

# The Impact of the EU Eastern Enlargement on the Status of Religion in Europe

ES rytinė plėtra keičia Sąjungos religinę sudėtį. Rytų krikščionių ir musulmonų skaičius gerokai padidės, kai Balkanų šalys ir Turkija taps ES narėmis. Šio straipsnio tikslas – atsakyti į klausimą, kokią įtaką ES rytinė plėtra turės religijos statusui ES, ir pasiūlyti galimus būdus sambūviui tarp skirtingų religinių ir ideologinių bendruomenių sukurti. Siekiant šio tikslo pristatoma Europoje vyraujanti sekuliarizmo ideologija ir dvi didžiausios religijos – krikščionybė ir islamas. Konstitucinio patriotizmo teorinė sąvoka pasirinkta kaip atspirtis sambūviui tarp skirtingų religinių ir ideologinių bendruomenių sukurti. Straipsnis praturtina akademinį diskursą apie religiją ES. Autoriai kritiškai įvertina vyraujančias nuomones ir siūlo ateities plėtotės kryptis. Straipsnyje taip pat praplečiama konstitucinio patriotizmo sąvoka ir atskleidžiamos naujos jos pritaikymo galimybės.

The EU eastern enlargement changes the religious landscape in the Union. The amount of Orthodox Christians and Muslims will increase remarkably after Balkan countries and Turkey are accepted to the EU. This article aims to answer the question what impact the EU Eastern enlargement will have on the status of religion and on the co-existence of different religious and ideological communities in the EU. For the purpose of this article the dominant ideology of secularization and the two biggest religions – Christianity and Islam – in Europe are discussed. As the theoretical point of departure for coexistence among communities to prevail the approach of constitutional patriotism is chosen. This article enriches academic discourse about religion in the EU by critically evaluating dominating opinions and drawing the authors' conclusions on future development. It also broadens the concept of Constitutional patriotism and opens new ways for its application.

## Introduction

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Whenever the European Union is enlarged, the discussion about European unity and integrity becomes important. Some erstwhile significant questions are already forgotten and even seem ridiculous – for instance, when Sweden applied for associate status in what was then the EC in 1961, Prime Minister Erlander claimed that the EC was a Catholic organization and there was therefore no place for Sweden in it. Equally, in 1994 (before the referendum about Sweden's EU membership), Deputy Prime Minister Margareta Winberg claimed that if Sweden became a member of the EU it would be ruled by Vatican. When the integrity of the EU is discussed, the differences between Catholics and Protestants are of little importance in nowadays. However, the EU eastern enlargement changes the religious landscape in the union. The amount of orthodox Christians and Muslims will increase remarkably after Balkan countries and Turkey are accepted to the EU. It leads to many different concerns. Can Islam and democracy coexist? Is Europe ready to admit the equality of all religions and cultures? The EU's eastern enlargement challenges the very

roots of the European self-understanding and reveals that religious issues are still important in the EU public discourse. This article aims to answer the question what impact the EU eastern enlargement and the more religious EU, as the outcome, will have on the status of religion and on the coexistence of different religious and ideological communities in the EU.

To reach the aim the following goals are established. Firstly, to present the ideology of secularization (the starting point for any religious discussions in Europe) and the two biggest religions in Europe – Christianity (the largest and with the oldest roots monotheistic religion) and Islam (the religion which causes the greatest concern among Europeans and is often seen as the most complicated challenge) by critically evaluating academic discourse around the topic. Secondly, to offer the ways of their future development and possibilities to establish the coexistence among them. As the theoretical point of departure for coexistence among communities to prevail the approach of constitutional patriotism is chosen in the article. ‘Constitutional patriotism’ is a term introduced in Germany describing the phenomenon in which, after World War II, citizens suffered from inability to identify themselves with the country’s past and history. Unity based on collective national pride in a glorious past was impossible<sup>1</sup>. This phenomenon leads to critical self reflection and ability to accept Other’s point of view, and that’s why it might be useful in the discussion, even if the focus is shifted from the nation towards religious or ideological communities. The subject of the analysis is academic books and articles published in international peer review journals in the field of the religious and European studies. The selection was based on the expertise of one of the authors (I. Karlsson). The method of critical discourse analysis is used in the article.

This article enriches academic discourse about religion in the EU by critically evaluating dominating opinions and drawing authors’ own conclusions on future development. It also broadens the concept of Constitutional patriotism and opens new ways for its application.

The article consists of four parts. The first three ones represent ideology of secularization and both religions mentioned above. The fourth one reveals the guidelines for future religious development in the EU and the possibilities to establish coexistence among different communities. Concluding parts summarizes the main insights of the article.

## **Secularization theory in practice**

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Europe is now the most secular continent on earth<sup>2</sup>. It is therefore impossible to discuss the question of religion in Europe without addressing the process of secularization.

Church and state are clearly separated throughout the EU with a few exceptions<sup>3</sup>. Already for many years the church has had no institutional authority within any EU country. Moreover, the presence of church or even God has been disappearing from the public discourse. Mentioning of God in any political rhetoric is considered religiously fanatical, narrow-minded and outdated. In Germany the former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and several of his cabinet refused to add the anodyne formula “so help me God” when swearing their oath of office<sup>4</sup>.

The debate about the EU Constitution made this secular trend more evident than ever. The European Constitution is a document that describes the roots of European values and civilization. In its present text it refers to ancient Greece and Rome and the philosophy of the Enlightenment, but erases any connections with Christianity<sup>5</sup>. One could question if it is historically correct. According to Geremek “any genealogic reconstruction of the idea or social imaginary of Europe that makes reference to Greco-Roman antiquity and the Enlightenment while erasing any memory of the role of Medieval Christendom in the very constitution of Europe as a civilization evinces either historical ignorance or repressive amnesia”<sup>6</sup>. Even if religiosity in Christianity is diminishing, it has had an enormous influence on European history for ages; it directed the development of education, culture, art, literature and philosophy. The picture of present secular Europe would be totally different without the ages of Christianity which preceded it.

Casanova notices that in the European discourse, being secular is “normal” and “progressive”; that is, as a quasi-normative consequence of being a “modern” and “enlightened European”<sup>7</sup>.

Another factor showing advanced secularization in Europe is a declining level of religious practice. Although national variations exist, the general trend shows that there are less and less weekly church attendants in Europe. This is declining together with the number of priests and abundant church buildings<sup>8</sup>. An institutionalized form of belief with the church as the mediator between man and God loses its importance.

The secularization theory is based on the correlation between modernity and religious decline. Most versions of the secularization theory attempt to explain religious decline as an effect of modernization, economic development, functional and structural differentiation, urbanization, industrialization and rising education<sup>9</sup>. Modern science questions and denies many religious truths; democracy and individualism assure the right of choice – be it women’s emancipation, gay marriage or contraception. Moreover, if we define the present as postmodern it is marked by “relaxation, hedonism, individualism, living in the present moment”<sup>10</sup>. Religion with its restraints does not fit into this context.

Jenkins questions the validity of the secularization theory, pointing out that it does not work in the United States which are still much more religious than Europe, despite urbanization, democracy and the advanced development of science<sup>11</sup>. There are several reasons for this. If modernization in Europe emerged together with the fight against ‘obscurantism’ of religion, in the US modernization and democracy arose as the freedom of religion and were never associated with the state. Another aspect of the religiosity of the US is explained by Jenkins himself as mainly a result of immigration and the ethnic diversification. When people move to a new country (or to a new state), they form institutions that allow them to group together for mutual support and reinforce similar values. This is what is happening in the US. People come not only from other countries but also migrate long distances within the same country, recreate their identities based around their religious communities. We would further propose that the effect of secularization in the US has been reduced due to the unique characteristics of the country; a point which does not refute the validity of the theory. An inverse correlation between level of economical and social development and level of religiosity can not be ignored<sup>12</sup>.

Another theory that opposes the secularization theory is the religious market theory. The basic assumption of this approach is that religious participation depends on the quality of the religious supply. The higher the religious pluralism and the lower the regulation of religious economies, the better the quality of the supply and the higher the religious participation. This means that cultural diversity could lead to higher religious participation<sup>13</sup>. In 1999/2000 Pettersson analyzed data from 50,000 respondents in 37 European countries<sup>14</sup>, testing the basic assumptions of both the secularization and the religious market theories. The results were contradictory as they confirmed that cultural diversity is positively related to religious involvement, while human well-being is negatively related to it. At the same time there is positive correlation between human well-being and cultural diversity. He concludes:

These results demonstrate that in analyses of religious change, one should not treat modernization as one homogeneous factor which would have one, and only one, impact on religion. Instead, different dimensions of modern society seem to be associated with different kinds of religious change.<sup>15</sup>

Even if the study does not offer clear and final answers, it is still important to have the religious market theory in mind, as imminent changes in the EU will increase the cultural diversity of this already diverse region. It can also explain the emergence of different sects and charismatic communities which will be discussed in the next section.

### **Christianity – individualized belief without institution**

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For a long time since the Carolingian empire, Europe had a predominantly Western Christian core<sup>16</sup>. Christianity is still the predominant religion in Europe, for which reason it was most strongly affected by secularization processes mentioned above. ‘Freedom’ from religion, (especially religion as institution) represented ‘freedom’ from Western Christianity; the present situation is sometimes described as ‘post-Christian Europe’<sup>17</sup>. Nevertheless, Christianity is still very much alive and its signs can be detected in different forms.

First of all, institutional religiosity (though declining) is still present in Europe and the number of practicing Christians throughout Europe is counted in tens of millions. But these are not the only or the most significant factors that describe modern Christianity.

One of the manifestations is what Jenkins calls ‘cultural Christianity’<sup>18</sup> and Hervieu-Léger (2006) describes as ‘belonging without believing’<sup>19</sup>. Christianity is preserved in language (Austrian greeting ‘Grüss Gott’), in names of streets and squares, in church taxes (paid in Scandinavia and some other countries) and many other factors that become a part of cultural identity. Many social events such as public holidays are constructed around religious celebrations. In these and many other ways, Christianity is embedded in cultural experiences, although it may not be consciously acknowledged on an everyday basis.

The second important aspect of modern-day religion is a belief in higher powers (with the attributes of the Judeo-Christian deity) – but in a more personal, non-institutional way. According to Hervieu-Léger, in modern (as well as postmodern) societies, particularly in Europe, religious identity is increasingly a matter of personal choice<sup>20</sup>. Heelas

describes postmodern religiosity as ‘consumer choice’ where one can consider oneself a Christian, but practice yoga and use contraception<sup>21</sup>. We can witness religious individualization in Europe (‘believing without belonging’), for which an interesting explanation is suggested by Hervieu-Léger. The author talks about the *revolution of food satiety* which changed modern society’s attitude to accomplishment. She writes:

Less and less associated with the arrival of the Kingdom, or even with the radical or gradual transformation of society, the ideal of accomplishment is increasingly centred on the individual, part of a trend not of dismissing, but of “subjectivizing”, utopia, which is perceived as a radical alternative to the experience of the present.<sup>22</sup>

In other words, to reach a personal utopia an individual needs a personalized relationship with God.

Jenkins claims the revival of Christianity as evidenced in the popularity of sites of pilgrimage, participation in charismatic communities and sects, also in the migration to the EU from Christian countries in Latin America and Africa<sup>23</sup>. This confirms that it is too early to announce the death of Christianity (as some authors did<sup>24</sup>). However, it can hardly be seen as the revival of it.

According to the Pew Global Attitudes survey<sup>25</sup>, religion is very important to 21 % of Europeans which equates to 60–70 millions. So it is very possible that these millions (mentioned by Jenkins) attending holy places or gathering in various religious communities constitute this 21 %, which is nonetheless a low number compared to other parts of the world. The fact that pilgrimage has increased since the 1950s does not necessarily demonstrate increased religiosity. The world has become much more accessible in 50 years, leading to easier and cheaper traveling which has affected the numbers of pilgrims and of course tourists visiting famous places.

Immigrants from Africa or Latin America add to the statistical number of practicing Christians in Europe and could be viewed as counteract for Muslim migration. The problem is that the means of worship is heavily influenced by local culture and traditions involving belief in miracles, visions and healing, not to mention occasional criminal voodoo or exorcism practices. These communities add to the multicultural and multi-faith scenery of Europe, challenging old-stock Europeans once again to show their openness and tolerance, rather than bringing about Christian revival.

Not a revival, but rather the continuing vitality of Christianity can be seen in some particular European countries such as Poland, Slovenia or Slovakia. Regular attendance at religious services is reported by 78 % of Poles, and around one-third attend Catholic services weekly. Poland in the 21st century seems poised to fulfill the same role in the global Catholic Church that Ireland did a century ago<sup>26</sup>. But does it mean that Poland will share the fate of Ireland and religiosity will diminish in coming decades, or that it has a chance to prove to the rest of Europe that it is possible to be religious and modern simultaneously? We will have to wait and see.

If Balkan countries become part of the EU, Eastern Orthodox Christianity will be enlarged in Europe’s religious landscape. According to Gerner, Hedlund and Sundström,

“the schism between the churches of Rome and Constantinople in 1054 divided Europe into ‘East’ and ‘West’ and established a strict cultural boundary”<sup>27</sup> (E. Ž. translation from Swedish to English). One of the crucial differences is the relation between church and state. In historical discussions, considering church and state relations in Byzantine Empire, Orthodox Christianity is often defined in a term of ‘caesaropapism’, meaning the concentration of complete civil as well as religious power in the hands of one person, as if he were at once both emperor and pope<sup>28</sup>. Patriarch and emperor existed as two different persons, but church and state as institutions were not clearly separated. Even such authors as Geanakoplos who doubt the validity of labeling Orthodox religion as ‘caesaropapistic’ agree that in an administrative aspect the emperor was able to exercise complete authority over the church<sup>29</sup>. It means that, contrary to the Western tradition, the secular and holy spheres are not clearly defined, and religion and state developed hand in hand.

Perica argues that the Orthodox and Catholic churches and Muslim community played a critical role in the development of separatist nationalisms in former Yugoslavia<sup>30</sup>. It means separation between church and state did not exist historically in the region, and the church has exerted influence over political life in modern times. It follows that Balkan countries are more religious than secular Western Europe in that they have different political cultures, and therefore integration might become more complicated. But is this claim really valid?

For many years Balkan countries were under communist regime, suppressing any religious movements. After the collapse of Yugoslavia, the end of Balkan wars and finally the fall of Slobodan Milošević regime in Serbia, there have been clear attempts to create modern democracies. As Mojzes observes, as with Europe as whole, powerful forces of secularization, whether in its Marxist atheist or its consumerist ‘Western’ garb, have also been at work in the Balkans. Many of the region’s religious leaders vehemently deny that religion (or at least their own religion) played an important role in Balkan wars. They point out how marginalized religion was under communist rule and how little actual power religious leaders and institutions have<sup>31</sup>. Moreover, the separation between church and state is established in the constitutions of the possible EU members. Orthodox EU countries such as Greece and Bulgaria do not face any religious problems in their integration process.

Though for more than a 1000 years Europe had marked boundaries against the Islamic civilization as well as Eastern Christianity<sup>32</sup>, in principle the arrival of Orthodox Christianity should not raise many problems nowadays. It is an old established religion, and actually the truths claimed by this religion and the manner of worship is not very different from Western Christianity. Historically interrelated church and state institutions seem more clearly defined in present constitutions and should not cause big cultural problems for integration into the European sphere. It is more likely that orthodox immigrants from the Balkans will be defined in ethnical or geographical but not religious terms.

Gerner et. al. use the term ‘hjärnidån’ to define divided Europe<sup>33</sup>. In Swedish it means ‘curtain of the brain’, and is also a wordplay as ‘järnidån’ means ‘iron curtain’ in reference to Churchill’s metaphor describing the separation of communist Europe from the rest of the democratic World. After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the entry of the Cen-

tral-Eastern block into the EU in 2004, the reunion of former communist and Western Europe was accomplished; the problem of the 'iron curtain' was solved and democracy established. If Balkan countries entered the EU, this would represent an opportunity to destroy the very first curtain that divided Europe. Initially this reunion would be more theoretical: the 'curtain of the brain' could not be destroyed because of the signed documents, but in the long run, with change of generations, the real reunion would happen. Democracy and stability would prevail in the region.

In 2005 Spohn, analyzing the EU enlargement, wrote: "The East Central European and Baltic states, predominantly Western Christian will enter first, whereas the Eastern Christian countries will be included later."<sup>34</sup> According to him, Turkey will be excluded "from the final *gestalt* of the EU". This is just one small example among many others, showing that Islam raises much bigger concerns and discussions than any other religion within the EU.

### **Islam – between the fundamentalism and liberal thought**

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There are about 15 million people with a Muslim background in Europe, representing about 4–5 % of the whole European population. Islam is thus already an integral part of Europe and a European religion<sup>35</sup>. When Turkey and the Balkan countries (having quite big Muslim population as well) enter the EU, the amount of people with Muslim background will increase to around 90 million. Due to an increase in migration, this will also lead to a higher percent of Muslims living in 'old-stock' European countries. That's why it is not only important to spread democratic values among countries candidates, for multicultural Europe to function; it is also crucial to understand and integrate Islam into traditional European society.

European political discourse, as mentioned above, is indifferent to religion. This concerns not only Christianity, but Islam too; religion is not mentioned in the EU Constitution. If Europe is not united by any religion, than religion cannot be the reason to reject any country. Even if Turkey's Islamic heritage was sometimes mentioned in political debates, it is not put forward as the main burden to enter the EU. Officially European leaders do not have anything against Islam and Europe is willing to accept Turkey and Balkan countries into the union after they meet economical and political requirements. The problem is that leaders' positions do not always represent society's position towards the issue. The Lithuanian case could be taken as an example. In 2005 Lithuanian biggest news portal, Delfi.lt published three articles about Turkey's membership in the EU<sup>36</sup>. The articles were neutral, informing about Turkey's progress in the process of the EU membership. It also represented supportive Lithuanian leaders' attitudes towards Turkey's membership and Lithuanian intellectuals' encouragement about tolerance. These articles had 239 readers' comments, from which about 90 % were negative, and most of them (except 2 which mentioned geographical location and some of these which did not write any reasoning) were negative because Islam is the main religion in Turkey. It was seen as a threat to Europe, democracy, especially women's rights. Though no generalizations may be done from this example, it still illustrates the gap between the political discourse and society's concerns and intolerance.

Spohn<sup>37</sup> says that the core of a European Identity transcends nationalistic xenophobia and ethnic discrimination. I would add to nationalistic xenophobia also religious one, or according to Roald 'Islamophobia'<sup>38</sup>. This tendency has historical roots as well as economical and social ones.

The negative images of Turks, Arabs and Muslims can be detected in European literature from the Middle Ages and added to the construction of 'dangerous Other' perception in the European mind. It is further elaborated by modern Western media, as well as some academic works<sup>39</sup>. In novels, short stories and TV programmes, Arabs are portrayed with impunity as either blood-thirsty, fanatical terrorists or as ridiculous, smarmy, unintelligent nouveaux riches with an insatiable desire for Western women<sup>40</sup>. For the majority of Western people 'Arabs' are the most accurate or typical representatives of Muslim world. So, the portraits of Arabs become the portraits of Muslim people in general. Moreover, many Europeans don't have any direct relations with Muslims, so the dominant perception of Islam is the one presented in the mass media.

Casanova brings to attention one more reason for Islamophobia (as the outcome of xenophobia): the overwhelming majority of immigrants in most European countries, the UK being the main exception, are Muslims and the overwhelming majority of Western European Muslims are immigrants. This makes Islam a foreign religion in Europe and turns Muslims into 'Others'<sup>41</sup>.

Karlsson also notices that a presentation of Muslims as 'Others' arises from a need to fill the threat scenario vacuum after the collapse of Communism. Without an external threat it appears to be much more difficult to keep the concept of Europe alive<sup>42</sup>.

Many authors, when analyzing Islam in Europe, address the question of the veil. This could be viewed as the oppression of women, or as their own choice to show religiosity and preserve their identity. In either case, it attracts lots of attention. At this point it is useful to give an illustration of a conversation between New York Times journalist Elaine Sciolino, who was observing and presenting Iran's issues for more than 20 years, and an Iranian woman. She asked if on the International Women Day Iranian women could go bareheaded in the name of choice. The answer was that they had bigger battles to fight, such as equal rights in matters of employment, divorce, inheritance, and child custody<sup>43</sup>. Europe is not Iran, but the example holds, showing that the veil bothers Westerners much more than Muslim women themselves. The fact that the majority of authors are bothered by the existence of veil in the European secular public space proves that signs of religiosity are hard to accept as a usual, integral part of Europe.

The most important source of Islamophobia in the Western world is fundamentalist Islamic movements. Fundamentalist movements do not represent Muslims communities, but are nonetheless the most conspicuous part of it. By such actions as 9/11 or the 2005 London bombing, every European becomes touched by an Islamic world in the very worst way.

Extremism in Europe is not new; it already existed in left-wing movements in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but took shape in current Islamism. Jenkins and Roy talk about economical and social reasons for fundamentalism in Europe. Jenkins discusses the situation of young second-generation immigrants Muslims<sup>44</sup>; Roy presents young European



converts<sup>45</sup>. In any case these are young people, very often poor “in not only and often not even material poverty, but rather moral and psychological misery, with no job prospects, no social advancement, sometimes dealing in drugs, stealing cars, living in the small world of the underground economy”<sup>46</sup>. This idea is also supported by Kepel. He discusses the situation of Muslims immigrants’ descendants who grew up surrounded by European culture and most often are citizens of some European country. But that citizenship is mostly formal, excluding social and economical aspects. Social and economical denial causes frustration and anger among Muslims, leaving them at the margins of the society. It leads to the formation of religious community identity as it “provides more freedom than does ‘antireligious secularism’<sup>47</sup>.”

Economic and social reasons are followed by cultural ones. Migration separates religion from culture and society. A Muslim living in Europe has somehow to reinvent, to rediscover or (to be more precise) to define what, to his thinking, belongs to the religious world; because religion and society or religion and culture are divided and separated, there is no more knowledge mediated by *ulemas* or legal experts<sup>48</sup>. The second-generation residents often suffer from identity crises, being separated from their country of origin and not identifying themselves with the country of birth. They are searching for truth to be told – a truth which is presented most clearly and simply in radical Islam organizations’ websites (published in English – the most accessible language)<sup>49</sup>. As religious institutions are diminishing, young people find their answers in extremism movements.

Karlsson discusses the differences between political and religious terrorism. Political terrorists try to avoid innocent people’s deaths and want to get the sympathy of the group they claim to fight for, while religious ones do not have such scruples and see terror as a holy war against all ‘nonbelievers’<sup>50</sup>. Though such differences exist, both trends fight against the system – they simply, define it in different way.

Fundamentalism, as any other phenomenon in society, will not disappear completely; it will just evolve into different forms. That said, it can be reduced by combating its economical reasons, fostering grassroots movements (through education, for example) that help to preserve family ties and develop social ones. Education of and information to other Europeans, hammering home the fact that fundamentalists are just very small amount of all Muslims in Europe, is another possible course of action. They are criminals that must be fought against, while Muslims are integral part of Europe with the same right to feel and be considered Europeans as representatives of any other religion or ideology. Moreover, events in India, when Indian Muslims’ community announced Pakistani terrorists of 26/11/08 as murders not martyrs and refused to bury them, reveal that while Islam is developing into a democratic and pluralistic society it does not have a fundamentalist trend and the leaders of such Muslim communities delegitimise terror acts<sup>51</sup>. Euro-Islam is still very young. But there is a strong chance that in the long run, surrounded by democratic values, it will lose its fundamentalist part. It is very important to send such a message to Europeans for better integration of Muslims communities.

Historical memory of Islam’s impact on the development of European thought is one more tool for facilitating the integration. Following a metaphor by Karlsson<sup>52</sup>, one can say that Europe’s heritage is enriched by the Islamic Arab world. It was Arabs that trans-

lated ancient Greek texts and passed them to Europe. They introduced the Indian number system from 0 to 9. Copernicus and Kepler's works would be hardly possible without the previous discoveries made by Arab astronomers. This means that such European epochs such as the Renaissance and the Enlightenment owe a lot to the Islamic world.

## Prospects for the future

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It is hard to say what will happen with the European project from the religious point of view after the process of Eastern enlargement is accomplished. Future cannot be measured, it can only be predicted. Membership in the EU should foster economic and social development of Turkey and other countries. If the secularization theory works, it is very possible that religiosity (at least religion as institution) will be reduced and religious differences will be less and less important. Moreover, secularization is the only ideology that is institutionalized in the EU Constitution, national constitutions (through the separation of state from religion) and other official documents. So a secular trend will dominate in Europe after Eastern enlargement, as well as before.

At least two paths for the development of Islam in Europe are possible. On the one hand, Muslims' exclusion from social and economic life together with the lack of the initiatives for cultural integration may lead to emergence of what Karlsson defines as 'Ghettoislam', supported by fundamentalist forces in the Islamic world, which would lead to permanent guerrilla warfare in the ghetto-suburbs of European major cities<sup>53</sup>. Alternatively, a much more optimistic scenario is possible. The number of Muslims living in old-stock European countries will increase due to easier migration. But as Göle observes, social mobility is also a precondition to a modern personality<sup>54</sup>. The larger Muslim population will make Euro-Islam more diverse, and there is a bigger chance for the development of liberal Islamic thought. Increasing migration may foster the initiatives that help Muslims' integration. Disseminating knowledge about Islam among Europeans and giving Muslims democratic opportunities to express themselves would make the integration process easier. Then Jenkins' prediction that "Europe could become the birthplace of a liberalized and modernized Islam that could in turn influence the religion worldwide"<sup>55</sup> could come true. The membership of Turkey would make Islam a 'home religion' in Europe as it would be the main religion in one of member countries. Though perhaps at first this would happen just on 'paper', gradually cultural acceptance would evolve.

Throughout history Christianity has had its ups and downs. As Jenkins (2007) says, "death and resurrection are not just fundamental doctrines of Christianity; they represent a historical model of the religion's structure and development"<sup>56</sup>. So it is not very likely that Christianity will disappear from the religious landscape of Europe. Policies and initiatives, helping the coexistence of different religions, are needed. Therefore Christianity, being the predominant religion in Europe, once again plays a part, as its rights must be preserved together with Islam and secular thought. There is even a chance that Christian religiosity will increase, as more widespread discussions about religion will urge people to examine or define their religious roots (albeit in a very individualized private way). In any case, Christianity is also embodied in cultural experience, as mentioned above. So it

will remain a part of Europe together with its impact on development of European history, thought and culture.

The future of religion in the EU depends not only on the status of every single community, but rather on their ability to co-exist. We would like to elaborate on the concept of constitutional patriotism. As it was mentioned before, 'Constitutional patriotism' is a term introduced in Germany describing the phenomenon in which, after World War II, citizens suffered from inability to identify themselves with the country's past and history. Unity based on collective national pride in a glorious past was impossible. Habermas was one of the German philosophers that developed and widened this concept. He contended that being a German citizen meant adopting a critical approach to traditions while assuming (without any reservation or concession) responsibility for the past, thereby transcending particular identities through a reasonable adhesion to universal principles<sup>57</sup>. The phenomenon of constitutional patriotism enables the nation critically to evaluate its own experience which leads to a reflexive national identity. Admitting the mistakes made by one nation regarding another, rather than denying or avoiding these issues in a sort of 'historical amnesia', increases the chance for successful cooperation and integration within the Union. Furthermore, critical self-reflection (or in other words, distancing from oneself) helps "to acknowledge and accept the point of view of the 'Other(s)' in their own democratic self-determination process"<sup>58</sup>. This understanding is crucial for including "Others" interests and goals in the policy-making. It also reduces intolerance and discrimination when one is in another member state. The EU is not only the union of nations; it is a society which consists of networks and different groups: for example, Muslims, Christians and secularists presented in the article. It follows that the concept of "Other" might not only be based on nationality, but rather on many other characteristics, including religion or ideology the person believes in. Muslims, Christians and secularists are those "Others" from each point of view. In the light of Eastern enlargement, the coexistence of different religious and ideological groups can be created only through a critical look at oneself, through respect and acceptance of "Other(s)" point of view. The concept of constitutional patriotism should be broadened and applied not only to nations, but to any groups within society. The first step towards this goal is to include this approach in public debates. The more the issue is discussed, the more visible and important it becomes. On the other hand, if the process of co-existence fails, the respect and acceptance of "Other" do not emerge, the chance of united, democratic and free Europe is very small.

## Conclusions

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The political events in the EU, such as Eastern enlargement, change the religious landscape and the situation of various religious and ideological groups within the union. On the other hand, the very situation and the ability to live together of those different groups affect the integrity of the union. The overview of academic discourse, analyzing the situation of religion in the EU, suggests a few possible paths of future developments. If secularization theory works, the secular trend will dominate in the EU after eastern enlargement as well as before. Islam might end up into "Ghettoislam", or in flourishing liberal Islamic

thought. Policies and initiatives, helping the coexistence of different religions, are needed. Therefore Christianity, being the predominant religion in Europe, once again plays a part, as its rights must be preserved together with Islam and secular thought.

On the other hand, the impact of cultural diversity, which possibly increases with larger and more religiously variant Europe, should be taken into account. There is no clear evidence at the moment, undoubtedly proving the claim of the religious market theory that cultural diversity increases religious involvement. Still, such a trend might be possible and it would be interesting to analyze this aspect after the enlargement process is accomplished.

The integrity and the unity of the EU depends a lot on the ability of different groups to co-exist, respect and accept each other's points of view. The broadened phenomenon of constitutional patriotism might create the possibilities for such co-existence to prevail.

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Gauta: 2009 09 18

Parengta spaudai: 2010 03 05

Elena ŽUKAUSKAITĖ, Ingmar KARLSSON

## ES RYTINĖS PLĖTROS ĮTAKA RELIGIJOS STATUSUI EUROPOJE

S a n t r a u k a

Kiekvieną kartą, kai ketinama į Europos Sąjungą priimti naujas nares, kyla diskusijos apie Europos vienybę ir integralumą. Balkanų šalių, kuriose daugumą sudaro Rytų krikščionys, ir ypač islamą išpažįstančios Turkijos narystė meta iššūkį europietiškajai tapatybei. Šio straipsnio tikslas – atsakyti į klausimą, kokią įtaką ES rytinė plėtra turės religijos statusui ES, ir pasiūlyti galimus būdus sambūviui tarp skirtingų religinių ir ideologinių bendruomenių sukurti.

Siekiant šio tikslo pristatoma Europoje vyraujanti sekuliarizmo ideologija ir dvi didžiausios religijos – krikščionybė ir islamas. Tyrimo objektas – religijos ir Europos studijų krypties akademinės knygos ir straipsniai, paskelbti tarptautiniuose leidiniuose. Atranka pagrįsta vieno iš autorių (I. Karlsson) ilgameite šios srities ekspertize. Konstitucinio patriotizmo teorinė sąvoka pasirinkta kaip atspirtis sambūviui tarp skirtingų religinių ir ideologinių bendruomenių sukurti.

Straipsnį sudaro keturios dalys. Pirmosios trys atstovauja sekuliarizmui, krikščionybei ir islamui: „Sekuliarizmo teorija praktiškai“, „Krikščionybė – individualus tikėjimas be institucijos“ ir „Islamai – tarp fundamentalizmo ir liberalios minties“. Ketvirtoji dalis atskleidžia ES religinės plėtotės kryptis ateityje.

Straipsnis praturtina akademinį diskursą apie religiją ES. Autoriai kritiškai įvertina vyraujančias nuomones ir siūlo ateities plėtotės kryptis. Straipsnyje taip pat praplečiama konstitucinio patriotizmo sąvoka ir atskleidžiamos naujos jos pritaikymo galimybės.

Sekuliarizmas yra vienintelė ideologija, įtvirtinta ES Konstitucijoje, nacionalinėse konstitucijose ir kituose oficialiuose dokumentuose. Tad šio straipsnio autoriai tvirtina, kad po ES rytinės plėtros, taip pat kaip ir iki jos, Europoje vyraus pasaulietinė kryptis. Islamo plėtra gali būti mažiausiai dviejų krypčių. Viena iš jų – „islamo getas“, kita – liberalios islamiškos minties suklestėjimas. Strategijos ir iniciatyvos, padedančios įgyvendinti įvairių religijų ir ideologijų sambūvį, yra būtinos. Tad krikščionybė – didžiausia Europos religija, bus ir vėl prisiminta, nes jos teisės turi būti saugomos kartu su islamu ir sekuliarizmu. Gali atsitikti net taip, kad krikš-

čioniškasis religingumas suaktyvės, nes diskusijos apie religiją skatins žmones pasitikrinti ir apibrėžti religines šaknis. Galima prieiti išvadą, kad skirtingos visuomenės grupės gali sugyventi tik kritiškai vertindamos save ir gerbdamos „kitą“. Konstitucinio patriotizmo sąvoka turi būti praplėsta ir pritaikyta ne tik tautoms, bet įvairioms visuomenės grupėms. Siekiant šio tikslo visų pirma reikėtų skatinti viešas diskusijas šiuo klausimu. Kuo daugiau jis būtų svarstomas, tuo matomesnis ir svarbesnis taptų. Kita vertus, jei procesas, įtvirtinantis įvairių bendruomenių sambūvį, nebūs sėkmingas, pagarba „kitam“ ir „kito“ priėmimas neįsitvirtins, vargu ar bus sukurta vieninga, laisva ir demokratiška Europa.

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PAGRINDINIAI ŽODŽIAI: ES rytinė plėtra, religija ES, konstitucinis patriotizmas, Europos islamas.

KEYWORDS: Eastern enlargement, religion in the EU, constitutional patriotism, European Islam.

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**Elena ŽUKAUSKAITĖ** – 2004 metais įgijo lietuvių kalbos bakalauro laipsnį Vytauto Didžiojo universitete. Bakalauro darbas buvo paruoštas spaudai ir išspausdintas „Darbuose ir dienose“ (42/2005). Straipsnio pavadinimas – *Kai žvilgsnis tampa balsu. Pasakotojo ir fokusuotės problematika Jono Biliūno ir Jurgio Kunčino prozoje*. 2006 metais VDU Politikos mokslų ir diplomatijos institute įgijo komunikacijos ir informacijos magistro laipsnį. 2008 metais Lundo universitete (Švedija) dirbo Europos mokslo fondo finansuojamo projekto asistente. 2009 metų sausio–birželio mėnesiais atliko mokslinę praktiką Lundo universiteto Vidurinių Rytų studijų centre. Praktikos metu ir buvo parašytas žurnale skelbiamas straipsnis. Namų adresas: Dag Hammarskjölds väg 51, 22464 Lund, Švedija. Telefonas: +46 76 135 7330. El. paštas elena\_zukauskaite@yahoo.com.

**Elena ŽUKAUSKAITĖ** – in 2004 got the bachelor degree in Lithuanian philology at Vytautas Magnus University. The bachelor thesis was prepared for publication and published in “Darbai ir dienos” (42/2005). The title of the article – *When a glance becomes a voice. The Problem of the Narrator and Perspective in the Prose Work of Jonas Biliūnas and Jurgis Kunčinas*. In 2006 at the Institute of Political Science and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University, she got the master degree in Communication and Information. In 2008 at Lund University (Sweden), at the department of CIRCLE, she worked as a project assistant for the European Science Foundation funded project. In January–June, 2009 she got the academic internship position at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at LU. The article published in this journal is the result of the internship. Home address: Dag Hammarskjölds väg 51, 22464 Lund, Sweden. Phone: +46 76 135 7330. E-mail: elena\_zukauskaite@yahoo.com.

**Ingmar KARLSSON** – Lundo universiteto teologijos mokslų garbės daktaras ir Vekšės universiteto filosofijos mokslų garbės daktaras, buvęs Švedijos užsienio reikalų ministerijos diplomatas, ambasadorius, generalinis konsulas Stambule (2001–2008). Jis yra penkiolikos knygų, analizuojančių Vidurinių Rytų religiją ir politiką, Europos ir Vidurinių Rytų santykius bei mažumų situaciją Europoje, autorius. Šiuo metu I. Karlssonas dirba vyresniuoju mokslo darbuotoju Lundo universiteto Vidurinių Rytų studijų centre ir Stambulo Kultūr universiteto Globalios politikos krypčių centre. Namų adresas: Fredsgatan 2, 22220 Lund, Švedija. Telefonas: +46 46 222 9160. El. paštas Ingmar.Karlsson@cme.lu.se.

**Ingmar KARLSSON** – is Doctor of Divinity (hon) at the University of Lund and Doctor of Philosophy (hon) at the University of Växjö. He is a former ambassador, Swedish Consul General in Istanbul (2001–2008), retired from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2008. He is the author of fifteen books, analyzing politics and religion in Middle East, the relations between Europe and Middle East and the situation of minorities in Europe. I. Karlsson is a senior research fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at LU and at Global Political Trends at Istanbul Kultūr University. Home address: Fredsgatan 2, 22220 Lund, Sweden. Phone: +46 46 222 9160. E-mail: Ingmar.Karlsson@cme.lu.se.