NOTES ON THE FIGURE OF THE REFUGEE
OR, TOWARDS A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
OF EXTIMACY

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What problem does the figure of the refugee pose for political philosophy? Perhaps this question has already clouded this seemingly always cloudy and uncertain topic. Let me try again, this time splintering the theme into three organizational stalks: 1) what is the problem that creates the predicament of refugium into which the stateless person or the refugee has fallen? 2) What is the further problem caused by the status of the refugee, or, differently, to whom or at what does this problem address itself? 3) Does this problem avail itself of a solution, and if so, in what directions does one look to starting thinking through possible alternatives? In order to address these three questions, the matter can be distilled into the following inquiry, to which this short article will attempt a preliminary, unsystematic response: How do we isolate the conditions of reality that make possible the emergence of a stateless person or refugee in the first place, and how do we therefore challenge or transform those conditions of possibility?

HUMAN RIGHTS AS THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS; OR, THE TRUTH OF THE CITIZEN IS THE REFUGEE

The predicament of the refugee ushers from a problem with rights. Not only are the rights of refugees uncertain, or in question, or altogether absent, but in the first place the figure of the refugee erupts from a fault line in the edifice of supposedly universal human rights. Typically, when civil rights are no longer protected or guaranteed by the nation-state, the disenfranchised (and therefore so-called) citizen expresses grievances of injustice (of whatever sort) by appealing directly to international and global authorities. Human rights promise a certain universal reach of protection, when one has been deprived of this power of guarantee under
a national legal system. This is what Hannah Arendt means when she suggests that by rights we really mean the right to have rights.\(^1\)

Rights are declared universally valid for generic human life as such, but practically speaking these rights are valid only to the degree to which these rights can be activated in the form their protection. Thus, if the matter is one of who or what protects the right of the human, then the rights of “man” are in essence nothing other than the rights of the citizen as protected by their nation-state— they coincide in such a way as to erase the elemental category of bare human existence.

In “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man,” Arendt explains that the hollow core of the claim to originary and universal rights belonging to all humans was exposed at the moment there emerged a human figure whose sole qualification and categorical identity was simply being human.\(^2\) In an uncanny, though not altogether fitting, echo of the title of Robert Musil’s classic modernist novel, we might say that the declared inherent and universally held rights of “man” spun into crisis when confronted by men and woman ‘without qualities’—i.e. humans reduced to an otherwise politically unqualified human life: the stateless person. In the nation-state system, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of “man” prove to be completely unprotected at the very moment it is no longer possible to characterize them as rights of the citizens of a state. Arendt reflects on the mass displacements that turned many people into “stateless” during the twentieth-century interwar era, and argues that the plight of these refugees reveals the limits of abstract commitments to human rights in an international system in which the main guarantor of human rights is the nation-state.

The problem and the seemingly infinite frustration of those who advocate on behalf of human rights, let alone the suffering of those who do not have—have not been granted or allowed to have—the right to have rights, is that “no adequate institutional structure exists to enforce [their human rights].”\(^3\) Appeals to some sort of universal morality remain the sole power of human rights. This is certainly a dubious foundation, because of its contingent (because thoroughly imperial) nature. As political philosophers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri remind us: “paradoxically, the enforcement of human rights has thus far relied in the most visible cases on the might of the dominant national powers, as, for example, in the


\(^2\) Arendt, 290-5.

1998 NATO military intervention in Kosovo. One nation might be willing to violate the sovereignty of another in the name of human rights, but it will simultaneously insist on the principle of national sovereignty—especially its own.”

Nowhere is this double standard more clearly exemplified than in the case of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which, in the best case scenario, should indicate “the possibility of a global system of justice that serves to protect the rights of all equally.”

Except reality does not adhere to the best case scenario, as witnessed by the United States’ refusal to ratify the statute of the ICC. Once again the notorious legal theorist Carl Schmitt proves to be correct: politics precedes law. So long as “the most powerful nation-states constantly maintain the power to negate any legal actions” via declared states of emergency and claims of exceptionality, universal human rights are nothing in and of themselves. They are, simply, the right to have rights in the form of the externally given protection of those rights. Thus, the figure of the refugee exposes the essential contingency and historically bound nature of the rights of the human, otherwise speciously declared to be natural, universal, and eternal.

THE DIVIDE BETWEEN BIRTH AND NATION; OR, THE RIGHT NOT TO NEED RIGHTS

For the nation-state and the category of the citizen, the refugee’s presence places the category of citizen in crisis. The refugee exposes the fundamental interval of separation between birth and nation, which is so often posed as a primordial unity. Refugees’ struggles for rights and recognition within a territory that is apparently not “naturally” their own exposes a particularly dangerous fiction—namely, that birth should immediately become—should always already have become—nation.

This is to say, if human rights are nothing other than their external protection, then bare human life is immediately qualified at the moment of birth as a politicized, legally oriented life. Thus, the figure of the refugee, who is precisely a human stripped

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4 Hardt and Negri, 275.
5 Hardt and Negri, 276.
6 Hardt and Negri, 276.
7 Though one finds the Greek terms deployed by other thinkers in this same topical context as well (e.g. Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault), Giorgio Agamben has helped popularize the schema that expresses the claim that zoe, i.e. unqualified bare life, is overlapped and subsumed as bios, i.e. qualified political life. For his fullest treatment of this theme, see Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
of rights, reveals the fictional quality of the link between birth and nation, human and citizen.

The twentieth century saw the figure of the refugee emerge as a mass phenomenon. As Agamben recaps, the emergence of this mass phenomenon following the first world war, “when the collapse of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires, and the new order created by the peace treaties, profoundly upset the demographic and territorial structure of Central and Eastern Europe. In just a short time, a million and a half White Russians, seven hundred thousand Armenians, five hundred thousand Bulgarians, a million Greeks, and hundreds of thousands of Germans, Hungarians, and Romanians left their countries and moved elsewhere.”

The additional list of events and causes unfolds seemingly endlessly; inter alia, the exemplary points include: the displacements cause by the racial laws in Germany; and, the further exodus and dislodgment due to the civil war in Spain.

The crisis enacted by the emergence of the figure of refugee has had dire outcomes. Fascism is the typical, if extreme, example of such consequences. But we are still living with the aftershocks of this crisis, especially in the form of the fanatical and highly regressive nationalism experienced in post-communist Eastern Europe today. This nationalism too is a result of—because a reaction to—the exposure of the essentially fictional quality of the relationship between birth and nation, human and citizen.

The typical formulation for this regressive and reactionary nationalism is the hendiadys Blut und Boden – more formally known as ius sanguinis (the right to citizenship by birth from citizen parents) and ius soli (the right to citizenship by birth in a certain territory). But the declarations of human rights—the 1789 declaration of the Rights of Man, and its twentieth-century renewal in the UN universal declaration of human rights of 1948—radicalize these Blut und Boden principles by virtue of the fact that very quickly distinctions began to be made between who is or could be a citizen and, most importantly, who may not. Fascism, Nazism, regressive fanatical nationalism—these are “above all, redefinitions of the relations between man and citizen.” Indeed, borders are back. They are back because human rights are not for humans, but for citizens. Though not all refugees are entirely without rights, let alone stateless, it is nevertheless the case that the figure of the refugee unhinges that otherwise invisible bond between

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9 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 130.
birth and nation, and the results have been and continue to be atrocious. Giorgio Agamben exhorts that “we should not forget that the first camps were built in Europe as spaces for controlling refugees, and that the succession of internment camps—concentration camps—extermination camps represents a perfectly real filiation. One of the few rules the Nazis constantly obeyed throughout the course of the ‘final solution’ was that Jew and Gypsies could be sent to extermination camps only after having been full denationalized (that is, after they had been stripped of even that second-class citizenship to which they had been relegated after the Nuremberg laws.”

When humans are reduced to bare life—precisely when their supposedly universally proclaimed rights, these apparently eternal metajuridical values, should be most plainly visible and apparently powerful—their rights are notoriously absent. But not only absent or missing; rather, it is more that these rights never adhered to the existential referent toward which the category of “human” points in the first place.

When human rights are “declared,” it is assumed in the rhetoric of the act that a kind of performative utterance has been executed in which these eternal rights of humans have been revealed—exhumed from the crypt of oblivion and contempt where they otherwise had been buried alive by the sands of human history. But what if this declaration does not reveal what has always been there, hidden behind the veil? I would like to suggest that, by virtue of the crisis at the heart of rights, the citizen, and the nation-state that the figure of the refugee instigates, perhaps these declarations of human rights do not reveal (or dis-cover) humans in their ontological-juridical essence. Instead, what if the declarations reveal nothing more than the form of ‘revealing’ itself—i.e. the event of revealing, of disconcealment, of discovery; or, put still differently, what if rights have no content, and “are” merely the empty form of blind declaration and disclosure? The subject of human rights, in this sense, is very similar to Kafka’s little man from the country, who cannot gain access to the door of the law, which exists specifically for him, because it may be that the law, rather than being a transcendent power (i.e. some ‘thing’ waiting beyond the threshold), is nothing more than its own deferral. What if the law is nothing more than a door from which a light emanates, fully immanent in its relation to the man standing before it? In other words, what if these human rights are nothing more than a constant deferral of the very rights they codify and make public? They are, in a sense, suspended at the very moment of their acknowledgment, only to be—naively, hopefully—retroactively confirmed by the externally dependent act of protection that happens in the first place only through

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the privilege of the ‘right of the citizen to have rights’. Thus, the ultimate exercise of human rights would not be the mere recognition of the right to have rights, but rather the right not to need one’s rights. It is surely the supreme justice signaled by ‘the right not to need rights’ that sponsors whatever hope may be attached to the figure of refugee.

UTOPIAN RIGHT; OR, TOWARD A POLITICS OF EXTIMACY

The refugee is surely a problem—but for whom? Refugees are not problematic unto themselves. More precisely, the figure of the refugee locates a problem. The refugee locates ‘location’ as the very nexus of the problem. In response to this problem, I would generally locate two discrete but related directions for rethinking the identity of the refugee: 1) political spatiality; that is, displacing the coordinates of ‘global linear thinking’ in favor of extimate dimensions; 2) a new form of right; delinking refugees from human rights as such by reimagining right as an originary power—as potentia—neither in relation to the prior existence of a given juridical order (e.g. divine justice) nor in its universalist guise as a manifestation of free will. Despite the centrality of both lines for inquiry, this article limits itself to exploring only the first of these threads. Therefore, in order to address the problem not that the refugee is, but to the problem the refugee poses for the system of the nation-state and its building block of citizenship, I propose now to pause for a moment over the gap of contingency rediscovered at the intersection of human and citizen, birth and nation.

The crack between human and citizen, birth and nation, should be considered in a renewed light. For like any gap that admits light through its strait gate, a crack is always and equally also a window. In this case, the figure of the refugee, which by virtue of its radical crisis-inducing presence becomes a kind of limit-concept of the logic of the traditionally organized nation-state, might be a conduit for re-envisioning the political coordinates the relate birth to nation, human to citizen. Or, more modestly, this essay turns now to one creative idea that purports


12 In following this second thread (inauspiciously snipped out of this published version of the text), the work of Baruch Spinoza provides the initial foundation for investigation, drawing in particular from his equation of right and power—by Spinoza’s logic, it makes little sense to speak of a right that one has not the determinate power to effectively activate.
to solve some small part of the larger problem to which the figure of the refugee bears witness.

In an essay titled “Beyond Human Rights,” a text supposedly dedicated to revisiting Hannah Arendt’s 1943 essay titled “We Refugees,” Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben pushes well beyond the bounds of merely explicating Arendt’s trenchant criticisms of the problems of universal human rights. Like many before him and surely (hopefully) many after him, Agamben draws much influence and inspiration from Arendt’s wonderful text; however, Agamben’s agenda clearly exceeds that of Arendt. Though both speak of the erosion and failing of the form of the nation-state, Agamben seeks to think beyond the troublesome state-form and its basic concepts in which we have represented political subjects up to now (e.g. human and citizen with their rights, but also the sovereign people, the worker, etc.).

In this provocative, stimulating, and courageous (and, certainly also naïve because courageous, and courageous because naïve) essay, Agamben offers as a possible step in the direction of a politics of rights no longer built upon the supposedly universalized structure of human rights as we have previously known them. Nation-states, says Agamben, should start “to question the very principle of the inscription of nativity as well as the trinity of State-nation-territory which is based on it.”13 The problem of territoriality and belonging develops in this discourse directly from the critique of universal human rights as leveled by Arendt in her essay on the perplexities of the rights of man.

To shortly sum up the theoretical provocation with which Agamben punctuates “Beyond Human Rights,” he suggests a condition of shared spatiality as a new model of international relations—a kind of extra-territoriality or aterritoriality in which the state locates the congealed body of the nation through the citizens’ adherence to one another primarily as a community (or, as Agamben will have it, as a people, in the ‘old’, one assume pre-Hobbesian sense of the term14). The provocative idea warrants quoting at some length:

14 Agamben’s nod to the “old concept of the people (which, as is well known, is always a minority),” suggests intriguing references when kept its immediate context of suggesting new models for organizing political community. Agamben, “Beyond Human Rights,” 164. Does this “old concept of the people” refer to nomadic tribes? Is that what determines their inherently minority status? This would suggest a sort of Judaic understanding of a people, such as what Moses founded; or it may also extend to Paul’s task and essential question: what does it mean to form a ‘new’ people? For more on this matter of the “old concept of the people,” and the comparison of the tasks of Moses and Paul vis-à-vis this concept of a people, see especially Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, eds. Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann, in conjunction with Horst Folkers, Wolf-Daniel Harwich, and Christoph Schulte, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
One of the options taken into consideration for solving the problem of Jerusalem is that it become—simultaneously and without any territorial partition—the capital of two different States. The paradoxical condition of reciprocal extraterritoriality (or, better, aterritoriality) that this would imply could be generalized as a model of new international relations. Instead of two national states separated by uncertain and threatening boundaries, it might be possible to imagine two political communities insisting on the same region and in a condition of exodus from each other—communities that would articulate each other through a series of reciprocal extraterritorialities in which the guiding concept would no longer be the *ius* (right) of the citizen but rather the *refugium* (refuge) of the individual. In an analogous way, we could conceive of Europe not as an impossible “Europe of nations,” whose catastrophe one can already foresee in the short run, but rather as an aterritorial or extraterritorial space in which all the (citizen and noncitizen) residents of the European States would be in a position of exodus or refuge; the status of European would then mean the being-in-exodus of the citizen (a condition that obviously could also be one of immobility). European space would thus mark an irreducible difference between birth (*nascita*) and nation in which the old concept of people (which, as is well known, is always a minority) could find again a political meaning, thus decidedly opposing itself to the concept of nation (which has so far unduly usurped it).  

Certainly Agamben is not the first to discuss the decline of national citizenship in the face of international human rights developments. And there are various versions of post-human-rights discourse that have been emergent for some time now: the notion of the postnational, denationalized citizenship, or cosmopolitan citizenship. In terms of its practical application, Agamben's seemingly off-the-cuff suggestion of a “paradoxical condition of reciprocal extra-territoriality” surely bears with it the institutional puzzles and bureaucratic nightmares that most critics see also in the other theories of porous borders and world citizen mobility. What strikes me as slightly more unique about Agamben’s suggestion, and what urges me to reconsider it both because of and in spite of its radicality, is that this raw, still

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clearly immaturity formed idea brings with it a corresponding model of subjectivity that is as decentered as the political boundaries to which it corresponds. Put simply, even if this is merely a thought-experiment, the point of creating a theoretical alternative means enlarging the scope of what can be thought—in this case, specifically by suggesting new coordinates for how we literally position and identify ourselves politically in the world.

The extra-territoriality of the refugee-citizen—the citizen in permanent exodus—gains articulation and identity through a transformed relationship to spatiality. Instead of being a subject on the basis of inclusion or exclusion, citizenship would gained by a specific denial of the sole uniqueness of one’s own state territory. Like a strange inversion of the New Testament invocation of humility in the face of possessions, one would have to give up the world in order to gain it. And, in a manner conveniently described in the rhetoric of a chiasmus, the otherwise externally determined identities of the citizen (via borders) become more internally inscribed (because shared), while the typically internal determinations of belonging to a people would become externalized through the constant interaction and relating to territorially overlapping political communities. In this model, the intimacy of bare human existence (birth) intersects with the externally activated, politically qualified identity of the citizen in a manner somewhat akin to the term “extimacy,” coined by French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan to explain the paradoxical manner in which the unconscious relates to conscious existence. Extimacy is the sort of concept Lacan had in mind when he made the oft-misunderstood claim that the unconscious is outside—i.e. an intersubjective structure. What that phrase suggests is that, as in the case of Agamben’s sextimate territorial arrangement, the typical inside/outside metaphorology is insufficient.

For Agamben, living in a perpetual state of exile, where each distinct community can inhabit the same realm but will respect the others’ respective diaspora, is a suggestion as to how to avoid the bloodshed and political turmoil that characterized the twentieth century. However, the real question seems to be the following: if the necessity of belonging to a nation-state as a citizen has been the root of the problem of universal human rights, does Agamben’s suggestion really move beyond that belonging, or does it still maintain it, but just in a kind of decentered or slightly displaced way? And is it even desirable that one still belong anywhere, if the truth of the citizen is in fact the refugee?

The extimacy of the matter, understood here as the paradoxical subjectivity vis-à-vis spatiality and territoriality, proves to be the truly inspiring point of this
thought experiment. The space of life and experience—i.e. the space of the subject’s development of itself as citizen-refugee-subject—would not be determined in any immediate sense by relation to the State and its territory; it would not equal their topographical sum.

This space would coincide neither with any of the homogeneous national territories nor with their topographical sum, but would rather act on them by articulating and perforating them topologically as in the Leida bottle or the Möbius strip, where exterior and interior indetermine each other. In this new space, European cities would rediscover their ancient vocation as cities of the world by entering into relations of reciprocal extraterritoriality.20

Topography, understood here as the delineation of particular region on the basis of its details, shapes and borders, belongs to the old imperial model of the world, in which the world can be split up into quantifiable entities, charted, intellectually and cartographically mastered—in short, conquered. In this sense, topography corresponds to the political optic that Carl Schmitt calls the now former nomos of the earth, marked in particular by its cohesion through the international legal framework of the jus publicum europaeum.21 In this nomos characterized by delimitation, topographical political space is subdued via the logic of exclusionary inclusion and inclusive exclusion. This extra-territorial, extraterritorial citizenship would articulate the contours of its own spaces and regions not by claiming inclusion or exclusion, but by topological relationships.

The contrast set up by Agamben here between topographical homogeneous national territories and topological heterogeneous extraterritorial political communities again calls up the specter of psychoanalysis. Freud spoke of various topographies of the psyche with which most of us are familiar (e.g. ego, id, super-ego). But many misunderstandings of Freud have occurred because those schemas have been understood topographically, instead of more properly conceptualized as topological. The notion of topological space is not limited to Euclidean (two- and three-dimensional) space, nor even to spaces which can be said to have a dimension at all. Topological space dispenses with all references to distance, size, area and angle, and is based only on a concept of closeness or neighborhood. In this schema, topology becomes a non-intuitive, intellectual means of expressing the concept of territoriality without territory. Or, put differently, it offers a way of giving spatial and territorial expression to a concept of political community that bears no relation

21 See Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum, Zweite Auflage (Berlin, Duncker & Humboldt, 1974).
otherwise to where these ‘people’ are located in relation to those of other communities; hence the examples from visualized, or imaged, mathematics, such as the Möbius strip (a surface with only one side and only one boundary), which has the mathematical property of being non-orientable, or a Klein bottle (a non-orientable surface without a boundary).

While Agamben’s “paradoxical condition of reciprocal extraterritoriality” is very theoretically engaging (if not also an absurdly convoluted syntagm), perhaps the really crucial question is not whether the category of citizen might bend to the M.C. Escher-esque twists and turns of this arrangement, but rather whether the category of refugee can support it? Certainly, with all the immigration and movement in and among the European states, especially those millions of immigrants moving westward from the central and eastern European countries, this revolution of perspective seems justified. As Agamben writes, “What the industrialized countries face today is a permanently resident mass of noncitizens who do not want to and cannot be either naturalized or repatriated. These noncitizens often have nationalities of origin, but inasmuch as they prefer not to benefit from their own State’s protection, they find themselves, as refugees, in a condition of de facto Statelessness.”22 Sadly, the increased number of such stateless persons coincides the rising intensity of regressive nationalism, racism, and xenophobia, in particular in Eastern and Central Europe, where some of these stateless persons can presently be found and from which now-stateless persons may once have hailed. In this regard, in the Eastern and Central European nations the ‘convenience’ of strategic historical forgetting and ‘creative’ historical memory typical of Blut and Boden principles are especially damaging and dangerous. The xenophobic tendencies on the rise in these countries expose the point that these countries continue to stabilize (via radical reduction of otherwise empirical heterogeneities in their past and present traditions and ethnic make-ups) their national categories of identity via an exclusionary practices that ostracizes the very people (stateless, refugees) whose heritage and personal stories include rich and striking intersections with the fates of these nations. For the national myths of small nations, the thought of ignoring political territoriality seems literally unthinkable.

For the category of the refugee to bear the substantial weight of the radical transformation suggested by Agamben, the concept of refugee would need to be utterly removed from any association with the concept of human rights in their current form. As Agamben suggests, perhaps “the right of asylum (which in any

case is by now in the process of being drastically restricted in the legislation of the European States) must no longer be considered as the conceptual category in which to inscribe the phenomenon of refugees.” 23 In other words, the categories of refugee and the citizen must undergo a kind of radical merger, in which asylum would be sought not via territory but solely by a non-spatially determined association with a particular community. Obviously the Nation-State form as we know it today could not support such a radical zone of indistinction between refugee and citizen. Estimate citizenship marks (one of) the threshold(s) of the Nation-State form and its current determinations by and through citizenship.

In the end, most crucial is not whether Agamben’s provocative idea “works” in reality (i.e., it should not be read as a policy paper); rather, its contribution to the philosophical and political future is that it presents a theoretical alternative. This is precisely its *utopian* quality. By utopian I refer not to some mystified future characterized by the supposed realization of idealized expectations ushering from present conditions; instead, with the *utopian* political philosophy of extimacy indicated by the model of the refugee, I wish to emphasize the original Greek etymology: a no-place; an *atopia*; the displacement of place; in short, an Elsewhere. Interestingly, this extimate subject-position—the atopic situation of being both inside and outside of a centered structure—is precisely how Socrates appeared before the court. He was a citizen of Athens, yet he needed to avow himself to the judges in the manner demanded by the court, namely, as if he were a stranger, a foreigner; or, dare I say: a refugee. 24

These notes, preliminary and unsystematic, suggest a potential new form of political self-realization based on the manner in which the figure of the refugee philosophically places in question place *[topos]* itself. But, most emphatically, the crisis produced by figure of the refugee suggests the need for a new lexicon of political philosophy—a political metaphorology that proceeds topologically. The refugee poses a problem for the concept of citizenship in the form of a liminal figure: an extimate shape stuck within the intimate and intimidating borders of a topographically tunnel-visioned State logic of political territoriality. Regardless of philosophical thought-experiments and the production of theoretical alternatives, grievous world-historical consequences nevertheless may usher from contemporary regressive nationalist political policies of traditional *Blut und Boden* categories and intensities. Needless to say, it is no mere matter of preemptive, protective philosophical strikes—refugees are an already firmly established mass

24 See Plato, *Apology*, section 17 d.
phenomenon. But sooner or later, however, we shall discover that, regardless of citizenship, in a world where the universality of human rights rings hollow, we are all refugees.

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NOTES ON THE FIGURE OF THE REFUGEE; OR, TOWARDS A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF EXTIMACY

Santrauka

Kokią problemą kelia pabėgėlio figūra politinei filosofijai? Autorius imasi šios temos suskaidyma į tris dalis: (1) kokia problema sukuria pabėgėlio būseną – tą, į kurią valstybės netekęs žmogus, bėglys, papuola; (2) kokią papildomą problemą sukelia pabėgėlio statusas arba, kitaip tariant, kam tai yra problema arba su kuo ji susijusi; (3) ar ši problema leidžiasi sprendžiama ir, jei taip, kokiomis kryptimis reikėtų dairytis pradedant ieškoti galimų alternatyvų? Tam, kad prie šių trijų klausimų priartėtume, temą galima suglausti į štai kokį klausimą, į kurį šis trumpsparnis bandys preliminariai, nesistemingai atsakyti: kaip išskirsime tas tikrovės sąlygas, kurios iš viso padaro galima, kad atsirastų žmogus be valstybės, arba pabėgėlis, ir kaip tuomet susidorosime su tomis šios galimybės sąlygomis ar jas pakeisime?