NATION-WIDE POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AS ELEMENT OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES: CASE STUDIES OF ESTONIA’S RUSSIANS AND SERBIA’S HUNGARIANS

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This article examines the impact of political cleavages existing in the host state on the receptivity of the political system toward minority claims, its proneness to accommodation and inclusivity toward minority political participation. Applying the theoretical framework of Political Opportunity Structure, the nation-wide political spectrum is regarded as an important element of the structure of political opportunities available to minority communities. By bringing together the cases of Russians in Estonia and Hungarians in Serbia, the article hypothesizes that in post-socialist nation-states, a higher degree of polarization of the political spectrum is more likely to expand the political opportunity structure for ethnic minorities in terms of inclusivity toward minority claims, compared to a political environment characterized by a consensus on the main directions of the country’s development. The structure of established political conflicts in Estonia and Serbia are analyzed from the point of view of ethnic minority politics, assessing the effect of nation-wide cleavages on the patterns of cooperation with ethnic minority political forces and concrete impact on minority-related policies.

Keywords: ethnic minority politics, political participation of ethnic minorities, political opportunity structure for ethnic minorities, ethnic parties, ethnopolitics.
INTRODUCTION

Ethnic minority policies are shaped in the context conditioned by developments on the nation-wide political arena. This context affects the ways in which ethnicity is politicized. The structure of nation-wide political cleavages is an important element of the political opportunity structure of the host state available to ethnic minority politicians, as it determines their position on nation-wide ideological scale, conditions choices of political alliances, political strategies of parties and electoral preferences of minority voters.

This article draws on the theoretical perspective of Political Opportunity Structure (POS), which considers inherent peculiarities of the context in which ethnic movements and parties shape their ideologies and choose strategies and tactics. It focuses on nation-wide cleavage structures, or established political conflicts in the country, as an important element of the POS. National cleavage structures are closely related to alliance structure, such as the availability of influential allies of ethnic elites or the shifts in ruling alignments or political alliances.

According to comparative research methodology, the two cases are comparable in terms of reorganization of political life of ethnic minority groups in the context of transition from the socialist framework of political representation to multi-party system. With the transition from multiethnic socialist federations toward nation-states, both cases saw ethnification of politics, absence of special minority political representation mechanisms and emergence of ethnic parties as primary channels of minority representation. The two cases are brought together on the basis of the contrasting independent variable, the structure of political cleavages of the host state, which is characterized by a consensus on the main directions of the country’s development in the case of Estonia, and is extremely fragmented in the case of Serbia. I hypothesize that in post-socialist nation-states organized around their ethnic majority cores, a higher degree of polarization of the nation-wide political spectrum is more likely to expand
the political opportunity structure for minority communities than a consensus of all major nation-wide forces on the main directions of the country’s development.

ESTONIA'S RUSSIANS IN THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE OF THE RESTORED ESTONIAN NATION-STATE

The main peculiarity of the ethnopolitical configuration of post-communist Estonia lay in a striking discrepancy between the share of non-Estonians in the society (roughly one third) and their under-representedness in all branches of power. This discrepancy occurred as a result of denying automatic citizenship and disfranchisement of over 250 000 non-Estonians in early 1990s. Subsequent naturalization dynamics did not help non-Estonians achieve a degree of representation in the national Parliament that would be proportional to their share in the society: in the wake of the 2011 parliamentary elections, as many as 10 elected MPs out of 101 were of Russian background.

Besides, an inherent feature of political organization of Russians in Estonia is the failure of ethnic parties to establish themselves as the main political representatives of the minority community. Unlike Latvia with similar ethnopolitical configuration, where strong political parties advocating the interests of Russophone population (Harmony Centre and “For Human Rights in the United Latvia”) appeared, Estonia’s Russian parties (United People’s Party, ONPE; Russian Party of Estonia, RPE) failed to retain their role of the main channel of political representation of the non-Estonian population both on the national and the local level, as Russian deputies used to be elected through nation-wide parties. Besides, the distrust of the Russian electorate towards political leaders and parties translated itself into distrust towards the whole party system and alienation from political life on all levels, manifested through a decrease in voter turnout.

These trends reveal a crucial importance of the majority political elite for the structure of political opportunities, available to Estonia’s Russian community.
Since Estonia is a parliamentary republic, parliamentary elections are the most crucial factor in determining the political course of the country. The consensus between all the major nation-wide parties with regard to the main principles of citizenship, language and migration policies remained intact for two decades, based on ethnic-primordialist vision of Estonian nation-state, commitment to a rigid procedure of naturalization and Estonian language requirements for employees of both public and private sector.

So far, no Estonian nation-wide party has elaborated special policy strategies with regard to minority issues. Nevertheless, the political practice of these parties with regard to ethnicity-related issues and tactics applied vis-à-vis the minority electorate allows to classify the major Estonian political parties into three groups.

The first group is made up by right-wing parties characterized by a notably intransigent stance with regard to language, citizenship and other ethnicity-related issues. Many provisions of rigid legislation on citizenship and language were initiated by the political leadership of these parties, the Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica.

The second group is represented by parties whose attitude towards the issues relevant for non-Estonian population was more pragmatic than ideological. These parties, the Social Democratic Party and right-wing liberal Reform Party, demonstrated consideration of the non-Estonian electorate, as Russian members of these parties managed to constitute Russian factions. The Reform Party was the first to create Russian faction, which elaborated the Program on National Minorities. However, the program did not have any effect on the party’s policies. Instead, its chairman, Andrus Ansip, Estonian prime minister since 2005, prioritized an appeal to ethnic Estonian electorate on issues of inter-communal discord: the removal of the Bronze Soldier monument from the center of Tallinn, initiated by Ansip, caused spontaneous mass protests of the non-Estonian population. Likewise, the leader of the Social-Democratic Party, Jüri Pihl, served as minister of interior during the events of April, 2007 that saw an excessive use of power against the protesters on the part of the police. The limited capacity of the Reform Party’s Russian deputies to represent the interests
of non-Estonian population became evident during the voting on the Law on Military Cemeteries in the Parliament on January 10, 2007, that laid ground for the April events: the law, opposed by a vast majority of Estonia's Russians, was passed with the superiority of two votes, while two Russian members of the Reform Party did not participate at the session. Thus, the political practice of this group of parties revealed that their orientation toward minority electorate was limited.

The last category comprises parties that consistently emphasize their commitment to the defense of national minority rights, seriously counting on non-Estonian electorate. The Estonian Centre Party (Eesti Keskerakond, KE) is the only nation-wide party that managed to build a stable relationship with the Russian electorate: electoral results and voting preference studies show that Russian voters constitute its crucial support base. The KE exploited the Russian electorate's disapproval of right-wing parties, presenting itself as the only alternative. Another step that showed a strong KE's orientation toward non-Estonian electorate was the cooperation agreement between the KE and Russia's ruling “United Russia” party, signed in 2004, and disapproved by other Estonian parties.

As a party-successor of the Estonian Popular Front which contained many adherents of ethnocentric vision of the state among its members, the KE did not have any alternative strategy on ethnicity-related issues. Instead, despite a more moderate position on many issues (such as the removal of the monument from the center of Tallinn or introducing the Estonian language of instruction in Russian gymnasiuums), the stance of the KE was in line with that of the right-wing forces. Balancing between the Estonian and the Russian electorate, the KE performed the mitigating function in critical situations of confrontation between the government and the Russian community (as it did during the “Bronze Soldier” crisis).

Nevertheless, the KE managed to create an image of the only Estonian party favourable for political and social advancement of non-Estonians within the society. Unlike other nation-wide parties, the KE has been consistently co-opting non-Estonian cadres and charging them with high offices. Other major Estonian parties, Reform Party,
Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica, manifested reluctance to accept this strategy.

The political practice of Russian members of Estonian nationwide parties showed that program guidelines of those parties allowed them to manage minority-related issues only in limited degree, while not a single party had special programs dedicated to minority issues. Besides, all Estonian nationwide parties, including the KE, had very few non-Estonian members of governing boards, where the real political power within these parties was concentrated. Russian deputies of the KE and the Reform Party had experience of initiating legislative decisions in the spheres of language, education and culture. Their experience showed that issues relevant for non-Estonians could be only promoted through constant commitment of non-Estonian members to press the party leadership for concrete policy measures aimed at retaining the minority electorate. E.g., in the Riigikogu of the 9th convocation, a set of liberalizing amendments to legislation on minority-related matters (language, primary education, citizenship, etc.), initiated by Russian deputies of the KE, was adopted in 2001-2003, after the KE entered the ruling coalition. In contrast, despite the verbal commitment of the KE to preserve Russian-language education in gymnasiaums, made on the eve of the 2007 elections, the party did not introduce any motion during the parliamentary debates on the Law on Primary School and Gymnasium (entered into force in January, 2010). Likewise, having a majority in Tallinn City Assembly, the KE did not use available opportunities to voice the question.

The attitudes of the Estonian political parties on ethnicity-related issues proved to be in line with public opinion of the majority community. Surveys show a clear wish of the minority community to be recognized as equal partner in the decision making process11. In 2007, 82 % of non-Estonians believed their involvement in economics and politics would benefit the country’s development, arguing that Estonian politicians should take their opinions more into account. However, only 28 % of Estonians were disposed in favour of such aspirations of non-Estonians; instead, 34 % of Estonians believed that participation of non-Estonians in the political and economic life would rather harm
Contrasting stances of the two communities on numerous issues determined opposing approaches adopted by political parties when appealing to Estonian or non-Estonian community, and a weak social basis for a civic approach, cutting across ethnic lines. Most importantly, due to the reluctance of all the major nation-wide political forces to recognize distinct collective interests of Estonia’s sizeable Russophone community and to adopt concrete measures aimed at enforcing its equal participation in economic, political and social spheres, the privileged position of the majority nation was never compensated by any practices of positive discrimination toward ethnic minorities.

Sociological surveys allow to distinguish the following most important issues for the Russian community: equal opportunities in social, economic and political life, the status of the Russian language, availability and quality of Russian-language education, collective presence in Estonia’s public life. The problems of the Russian population laid not only in the field of political, linguistic and cultural rights, but subsequently had social and economic repercussions. Language policy became a tool of socio-economic stratification along ethnic lines. Researches showed that Estonian citizenship and language proficiency did not create equal social and political opportunities for non-Estonians. As a result, the value of Estonian citizenship in Estonia’s Russians’ eyes decreased drastically: the percentage of those willing to become Estonian citizens fell from 74% in 2005 to 33% in 2009. Simultaneously, Russians manifested an especially low degree of trust toward the Government (9%), Parliament (7%), and President (14%).

With an increasing alienation of Estonia’s Russian community from social, economic and political life not a single nation-wide party or government institution had a strategy aimed at overcoming ethnically-based cleavages. Instead, state integration programs were focused mostly on Estonian language learning. Nevertheless, available research data show that strategies aimed at basing the civic public space on the Estonian language were doomed to failure. Moreover, no official public space existed for the dialogue between the Estonian
state and the non-Estonian community. After the unilateral decision of the government to relocate the Bronze Soldier’s monument from the center of Tallinn, a spontaneous mobilization of Russian population in defense of a symbol of its group identity in April 2007 became the most eloquent manifestation that for one third of Estonia’s population, channels of participation in the political system and the process of making decisions concerning them proved to be inefficient. Accordingly, a considerable degree of closure of the system of political opportunities, characterized by a consensus of nation-wide political spectrum on the main principles of minority-related politics, prompted the non-Estonian community to look for non-institutionalized forms of political participation.

SERBIA’S HUNGARIANS IN THE POST-YUGOSLAV POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE: THE ROLE OF NATION-WIDE POLITICAL CLEAVAGES

In the wake of the SFRY disintegration, political divisions with regard to democratic definition of the nation’s identity, character of the Serbian state and its political arrangement were affected by historically inherited ethnic cleavages. Ethnic homogenization cut across other social cleavages, with one half of the society (49.7 %) manifesting commitment to nation as a primary identity framework. Ethnification of political culture and ethno-nationalization of politics determined that the “ethnic vs civic” cleavage appeared to be the most salient one on the Serbian political arena.

The genesis of the Serbian political scene with regard to the implications for the situation and political life of national minorities can be divided in two phases.

The first, “defensive”, phase lasted from the beginning of disintegration of Yugoslavia until the fall of the Milošević’s regime. With the introduction of the multi-party system in Serbia in 1990, Hungarians, the only national community in Vojvodina that had sufficient demographic resources for a successful ethnopolitical mobilization, articulated their political claims in the framework of the Democratic
Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMDK)19. This party suggested a concept of minority autonomy as a “survival strategy” for the Hungarian national community in the context of the centralization of the Serbian state in the 1990s, with the decreased role of the provincial institutions, which led to the deconstruction of the socialist-era legislative and institutional framework of nationalities’ rights protection20. Its impact on every-day practice of implementation of minority rights created a pronounced feeling of relative deprivation among Vojvodina Hungarians, aggravated by an overall deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in Vojvodina in the 1990s: military draft and emigration of Hungarians from Vojvodina, influx of refugees from the war-torn parts of former Yugoslavia, changes of ethno-demographic structure of Vojvodina and changes of ethno-psychological atmosphere. Feelings of a rapid deterioration of minority rights situation were accompanied by a drastic re-orientation of ruling elites towards the concept of majority nation-state, advocated by the dominant parties Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS); Yugoslav United Left (JUL); Serbian Radical Party (SRS).

In the said period, no special mechanisms of minority proportional representation existed in government institutions. Existing laws were ethnically neutral: they prohibited discrimination; minorities could found political organizations and nominate candidates for elections under equal conditions. The political majority used to be formed within ethnic majority that was less sensitive to minority needs.

During the 1990s, Hungarian political parties were in opposition on the republican level. The VMDK largely abstained from cooperation with the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, being part of all anti-Milošević coalitions since 1992 till 2000.

The 2000 elections marked a watershed between the two eras characterized by different patterns of interaction of the Hungarian parties with nation-wide political forces. The following period saw the disappearance of the perceived existential threat for the Hungarian minority and brought about concerns about a better life quality. After 2000, a substantially different kind of nation-wide parties (Democratic Party, DS; G17+; League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, LSV;
Liberal Democratic Party, LDP), employing a different kind of rhetoric, succeeded in attracting minority voters, as they came up with electoral programs focused on socio-economic issues.

Over the two decades, the Hungarian community in Serbia manifested a high degree of homogenization in its political preferences. The patterns of its electoral behaviour can be summarized, defining an average Hungarian voter as oscillating between the appeals of ethnic Hungarian parties and nation-wide political forces. Those nation-wide parties that enjoyed support of the Hungarian electorate manifested the following features: a political rhetoric emphasizing a civic dimension of the Serbian state contrary to an ethnic one; commitment to Serbia’s European integration; and support to Vojvodina’s autonomy.

The European dimension appeared to be a fundamental factor determining electoral preferences of Vojvodina Hungarians. In nationwide elections, the Hungarian electorate, given its share in the total population of Serbia, having to join one of the two rival options (pro-European and anti-European), consistently preferred the pro-European one. The Hungarians massively voted for the Ante Marković’s Union of Reform Forces in 1990; for the presidential candidate Ivan Đurić in 1990; for Milan Panić against S. Milošević in 1992; for the coalition “Zajedno” against the left coalition in 1996; they directly contributed to Boris Tadić’s victory over Tomislav Nikolić in the 2004 presidential elections, and contributed significantly to B. Tadić’s victory in the 2008 presidential elections21.

The ideological cleavage along the line of “national vs civic” orientation of nation-wide party program goals and political agenda appears to be fundamental both for the national minority electorate’s perspective and for political tactics employed by the Hungarian parties22. The parties belonging to the first group had only limited appeal for minority voters. Beside parties that prioritized the electoral appeal to the majority nation (Serbian Radical Party, SRS; Serbian Progressive Party, SNS), this category included the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the main protagonist of centralist policies in the 1990s, and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS).
The second group is represented by political parties that distanced themselves from any kind of ethnically-defined rhetoric and framed their political identity, programs and membership in civic terms, cutting across ethnic lines and national differences. This approach helped the biggest party of this group, the ruling DS, to built its political identity on the discourse of overcoming the legacy of the 1990s and on the commitment to the path of European integration. European dimension appeared as an additional incentive for improving minority-related legislation (the Law on National Councils of National Minorities, passed in 2009), as well as timely responding to inter-ethnic incidents. Another party of this group, G17+, gave proof of its minority strategy, achieving an exceptional success in the 2008 local elections in the Hungarian-populated Ada municipality and in the Slovak-populated municipality of Bački Petrovac. Parties of Vojvodina autonomist and regionalist orientation are particularly characteristic of cross-cutting approach to ethnicity. The main protagonist of Vojvodina regionalism, the LSV, beside having minority representatives among its MPs, attempted to elaborate minority policies (party committee for human and minority rights).

The cooperation of the Hungarian parties with nation-wide political forces was conditioned by limited demographic resources of its electorate. Since the 2000 parliamentary elections, the Hungarian parties employed tactics of political manoeuvring, running in coalitions with nation-wide parties (DS since 2000, LSV in 2003). They had an opportunity to participate in the ruling majority and to shape minority-related policies on republican, provincial and local levels. Both in the 1990s and in the post-Milošević period, minority parties in the republican Parliament were often in a position to influence and to condition the decision-making process, balancing between the opposed forces.

A reorientation of the Hungarian elite towards civic concepts was marked by the support of the major Vojvodina Hungarian party, the Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ) to the Statute of Vojvodina, as it placed the Hungarian community in the dimension of citizens of Vojvodina. The VMSZ, actively participating
in creating the Statute of Autonomy, gave proof of recognizing the Province as a primary framework of articulation of the Hungarian community’s interests.

The redefinition of Vojvodina’s competences within Serbia is a crucial dimension of political changes of the beginning of the 21st century in Serbia, relevant to the situation of Hungarian minority.

The practice of the first decade of the 21st century showed that the provincial institutions proved to be more sensitive and efficient in promoting the rights of national minorities. With the transfer of powers to provincial institutions in the spheres of culture, education, official use of languages and alphabets, public media, the level of minority rights protection was further raised. The role of the Hungarian elite is notable: in the said period, the VMSZ was coalition partner in the provincial government for several mandates. Hungarians were adequately represented in the provincial institutions on relevant offices with respect to their share in the population.

The restoration of Vojvodina’s autonomy allowed to reanimate the set of collective political and cultural rights and to enshrine the legal framework of minority rights protection in the Statute of Autonomy of Vojvodina. The Statute reconfirmed the status of Hungarian as one of the official languages in Vojvodina and established modern principles of minority rights protection: proportional representation, irreversibility of level of individual and collective human and minority rights. The Statute of Autonomy was jointly drafted by the DS, the LSV and the Hungarian Coalition. The impact of the Hungarian Coalition is visible in those parts of the Statute that regulate political representation of national communities in the provincial institutions.

In psychological sense, the adoption of the Statute of Vojvodina implied the legalization of Vojvodina’s specificity. In the process of European integration, Vojvodina autonomist political forces (LSV) pretended to present Vojvodina regionalism as Serbia’s locomotive on its way to Europe. In this context, Vojvodina’s multicultural profile was used as one of legitimating reasons for politically institutionalizing its peculiarity. Therefore, the structure of political cleavages in Serbia opened opportunities for the cooperation of the Hungarian political
community with both provincial and nation-wide political forces in two interrelated dimensions: the process of expanding the Vojvodina’s autonomy, and the process of Serbia’s integration into the EU.

In the new political circumstances marked by the liberalization of ethno-political atmosphere, decreasing attractiveness of the appeal of the Hungarian parties came to the fore during the 2008 local elections, when the Hungarian Coalition showed weak electoral results in urban areas. The existence of nation-wide parties, whose political identity was framed in civic terms, helped to canalize the new preferences of the Hungarian population. At the same time, the commitment of the VMSZ to establish a communication with the nation-wide political forces on the basis of common program goals conditioned the rapprochement of the moderate part of the Hungarian elite with the civically-oriented nation-wide parties on the basis of civic values, accompanied by a slight re-definition of the VMSZ’s identity as a civic regionalist party. Therefore, the creation of a political alliance on a shared trans-ethnic basis showed signs of overcoming political divisions along ethnic cleavages.

CONCLUSION

The comparison of the two case studies, characterized by contrasting configurations of the nation-wide political spectrum, showed that the political scene of the host state, affected by an important cleavage or polarization of attitudes of nation-wide forces with regard to the fundamental directions of the country’s development, is more likely to expand the political opportunity structure in terms of inclusivity towards national minorities, alternatives available both for ethnic minority parties (in terms of tactical choices) and for minority electorate (in terms of canalizing its claims), when compared to a political scene characterized by a general consensus of nation-wide parties on the fundamental directions of the country’s development.

Both case studies revealed a strong correlation between the degree of pluralization of the political spectrum of the host state and the ability of the respective minority political communities to expand
the institutionalized structures of minority political participation. The case of Estonia’s Russians provides an important example of how a general consensus of nation-wide political forces on the main principles of minority-related policies (including citizenship, language and integration policies), based on a majority-centered vision of nation-state, can reduce inclusivity vis-à-vis minority claims and the overall efficiency of the channels of minority political participation. Besides, the Estonian case study expands the initial theoretical framework, revealing the importance of prevailing attitudes of the majority group towards political participation of minorities as an important element of the political opportunity structure: the prevalence of reserved attitudes of the ethnic majority group towards the minority participation can significantly reduce the opportunity structure for minorities, as the majority attitudes affect political tactics of nation-wide political forces.

Serbia, with its extremely polarized nation-wide political spectrum, provides an opposite example. There, national minority political forces managed to build a stable relation of cooperation with nation-wide political forces that are inclusive toward minority identity and effectively contributed to establishing a complex and balanced system of minority political participation. Extreme heterogeneity of the Serbian nation-wide political arena expanded the political opportunity structure, available for the Hungarian community, as it created favourable conditions for Vojvodina becoming a regionally and institutionally defined political opportunity framework for minority political participation. Besides, the existence of politically allied civically-defined nation-wide parties and moderate ethnic Hungarian party created a balanced civically-based system of channels of articulation of political claims for Hungarian voters, largely adapted for the articulation of both ethnically-motivated and ethnically-neutral (social and economic) expectations of the Hungarian population. Therefore, the example of Vojvodina Hungarians shows that existence of both cross-cutting (nation-wide parties, regionalist movements etc.) and ethnically defined (ethnic parties) channels of articulation of group interests, which compete over appealing to the same minority interests, contributes to
the stabilization of minority political participation within the POS, political integration of the minority community, and a shift of ethnic parties towards more inclusive (civic) identity.

Beside nation-wide political cleavages, other factors should be considered in this respect, including the strength of ethnic parties and the degree of popular support toward various claims of minority politicians. In both cases under analysis, these factors significantly complemented the effect of the layout of nation-wide political spectrum on the degree of inclusivity of the political system toward minorities, where the structure of nation-wide political cleavages proved to be of crucial importance.

REFERENCES AND NOTES


2 Other elements of the POS include formal institutional structures (institutional make-up of the stable elements of the political system, such as parliament, public administration, or other more direct democratic procedures); prevailing informal strategies in dealing with social movements (strategies members of the political system typically employ to deal with social movements).


5 It would be beyond the scope of this article to quote the abundant literature dedicated to Estonian ethnopolitics. In the context of the present analysis, the most relevant works include: Smith, G. The Ethnic Democracy Thesis and the Citizenship Question in Estonia and Latvia // Nationalities Papers, 1996, 24 (2), p. 199–216; Pettai, V.; Hallik, K. Understanding Processes of Ethnic Control: Segmentation, Dependency and Co-optation in Post-Communist Estonia // Nations and Nationalism, 8 (4), 2002, p. 505–529; Pettai, V. Emerging Ethnic


7 In the period following the restoration of Estonian statehood, non-Estonian population showed a considerable degree of political activity: in local elections where non-citizens have the right to vote, the turnout in 1993 and 1996 in East Viru County was higher than the Estonian average. Later elections saw a decline in voter turnout among non-Estonians.


9 The preamble to the Estonian Constitution establishes a notably strong link between ethnicity and the state, as it reads: “the state [...] shall guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation, language and culture through the ages”.


This chapter draws on the primary sources collected during the interviews of leaders of Serbian political parties in Vojvodina in 2009.


SANTRAUKA

NACIONALINIS POLITINIŲ PARTIJŲ SPEKTRAS KAIP ETNINIŲ MAŽUMŲ POLITINIŲ GALIMYBIŲ STRUKTŪROS ELEMENTAS: ESTIJOS RUSŲ IR SERBIJOS VENGRŲ ATVEJŲ STUDIJA

Reikšminiai žodžiai: tautinių mažumų politika, tautinių mažumų politinis dalyvavimas, tautinių mažumų politinių galimybių struktūra, etninės partijos, etnopolitika.

Remiantis Estijos rusų ir Serbijos vengrų atvejų studijų teikiamais pavyzdžiais, straipsnyje nagrinėjama, kaip pokomunistinių valstybių vidinių politinių takoskyrų struktūra paveikė šalies etninių mažumų politinio dalyvavimo ypatumus ir politinės sistemos atvirumą mažumų dalyvavimui bei jų keliamų reikalavimų. Taikant politinių galimybių struktūros teorinį modelį, nacionalinio masto politinių partijų spektro susiskaidymas į politines pozicijas pagal pagrindines šalies vystymosi kryptis yra analizuojamas kaip esminis etninių mažumų politinių galimybių struktūros elementas. Keliamą hipotezę, kad politinis spektras, pasižymintis didelė poliarizacija esminiais šalies raidos klausimais, sąlygoja palankesnes galimybes politinės sistemos atvirumui (kuris skatintų etninių mažumų dalyvavimą ir padėtų įgyvendinti jų kolektyvinius interesus) negu politinis spektras į kurį įeinančios partijos sutaria dėl esminių nacionalinės politikos kryptių.