy has potentially stimulated a new sense of responsibility among European leaders. Similarly, on the one hand, Brexit also established new dynamic within the EU, which was reflected in recent moves towards extended European defence cooperation. On the other, EU-referendum in Britain has created further institutional, diplomatic, budgetary complications for the EU’s CSDP and thus affected relations with NATO as well.

All in all, challenges for both organizations evidently remain the same. It affects bilateral interaction and requires proper reactions. However, in spite of the common perceptions of the challenges, the response on them still remains divergent. This trait will be analysed in the following chapter. Due to the fact that NATO’s activities are mainly designed according to the American insights, in the proclaimed section, accent will be made on the difference between the US-European threat reactions.

4.4. U.S. and European Differences over Threat Response

Despite the fact the NATO is an alliance where the rights of each member state is equal and agreement on the threats is common, there are still considerable differences between the United States and its allies over appropriate responses. Allied governments argued that the Administration excessively emphasize military over political means to counter a threat. Plus, allies have other domestic budget priorities than expanding allocations for defence. This opposition was the most obvious during Bush Administration while American National Security Strategy (2002) noted that the United States was reserving the right to take military action to prevent hostile acts” by an adversary. Most of the allies view it as an example of U.S. unilateralism, while they believe that military action must be undertaken within a multilateral framework.

Differences were also visible in terms of the putting the priority to the UN decisions. Most allies consider UN resolutions as a mandatory step for NATO military action. They insist involvement of international institutions in “legitimizing” humanitarian missions. This tendency roots in the aftermath of the two world wars. Europeans remain loyal of the international diplomatic means and international law, meanwhile the U.S. prioritize national interests and attempts to justify taken actions through accentuating on the global threats.

Apart from these divergences, there are certain similarities. Namely, whereas the UN represents only peacekeeping framework, NATO and the EU have been transformed into “crisis managers” with their own unique characteristics. However, each of these organisations possesses its own operational planning process and command culture. Specifically, the EU’s CSDP adds value on three accounts.

Firstly, it launches crisis management operations in the parts of the world where other organisations are not welcome. Those are Rafah, Georgia, Aceh or Chad. Secondly, it is synchronising the different instruments of European foreign policy, and thirdly, it attempts to perform an insurance policy that Europeans can act autonomously if US leadership is absent.

To sum up, it should be noted that the European attitude towards type of responses on the menaces differs from the transatlantic view. It seeks for more diplomatic means, though, currently, it also leaned towards the ‘hard’ tools of the crisis management. It is reflected in the emergence of the PESCO that implies more collaboration in the military field. However, the future results of such tendencies are not clear yet. Apparently, up-to-day military operations, weighted by the EU, do not set the foundations for hopes, as it has been characterised by certain flaws and lacks of resources.
4.5. EU Operations and Missions

The European Union has undertaken number of overseas operations, using civilian and military instruments in three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia), as part of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Each of them works in the framework of a comprehensive approach. Up-to-date, the EU had launched 34 operations and missions, from where 10 were military, 23 civilian, and one mixed civil-military mission. There are also differences in terms of characters for each operations/missions that is presented bellow, in the table.

Table 1. EU Operations and Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Military operations</th>
<th>Assistance missions</th>
<th>Police operations</th>
<th>Law missions</th>
<th>Border missions</th>
<th>Monitoring missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Concordia</td>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>EUPM BiH</td>
<td>EUJUST THEMIS</td>
<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>AMM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Artemis</td>
<td>AMIS Darfur</td>
<td>EUPOL Proxima</td>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>Ukraine/Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>EUPAT FYROM</td>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa</td>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>EUFOR DR Congo</td>
<td>EUSSR Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>EUFOR Tchad/RCA</td>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger</td>
<td>EUPOL DRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>EUNAVFO R Atalanta</td>
<td>EUCAP NESTOR</td>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>EUAVSEC South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>EUFOR RCA,</td>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>EUMAM RCA</td>
<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>EUNAVFO R MED Sophia</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Currently, there are 18 ongoing missions and operations, 6 military operations and 12 civilian missions (see the map into the annex 1.). Between 2006 and the first phase of the economic crisis in 2008, the amount of EU crisis management operations peaked, however, after an entry of Lisbon Treaty in 2009 into force, there were no new missions or operations launched for two years.

The names of operations are given by the usage of prefix of either European Union Force (EUFOR), or European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR), for land and naval missions, respectively. As for headquarters, for each operation, an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) is scheduled by the appropriate Council decision. Since, 2003, four types of OHQs have been employed:

- National 'parent headquarters';
- Allied Command Operations (ACO) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) based on the Berlin Plus agreement;
- Local Mission Headquarters;
- European Union Operations Centre (EU OPCEN).

Generally, the EU conducts an autonomous policy on security and defence but it also undertakes effective multilateralism. Meanwhile, it usually acts under the authorisation of Security Council resolutions; a formal request from the local authorities is also basis for the establishment of civilian missions. However it does not mean that the mission should be against UN guidelines and mandates. Traditionally, EU member states showed inclination for civilian missions to in low-risk security contexts. It entails response to the regional conflicts, social inequality, organised crime and failed states, meanwhile, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, competition for natural resources and energy dependences have been always behind the scene.

The table below catalogues the key determining factors in the area of EU CSDP.

**Table 2. CSDP key determining factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categorization of the Factors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risks type</strong></td>
<td>Low risk scenarios and minimisation of risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of involvement</strong></td>
<td>Preference for civilian and non-coercive missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time frame</strong></td>
<td>Long-term civilian missions vs. short-term military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy preference</strong></td>
<td>Through UNSC Resolutions (military operations) or consent of the state being in civil crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographic areas of interest</strong></td>
<td>Neighbouring countries or the former African colonies of EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Menaces that directly affect EU internal security - terrorism, irregular migration, drug trafficking, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The categorization of the factors reveals that traditionally the EU was opting to carry out low risk missions and most of them were civilian one. The reason of these preferences can be viewed in the scarcity as of resources as well as the limitation of the political willingness. For instance, time required for establishing of small-scull EU operations in Africa has exceeded the eighteen-month period required for planning Operation Overlord, which mainly result of political disagreement. Whereas, quick operating in the Congo in 2003, in Lebanon in 2006 or in Libya in 2011 was the product of undisputed political willingness to act collaboratively.95

Additionally, current crisis in Mali illustrated the significance of well-trained troops on standby to carry out swift missions at the appropriate strategic speed. Although, EU battle groups performed qualitative improvement they still simply lack the fighting power for any mission that goes beyond political representation. Plus, debate is required about immediate reaction capacity. In this way, the EU could guarantee a quicker and more effective deployment. Even more complex challenges that the EU faces to are insufficient nexus between civilian and military components: mainly in the chain of command. Lastly, link amid internal-external security is crucial. Specifically, security problems such as terrorism, illegal migration, organised crime made the traditional division irrelevant and led to necessity of greater interaction between different levels of EU action.96

In a nutshell, EU operations and missions count quite long history, however, up-to-date it still lacks political agreement, rapid response traits, credible commanding structure, and as the most essential, it proper headquarter that is core point of an independent military operations. Meanwhile the EU envisions weighing the responsibility for regional security more autonomously, high-intensity and large – scale operations are likely to become requested.

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5. INSTITUTIONAL AND RESOURCE CAPABILITIES OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE POLICY

Recent EU defence initiatives such as PESCO and EDF have shown that European defence collaboration has made more progress over the past year than in the past decade. Deferred from previous attempts, currently it seems to be as genuine political will and as well as comprehension of the urgency of further cooperation. Explicitly, the election of Donald Trump raised questions about military reliance on the United States, and plus, the exit of the UK from the EU means less internal opposition to more autonomous EU defence policy. Additionally, France’s new president Emanuel Macron revealed a strong support for deeper defence collaboration. Hence, as there were steps taken towards planning crisis management independently, the question is how ready the EU is for that. Once the target is set, pooling European efforts together is crucial. They still possess sizable numbers of fighter aircraft and infantry battalions, but if ones cannot keep them in the air as it lacks air-to-air refuelling, or are unable to deploy them where they are needed because of the scarcity of strategic transport, the there is no sense of their possessions. Therefore, everybody in the EU acknowledges more capacity building activities are essential.  

However, there are certain amounts of constraints, being the strategic, financial, institutional, etc. which requires to be tackled in the near future for ensuring the effectiveness of European humanitarian or military missions/operations. Key questions in this regard include whether militaries are attempting to geopolitical and fiscal constraints, whether Europeans are absolutely ready to share the sovereignty in the field that had been literally closed for years. Therefore, in the following chapters the analysis will be made on the institutional and resource capabilities for more independent European defence activities. In the beginning accents will be made on the constraints that exist with the Union and can hinder credible crisis management actions, on the other hand, in the second part of the chapter, institutional changes and developments will be emphasized in order to define the future prospects of European defence. Meanwhile, the external features of the global politics can be evaluated as one of the facilitator of accelerated relations between the member states in the realm of security.

5.1. External Facilitators: Current Global Political Environment

In terms of external environment, as last but not least indicators of the collective action, current global political situation are significant determinant of the possibility for deeper military cooperation in the EU. Even if the EU’s political power is already worldwide famous, domestic and external challenges in last few years have eroded the European Union’s image. EU faces as internal

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as well as external challenges that require deeper analysis and finding solution ways. However, present year showed some steps taken towards addressing the problems and various initiatives in the field of defence and security. Last two years were full of unexpected events, started with the Brexit finished with the election of one of the most uncertain president in the history of the US – Donald Trump. All these events apart from the confusion in the European Union, also yielded pushing factors for the leaders to picture real challenges of the Union’s near future and forced them to take steps for further cooperation in the field that was ‘untouchable‘ for decades. Except of the security threats on the continent and in the southern neighbourhood, there have been revealed the necessity for stronger position on the international level that can be provided only in the conditions of the more powerful defence and security policy. In the presented chapter external political environment will be discussed that contributed deeper integration in the ‘untouchable’ sphere.

Generations of European politicians have been used to expect Washington to take the lead in responding to any emerging crisis. This close partnership with the White House served both sides well, but it came at a cost. Over decades, Europeans neglected the development of independent strategic thinking and invested too little in Europe’s own security and defence. However, historical cooperation between the two actors has been shaken over the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This later resulted into the new initiatives for an independent European security and defence capabilities. Although they were rarely successful. Apparently, Donald Trump’s election and his sarcastic statements about the NATO’s obsolete feature or his orientation mostly on the other parts of the world deepened the concerns about Washington’s less engagement in the Europe’s crisis.  

Another external event that also requires stronger Europe for providing competitive stance in the future is the increased ambitions of the PRC that was stressed by the current speech of the Xi Jinping. It attracted the attention all over the world, especially in USA and EU. In spite of the fact that EU and China have facilitated their cooperation during the last decades in various spheres, there are still certain concerns for the EU from the side of China, being it the competition on the international trade platform or security field.

First, concern is that China moves away from the export of lost-cost manufactured goods and moves up the value-added chain, putting Chinese firms in direct competition with European businesses. European governments and businesses often complain that China has still not opened up fully its economy to investment from European firms and businesses. It continues to deliver restrictions on foreign investment in many sectors of its economy, meanwhile European governments and companies are calling for reciprocity in China, especially over government

procurement projects. Across Europe, Chinese firms initially invested in infrastructure projects such as ports and airports, the energy sector, telecommunications, and real estate, which are strategic objects of the countries. More recently, however, acquisitions have focused on high tech companies in sectors such as robotics, semi-conductors, and chemicals. As a result, there have been concerns about the transfer of know-how and critical expertise from Europe to China and the loss of competitive advantage that Europe might face as a result.99

Another challenge refers to security issue in Asia Pacific region: China’s military spending has risen by an average of 9.5% per year over the past decade, and its military budget for 2015 was between $145 and $215 billion.100 Over the past decade, Beijing has made major investments in advanced weaponry, communications, surveillance, and other military technology. As one analysis puts it, China’s military forces now boast advanced ballistic missiles, various types of cruise missiles, nuclear submarines, modern surface ships, and an aircraft carrier. Furthermore, China’s actions in the East and South China Seas are a cause of concern and anxiety for many countries in the region and in Europe as well. The fact is that the EU’s 80% of trade is based on maritime tracks, including south China Sea, which require more attention from the side of the Union.101 However, European states only have a limited military presence in the Asia-Pacific, which gives them little ability to shape security dynamics directly. Instead, Europe has positioned itself as a diplomatic broker on issues such as counterterrorism, maritime cooperation, preventive diplomacy, and disaster management. Europe has sought to strengthen regional multilateral institutions and to enhance and expand diplomatic mechanisms to avoid costly miscalculation.

Apart from the rising of Chinese power worldwide, the instability in the neighbouring region still remains one of the primary concerns of the Union. Permanent flows of the refugees from MENA and Sahel region became one of the vivid sign of the necessity of more credible defence capabilities. Despite the fact that the US is also concerned by the turmoil in the Middle East, it still does not menace its territories physically and does not present immediate threaten. Therefore, more cooperation among EU member states is crucially significant for joint actions in the defence field. The Middle East is trapped in a cycle of war and suffers from lack of collective security. Starting from the historic Palestinians-Israel problem, finished by the destructive policy of Turkey, tensions

in Yemen and political instability in Lebanon, all contributes to the historically catastrophe of the region, and it in its turn threats the EU.\textsuperscript{102}

Finally, external forces and authorities also affect further collaboration to large extent, and these forces may be interpreted as a facilitator of the internal cooperation. Concern sabotage the external threats or future challenges in terms of losing common voice and therefore the status of global power involves higher transaction towards collective actions. As seen, current external environment pushes the member states to be engaged more in the defence field. However, there are still number of constraints that require to be addressed properly. One of them is strategic divergences between the members. The analysis of this aspect is given below.

\textbf{5.2. Strategic Constraints}

In a speech 20 years ago, Margaret Thatcher interestingly pointed out: “Such a body [a European Community of 30 nations…] is an even more utopian enterprise than the tower of Babel. For at least the builder of Babel all spoke the same language when they began”.\textsuperscript{103} This statement still reflects recent concerns about the integration process within the EU, in particular, in foreign and security fields. The pattern of convergence – divergence among the EU states is still pivotal determinant of the CFSP’s strength and its governance remains patchy and trickle-down effect of Europeanization.\textsuperscript{104} Despite numbers of initiatives, mostly made by France and Britain over the years, formation of the credible common foreign and security policy was always ‘Achilles Heel’ for the EU. Moreover, after the Brexit, all burdens move on the French stewardship on the further integration way. Therefore, it is worth to mention current proposals of French president Emmanuel Macron and emphasize key takeaways from his speech.

While talking about the different foreign and security strategies of the EU member states, stresses could be done on the certain groups inside the EU. For instance, we could undermine the commonality based on the geography, cultural or economic closeness. To some extent, common strategic culture could be pointed out in the Northern European member states. Finland had a fairly well established identity as a neutral country, rooted in the Cold War. However, in conjunction with the Ukraine conflict, President Sauli Niinistö repeatedly called for enhanced cooperation on the EU level in tackling the potential hybrid threat from Russia.\textsuperscript{105} Sweden is also supporting a common European foreign and security policy that safeguards respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law. It also assumed leadership role in the Nordic Battle group. Regarding to Denmark, as a founding member, NATO continues to be the cornerstone of its defence and security policy. For


Ireland the EU mostly performs forum for its foreign policy. Netherlands, as perceived EU’s middle power, always supported further development of the European foreign policy. Meanwhile, Belgium sees the EU as a primary venue for pursuing Belgian national foreign policy interests and Luxembourg targets to gain key leadership and initiative seeking role within the EU.106

To allude to the Eastern European states, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania, they mostly conduct their foreign policy through the EU, rather than on bilateral basis. In spite of the high ambitions of regional grouping such as the V4, region could not still succeed in original project. ‘Shadow’ of Russia is very present in that area. It became more vivid while the EU was discussing sanctions on Russia in 2014 and Poland and Romania were supporting, meanwhile Hungary and Slovakia were against. As for the central member states – Germany and France, latter’s geostrategic attention concentrates primarily on Europe. Primary objective of French security policy is an autonomous and militarily strong Europe. French defence minister Hervé Morin once pointed out: “L’Europe ne peut se contenter d’être l’agence civile de l’OTAN.”107 According to him, without military backing, Europe cannot play any role globally. Regarding to Germany, it is also his intention to play the ‘world game’, but much more of an interest in the ‘small power’ game. In order to deploy abroad, German government elites need major international backing to ensure legitimacy. It has repeatedly insisted that the emphasis should be placed on integrated civ-mil planning to avoid duplicating structures of NATO. Even in terms of threats perception, Germany was more reluctant to admit the menace from Russia. Despite the fact that Germany supported sanctions against Russia, it was also careful not to push too far and left the door slightly open. And, precisely, it has reflected in the recently agreed setup of Nord-Stream Two. Different perception of threats is mainly connected to the Russian issue and mostly between Germany and Baltic States. For later ones, deeper integration is the best security guarantee. Ukraine crisis reconfirmed indispensable role of NATO, though, it did not pale the importance of the EU for national security. Hence, they are among the firm supporters of further military cooperation. As for the southern Europe, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece, Cyprus, they all contribute to further integration of the EU common security and defence policy through the participation in civilian and military missions. Moreover, challenge of migration even facilitated this willingness.

All in all, cooperation between the member states is crucial for more ambitious steps in terms of common defence policies. As neoliberalists argue deeper integration ensures decreasing of national costs, resolves the distribution problems and smaller members obtained more power through engagement. Hence, harmonizing in the strategic concepts, concentrating on the

collaborative actions is evidently much more pragmatic than isolating in the defence field. It helps states to overcome the problem on uncertainty and diminish the weight of security dilemma. In this term the EU as the most progressive institution provides a coordinating mechanism to help states capture prospective gains from cooperation. Along with the strategic harmonisations, the readiness of sharing part of sovereignty is also significant. In this sense more collaboration in the intelligence field is crucial. Precisely, this topic will be elaborated in the subsequent chapter.

5.2.1. Sharing Information Issues

Information sharing is fundamental to the success of transnational and multi-agency military, humanitarian, and counterterrorism operations. Intelligence is “... the collection and examination of open, publicly available and secret information with the goal of reducing policy-makers’ vagueness about a security policy problem, it takes raw information and analyses it, placing it in the proper context and using it to illustrate conclusions about attributes of other actors or about the state of the world that are not directly observable.”

The gathering and analysis of intelligence is ever more important for the European Union (EU). European governments need a precise intelligence for dealing security menaces, such as terrorism, the failure of state institutions and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The key mechanism to get the necessary information is sharing with other countries. Therefore, since 1990s the EU has established/extended three institutions: Berne Group, Europol, and the European Union Military Staff.

The Berne Group was set up in the 1970s as a forum for the security services of six EU Member States. It consists of 27 members. It contacts the heads of national security services, who meet regularly under its patronage. The Group has working groups on terrorism and organized crime and the Counterterrorist Group (CTG) since 2001, where the Member States, as well as the United States, yield common threat assessment. Since the Berne Group operates outside of the institutions of the EU, it does not appear to be a formal commitment for participants to share all relevant intelligence in their possession with other members.

The European Police Organization, or Europol, created in 1995, began operations in 1999. Europol’s priorities are illegal trafficking in drugs, human beings and vehicles, illegal immigration, terrorism, forgery, money-laundering and cyber crime that cross national borders. Its primary objective is to improve the sharing of intelligence on these matters between Member States. Since April 2002, establishes ad hoc teams of staff from Europol and interested Member States to collect

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shared intelligence on specific terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{111} Member States are required to provide relevant intelligence to Europol. Member States deliver at least one person to work on the Military Staff to sustain secure communication links with their national security agencies. Another body concerned with sharing is the situation centre, which gathers and analyses intelligence collected from Member States and others for the High Representative.\textsuperscript{112}

The EU also has capabilities to collect intelligence through diplomatic missions throughout the world and by the aid of representatives assigned to specific regions and crises, such as the Balkans, Caucasus, the Great Lakes region of Africa and for the Middle East peace process. These enables to gather openly information from sources such as government officials, publications, etc.

As the Berne Group, Europol and Military Staff permit the Member States to decide what intelligence they will share with their partners, it is not unexpected that they will not distribute relevant intelligence. Voluntary sharing implies that there is no guarantee. In order to overcome these barriers to intelligence-sharing, giving the institutions the capacity to monitor Member States’ compliance with fair and trustful sharing requirement would be better. At the extreme, it could involve the creation of a EU intelligence agency responsible for directly collecting and analysing intelligence on its own, as some Member States such as Belgium and Austria have suggested. However, the fact is that national governments do not trust each other enough to share intelligence fully. Hence, the solution is that to encourage member states to decentralize sharing process between sub-sets of Member States.\textsuperscript{113}

To conclude, deeper collaboration in the field of intelligence is significance for achieving the credible defence structure within the EU. However, as seen from presented chapter, currently only voluntary sharing is on the face, which cannot be perceived enough for the ambitions that the institution has in the field of security. Hence, lack of information sharing is definitely one of the constraints of further cooperation. This latter, along with the military capabilities, create the realistic foundation for more autonomous defence policy. Precisely, military aspect of European security structure will be elaborated in the following chapter.

\section*{5.2.2. Military Capabilities of EU Member States}

Among the various resources, military capabilities are one of the main providers of the strength of the state as on internal also on the external level, hence, for exploring the possibilities for the European cooperation in the military field, it seems significant to analyze each member states’

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111}Europol Convention, Articles 3.1 and 3.2.
\end{itemize}
military power that in its turn should contribute common framework of the EU defence policy. As Peter Paret summarized it, “… military power expresses and implements the power of the state in a variety of ways within and beyond the state borders, and is also one of the instruments with which political power is originally created and made permanent.”114 There are certain measurements for military power. One of them is a size of the defence budget. Its size serves to classify the comparative importance of the coercive arm in comparison to other organs of state, and it delivers general sense of the size of the military establishment in absolute terms. Manpower is the second kind of resource that yields insight into a country’s national power. It is important as a basic index of military strength and also because quantity is still relevant in the combat environments. The disposition of a country’s military inventory and its combat support capabilities is also essential category of military capability and effectiveness. Evidently, collecting detailed information about the military inventories of countries remains one of the fasten pursuits of the intelligence community and also one of the top secrets of the national authority. The quality of a country’s defence industrial base also affects military effectiveness. It encompasses firms or industries that depend on a country’s defence spending for survival and upon which the country itself depends for the production of military technologies and instruments. For measuring military power and its credibility, logistical features are also essential. War is as much a battle of logistics, moving man and machine from-to points all over, as it is direct combat. Hence, quantitative/robust Labor Force also adds to available wartime industry.115

According to the current data, provided by the Global Fire Power Strength in Numbers, the EU has on call (at least theoretically) over 1,5 million personnel, nearly 7,700 tanks, 2,450 aircrafts (including helicopters), and nearly 550 warships and submarines. As for individual member states, their military capabilities are shown in the chart (Annex No.1) that is necessary in order to define the perspective military power of the Union in terms of further cooperation in that field. For 2017 there are a total of 24 countries including in this listing. The Republic of Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta are not included in this list due to unmet conditions and minimums.116

From the presented chart it is seen that the global economic crisis and austerity measures affected Member States’ defence budgets. From 2005 to 2015, defence expenditure increased by 3.6% from EUR 193 billion to EUR 200 billion, in real terms there was a 10.7% or EUR 22 billion decrease.117 However, 2014 marked as a turning point as total defence expenditure raised by 2.3% from EUR 190 billion to EUR 195 billion, compared to the previous year. This was sufficient to

overcome inflation and achieve a 0.6% or EUR 1.1 billion real-term growth. Precisely that year, European NATO members announced to stop the cuts in defence spending and to attempt to achieve the 2% of GDP target within a decade, with 20% of defence expenditure to be used for major equipment purchases and Research and Development (R&D). However, in 2014, among European NATO members, only Greece, Estonia and the UK met the 2% target. There are serious concerns also about UK leaving the Unions. The fact is that defence expenditure is growing in every region in the world except Europe and North America, and especially in the conditions of an increasingly aggressive Russian posture (Russia declared a US$700 billion rearmament programme by 2020). Declining defence budgets might have serious consequences. A decisive level will be reached when military forces and equipment are no longer credible or relevant. Therefore, consolidation of demand through pooling and sharing initiatives is one of the means to increase efficiency in spending and avoid duplication.

Mobilization of the military forces is also crucial. Military forces are contributed by Member States and third countries on a case-by-case basis. European Union's combined active military forces in 2014 total 1,423,097 personnel. According to the European Defence Agency, the European Union had an average of 31,570 land force personnel deployed around the world (or 2.2% of the total military personnel). In a key operation the EU could readily deploy up-to 417,180 land force personnel and sustain 79,352 of those during an enduring operation. Since 2003, more than 30 CSDP missions have been conducted Most of them have been Civilian Missions of different sorts: Police, Rule-of-Law, Border Assistance and Monitoring, Civilian Monitoring, Security Sector Reform, Capacity-Building. Military missions may involve operations to maintain a Safe and Secure Environment ( case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Central African Republic), to counter piracy (Operation Atalanta, off the coast of Somalia), or to provide military training and advice (Mali and Somalia).

In nutshell, according to the existed resources of the EU member states, it is hard to say that credible military power is on the stake. However, optimal distribution of the expenditures and focusing on the modernization of the infrastructure or investment in the new technologies would be one of the solutions. Furthermore, consolidation between the member states and collaboration in the military industry would be beneficial for the organization. The scarcity of the resources is to large extent caused by the limited of the scope for investment in cutting-edge technologies. Therefore, radically new approach to defence planning is needed. It certainly is connected to the financial

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capital, which as seen is also one of the constraints of improvement military capabilities. Member States are understandably reluctant to write a cheque when it comes to operational expenditures. Plus, multilateral character of modern operations incentivises them to free ride on the efforts of others. Fiscal constraints on defence budgets require EU member states to prioritise equipment purchases relevant to for intervention. Except of financial scarcity, the EU often struggles to convince Member States to contribute the human resources for conducting expeditionary missions. This issue is suggested in the following chapter.

5.2.3. Civilian Capability Constraints

Civilian capabilities are at the core of every EU CSDP mission. Adequate and sufficient capabilities are the prerequisite for successful implementation of the assigned tasks in the field. The presented chapter analyze challenges of identifying, training, selecting, deploying and re-integrating challenges civilian personnel for the EU’s operations. The fact is that few trained experts exist who could be deployed abroad and work as legal advisers, police officers and experts. In practice, yielding sufficient civilian personnel has always been challenging as these capabilities are in the jurisdiction of three to four different ministries in each member state. It usually involves the Minister of Interior and the Police, the Foreign Ministry, the Justice Ministry and the Ministry of Defence. Although the processes had to be set in coordinative motion in order to ensure availability of personnel pledged by governments. Observing the development process of the civilian capability during last ten years, four drivers can be identified:

1. EU ambitions;
2. National Strategies;
3. Lessons Learned, and
4. External demands, such as the European response to the Arab Spring.\textsuperscript{122}

The Civilian Headline Goal (CHG), adopted in 2008 and 2010 aimed at addressing these issues. The CHG 2008 gives a number of recommendations for Member States how to recruite personnel more effectively. After then Member States were supposed to announce their capacity and collectively cover all the requirements. Despite these improvements, recruitment and training of personnel still remain problematic. As scholars, Korski and Gowan pointed out in 2009 the CHG was not succeeding in improving the availability of trained personnel for civilian missions. However, in 2011, Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) was launched to respond to the necessitation for standardised training of crisis management personnel.

\textsuperscript{122} Workshop report. St Malo and European Security and Defence: Much Ado about Nothing?! University of Cambridge, 7-8 December 2012. P. 16.
Even though, it was an example of productive coordination between member states, at the workshop, held in February 2012 on training effectiveness, series of challenges were still highlighted. Among them, the random use of ENTRi by Member States deploying personnel, insufficient number of qualified staff members for missions, and the fact that a third of staff were deployed without adequate training were revealed. Interviewees also stressed out that mandates were mostly written on the basis of abstract concepts and were not informed by knowledge derived from the operational realities at mission level.\textsuperscript{123}

To sum up, civilian capabilities, as one of the main components of crisis management, requires improvement. It is widely depended on the better mobilization of the existed assets and more involvement of human resources. Despite of certain development in this sense, the need of deeper cooperation in this realm is still vivid. One of the facilitator of this process is establishment of proper framework. The fact is that for improving of the civilian capacities, more financial resources, sharing more information, merging separate capabilities are primary. In this sense, current initiatives within the CSDP are worthy to be mentioned.

### 5.3. Institutional Framework for Better Cooperation

CSDP is an intergovernmental policy, focused on the EU’s missions and operations in third countries. Although several possibilities for deepening defence cooperation were included in the Treaty, member States, until now failed to agree on the modalities. One of such provisions was permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), defined by the Article 44 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). According to it PESCO would establish cooperation in five fields:

- “budgetary (setting objectives on the level of investment in defence);
- equipment (identifying military needs, pooling and sharing, and specialisation);
- operational (interoperability and readiness of forces);
- capabilities (remedying the capability gaps);
- industry (participating in major equipment programmes).”\textsuperscript{124}

Unfortunately, none of these options has been used by Member States in defence, due to the opposition by some states (in particular the UK), despite others’ interests (remarkably Belgium, Hungary, Poland, and Spain). However, tendencies changed because of number crises in the EU and the launch of PESCO is expected before the end of the year or in early 2018 at the latest. Plus, the potential window of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) are suggested that should amount to €5 billion per year, from

\textsuperscript{123} Interviews with EEAS staff, 18 January 2012, 20 January 2012.


which up to 20% can be funded from the EU budget, for multinational projects that address a commonly identified deficit. Much more important is explicitly mentioned commitment about 20% of total defence spending that ought to be invested.\textsuperscript{125} In addition to this, France, Germany, Italy and Spain suggested the creation of “EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core” or EUFOR CROC. That is a concrete list of force elements, which would accelerate the force sensing process after the Council has decided to launch an operation. Apparently, it would be a significant improvement on the existing generic Force Catalogue.

European Council President Donald Tusk called the move a “historic step” that would allow the EU to move towards deeper defence integration. He stated that their aim is to be ambitious and inclusive, “… so every EU country is invited to join. Within three months, member states will agree a common list of criteria and commitments, together with concrete capability projects, in order to take this cooperation off the ground.”\textsuperscript{126}

Plus, as part of an ongoing work to strengthen its security, defence and crisis management capacity, the European Union decided to establish a permanent operational Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) at the military strategic level for non-executive military missions, as an element on implementation of the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence. It will be responsible on the building up, launching, sustaining and recovery of European Union forces. These laters, in its turn, will allow the mission staff to focus on the specific activities of their mission, with better maintenance from Brussels. The MPCC will operate closely with the civilian counterpart, the CPCC, through a Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC), in order to ensure maximum coordination of civilian and military synergies and sharing of expertise.\textsuperscript{127}

To sum up, a current institutional background of the European Union’s security policy clears up that deeper cooperation is only possible under the restructured framework. It is a fact that the success of collective action is determined by the involved institutional arrangements which rely on effective monitoring and endorsing systems. In addition to the rules implemented, the triumph is also linked to the ‘thickness of local institutions, which may be able to generate public objectives from economic activities. ‘Institutional thickness’ might be connected to the combination of human capital (knowledge resources), social capital (trust, reciprocity) and ‘political capital (capacity for collective action). Precisely, newly invoked structure – PESCO – entails the possibilities for such combinations. This framework is undergoing daily configurations and developments. However, up-to-date tendencies and future perspectives are explored in the following sub-chapter


5.3.1. Perspectives of PESCO Functioning

PESCO has been officially established by the Council’s Decision of (CFSP) 2017/2315 on 11 December of 2017, and determined the list of participants. Overall, twenty – five member states (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden) expressed the readiness to involve in PESCO and share the responsibilities on common defence policies. On 6 March 2018, the Council adopted a roadmap for the implementation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). This roadmap provides the direction and guidance for further operating of the PESCO. Namely, it sets out a calendar for the review and assessment process of the national implementation plans to fulfill the binding commitments they have made to one another. In addition, it provides a timeline for agreement on possible future projects. These projects, given into the annexes, deem to unite efforts of the parties and advance the military capabilities of the Union. However, even if the list contains number of truly significant projects, most of them could have been implemented individually by member states without referring to the EU and would be also budget-effective. The primary accents are required to be put on the creation of the Head Quarter for independent European operations, as currently they are conducted from the SHAPE. Plus, while evaluating those projects, the risks of duplication of NATO goals seem even more vivid. Regardless of the fact that high-level officials from the EU and NATO asserted that PESCO does not deems to compete against NATO, it is highly likable. While both organizations stress the demand for capabilities of air-to-ground surveillance aircraft, transport ships, planes, and cyber defence capabilities, NATO also wants more heavy armour, missile defence and the United States would like to see its European allies also contribute to the development of new capabilities, which would be additional load for PESCO.

If PESCO generates capabilities that may strengthen the European pillar within NATO, rather than creating a duplicative and alternative capability to NATO, it would be beneficial for both organizations. However, one of the explicit objectives of PESCO is also to make the European defence industry more competitive, which might cause worrying in the US. Apparently, America should not expect that Europeans would increase their defence budgets only to buy all of their equipment in the US.

All in all, if PESCO is successful, Europeans will be able not only contribute more to collective territorial defence and expeditionary operations in a NATO framework, but also to weight autonomous operations in their own periphery, without referring to American assets. The more Europeans can take charge of own problems independently around Europe, the more they can do in their way, and focus on its own priority.
Presented paper aimed to examine possibilities of an independent European defence, in the near future. As it has been shown from the study, during last two decades, EU member states have been attempting to provide continental protection autonomously from American defence umbrella, though, the main constraints, such as strategic divergences and sensitivity of the security realm itself, were hindering further cooperation in this sphere. Naturally, national states are always reluctant to share part of sovereignty, especially when it refers to sharing confidential information, uniting efforts in the military field and sacrificing own national interests on the common, institutional ones. However, the current changes in the global political environment, being it election of President Donald Trump, rising of Chinese power, uncertainty in the MENA region, Russian aggression in Ukraine, etc, raised the concerns in the Union and facilitated deeper collaboration process in the defence and military field. Hence, the question about how far the EU can go in this favour, have been asked actively. In order to answer these enquiries, two main theoretical approaches have been used in the thesis. One is neorealism, which explains EU aspirations towards autonomous defence policy by the intention to balance American presence in the region. This tendency is mostly maintained by France and can be proved by an independent operation in Somali (EUNAFOR Atalanta) and invoking of the Mutual Clause after the terrorist attacks in Paris (2015) by French President. Moreover, as currently elected president of France seems also quite passionate about the developments of European common defence politics, possibilities of an independent operation of EU member states in this field appear even more relevant. For instance, on Tuesday, 26 September, at Paris-Sorbonne University, President Emmanuel Macron gave a pro-European speech with a long and ambitious list of initiatives from defence to development. Three main proposals in the security field can be stressed out. These are establishing a common intervention force, a common defence budget, and a common military doctrine for action.\textsuperscript{131} Apparently, French ambitions to take leading positions in Europe, especially after Brexit, and attempt to eliminate the reliance on the American aid, increases probabilities in favour of the first hypothesis, presented in the introduction.\textsuperscript{(H1: EU will be able to provide own security, independently from the American aid, which is currently provided through NATO). Apart from neorealist approach, which is mostly consternated on the state-centre system of international relations and therefore lacks explanation for deepening cooperation among members of the institutions, neoliberalists assume that creation of the CSDP and its further improvement was a sign of beneficial outcomes of such collaborations. Namely, it is absolute gain which plays major role in establishing organizations, in other words, while each member of the EU is equally won, and then

the concerns about sharing sovereignty remain way beyond. Hence, if considered current tensions in the neighbouring region of Europe, more cooperation in the military field is quite logical. It is evident that uniting military and financial efforts could be budget-effective and beneficial for all EU member states. That is why, differed from envisioned amount of PESO party countries, nearly all Member States (25 countries) decided to join the structure. Overall, as seen from theoretical lenses, first hypothesis is more relevant in the modern conditions. Even though, there are number of restraints, being it strategic constraints, sharing information issues or lack of financial and military/civilian capabilities, the improvements of institutional framework for deeper collaboration in the defence field and current global political environment reveal as facilitators of more credible European defence system.

To sum up, the reality is the following: despite a long history of the CSDP, until last year, (2017), any credible structure has not been activated (even though incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon – namely PESCO), which would provide common responsibility on the security field of the Union. The fact is that only France and the UK were able to weigh expeditionary operations, and mostly humanitarian tasks were fulfilled by the EU, meanwhile the events into the MENA region required harder efforts. For long time states were reluctant to share valuable information and join financial resources for yielding budget-effective military capabilities. However, awakened ‘sleeping beauty’ has the potential to implement the projects that will benefit all parties of the Union and become the system more flexible and productive. In order to achieve all these goals, top-down decisions seems to be more prudent than down-top, as it has been happening for decades.
Conclusions
1. Neoliberal and neorealist approaches see the establishment and the development of the CSDP divergently. However, both of them explains certain aspects of this phenomenon rationally and suggests own arguments. If the neorealist approach explores mainly the reasons of the setting up the CSDP and asserts that it was an attempt to balance American presence in the Region, neoliberalists’ accentuate on the perspectives of its development and claims that the benefits of cooperation in the security field is such an apparent that each national-state is ready to share part of own sovereignty. These theories revealed to be the most appropriate approaches to explain the perspectives of an independent EU defence in the future, as both of them suggest the reasonable arguments why the EU should be willingness to strive own security policy;

2. Development of the CSDP was accompanied with a number of changes on the international relations’ arena. Starting from the conflicts in the Balkan regions, finished by the reluctance of the US to remain the main defence provider in Europe. Therefore, steps were taken towards yielding European defence and security policy independently. However, on this route, the challenges have been revealed, as it rose the questions about the duplicating the tasks of the NATO. That is why the key document, defining the relations between the EU and NATO, was adopted. Namely, the Berlin Plus Agreement, which was intended to prevent overlapping of two organizations. Even if this structure was benefiting both IOs, it was only used in several cases and not so productively. Therefore, perspectives of an independent European defence policy revealed more possible and rational;

3. Institutional overlap of the EU and NATO has become a vivid after establishment of the CSDP, which entailed nearly same tasks of the NATO. This phenomenon seems to be even more evident after the activation of such initiatives of the EU as PESCO and CROC, which intend to accumulate military capabilities of nearly all member states and advance defence policy independently. Despite the attempts from the officials of two IOs to prove that they do not duplicate each others’ tasks and in contrary, complete them, the division lines become so blur and obscure that it is hard not to notice the challenges in perspectives. In particular, meanwhile activation of the PESCO might take an attention of dual member states of the EU and NATO, from this latter towards the first one. As long as, after the election of Donald Trump, NATO does not seem as reliable as in previous decades and counting on an internal European defence capabilities appears to become more relevant;
4. The comparison of the features of NATO and EU operations/missions has shown that despite the resemblance of the perception of threats, the responses of these two entities have been different for years. Namely, EU has been seeking for more diplomatic means, rather than military, though, currently, it also leaned towards the ‘hard’ tools of the crisis management. This change is reflected in the emergence of the PESCO that implies more collaboration in the military field. However, the future results of such tendencies are not clear yet. Apparently, up-to-day military operations, weighted by the EU, still lacks ‘hard’ power, therefore, the assurance of the successful accomplishment of military operational tasks can be placed under the question to some extent;

5. Analysis of institutional and resource capabilities for an independent European defence policy revealed the challenges and the perspectives it will have in the future. Namely, current conditions create an appropriate environment for developing more credible defence policy, considering moderated institutional framework (accent is made on PESCO), external political facilitators (such as instability in the MENA region, threats of Russian aggression, rising of Chinese power, uncertainty of American policy), readiness of member states to collaborate national financial and military resources, etc. However, as seen from the research, certain kind of constraints, such as strategic divergences, issues related to the sharing intelligence and others still remain present and can be perceived as potential obstacle on the way of an independent European defence policy. However, if the aspirations keep the pace and leading EU member states do not change currently held course, one of the hypothesis performed in the introduction, seems more relevant. Namely, EU will be able to provide own security, independently from the American aid, which is currently provided through NATO.
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Annexes

Annex No. 1. EU Missions and Operations

[Image of EU missions and operations map]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Ranking (among 133 countries)</th>
<th>Total Military Personnel</th>
<th>Total Aircraft Strength</th>
<th>Combat Tanks</th>
<th>Total Naval Assets</th>
<th>Defence Budget ($)</th>
<th>Labour Force</th>
<th>Major Ports</th>
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Annex. No.3. Council Decision of 6 March 2018 establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO

The following projects shall be developed under PESCO:

1. European Medical Command;
2. European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR);
3. Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations
4. Military Mobility;
5. European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC);
6. European Training Certification Centre for European Armies;
7. Energy Operational Function (EOF);
8. Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package;
9. Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM);
10. Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO);
11. Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance;
12. Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform;
14. Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations;
15. Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle;
16. Indirect Fire Support (Euro Artillery);
17. EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC)

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134 Council Decision of 6 March 2018 establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO