

POST MODERN FORMS OF CITIZENSHIP IN LITHUANIA

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Introduction

Postmodern perspectives on citizenship are getting more important in social sciences in recent decades (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart & Welzer 2005, Norris 1999). Proponents of the postmodern citizenship argue that the widespread decline of traditional forms of citizen participation and declining trust in government is a natural phenomenon and may be explained as the shift from traditional forms of citizenship to the new ones (Dalton & Wattenberg 2001, Inglehart 1997, Inglehart & Welzer 2005, Norris 1999). Young people are not apathetic, but express an increasing rejection of institutional politics (Rossi 2009).

Nevertheless, other scholars (Putnam 1993, 2000, Putnam & Goss 2002) indicate that some fundamental social and cultural preconditions for effective democracy have been disrupted in recent decades, because the decline of civic participation weakens representative democracies.

Although the transitions to democracy in postcommunist countries were facilitated by mass mobilizations of elite-challenging activities, the interest in politics, voter turnout and participation in protest acts have been declining in recent decades (Degutis 2002, Degutis 2004, Imbrasaitė 2008, Inglehart & Catterberg 2002, Ramonaitė 2006, Riekašius 2002,

Žiliukaitė 2006). Post-transitional problems such as rising aspirations of economic well-being and persisting inequality led to the decline of participation rates (Inglehart & Catterberg 2002). Most scholars argue that there are no socioeconomic and cultural conditions for the development of postmodern citizenship in new democracies (Mishler & Rose 1998, Inglehart & Catterberg 2002, Inglehart & Welzer 2005, Savicka 2004). Nonetheless, they indicate that the current decline of elite-challenging activities in postcommunist countries is a temporal thing (Inglehart & Welzer 2005).

The focus of my paper is an empirical investigation of the occurrence of postmodern citizenship in Lithuania. Does postmodern citizenship actually occur in Lithuania? What may be explanations of differences between the postmodern citizenship and other types of citizenship?

The method of the study is an analysis of the data presented in the survey. The article consists of four parts. In the first section, definitions of citizenship are introduced. In the second section, postmodern citizenship and its characteristics are described. In the third section, the results of the descriptive analysis and linear regression are presented. In the fourth section, the occurrence of postmodern citizenship and its conformance to theoretical expectations are discussed.

Definitions of citizenship

Concerns over the distribution of political and social rights and duties, institutional infrastructures of participation and engagement, and issues of integration have been debated in recent decades. Most social scientists have worked to analyse the concept of citizenship in terms of the legal, political and social entitlements which define the privileges and duties of the citizen. Marshall (1964) presented the definition of citizenship as a status or a category of persons. He was concerned with citizenship was related to a specific problem of liberal theory: how to reconcile the formal democracy with the social consequences of capitalism. Marshall was certain that the negative impact of class differences on individual life-chances may be limited by the help of the welfare state. Marshall (1964) divided citizenship into three dimensions, which included civil, political and social rights that were not equally significant. Marshall's theory raises the question whether there is a single version of citizenship, or whether there are different forms of citizenship in different social and cultural conditions.

Some definitions of citizenship focus on “being a good citizen”, which consists of knowing citizenship rights and tending to participate in political and social life (Roelofs 1957). Somers (1993: 589) argues that citizenship may be defined as an “instituted process”, which includes a “set of institutionally embedded practices” that are “contingent upon and constituted by networks of relationships and political idioms that stress membership and universal rights and duties in a national community”. Somers’ definition refers to dynamics of social construction of citizenship during particular social and cultural conditions.

Turner (1993: 2) redefines citizenship as a set of political, economic, juridical and cultural practices that “define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups”. The flow of resources is related to “differences in the individual life-cycle in relationship to the enjoyment of citizenship privileges” (Turner 1998: 4). The type of citizenship refers to whether citizenship is passive or active and the form of citizenship participation defines the nature of the subject in modern politics (Turner 1998). Turner (1993) indicates that his “definition of citizenship places the concept squarely in the debate about inequality, power differences and social class, because citizenship is inevitably and necessarily bound up with the problem of unequal distribution of resources in society” (Turner 1993: 3).

Some social scientists argue that an understanding of citizenship as “a passive status and active form of participation may solve some objections, but there are problems in all processes leading to citizenship in the basic definition of the concept” (Janoski 1998).

Postmodern citizenship

Most scholars argue that postmodern concepts of citizenship are getting more important in contemporary Western societies. (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart & Welzel 2005, Norris 1999). Inglehart (1977: 317–321) predicted declining rates of elite-directed political mobilization and rising rates of elite-challenging citizen participation in advanced industrial societies. According to Inglehart (1977, 1997), citizen participation is shifting from bureaucratized and elite directed forms of participation such as voting, membership in political parties and trade unions to more spontaneous, issue-specific, and elite-challenging actions such as petitions, demonstra-

tions, and boycotts. Citizens are inclined to participate in self-organizing and self-expressive forms of actions. If issues have broad symbolical relevance, citizens are mostly ready to express their preferences on specific issues directly. Citizens participate, even if they think that their actions are not able to change official decisions. "Political self-expression becomes a value in itself" (Inglehart & Welzer 2005: 119). The main source of the change has been an intergenerational shift from materialist to postmaterialist or self-expression values (Inglehart 1977, Inglehart 1997, Inglehart & Welzer 2005).

The shift towards self-expression values is going together with cognitive mobilization (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart & Welzer 2005). Because of the rising levels of education and skills, citizens prefer to shape specific decisions rather than entrust them to more skilled representatives (Inglehart & Catterberg 2009). The younger, better-educated, and more oriented to self-expression citizens replace older ones in the adult population. Inglehart and Welzer (2005) argue that the increase of intrinsically motivated, expressive, and elite-challenging forms of participation in postindustrial societies reflects the changing nature of social capital. Elite-challenging activities are mostly not related to permanent membership lists and usually emerge from loosely knit and civic networks (Inglehart & Welzer 2005). This indicates the shift from externally imposed ties based on social control mechanisms to autonomously chosen ties, which people create themselves. "The publics of postindustrial societies are becoming more critical of institutionalized authority in general, and political authority in particular, and less likely to become members of bureaucratized organizations" (Inglehart & Welzer 2005: 117).

Western democracies are characterized by large age-related differences, while the young citizens emphasize self-expression values much more than the old ones (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart & Welzer 2005). The generational differences reflect long-term improvements in the living conditions that shaped the formative years of the respective generations, and these improvements were not experienced in all societies (Inglehart & Welzer 2005). According to Inglehart (1997, 2005), socioeconomic development, self-expression values, and democratic institutions work together. The shift in forms of citizen participation is related to economic, social and political developments in a particular society (Inglehart & Welzer 2005).

Schudson (1998, 1999) argues that a form of citizenship corresponds to a particular phase in the political system. The traditional model of citizen-

ship in the eighteenth century was based on trust and confidence. A structural cause such as individualization implies that traditional and political party related participation is declining in recent decades. Nowadays citizens may be monitorial rather than informed (Schudson 1998: 8):

A monitorial citizen scans (rather than reads) the informational environment in a way so that he or she may be alerted on a very wide variety of issues for a very wide variety of ends and may be mobilized around those issues in a large variety of ways. <...> The monitorial citizen engages in environmental surveillance more than information – gathering. Picture parents watching small children at the community pool. They are not gathering information; they are keeping an eye on the scene. They look inactive, but they are poised for action if action required. The monitorial citizen is not an absentee citizen but watchful, even while he or she is doing something else. Citizenship during a particular political season may be for many people much less intensive than in the era of parties, but citizenship now is a year-round and day-long activity as it was only rarely in the past. In this world, monitoring is a plausible model of citizenship.

Politics has a constant presence in the lives of citizens in recent decades. “Citizenship now is a year-round and day-long activity, as it was only rarely in the past” (Schudson 1998: 311). According to Schudson (1998), a monitorial citizen is not a passive one and he /she acts whether he/she feels it is necessary. Consequently, the monitorial citizen scans commodities, persons, issues, values, styles, rhetoric and politics every day. The constant maintenance of the citizenship through monitoring is greatly facilitated by technological means (Schudson 1998: 310):

<...> the democracy of partisanship and the democracy of rights both call attention to two concepts that are far too often omitted in discussions of digital democracy: expertise and institutions. We are not going to have democracy without expertise, nor should we want to. We are going to have a democracy without a variety of institutions that mediate between private individuals and public governing bodies, nor should we. But we do and will have continuing discussions about a wired nations as if every citizen could be and should be his or her own expert and could and should communicate directly with political representatives without benefit of mediating institutions.

Hooghe and Dejaeghere (2007: 261) indicate that Schudson’s description of the monitorial citizen is an ideal type, which “corresponds to someone who is politically interested, enjoys efficacy and participates in a non-traditional manner”. They argue that the monitorial citizen may be identified by four defining characteristics: political interest, a high level of internal political efficacy, a certain degree of political activity, and partici-

pation outside of institutionalized politics (Hooghe & Dejaeghere 2007). Hooghe and Dejaeghere (2007) suggested measurement of the defining characteristics of the monitorial citizen. The first criterion, political interest may be measured by asking respondents whether respondents are interested in politics.¹ The second criterion, internal political efficacy may consist of two items: the first question is the Likert statement that politics is so complicated that one can no longer understand it, the second question asks whether the respondents finds it difficult to make up his or her mind about political affairs. It is assumed that the monitorial citizens will have feeling that they can understand politics and that they finds it relatively easy to form an opinion on politics.² The third criterion, political participation is measured by seven items (contacting a politician or government official, working in a political party or action group, working in another organization, displaying a sticker or a badge for a campaign, signing a petition, taking part in a legal demonstration, and boycotting goods for political or ethical reasons).³

Hooghe and Dejaeghere (2007) applied three criteria (interest, efficacy and participation) in a logical manner and deduced eight groups of citizens (Table 1). The fourth criterion is participation in institutionalized politics.⁴ The citizens, who are interested in politics, feel politically efficacious and are members of political parties and trade unions, are defined as the active traditional. Hooghe and Dejaeghere (2007) assumed that the citizens, who are interested in politics, feel politically efficacious and participate in some political acts, but refrain from institutionalized politics, are the closest to the ideal type of the monitorial citizen.

¹ Based on the European Social Survey (2004), Hooghe and Dejaeghere (2007) analyzed the distribution of postmodern citizenship in Scandinavia. The precise questions can be found on the ESS website: www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

² Hooghe and Dejaeghere (2007) considered respondents who gave a positive answer on both questions as politically efficacious. Both questions were asked as Likert items. Positive answers refer to answering possibilities 1 to 3 on a 5-point scale.

³ The precise wording of questions can be found on the ESS website: www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

⁴ Hooghe and Dejaeghere (2007) indicated that the fourth criterion was used together with other free criteria (interest, efficacy and participation) and it led to 16 cells, which not all were theoretically relevant. "For reasons of clarity, the fourth criterion will only be applied to the first group of active citizens" (Hooghe and Dejaeghere) (2007: 269).

Table 1. Hooghe's and Dejaeghere's an ideal type-based approach to citizenship

	Interest in politics	Political efficacy	Participation
Active traditional	interested	efficacious	active
Active, monitorial	interested	efficacious	active
Burnt out citizen	interested	efficacious	not active
Modest citizen	interested	not efficacious	active
Timid citizen	interested	not efficacious	not active
Opportunistic citizen	not interested	efficacious	active
Bold citizen	not interested	efficacious	not active
Instrumental citizen	not interested	not efficacious	active
Passive	not interested	not efficacious	not active

The findings of Hooghe's and Dejaegheres (2007) research reveal that the group of citizens (18.1 percent of population) that mostly corresponds to the notion of postmodern citizen identified by various authors belongs to political parties and trade unions in Scandinavian countries.

Research methodology

The measurement of political participation in the questionnaires corresponds to questions that are used in classical studies of political participation (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993, Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978, Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995). Political participation is measured by 14 questions that include modes of political participation such as voting, contacting, working in a political party or/and in an election campaign and protest actions.⁵

The instrument of the survey was a questionnaire, which includes closed questions concerning political participation modes, membership in organizations, characteristics of networks of discussion about politics, individual and collective values and attitudes.

⁵ The precise wording of 14 questions referred to political participation: 1) Did you contact a politician last year? 2) Did you contact any organization or association last year? 3) Did you contact any government or local official last year? 4) Did you work in a political party last year? 5) Did you work in any local initiative group last year? 6) Did you work in any other organization last year? 7) Did you wear or display any badge or sticker of any campaign last year? 8) Did you sign a petition last year? 9) Did you contact or appear in the media last year? 10) Did you participate in a demonstration last year? 11) Did you participate in a strike last year? 12) Did you boycott certain products last year? 13) Did you perform an act of civil disobedience last year? 14) Did you participate in any other political activities last year?

The empirical analysis of the types of participators is based on quantitative data. The method of the study is survey sample data. The survey was conducted by the Market and Opinion Research Center “Vilmorus” in June, 2006. The sample of the survey was a stratified multi-stage sample, which represents the total number of the inhabitants of Lithuania at the age 18 – 75 and includes 1050 respondents.

This study employs various methods and techniques of statistical analysis in order to measure relations between types of citizenship and age, education, income as well as to investigate the differences among the types of the citizenship.

Types of citizenship in Lithuania: the results of an empirical investigation

There is a statistically significant relation between types of citizenship and age (Table 2). The active traditional citizens mostly include respondents from 36 to 55 years of age (42.5 percent of all active traditional citizens), but there are a number of respondents among traditional citizens from 18 to 35 years of age. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the active monitorial group is older, than the active traditional group – 37.7 percent of respondents of the active monitorial group are over 55 years of age and 35.2 percent of the respondents of this group are between 36 and 55 years of age.

The highest percentage of respondents between ages of 18 to 35 years is among the opportunistic (47.2 percent) and the bold citizens (53.3 percent).

Table 2. Types of citizenship by age

	18–35 years, %	36–55 years, %	over 55, %	Total, %
Active traditional	30.0	42.5	27.5	100 (40)
Active, monitorial	27.0	35.2	37.7	100 (122)
Burnt out citizen	15.2	27.4	57.3	100 (164)
Modest citizen	17.4	26.1	56.5	100 (23)
Timid citizen	8.8	31.9	59.3	100 (91)
Opportunistic citizen	47.2	29.2	23.6	100 (72)
Bold citizen	53.3	26.9	19.8	100 (167)
Instrumental citizen	29.3	46.3	24.4	100 (41)
Passive	29.4	25.8	44.8	100 (163)

Note: N=883; Cramer's V =0.373, p=0.000.

There is a statistically significant relation between types of citizenship and education (Table 3). More than half of the traditional citizens (55.0 per cent) have pursued higher education. The highest percentage of highly educated respondents is in the group of the traditional citizens. As could be expected, the lowest education level is among the passive. The data in the Table 3 contradicts to theoretical expectations that the monitorial citizens are mostly educated – 34.4 percent of the monitorial have pursued high education and it is lower level in comparison with the traditional group.

Table 3. Types of citizenship by education

	Incomplete secondary, %	Secondary, %	Secondary professional, %	High, %	Total, %
Active traditional	5.0	10.0	30.0	55.0	100 (40)
Active, monitorial	9.0	25.0	31.1	34.4	100 (122)
Burnt out citizen	21.3	24.4	32.3	22.0	100 (164)
Modest citizen	17.4	21.7	30.4	30.4	100 (23)
Timid citizen	30.8	33.0	28.6	7.7	100 (91)
Opportunistic citizen	23.7	20.8	31.9	23.6	100 (72)
Bold citizen	31.2	37.7	18.6	12.6	100 (167)
Instrumental citizen	21.9	36.6	26.8	14.6	100 (41)
Passive	42.3	34.4	16.0	7.4	100 (163)

Note: N=883; Cramer's V =0.205, p=0.000.

There is a statistically significant relation between types of citizenship and self-realization (Table 4). The traditional citizens are characterized by high self-realization – 94.9 percent of all traditional citizens are characterized by high level of self-realization. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the monitorial citizens are characterized by lower level of self-realization in comparison with the traditional citizens and opportunistic citizens – 87.3 percent of the opportunistic citizens and 82.8 percent of the active monitorial are characterized by high level of self-realization.

Table 4. Types of citizenship by self-realization

	Low self-realization, %	Middle self-realization, %	High self-realization, %	Total, %
Active traditional	-	5.1	94.9	100 (39)
Active, monitorial	5.7	11.5	82.8	100 (122)
Burnt out citizen	10.6	19.9	69.6	100 (161)
Modest citizen	13.0	8.7	78.3	100 (23)

	Low self-realization, %	Middle self-realization, %	High self-realization, %	Total, %
Timid citizen	17.2	34.5	48.3	100 (87)
Opportunistic citizen	4.2	8.5	87.3	100 (71)
Bold citizen	7.9	12.7	79.4	100 (165)
Instrumental citizen	7.5	17.5	75.0	100 (40)
Passive	25.9	28.4	45.7	100 (162)

Note: N=870; Cramer's V =0.253, p=0.000.

There is a statistically significant relation between types of citizenship and generalized trust (Table 5). The active monitorial citizens are characterized by the highest levels of generalized trust in comparison with other groups. The group of the active monitorial citizens includes 32.0 percent of respondents whose levels of generalized trust is low, 38.5 percent – levels of generalized trust is middle and 29.5 percent – levels of generalized trust is high.

Table 5. Types of citizenship by generalized trust

	Low trust, %	Middle trust, %	High trust, %	Total, %
Active traditional	35.0	40.0	25.0	100 (40)
Active, monitorial	32.0	38.5	29.5	100 (122)
Burnt out citizen	41.1	44.2	14.7	100 (163)
Modest citizen	56.5	43.5	-	100 (23)
Timid citizen	57.8	31.1	11.1	100 (90)
Opportunistic citizen	36.1	40.3	23.6	100 (72)
Bold citizen	44.0	39.8	16.3	100 (166)
Instrumental citizen	43.9	48.8	7.3	100 (41)
Passive	69.4	24.4	6.3	100 (160)

Note: N=877; Cramer's V =0.212, p=0.000.

There is statistically significant relation between types of citizenship and membership in a sport club, membership in cultural club, membership in local community organization, membership in political party, and membership in trade unions (Table 6). The highest percentage of members of sport clubs and culture clubs is among the active monitorial citizens. The monitorial citizens and the bold citizens refrain from membership in a local community organization. The higher percentage of members of sport clubs (15.6 percent) and members of cultural clubs (22.5 percent) is

among the opportunistic citizens in comparison to the active traditional ones (adequately 13.3 percent and 12.5 percent). The highest percentage of members of local community organizations (51.6 percent), political parties (66.7 percent) and trade unions (61.9 percent) is among active traditional citizens.

Table 6. Types of citizenship by membership in organizations

	Sport club		Cultural club		Local community organization		Political party		Trade union	
	Yes, %	No, %	Yes, %	No, %	Yes, %	No, %	Yes, %	No, %	Yes, %	No, %
Active traditional	13.3	86.7	12.5	87.5	51.6	48.4	66.7	35.3	61.9	38.1
Active, monitorial	22.2	71.8	27.5	72.5	-	100	-	100	-	100
Burnt out citizen	13.3	86.7	10.0	90.0	-	100	-	100	-	100
Modest citizen	4.4	95.6	-	100	-	100	-	100	-	100
Timid citizen	2.2	97.8	-	100	9.7	90.3	4.2	95.8	9.5	80.5
Opportunistic citizen	15.6	84.4	22.5	77.5	6.5	93.5	8.3	91.7	-	100
Bold citizen	13.3	86.7	7.5	92.5	-	100	-	100	-	100
Instrumental citizen	11.1	88.9	7.5	92.5	22.6	87.4	20.8	79.2	19.0	81.0
Passive	4.4	95.6	12.5	87.5	9.7	90.3	-	100	9.5	90.5
Cramer's V	0.179***		0.195***		0.474***		0.525***		0.452***	

Note: ***p=0.000, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

There is a statistically significant relation between types of citizenship and different modes of political participation (Table 7). The highest percentage of respondents, who have participated in protest actions are among the monitorial citizens. 22.1 percent of the monitorial citizens participated in the protest actions.

The highest percentage of respondents who signed a petition or/and contacted mass media are among the traditional citizens. 60 percent of the traditional citizens signed a petition or/and contacted mass media. The second group, which includes a number of respondents, who signed a petition or/and contacted mass media, are the monitorial citizens. 44.3 percent of the monitorial citizens signed a petition or/and contacted mass media.

Table 7. Types of citizenship by participation in political acts

	Voting		Contacting		Working in a party/ organization		Signing a petition/contacting mass media		Protesting	
	Yes, %	No, %	Yes, %	No, %	Yes, %	No, %	Yes, %	No, %	Yes, %	No, %
Active traditional	97.3	2.7	50.0	50.0	92.5	7.5	60.0	40.0	15.0	85.0
Active, monitorial	91.5	8.5	54.1	45.9	37.7	62.3	44.3	55.7	22.1	87.9
Burnt out citizen	92.7	7.3	-	100	-	100	-	100	-	100
Modest citizen	100	-	69.6	30.4	3.0	97.0	26.1	73.9	13.0	87.0
Timid citizen	93.6	6.4	-	100	-	100	-	100	-	100
Opportunistic citizen	80.6	19.4	58.3	41.7	94.9	5.1	31.9	68.1	16.7	83.3
Bold citizen	67.1	22.9	-	100	77.6	22.4	-	100	-	100
Instrumental citizen	85.7	14.3	51.5	48.8	97.0	3.0	34.1	65.9	7.3	92.7
Passive	71.0	29.0	-	100	-	100	-	100	-	100
Cramer's V	0.211***		0.402***		0.331***		0.417***		0.197***	

Note: ***p=0.000, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

Table 8 presents the profile of types of citizenship. Higher number of respondents belong to the group of the monitorial citizens (17.4 percent of population) in comparison to the traditional citizens (4.5 percent of all population). It has to be noted, that the group of the monitorial citizens does not fulfil all theoretical expectations. This group is not extremely young – their average age is 48.0 years, we tend to find the youngest age groups in the lower categories, who claim they are not interested in politics, such as the opportunistic citizens – their average age is 40.5 years – and the bold citizens – their average age is 38.4 years. The highest percentage of highly educated respondents is in the group of the active traditional citizens. There are less respondents among the monitorial citizens, who pursued higher education in comparison with the active traditional citizens. There are less respondents among the monitorial citizens, who pursued higher education in comparison with other groups. The lowest level of education can be found among the group that is completely passive (no interest, no efficacy, no activity) – the passive citizens. There is no statistically significant relationship between types of citizenship and trust to political institutions.

Table 8. Profile of types of citizenship

	Frequency, % (N)	Average age	High education, %	Average income	Self- realization	Gene- ralized trust	Average number of acts
Active traditional	4.5 (40)	45.7	55.0	819.0	9.4	4.6	3.58
Active, monitorial	17.4 (155)	48.0	34.4	584.6	8.4	4.8	2.23
Burnt out	19.1 (170)	55.8	22.0	558.2	7.5	4.2	0
Modest	2.9 (26)	56.0	30.4	510.9	7.7	2.8	1.74
Timid	9.6 (85)	59.0	7.7	456.7	6.4	3.3	0
Opportunistic	9.2 (82)	40.5	23.6	553.5	8.8	4.6	1.98
Bold	19.3 (172)	38.4	12.6	507.8	8.0	4.0	0
Instrumental	3.5 (31)	45.1	14.6	482.1	7.6	3.7	2.0
Passive	18.1 (161)	49.1	7.4	445.6	6.0	2.9	0
Total, (N)	100 (889)	48.3 (889)	100 (889)	527.4 (889)	7.5 (889)	3.9 (889)	1.77 (883)

A multilevel analysis of the relationship between the types of citizenship and self-realization and the types of citizenship and generalized trust are presented in Table 9. Since the types of citizenship differ with regard to age, education, income, these characteristics are included as control variables. It has to be noted that the aim of multilevel analysis is to develop a test including controls for the bivariate observation that monitorial citizens do not seem to be exceptional with regard to self-realization and levels of generalized trust.

The results of multivariate level analysis confirm that age (negatively), education (positively) and the type of citizenship (positively) have impacts on self-realization. Age has the highest impact on self-realization in comparison with education, income and type of citizenship.

Education, income and type of citizenship has an impact on generalized trust levels, but even taking into account these control variables there is a significant relationship between types of citizenship and levels of generalized trust. Education has a higher impact on self-realization in comparison to type of citizenship.

Table 9. The impact of citizenship types on self-realization and generalized trust

	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta
Intercept	7.104***	0.366		2.083***	0.358	
Age	-1.266	0.102	-0.379***	-0.123	0.100	-0.044

	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta
Education	0.526	0.073	0.231***	0.367	0.071	0.192***
Income	0.001	0.000	0.078*	0.001	0.000	0.099**
Active traditional	2.011	0.425	0.152***	0.690	0.415	0.061
Active, monitorial	1.171	0.248	0.160***	0.670	0.242	0.108**
Burnt out citizen	1.196	0.255	0.170***	0.699	0.248	0.118**
Modest citizen	1.029	0.477	0.065	-0.696	0.466	-0.052
Timid citizen	0.360	0.313	0.038	0.024	0.302	0.003
Opportunistic citizen	1.499	0.306	0.157***	0.959	0.299	0.119**
Bold citizen	0.965	0.253	0.137***	0.661	0.248	0.110**
Instrumental citizen	0.417	0.445	0.028	0.146	0.429	0.012
R -square	0.58			0.34		

Note: ***p=0.000, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

Entries are results from an OLS-regression. Types of citizenship are dummy variables. The group of the passive citizens is omitted. Self-realization is a dependent variable in the first model, generalized trust is a dependent variable in the second one.

The monitorial citizens significantly differ from the traditional ones according to their levels of self-realization, but those groups do not significantly differ according to their age, in comparison with the traditional citizens (Table 10). The monitorial citizens have the lower income per family person in comparison with traditional ones. The monitorial citizens differ from the traditional citizens according to their perceptions of effectiveness of civil disobedience in the decision – making process and trust to political parties. The monitorial citizens have higher levels of perceptions of effectiveness of civil disobedience and lower levels of trust to political parties in comparison to the traditional ones. The monitorial citizens have higher levels of perceptions that a good citizen has to show solidarity with other people, on the other side, they have less developed “open” leisure networks in comparison to the traditional citizens.

Table 10. Differences between the monitorial citizen and the traditional citizen

	Active monitorial	Active traditional	t
Income	584.6	819.0	-3.154**
Effectiveness of civil disobedience in the decision-making process	5.27	4.18	2.005*
Socializing with people one does not know	1.98	1.53	2.821**

	Active monitorial	Active traditional	t
Socializing with people who have different lifestyle	2.17	1.68	2.661**
Socializing with people who are not born in Lithuania	2.26	1.68	2.698**
Good citizen has to show solidarity with other people	8.04	6.85	2.824**
Trust to political parties	2.64	3.58	-2.162*
Self-realization	8.39	9.44	-2.807**

Note: ***p=0.000, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

The monitorial citizens do not significantly differ from the opportunistic ones by levels of self-realization, but they differ by age (Table 11). The monitorial citizens significantly differ from the opportunistic citizens by their frequency of talking about political and social matters, self-assessment of easiness of expression of a deviant opinion, self-assessment of own abilities to write a letter against the decision of a government institution and perceptions of a good citizen. The monitorial citizens talk about political and social matters more frequently; their self-assessment of easiness of expression of a deviant opinion and their self-assessment levels of ability to write a letter against the decision of a government institution is higher in comparison with the opportunistic ones. The monitorial citizens have higher levels of perceptions that a good citizen has to serve in the Army in comparison with the traditional ones.

Table 11. Differences between the monitorial citizen and the traditional citizen

	Active monitorial	Opportunistic	t
Age	48.9	45.7	2.751**
Frequency of talking about politics	1.98	2.97	-6.455***
Easiness of expression of a deviant opinion	8.25	6.61	4.397***
Able to write a letter against decision	1.29	1.56	-3.832***
Good citizen has to serve in the Army	8.47	7.18	3.027**

Note: ***p=0.000, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

The monitorial citizens significantly do not differ from the opportunistic citizens by levels of self-realization, but they differ by age (Table 12). The monitorial citizens significantly differ from the opportunistic ones by their characteristics of political communication, perceptions of effectiveness of various forms of participation in the decision-making process, perceptions of a good citizen, generalized trust, trust to the Army and importance of

social justice. The monitorial citizens' levels of these dimensions are higher in comparison to the bold citizens with except of perceptions that a good citizen does not to wait the State to solve his/ her problems. The monitorial citizens' levels of perceptions are that a good citizen does not to wait the State to solve his/ her problems are lower in comparison to the bold ones.

Table 12. Differences between the monitorial citizen and the bold citizen

	Active monitorial	Bold	t
Age	45.7	38.4	4.377***
Frequency of talking about politics	1.98	3.38	-10.688***
Number of people whom discuss politics	4.0	2.87	3.383**
Effectiveness of civic disobedience in the decision-making process	5.27	4.19	3.145**
Effectiveness of a petition in the decision-making process	5.44	4.34	3.135**
Good citizen has to show solidarity with other people	8.04	7.38	2.436*
Good citizen has to vote in elections	8.61	7.90	2.367*
Good citizen has to serve in the Army	8.47	7.10	4.040***
Good citizen has to learn state language	9.74	9.36	2.778**
Good citizen has to be informed	9.28	8.39	4.714***
Good citizen has not to wait the State to solve his/her problems	7.74	8.33	-2.046*
Good citizen has to not treat the minorities as worse	8.88	8.32	2.079*
Trust to people	4.75	4.02	2.479*
Trust to the Army	6.78	6.17	2.001*
Social justice	9.48	8.42	3.553***
Evaluation of present economic situation of the country	6.59	6.16	2.020*

Note: ***p=0.000, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

The opportunistic citizens significantly differ from the bold ones by levels of self-realization, but there is no difference between those groups by age (Table 13). The opportunistic citizens significantly differ from the bold ones by characteristics of political communication and values such as self-realization, self-discipline and social justice. The opportunistic citizens are characterized by higher levels of characteristics of political communication and values such as self-realization, self-discipline and social justice in comparison to the bold ones.

Table 13. Differences between the opportunistic citizen and the bold citizen

	Opportunistic	Bold	t
Number of people talk about politics	3.63	2.87	2.452*
Frequency of talking about politics	2.97	3.38	-2.408*
Self-realization	8.76	7.99	2.320*
Self-discipline	9.15	8.58	2.428*
Social justice	9.53	8.92	3.125**

Note: **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

Discussion

The focus of this article was an empirical question whether postmodern citizenship occurs in Lithuania. 17.4 percent of the citizens, who are interested in politics, feel efficacious and participate, but refrain from traditional organizations such as political parties, trade unions and local community organizations and might be called monitorial citizens. From the theoretical perspective of postmodern citizenship, the characteristics of a “monitorial citizen” in Lithuania do not confirm theoretical hypotheses. Although the monitorial citizens abstain from membership in political parties, trade unions and local community organizations, they have a high percentage of participation in elections (91.5 percent of all monitorial citizens).

Even the percentage of participation in protest actions is the highest among the monitorial citizens, the lowest in comparison to participation in other modes of political acts. Only 22.1 percent of all monitorial citizens participated in protest actions, 37.7 percent – worked in a party or/and an organization, 44.3 percent – signed a petition or/and contacted mass media, 69.6 percent – contacted a politician or/and a government official or/and organization. It allows an assumption that enthusiasm of elite-challenging actions of the transition period gave way to more passive behaviour and the decline of protest actions. On the other side, even if the monitorial citizens are characterized by the highest levels of generalized trust in comparison to the other groups (Table 5 and Table 8), they are inclined to participate in individual political actions such as voting, contacting, signing a petition and it may be explained as a result of derogation of social capital under the Soviet regime or/and a shift towards individualistic values after the collapse of communism.

The levels of generalized trust and the percentage of membership in sports clubs and cultural clubs and participation in the protest actions among the monitorial citizens are the highest. The highest generalized trust and membership in leisure organizations is related to the highest level of social capital, which enhances participation in different modes of collective actions, including participation in protest acts. On the other side, it is possible to assume that the highest generalized trust and membership only in leisure organizations causes higher evaluation of effectiveness of civil disobedience acts in the decision-making process and perceptions that a good citizen has to show solidarity to other people in comparison with the traditional citizens.

The levels of self-realization among monitorial citizens are lower in comparison with the traditional citizens and the opportunistic citizens – the group, which is younger than the monitorial citizens and includes lower percentage of respondents who pursued high education than the monitorial citizens.

The monitorial citizens do not significantly differ from the traditional ones by age. The monitorial citizens significantly differ from the bold ones by age (Table 12). Contrarily to theoretical expectations the monitorial citizens are older than the bold ones.

The data in the Table 3 contradicts to theoretical expectations that the monitorial citizens are mostly educated – 34.4 percent of the monitorial have pursued higher education and this is a lower level in comparison to the traditional group.

The monitorial citizens do not seem to be exceptionally young and educated, nor are they exceptionally oriented to self-realization values. From the theoretical perspective of postmodern citizenship the characteristics of the monitorial citizens are mixed.

Citizens with high levels of self-realization are driven by intrinsic motivations, are critical concerning hierarchically organized institutions and prefer to engage in elite-challenging forms of participation according to Inglehart and Welzer (2005). But this is not a case for traditional citizens in Lithuania. The traditional citizens in Lithuania are members of political parties and trade unions and almost all are inclined to participate in elections (97.3 percent of all traditional citizens). On the other side the two types of citizens, who are mostly young – the opportunistic and the bold citizens – are not interested in politics, and the percentage of their partici-

pation in elections (80.6 percent of all the opportunistic and 67.1 percent of all the bold citizens) is the least in comparison to other groups. On the other side, the percentage of participation of the opportunistic citizen in protest actions is almost the same as among other groups and even higher than the traditional citizens.

It is worth pointing out that the monitorial citizens significantly differ from the bold ones by their perceptions of the role of the state in solving their problems (Table 12). The higher reliance of the monitorial citizens on the state in comparison to the bold ones may be explained as the result of paternalistic attitudes towards the role of the state that formed under the Soviet regime and/or a shift towards individualistic values after the collapse of communism.

The group of citizens in Lithuania that mostly corresponds to the notion of post-modern citizens identified by various authors is the traditional citizens. To some extent, this might be due to instrumental motivations and the results of derogation of social capital under the Soviet regime. But a number of the traditional citizens is exceptionally low (4.5 percent of all population) in comparison to other groups and this might be related to the lack of institutional infrastructure of participation, the lack of efficiency or the loss certain attractive attributes in political parties and trade unions, mistrust to political organizations in general that might be the result of the Soviet legacy.

Young citizens are becoming more highly educated, individualized and oriented towards self-expression values in post-industrial societies according to Inglehart and Welzer (2005). This process of postmodernization leads to a problematic and hostile relationship between post-modern citizens and political parties and trade unions. This does not seem to be the case in Lithuania; the group of citizens that most closely corresponds to the notion of post-modern citizen, which were identified by various authors, belongs to political parties and trade unions.

Conclusion

From a theoretical perspective of the postmodern citizenship, the characteristics of identified groups (the traditional citizens, the monitorial citizens, the opportunistic citizens and the bold citizens) are mixed, because of socioeconomic and cultural conditions in Lithuania.

The group of the monitorial citizens includes a substantial number of respondents. However, the characteristics of a “monitorial citizen” in Lithuania do not confirm theoretical hypotheses. Although, the monitorial citizens abstain from membership in political parties, trade unions and local community organizations, they participate in institutionalized politics such as voting in elections. The highest generalized trust and membership in leisure organizations is related to the highest level of social capital, which enhances participation in different modes of collective actions, including participation in protest acts. The monitorial citizens do not seem to be exceptionally young and educated, nor are they exceptionally oriented to self-realization values.

The higher reliance of the monitorial citizens on the state in comparison to the bold ones may be explained as the result of paternalistic attitudes towards the role of the state that formed under the Soviet regime and a shift towards individualistic values after the collapse of communism.

The traditional citizens that mostly correspond to the notion of post-modern citizen identified by various authors belong to political parties and trade unions, but their number is exceptionally low in comparison to other groups and this might be related to the lack of institutional infrastructure of participation, the lack of efficiency or the loss certain attractive attributes in political parties and trade unions, and mistrust to political organizations in general that might be the result of the Soviet legacy.

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Abstract

Most scholars argue that postmodern citizenship is a characteristic of young generations. Young people are not apathetic, but express an increasing rejection of institutional forms of participation. Post-transitional problems such as rising aspirations of economic well-being and persisting inequality led to decline of conventional and nonconventional participation in post-communist countries. The focus of this article is to investigate whether postmodern citizenship actually occurs in Lithuania. Based on a survey conducted in Lithuania in 2006, the article draws conclusions that postmodern citizenship occurs in Lithuania, but it does not confirm theoretical expectations. From theoretical perspective of the postmodern citizenship, the characteristics of identified groups (the traditional citizens, the monitorial citizens, the opportunistic citizens and the bold citizens) are mixed, because of socio-economic and cultural conditions in Lithuania.

POSTMODERNIOS PILIETYBĖS FORMOS LIETUVOJE**Santrauka**

Postmodernios pilietybės sampratos šalininkai teigia, kad narystės politinėse partijose ir profsąjungose, balsavimo, pasitikėjimo valdžios institucijomis mažėjimas gali būti paaiškinamas tuo, kad kinta tradicinės ir atsiranda naujų, spontaniškų, į konkrečių problemų sprendimą nukreiptų dalyvavimo formų. Kita vertus, demokratijos krizės teoretikai nurodo, kad pastaraisiais metais piliečių dalyvavimo sumažėjimas paskatino socialinio kapitalo nykimą ir atstovaujamosios demokratijos silpnėjimą.

Šio straipsnio tikslas – nustatyti ir paaiškinti postmodernios pilietybės formų egzistavimą Lietuvoje. Ar Lietuvoje esama postmodernių piliečių? Kokie skirtumai išryškėja tarp postmodernių ir kitokių piliečių grupių? Kaip būtų galima paaiškinti šiuos skirtumus?

Pirmojoje straipsnio dalyje apžvelgiama pastaruoju metu vykusį pilietybės sampratos kaita. Antrojoje straipsnio dalyje apibrėžiama postmodernios pilietybės samprata, apibūdinami ir paaiškinami piliečių dalyvavimo ypatumai poindustrinėse visuomenėse, pristatoma stebinčio ir kontroliuojančio piliečio sampratos operacionalizacija. Šiuolaikinėse poindustrinėse visuomenėse kinta piliečių dalyvavimo politinėje veikloje formos. Dalyvavimas biurokratinėje ir elito vadovaujamoje veikloje (balsavimas, narystė politinėse partijose ir profsąjungose) mažėja, tačiau piliečiai dalyvauja spontaniškoje, su konkrečių problemų sprendimu susijusioje politinėje veikloje (pasirašo peticijas, dalyvauja demonstracijose, boikotuose). Politinio dalyvavimo formų kaitos šaltinis yra vertybių skirtumai tarp kartų, atspindintys ilgalaikį gyvenimo sąlygų pagerėjimą, kuris vaikystėje formavo konkrečios kartos vertybes.

Šiuolaikinėje visuomenėje politika veikia įvairias socialinio gyvenimo sferas, todėl piliečiai yra priversti kiekvieną dieną stebėti ir kontroliuoti politinius procesus. Jie stebi ir kontroliuoja aplinką, tačiau veikia tik tada, kai mano, kad veikti yra būtina. Mokslininkai išskyrė 4 kriterijus (domėjimąsi politika, aukštą politinio efektyvumo lygį, dalyvavimą politinėje veikloje, susilaikymą nuo dalyvavimo tradicinėje politinėje veikloje, t. y. narystę politinėse

partijose ir profsąjungose), kuriais remiantis galima empiriškai nustatyti stebinčius ir kontroliuojančius piliečius.

Trečiojoje dalyje pagrindžiamos kiekybinio tyrimo pasirinkimo priežastys ir tyrimo metodas – apklausos duomenų analizė. 2006 m. birželio mėn. 5–8 dienomis Visuomenės nuomonės ir rinkos tyrimų centras „Vilmorus“ atliko keturių pakopų stratifikuotą Lietuvos gyventojų apklausą, kurioje dalyvavo 1050 respondentų. Apklausos priemonė buvo klausimynas, kurį sudarė uždarojo tipo klausimai apie gyventojų politinio dalyvavimo formas, narystę organizacijose, politinių diskusijų tinklų ypatybes, vertybes ir požiūrius.

Ketvirtojoje ir penktojoje straipsnio dalyse apibrėžiami statistiškai reikšmingi skirtumai tarp piliečių tipų ir amžiaus, išsilavinimo, savirealizacijos, bendrojo asmeninio pasitikėjimo, narystės organizacijose ir dalyvavimo politinėje veikloje. Pateikiamos skirtingų pilietybės tipų charakteristikos, regresijos analizė tarp pilietybės tipų ir savirealizacijos bei bendrojo asmeninio pasitikėjimo, kai amžius ir išsilavinimas yra kontroliuojamas. Aptariami įvairiais statistiniais metodais nustatyti statistiškai reikšmingi skirtumai tarp stebinčių ir kontroliuojančių piliečių bei kitų piliečių grupių (tradicinio, oportunistinio ir „drąsaus“ piliečių).

Straipsnio pabaigoje daroma išvada, kad, remiantis postmodernios pilietybės teorinėmis perspektyvomis, nustatytų piliečių grupių (tradicinių, stebinčių ir kontroliuojančių, oportunistinių ir „drąsių“) ypatybės yra mišrios ir tik iš dalies atitinka teorinius lūkesčius. Nors stebintys ir kontroliuojantys piliečiai nėra politinių partijų, profsąjungų ir vietinių bendruomenių nariai, jie aktyviai dalyvauja rinkimuose. Stebintys ir kontroliuojantys piliečiai pasižymi aukščiausiu socialinio kapitalo lygiu, kuris skatina jų dalyvavimą kolektyvinėje veikloje. Tačiau stebintys ir kontroliuojantys piliečiai Lietuvoje nėra nei išskirtinai jauni, nei išsilavinę, nei pasižymintys aukštu saviraiškos vertybių lygiu. Tradiciniai piliečiai turi daugiau bruožų, atitinkančių postmodernaus piliečio charakteristikas, tačiau jie yra politinių partijų ir / arba profsąjungų nariai. Oportunistinių ir „drąsių“ piliečių grupėse, lyginant su kitomis grupėmis, yra didžiausias procentas asmenų nuo 18 iki 35 metų, tačiau šios grupės nesidomi politika, nors jaučiasi politiškai efektyvios.