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Dovilė Stumbrytė

**KINIJOS SULAIKYMO STRATEGIJA JAV UŽSIENIO POLITIKOJE B.
OBAMOS PREZIDENTAVIMO LAIKOTARPIU**

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Vadovas (-ė) dr. Gerda Jakštaitė

Apginta prof. dr. Šarūnas Liekis

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SANTRAUKA

Magistro darbe analizuojamas sulaikymo strategijos taikymas Kinijos Liaudies Respublikos (toliau – Kinija, KLR) atžvilgiu Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų (toliau – JAV) užsienio politikoje abiejų Barack Obama kadencijų metu. Kinija dėl sparčiai kylančios ekonominės, politinės ir karinės galios yra laikoma potencialu konkurentu JAV įtakai Azijos-Ramiojo vandenyno regione, todėl siekiant sumažinti Kinijos įtaką regione JAV turi peržiūrėti savo užsienio politikos tikslus, prioritetus ir metodus jiems pasiekti. Vienas iš tokių metodų įgalinantis pasiekti geresnių rezultatų konkuruojant su kita valstybe yra Sulaikymo strategija.

Daugiau nei dešimt metų JAV užsienio politika buvo sutelkta ties Viduriniaisiais Rytai ir daugiausiai dėmesio buvo skiriama karui su terorizmu Afganistane ir Irake. Ilgi nesėkmingo karų metai lėmė JAV visuomenės pritarimo šiems karams smukimą, o prasidėjusi krizė tik dar labiau išvargino žmones, trokštančius ekonominių pereinamųjų, o ne karų. Karas Afganistane ir Irake išsekino JAV ekonomiškai ir moraliai, bei pakenkė Jungtinių Valstijų prestižui pasaulyje. Prezidentas Barack Obama turėjo būti nauju gaivaus vėjo gūsiu JAV, kuris sugražintų Jungtinėms Valstijoms prarastą prestižą pasaulinėje arenoje ir padėtų stabilizuoti ekonominę ir karinę galią išbalansuotą dviejų nuostolingų karų ir Pasaulinės ekonominės krizės.

Prezidentu tapus Barack Obama'ui buvo susidurta su naujos politikos ir saugumo strategijos poreikiu. Nors daugiau nei dešimtmetį Jungtinės Valstijos buvo susitelkusios ties Viduriniaisiais Rytai, šis regionas kol kas neformuoja pasaulio politikos ir yra ekonomiškai silpnas. Pasaulio politikos ir ekonomikos centrai vis labiau įsitvirtina Rytų Azijoje ir Azijos-Ramiojo vandenyno regione. Kylančios naujos galybės, tokios kaip Indijos Respublika, Indonezijos Respublika ir, ypač, Kinijos Liaudies Respublika (toliau – Kinija, KLR) siekia įtvirtinti savo pozicijas regione ir plėsti galią tarptautinėje arenoje. Tai ypač akivaizdu žvelgiant į Kiniją - sparčiai auganti ekonomika, didėjanti politinė galia regione ir intensyvus kariuomenės modernizavimas lemia augančią Kinijos politinę, ekonominę ir karinę konkurenciją Jungtinėms Amerikos Valstijoms. Ekonominės, politinės ir karinės Kinijos galios plėtra yra ypač neraminanti ir kelia nesaugumo jausmą ne tik regione esančioms JAV sąjungininkėms, bet ir mažina JAV politinį, ekonominę ir karinį dominavimą regione.

Panašaus konkurento JAV neturėjo nuo Šaltojo karo laikų. Šaltojo karo metu Sovietų Sąjungos grėsmę mažinti padėjo Sulaikymo strategija, kuri tapo JAV politikos kertiniu akmeniu. Sulaikymo strategija pasiteisino Šaltojo karo metu, tad galėtų būti pritaikyta ir JAV užsienio politikos tikslų įgyvendinimui Azijos-Ramiojo vandenyno regione. Tačiau kyla klausimas ar Sulaikymo strategija yra taikoma JAV užsienio politikoje Kinijos atžvilgiu ir koku mastu.

Objektas: Sulaikymo strategijos taikymas Kinijos atžvilgiu JAV užsienio politikoje Barack Obama prezidentavimo metu.

Darbo tikslas yra išanalizuoti kaip sulaikymo strategija buvo taikoma Kinijos Liaudies Respublikai Jungtinių Valstijų užsienio politikoje Barack Obama kadencijų metu.

Tiksliui įgyvendinti keliami šie darbo uždaviniai:

1. išanalizuoti sulaikymo strategijos bruožus neorealizmo kontekste;
2. išskirti pagrindines JAV-Kinijos dvišalių santykių kaitos nuo Antro Pasaulinio karo pabaigos priežastis;
3. atskleisti oficialiai deklaruojamą JAV poziciją Kinijos atžvilgiu;
4. išanalizuoti Sulaikymo strategijos taikymą Kinijos atžvilgiu politikos, karinio saugumo ir ekonomikos srityse.

Siekiant įgyvendinti išsikeltus uždavinius analizuojami pagrindiniai oficialūs JAV dokumentai formuojantys JAV užsienio politiką – kasmetinės „State of the Union“ kalbos, sakomos JAV prezidento ir „Nacionalinė saugumo strategija“ (National Security Strategy). Barack Obama abiejų savo kadencijų metu paskelbė dvi „Nacionalines saugumo strategijas“ – 2011 ir 2015 metais. Darbe taip pat naudojama atvejo analizė ir lyginamoji analizė. Atvejo analizė padeda atskleisti Sulaikymo strategijos naudojimą Kinijos atžvilgiu, o lyginamoji analizė padeda atskleisti Sulaikymo strategijos bruožų skirtumus Šaltojo karo metu ir jos taikymo Kinijos atžvilgiu Obama kadencijų metu.

Sulaikymo strategija buvo sukurta realizmo kontekste ir atspindi pagrindinius realizmo ir, ypač, neorealizmo bruožus. Sulaikymo strategija yra skirta išlaikyti galios balansą didinant turimus pajėgumus, kuriant ir stiprinant sąjungas ir formuojant tarptautinę sistemą joje pritaikant sau naudingiausias vertybes. Pagrindiniai Sulaikymo strategijos bruožai yra turimos galios didinimas, taip siekiant atgrasinti potencialius priešininkus ar konkurentus, savo pozicijų stiprinimas sudarant sąjungas su vertybiškai artimais partneriais ir skleidžiant sau palankias vertybias, tokias kaip demokratija ir laisvos rinkos ekonomika, taip formuojant palankiausią tarptautinę aplinką.

Šaltojo Karo metu ši strategija buvo efektyviai naudojama SSRS atžvilgiu. Tuo tarpu Kinijos atžvilgiu Sulaikymo strategija pradėta taikyti ne iš karto. Po Antro Pasaulinio karo pabaigos, Kinija buvo laikoma per daug silpna ir susiskaldžiu, kad galėtų kelti realią grėsmę JAV interesams. Kiniją nuvertino ne tik JAV, bet ir Sovietų Sąjunga, kuri Kiniją laikė ne tik sąjungininke kovoje su

JAV, bet ir konkurente kovoje dėl vienvaldžio komunistinio pasaulio lyderio titulo. Sulaikymo strategija pradėta taikyti Kinijai dalyvavus Korėjos kare ir palaikius komunistinį judėjimą Vietnamo kare. Tai parodė, kad Kinija gali būti pavojinga jėga, galinčia lemti jėgų pesvarą vienai arba kitai puisei. Siekiant pasinaudoti Kinija kaip galima atsvara SSRS Azijoje, JAV siekė pagerinti santykius su KLR. Prezidento Nixon vizitas Kinijoje buvo vienas iš pirmų žingnių pragmatizmu paremtuose santykiuose. Kinijai taip pat buvo naudinga pagerinti santykius su JAV ir taip sumažinti SSRS keliamą grėsmę. Šie pragmatizmu paremti santykiai, net ir išgyvendami nuosmukio laikotarpius dėl nesutarimų Taivano klausimu ir žmogaus teisių srityje, vis labiau tvirtėjo, o pasibaigus Šaltajam karui šiuos santykius stiprino tvirtėjantys ekonominiai ryšiai ir gaunama abipusė ekonominė nauda. Tačiau greitas ekonominis Kinijos augimas lėmė Kinijos politinių ambicijų augimą ir kariuomenės finansavimo didinimą. Tai pradėjo kelti įtampą regione ir mažinti JAV įtaką Rytų Azijoje. Vis dažniau pasitaikančios Kinijos ir JAV sąjungininkių, tokių kaip Japonija ir Pietų Korėja, teritorinių konfliktų eskalacijos paskatino Obamos administraciją ieškoti naujo požiūrio ir formuoti naują politiką Kinijos atžvilgiu.

Viešai Obamos deklaruojama JAV politika Kinijos atžvilgiu neatspindi praktinės politikos taikymo. Savo kasmetinėse „State of the Union“ kalbose Barack Obama Kiniją mini tik kaip konkurentą ekonomikos srityje ir partnerį taršos mažinimo srityje. Net ir Nacionalinio saugumo strategijose Kinija nėra įvardinama kaip grėsmė JAV saugumui, tačiau minima kaip viena iš kylančių pasaulio galių, kuri ateityje vis labiau prisidės prie tarptautinės sistemos formavimo. Oficialioje retorikoje vengiama kontraversalių pasisakymų ir nereikalingų provokacijų siekiant išlaikyti pozityvius ir konstruktyvius santykius su Kinija, tačiau net ir oficialioje retorikoje galima rasti sulaikymo strategijos bruožų, tokių kaip skatinimas stiprinti sąjungas Azijos-Ramiojo vandenyno regione, plėsti laisvosios prekybos sutarčių, į kurias Kinija nėra įtraukta, skaičių, didinti karinius pajėgumus Azijos-Ramiojo vandenyno regione.

Pagrindinius praktinio Sulaikymo strategijos taikymo aspektus galima išskirti trijose sferose: politinėje, karinėje ir ekonominėje. Politinėje sferoje Sulaikymo strategija ryškiausiai matoma naujosios JAV užsienio politikos „Rebalance“ arba „Pivot“ formavime. Padidėjęs JAV politikų dėmesys ir naujos strategijos formavimas rodo Azijos-Ramiojo vandenyno svarbą JAV užsienio politikai. „Grįžimas“ į šį regioną po daugiau nei dešimt metų trukusio susitelkimo į Artimuosius Rytus rodo JAV politikos krypties keitimą ir naujų prioritetų įvertinimą. Karinėje srityje, JAV siekia dislokuoti daugiau karių Azijos-Ramiojo vandenyno regione, stiprinti ten turimas karines bazines, didinti karių skaičių ir taip stiprinti savo sąjungininkų saugumą. Taip pat ypač svarbiu Sulaikymo strategijos Kinijos atžvilgiu įrankiu tampa Azijos-Ramiojo vandenyno šalių laisvosios prekybos sutartis (Trans-Pacific Partnership). Pasirašius ir įgyvendinus šią sutartį Azijos-Ramiojo vandenyno šalys, kurios sudaro 30% pasaulio prekybos apimčių, taptų didžiausios prekybos sutarties

narėmis ir galėtų vykdyti prekybą didžiausioje laisvos prekybos zonoje. Kinija šiai sutartčiai nepriklauso, siekiant ekonomiškai mažinti Kinijos augimo galimybes ir jos ekonominės galios plėtrą ne tik regione, bet ir visame pasaulyje.

Sulaikymo strategija yra vienas ryškiausių neorealizmo pavyzdžių, kuria siekiama išlaikyti galios balansą ir silpninti konkurentų galimybes. Po sėkmingo Sulaikymo strategijos taikymo Šaltojo karo metu, šiandien galima matyti Sulaikymo strategijos taikymą JAV užsienio politikoje Kinijos Liaudies Respublikos atžvilgiu, tačiau ar ši strategija pasiteisins ir ar nauja „Pivot“ politika bus veiksminga bus galima spręsti tik ateityje.

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ABSTRACT

The master thesis analyses the use of Containment Strategy towards People Republic of China in USA foreign policy during both Barack Obama presidencies. The Object is the Containment strategy of the United States of America towards People's Republic of China during both terms of B. Obama presidency.

The aim is to reveal how the Containment strategy was used in U.S. foreign policy towards People's Republic of China during both Presidential terms of Barack Obama.

The goals are:

1. To analyze the features of Containment strategy in the context of neorealism theory;
2. To present the main reasons for a change in U.S. policy towards PRC since the end of Second World War;
3. To reveal the official position towards China in U.S. foreign policy in both terms of Barack Obama;
4. To analyze the use of Containment strategy in U.S. foreign policy towards China in military, economic and political spheres.

It should include the following

Containment Strategy is based on neorealism concept of power balance. In order to balance the power states that are using Containment have gather military strength, strengthen their alliances and shape the international arena according to their values.

This was successfully done during the Cold War and USA is trying to apply modified version of Containment Strategy towards the rising economic, political and military power of China. Since the end of II World War U.S.-China relationship varied according to the situation and the needs of both parties. Wright now the official position towards China is more neutral than negative, however in practice U.S. is implementing the Containment strategy in political, economic and military spheres.

INTRODUCTION

Cold war was one of the main features of the twentieth century that changed the course of history and marked new development in the world order. It was one of the reasons that helped United States of America to become the sole leading power in the world. The tension between two superpowers ended in USSR's lost leaving the only superpower to shape the world order in the end of the end of 20th century and the beginning of 21st century. The new question was how this new super power which became even a hyper power will use its status and all the possibilities that comes with it. Will there be other states that could challenge the new hegemon. Rising Japan was seen as a potential rival but 20 years of economic stagnation and lack of political and military ambitions made this possibility less likely. The end of the 20th century did not show any signs of a possible rival to USA domination.

The 21th century brought new challenges in a form of growing economic and military power of China (People Republic of China – PRC). The rapid economic growth, immense human resources and growing political ambitions made China a possible rival for U.S. authority in Asia-Pacific region. The possibilities for further economic development and the growing political ambitions might encourage China to broaden its influence to other regions as well. According to realist theory a state in order to survive has to strengthen its power – economic and military – and prevent its rivals from doing the same. These methods have been used during the Cold War to prevent USSR from getting too much power and influence in strategically important areas for U.S. domination. If these methods have worked during the Cold War against a state as strong and unpredictable as USSR then it might be possible to use the methods to hold and control the rise of China.

The strategy used in Cold War era that changed the course of events and the future of U.S. foreign policy was Containment strategy. The conditions of using this strategy against China are different and as a whole PRC is a totally different state from USSRS however Containment strategy is very flexible, it has changed and has been improved several times through the XX century. Possibility to adapt makes it easier to apply this strategy in different situations. The question here is whether U.S is using this strategy in its foreign policy towards PRC and whether it is successful.

Barack Obama has declared that U.S. is turning its attention back to Asia-Pacific region. This so called back to “Pivot” politics is supposed to consolidate and strengthen U.S. positions in Asia-Pacific. The strengthening of its presents shows the importance given to this region and one of the reasons for that is the growing strength and ambitions of China. Being one of the most economically and politically dynamic regions Asia-Pacific has the potential to grow even more and become one of the leading centers in decision making in world politics and Asia-Pacific is already

showing its capabilities with the growing influence of China. In order to keep their position United States of America have to rethink its foreign policy in Asia-Pacific and find the means to strengthen their own position and weaken the position of its rivals. Containment Strategy is one of the means to reach their goals. This paper analyses the implementation of Containment strategy towards Peoples Republic of China during both – first and second – Barack Obama’s terms in the office and its efficiency.

The problem is that the U.S. reaction to the rise of China might predetermine China’s position in the region as well as in the international arena. So it is important to distinguish main features U.S. foreign policy towards China, to examine if the policy used is effective and analyze its possible effect on China and its foreign policy.

The Object: Containment strategy of the United States of America towards People’s Republic of China during both terms of B. Obama presidency.

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The hypothesis: The more power People’s Republic of China projects over the Asia-Pacific region the stronger Containment Strategy will be applied towards it by the United States of America.

Research methods. The content document analysis of official documents is used in this paper to show the official position of the USA and the change in the rhetoric towards China. It is also used to compliment systematic analysis method which is used in order to analyze the complicity of USA foreign policy, the use of Containment strategy and the effect it has. Also the comparative method is used to disclose differences and similarities between U.S. Containment strategy used towards PRC during Cold War and in the time of Obama Presidency. The main criterions in comparing the use of Containment Strategy during Cold War and during Obama presidency are the strengthening of alliances, usage of economic means to constrain the growth of economic power of the rivaling state and the military capacities and presence in the region.

Research source base. Containment Strategy and its usages during the Cold War has been widely analyzed. This research was based on one of the most influential books on Containment -John Lewis Gaddis *Strategies of Containment. The Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War.* J. L. Gaddis work is one of the most detailed analysis of the theory and practice of Containment strategy, its development during the Cold War period. This book is essential in order to understand the main features of Containment but it has its limits in analyzing Containment Strategy towards China. Containment strategy towards China has been analyzed in numerous publications but it has never been analyzed in such a detail as the Containment Strategy used towards USSR. Containment Strategy towards USSR was an official policy towards this communistic state, but in case of China Containment is not an official USA policy. This makes it harder to analyze and most of the scholars have analyzed only some features of applying the Containment Strategy – either economic (John Wong), political (Ashley J. Tellis), or military (Anna Kireeva).

To analyze the base of Containment Strategy famous “Long telegram” sent by George F. Kennan is being used as the beginning of the Containment strategy. In order to analyze Containment strategy in the context of realism theory the Hans J. Morgenthau *Politics Amongst Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace* and Barry Buzan’s *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in Post-Cold War Era* are being referred to. The official U.S. position during Obama presidency period is revealed through analysis of annual Information about the State of the Union given by the president Barack Obama since 2009, National Security Strategies prepared in 2010 and 2015. Also research papers and articles from scientific journals such as International Security, International Relations, Security Studies, China Economic Journal, Asia Pacific Business Review and others are being used. Internet resources are also used to get more up to date data.

Structure of the thesis. First part of the paper analyses Containment strategy in the context of realism theory showing its realist nature and revealing the main features of this strategy. Second part of the paper analyses the use of Containment strategy during The Cold War towards PRC. The third part examines the contemporary official position stated by President Barack Obama in the annual State of the Union Speech. In order to better understand the importance of these speeches to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy the most influential institutions in the formation of U.S. foreign policy are also being presented. The fourth chapter analyses the practical impact of the Containment strategy and its implementation on China in political, military and economic spheres.

1. CONTAINMENT STRATEGY IN THE CONTEXT OF REALISM

Since the end of 18th century realist theory was the dominant one in the analysis of international relations. Its dominance was based on ideas and works of classic political theory authors such as Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.¹ Realists see the state as the main player in the international relations and international system is analyzed through the actions of a state. The main objective of a state is to survive in an anarchic international system. Because there is no higher entity to enforce the law and order to the system states have to compete with other states for survivor and resources. For that states have to gather as much power as possible.² Realism theory focuses on analyzing the ways in which the state tries to maximize its power and satisfy its national interests. In order to survive and maintain its power in the system Anarchy, the State has to use force. These are the main concepts in classical realism.³

These principles of Classical Realism were more or less enough to analyze the international system during the Cold War but after the collapse of Soviet Union the changing situation in international community required changes in the theory that was supposed to explain it as well. So after the Cold War realism came back to the international arena in a form of Neorealism.⁴

1.1 Containment Strategy in the Context of Neorealism

Neorealism as a theory is still close to the Classical Realism in a way that it focuses on the State as the main actor and its survivor in anarchic international system. However it does not focus on maximizing ones power but stresses the necessity of balance of powers between states. In this way states can realize their interests without having to create additional tension in the system.⁵ Here state is still the main actor in international system and its survivor is the main objective but it is accomplished by taking into consideration a wider range of variables and also the context. The balance of power after it has been erupted can be restored or created a new. For restoring the balance of power states can become stronger by gathering more economic, political and, especially, military power or find allies to counterweight the power of the state that disrupted the power balance.⁶ Becoming more powerful militarily means armament and can create the arms race. Creating alliances can boost the power of one state or/and withhold the power of the ally from the rival state.

¹ Deudney, D. (2009). Left Behind: Neorealism's Truncated Contextual Materialism and Republicanism. *International Relations*, 23 (3). p. 342.

² Tarzi, Sh. M. (2004). Neorealism, Neoliberalism and the International System. *International Studies*, 41:1. p. 115.

³ Ibid, p. 114.

⁴ Telhami, Sh. (2002). Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy. *Security Studies*, 11:3. p. 160.

⁵ Ibid, p.163.

⁶ Morgenthau, H.J. (1993). *Politics Amongst Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: McGraw-Hill, P.191-92.

Anarchy in international system creates competitive political environment where rivalry between states for resources thrives and makes the states become focused on survival and security. In this kind of environment, according to classic realism, every state uses the self-help method and by using this method states create tension between each other and makes it more complicated to cooperate.⁷ In the system where self-help method is the predominant one the relationships between states are based on suspicions and competition. Containment strategy in this sense is understood as a version of self-help method which helps to stop the spread of rival powers and influence while at the same time trying to weaken the rival in a longer period of time.⁸

In international relations every state is trying to maximize its power. In order to do that they have to make risky decisions that might cause negative impacts as well as positive ones to the international position of the State or even become fatal to it. Power is needed to ensure survival and security of the State so in order to do that states have to use power to balance other powers and not to try to perceive a maximized gain.⁹ Neorealism stresses the importance of balance of powers that is most favorable to the State.

Because of the fragmentation of anarchic international system the absolute security is not possible. There is always a possibility of a threat or attack from other states. A state of absolute insecurity is also not possible because most of the States will try to ensure the security of their citizens and the implementation of their international interests.¹⁰

So there are three main aspects in the anarchic nature of international relations that are important for neorealist:

- The State is the main actor in international system. There is no stronger actor in the system than the State which is trying to get as much power as possible. Because of this aspiration for power states create the security problem for themselves and other players in the system.
- Although the security of the State is the main object it also depends on decisions made by other states in international arena. This creates the international security which determines the interdependence between states in international system and their sense of security.
- Sense of security is limited by the rivalry in international arena. The anarchic nature of the system determines that harmony between states

⁷ Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. p.105.

⁸ Waltz (1979). *Op. Cit.* p. 106.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Buzan, B. (1991). *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in Post-Cold War Era*. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf. p. 149.

and/or hegemonic security is temporary. States can never achieve full security, only partial one.¹¹

Containment strategy is one of Realist defense methods to attain and keep the balance of power. This method helps to maximize the benefits while ensuring national interests and security. This is done while decreasing the power of rivals and weakening their position in international system and at the same time trying to become more powerful themselves without creating the arms race.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 22-23.

1.2 Containment Strategy as a Mean for Security in International Arena

Theoretically states are equal units in international system but that is not true taking into consideration their abilities and capacities.¹² According to military and economy capacity states can be strong powers or weak powers. A strong state is not necessary a strong power. The strength of the state is determined by its long history during which the state had the opportunity and time to consolidate its system and institutions. The main threats to a socio-politically strong state comes from outside that is - from anarchic international system and the relations with other, mostly neighboring, states.¹³ For weak states threats can come from inside as much as from outside. Weak states are not capable of consolidating the political system of the state and in order to maintain domestic power these states tend to use violence. These actions tend to provoke protests from the citizens and opposition, upheavals, guerrilla movements and even civil wars. Being weak from the inside, these states attract additional and unwanted attention from other states that are drawn up by the inner weakness.¹⁴ In order to assure its security, a weak state has to try to avoid all the possible threats coming from outside and also it has to focus its attention to threats arising from within. Strong states do not have serious internal problems so their attention is focused on maintaining its sovereignty, independence, political identity and life style, so in other words, they care about possible threats that would arise from outside.¹⁵

A strong power is a state that has a strong military and advanced economy. A strong power can be a weak state in sociopolitical aspect and vice versa. A state can be both a weak power and a weak state at the same time and also be a strong power and a strong state at the same time too. The vulnerability and ability to resist threats depends on whether the state is strong or weak in both aspects. If a strong power but socio-politically weak state challenges a strong state in both aspects the outcomes of this conflict are hard to foresee and most of the time it might end up in a big loss to the state that has a powerful military but is politically weak. Most of these losses come from the unpredictable nature of socio-politically weak state.

Even though the threats to security come from inside of the state and outside of it – from the nature of international system - the threats can be put in five different security sectors, according to Barry Buzan:

- Military sector. This sector is a traditional one in realist theory. The security of a state is mainly associated with military power of the state.

¹² Waltz. K. P.105.

¹³ Buzan. Op. Cit. p. 99.

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 102.

¹⁵ Buzan. Op. Cit. p. 101.

The ability to defend itself and to be able to attack and anticipate the future moves of your rivals is the main point dealing with military threats.¹⁶

- Political sector – in this sector threats come from instability of domestic politics, institutions and ideology inside of a state.¹⁷
- Social sector. This sector accentuates the importance of language, religion, culture and understanding of national identity.¹⁸
- Economic sector. To be economically secure a state has to have enough of resources and capital, it has to maintain an acceptable level of welfare for its citizens and be prepared to adjust to the changing nature of market and unpredictability of international economy.¹⁹
- Environmental sector. Before environmental threats came from nature in a form of natural disasters but later when the human population grew and started using more technology the main task became to keep environment clean and safe for human existence. This includes the securing of natural resources, drinking water and food resources.²⁰

All these sectors are interconnected and instability in one of them makes an impact to others. In order to lessen the possibility of threats the states use complex methods to strengthen all sectors altogether to make the possibility of threat minimum.

Containment strategy is used to lessen some of these threats and insecurities especially when they arise from hostile states. Threats are lessened by strengthening ones military and economic power and in this way deterring hostile states from possible attack. Also strengthening ones position by having more reliable and strong allies and shaping international system in a way that its values and standards would be in favor of the state and not its rivals. In this case favorable values are being promoted even inside the hostile states in this way trying to change the hostile nature from within.

The concept of Containment strategy began with the famous “Long telegram” sent by George F. Kennan to the State Department in 1946.²¹ This has been seen as the breaking point in USA’s foreign policy that determined the whole course and dynamics of the Cold War. In his telegram Kennan states his insights about the nature of USSR and its policies and also distinguishes main differences compared with the policies of Western World. The open policy used by U.S. towards USSR did not lessen the suspicions and mistrust with USSR and there was a need of new policy toward it for more balanced relationship. Kennan was the first trained USSR expert who showed the

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 117-18.

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 119-22.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 123.

¹⁹ Ibid. p.127-31.

²⁰ Ibid. p.131-34.

²¹ The Long Telegram. // http://www.johndclare.net/cold_war7_Kennan.htm, last accessed: 2014 11 29.

importance of deep understanding and knowledge of one's foreign partners and rivals to be able to realize national interests of the state.²²

The term "containment" was not yet mentioned in Kennan's "Long telegram" but in the telegram the need of a long term political strategy towards USSR was pointed out. In his telegram Kennan distinguishes the main feature of USSR foreign policy that is - the emphasis on real and imaginary foreign enemies that helps to keep the power of ruling elite and the domestic situation stable.²³ That did not happen. The failure of stabilizing the relationship, according to Kennan, was not ideologically based. USSR was a communist state. Communism came to Russia from Western states where it did not take roots. Even taking into consideration ideological differences it was not the main reason of tension between West and USSR. The USSR interpretation of communism only helped the ruling elite to maintain the power using the "enemy from abroad" method.²⁴

War as a possible solution in bilateral relations was eliminated for few main reasons. First of all, Roosevelt did not believe in a war as an adequate method to solve conflicts and saw more disadvantages than advantages in it. USSR was too big for intervention and too far away to have an opportunity to make a significant impact to its politics. Roosevelt saw the spread of Western values as the best possible way to get better communication with USSR but in this way he overestimated the logics of communists. The Western propaganda was ineffective to the communists and the existence of the atomic weapon was totally ignored by the Soviets too.²⁵ In this way the spread of American values was ineffective while war, used as a method in this situation, could bring more destruction and harm and even demoralize the society of USA. F.D. Roosevelt's policy came to a dead-end in the relationship with USSR so the new perspective given by G.F. Kennan was just on time though Roosevelt himself did not live to see those changes in the U.S. foreign affairs.

In his "Long telegram" Kennan suggests to apply careful and thorough tactics towards USSR taking into consideration that USSR is extremely dangerous because of its capability to sustain itself with the resources it has, its impermeability to outer information and because of its model of rule applied by the elites inside of USSR. This new tactic would help to carefully but consistently reach for security through the balance of power and balance of interests. It also would help to manage the hostile attitude towards the West. Kennan expanded and explained his ideas in more detailed manner in his article published in 1947 called "The Sources of Soviet Conduct". In his article, Kennan lists the main goals of USA foreign policy at the time:

²²Russell, R. (2000). American Diplomatic Realism: A Tradition Practiced and Preached by George F. Kennan. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*. Vol. 11, No.3. p. 164.

²³ Kennan, G. F., Long Telegram. <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm>; last accessed: 2013 11 21.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Gaddis, J.L. (2005). *Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Oxford: University. P.22.

- To defend the security of the USA;
- To rise the welfare of citizens USA.²⁶

These goals were mostly threatened by the unpredictable nature of USSR. Its tendency to expand its territory challenged the international position of USA and in this way it challenges the main interests of USA too. Because USSR is too big to use military actions against it effectively, the best way to deal with this threat is to apply a new long-term type strategy that is based on three main aspects which is the Containment strategy.

²⁶ Gaddis, J.L. (2005). Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. Oxford: University. P.26.

1.3 Feature of Containment Strategy

There are three main features of Containment strategy that were pointed out by G.F. Kennan and which were improved and adapted to the changes in circumstances. These features are:

- Deterrence;
- Spread of democratic Western based values;
- Allies support.²⁷

In order to stop the spread of USSR influence around the world USA has to increase its military power. Kennan believed that the increase of USA military power will lessen the possibility of USSR attack. USA had a more developed industry and better military capacities so improving it was not very hard. The weakness of this feature is that the militarization of one state will encourage the militarizing of other states and in this way will create the armaments race and security dilemma.²⁸

Another important step is to support allies creating the power balance with the USSR. The first and most important step was to return Germany and Japan to international community as respected and stable members. According to Kennan Germany and Japan are two of five power centers in the world so it is vital to make them to become stable democratic states with prosperous economies. Other three power centers were the Great Britain, USA and USSR.²⁹ The revival of the economies of Japan and Germany was an important step in reviving them as power center and in this way creating counterweight to USSR.

Next step would be to spread the democracy across the world. Democratic states tend to share the same values as the US so having more democratic states around world is having more possible allies. The spread of democracy would increase the stability of international system and decrease the spread of communism in Europe, South America and Asia. The possible spread of communism in Japan and West Europe would have helped the USSR to control these states and it would have been especially disadvantageous for U.S. The spread of American based values would have helped to have more possible allies around the world.

²⁷ Kelly, R. E., (2010) American Dual Containment in Asia. Geopolitics, Vol. 15. P. 710.

²⁸ Buzzan

²⁹ Gaddis, J.L. (2005). Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. Oxford: University. P.29.

Table 1. Main Containment Strategy Features in USA Foreign Policy during the Cold War towards USSR and in the 21st Century towards PRC.

Three Main Features of Containment Strategy	Features of Containment Strategy during the Cold War in U.S. Foreign Policy towards USSR	Features of Containment Strategy in 21st century in U.S. Foreign Policy towards PRC
Deterrence	Atomic Weapon; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Investment in military capabilities	Military Bases in Asia-Pacific Investment in military capabilities
Spread of democratic Western based values	Marshal Plan; United Nations (UN)	Trans-Pacific Partnership; Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN); East Asia Summit; United Nations (UN)
Alliance	NATO Bilateral, Trilateral Defense Treaties	Bilateral, Trilateral Defense Treaties

During the Cold War USA discouraged USSR from direct attack with atomic weapon (until USSR invented its own), the creation of NATO and investment in its security and military capacities. In the 21st century to deter China USA is strengthening its military positions and military bases in Asia-Pacific region, investing money in military modernizations and relocating troops and military equipment from other regions – this will be analyzed further in later chapter.

To spread Western-based values U.S. used economic and political tools such as Marshal Plan and participation in the activity of the United Nations. It also tried to spread democracy and human rights as fundamental and in this way to ensure the creation of the best possible environment for the spread of USA influence. Currently U.S. is also using economic means such as the promotion of Trans-Pacific Partnership treaty and political means such as participation in international organizations like UN and APEC to project its influence over the Asia-Pacific region. International organizations are used to promote human rights, free market economy and democracy.

For creating alliances U.S. still prefers bilateral and multilateral defense treaties. During the Cold War U.S. had to ensure the alliances of European nation and in the 21st century it tries to ensure alliances with rising powers in Asia such as India, Philippines and Indonesia.

2. CONTAINMENT STRATEGY IN US-CHINA RELATIONS

Implementation of Containment strategy towards People Republic of China was never officially declared. Containment strategy is mostly associated with U.S. – USSR relations and the relations of U.S. and Russian Federation. Although it was never officially implemented toward China recently, starting with the first term of President G. W. Bush, the features of Containment strategy can be seen being applied to China.

During the Cold War USA kept its distance with China. According to Kennan China was not strong enough to pose any serious threat to U.S. or its interests. China was also not favorable to USSR because it lost the control over China's communist party.³⁰ In the period of Cold War USSR was seen as the main threat by USA officials and China was ignored to a certain degree as not dangerous enough.

For some time political authors thought that Japan might become a state that could challenge U.S. hegemony.³¹ This theory became especially popular after the end of Cold War but then Japan faced economic stagnation and demographic problems that made it hard to challenge U.S. Then attention went to the rising China. PRC became seen as a possible threat to U.S. only at the beginning of 21st century. The fast growth of economy and intense investment in modernizing military made China one of the attention centers for the USA.

The change in USA position towards China became visible in 2000 when G.W. Bush referred to China as a “strategic competitor of the United States”.³² PRC has not officially declared its position as a strategic rival to USA's hegemony so it is hard to call China a serious threat to U.S. now but its ambitions are growing and in the near future China's position might change. At the moment China is trying to improve its economy and modernize the state but the rapid rise of it makes USA cautious and draws its attention more towards China. This also makes U.S. to think about possible prevention methods.

What makes USA most concerned is the unpredictability of the size, direction and speed of changes in PRC actions.³³ One of the biggest concerns is the rapid investments in military modernization and expansion. Since 2004 till 2008 the expenditure for military was equal 2-2.1% of China's GDP. It is not a big number compared with 4.5% of GDP that USA spent on its military in 2008.³⁴ Never the less China has an army of 2.5 million soldiers and new modern weapons and it

³⁰ Gaddis, J.L. (2005). *Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War.* Oxford: University. P.45.

³¹ Waltz, K. N., (2000). *Structural Realism after the Cold War.* *International Security*, Vol.25, No.1. P.32.

³² Kelly, R. E., (2010). *American dual Containment in Asia.* *Geopolitics*, Vol.15. P.706.

³³ Lee, W., (2008). *China as a Military Power and Its Implications for the USA and Taiwan.* *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol.43, No. 5. P.525.

³⁴ Military expenditure (% of GDP). //http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?page=1 ; last accessed: 2014 11 29.

makes China more and more of a threat to U.S. This chapter will approach the changes in the U.S. policy towards China since the end of World War II to explain the shift of importance of China in U.S. foreign agenda and methods used to contain it.

2.1 USA Foreign Policy Towards China During the Cold War

If the international order after the World War II (WWII) in Europe was shaped by the Yalta conference signed in 1945 and was understood as the “Yalta System”, the same did not happen in the Asia-Pacific region. The Yalta treaty included some points considering Japan and its position in the new world but it did not bring more details about the Asia-Pacific region. Yalta treaty was a mutual work of USA, UK and USSR.³⁵ This shows that the interests in the post war Europe were divided according to all three sides and their preferences in power division. But that did not happen in Asia-Pacific.

The official power division in Asia-Pacific was initiated and organized entirely by U.S. The “San Francisco System” that started with the signing of San Francisco treaty in 1951 shaped the Cold war politics in the Asia-Pacific region. China becoming a communist People’s Republic of China, the beginning of the Korean War, USA involvement in Taiwan-Mainland China conflict made it clear that the “Cold War” in East Asia is starting to become a “Hot war”. The San Francisco Treaty could be seen as an attempt to stabilize the situation in East Asia in the most favorable way for U.S. but instead this treaty became one of the triggers for most of the territorial conflicts and divisions in East Asia. USSR was not involved in shaping the treaty and so it did not sign it. Also USSR wanted to have bigger participation of China in making this treaty and that also failed.³⁶ So the one-sided treaty that was in favor of U.S. power spread in the region created more frustration and tension in USSR and China.

The U.S.-China relations during the Cold War could be seen as truly “Cold” because U.S. and China never had a real clash between each other.³⁷ But differently from the U.S.-USSR relations, it is hard to say when the Cold war have ended between U.S. and China. The reunification of Germany and the collapse of USSR later are the signs of the end of Cold war in Europe and Euro-Atlantic region. However nothing of that sort has happened in East Asia. It could be argued that after the end of Cold war in 1990 in Europe the situation in East Asia stayed more like in a D tente period of 1970 between U.S. and USSR.³⁸ Later relationship between USA and Chine were created by pragmatism and the need for economic cooperation and development but it has never lost the bit of tension usual for global rivals.

During the Cold War at first China was not seen as a real threat. Having weak economy and military it did not pose much threat to U.S. When in 1949 China became communist and the U.S.

³⁵ Hara, K. *Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific. Divided territories in the San Francisco System.* London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007. P.3.

³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 4.

³⁷ *Ibid*. p.6.

³⁸ *Ibid*. p.7.

supported Chiang Kai-shek lost to Mao, USA started thinking about the “lost” China.³⁹ Even though China was not very advanced in economy or military it still was a big nation people wise. The support to USSR for this big of a nation was seen as a problem. It became even a bigger problem when China participated in Korean War. That was the moment when U.S. started to use some parts of Containment Strategy towards China too.⁴⁰

For the first three decades of the Cold War China was seen as a weak power and most of the time underestimated by both U.S. and its ally – USSR. The China’s military interventions in Tibet, Taiwan and its participation in Korean War caught the political elite of that time off guard.⁴¹ Later the development of China’s nuclear weapon in 1964 made it clear that China is seeing itself as a new growing superpower.⁴² The differences that were lightly disregarded by the USSR backfired when PRC challenged both U.S. and USSR in the power game in the Asia-Pacific region. In this way the Cold war in Asia-Pacific was not divided in two sides but had a tri-polar system.

In response to China’s participation President H. Truman was forced to allocate the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan’s shores to give a warning to China for its actions in Korea, though he never wanted to start a war with China.⁴³ PRC participation in Korean War was a very dangerous and surprising and made it clear that USA has to formulate a more appropriate politics towards China that is different from the policy applied to USSR. The possibility of a greater cooperation between USSR and PRC was seen as a very dangerous and threatening one, but because of China’s rivalry for primacy in ideological a geopolitical spheres with USSR, this cooperation was not possible.⁴⁴

China – U.S. relations became extremely heated during both Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954-55) and both sides were hostile to each other. China was seen as the most revolutionary of the Communist states and that complicated the relationships. But both states had to reconsider their relationship when it became too hard keep the tension.

The difference in ideology the view over the communist world was so deep and wide that it made very difficult for PRC and USSR to cooperate. USSR did not understand how Mao perceived China, communism and its future and did not recognize the importance of the feeling of humiliation that China had. This humiliation came from Russia as well when Tsar and Lenin occupied northern territories.⁴⁵

China saw itself as the possible new leader in communist Asia and was opposed of the USSR attempts to become the hegemon of the communist world. Hegemon by all means was seen as

³⁹ Kissinger, H. *On China*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2011. P.98.

⁴⁰ Hara, K. *Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific. Divided territories in the San Francisco System*. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007. P.7.

⁴¹ Kissinger, H, *Opt. cit.* p. 103.

⁴² Hara, K. *opt. cit.* p. 7.

⁴³ Kissinger, H, *Opt. cit.* p. 98.

⁴⁴ *Opt. Cit.* P. 149.

⁴⁵ P 164

an imperial power spread of the West world to the Asia and it pose threat to China and Mao's leadership.⁴⁶

USSR intervention in Czechoslovakia was one of the final evidence that USSR might attack even its allies so China had to reconsider its allies which at the time was very little. This led to the more pragmatic politics toward USA.

President Nixon's approach to China was a turning point in the history of the Cold War. At that time the idea of rapprochement with China was seen as very controversial and very hard to obtain. Not to mention all the criticism and disagreement from U.S. allies such as Japan and Taiwan.⁴⁷ The changing situation in the international arena, the economic and moral exhaustion from the Vietnam War and the tension with USSR led USA to reproach China. After the USSR intervention in Czechoslovakia China was scared of USSR possible intervention to PRC in the rivalry for the power in the communist world. China also needed new opportunities to strengthen the economic development of the country.⁴⁸

At the same time U.S. was searching for ways to lessen tension with USSR and lessen the economic burden of having to participate in conflicts all around the world (War in Vietnam, Cuban Revolution, and Middle East crisis). Making China more approachable to USA would leave USSR with less possible allies and in this way it would lessen its strength and power over the region. Also, China that is open to the world and especially to the world market would create economic ties and new business opportunities and might even lessen the negativity and enmity towards the Western World. Nixon had a very realistic approach while creating this strategy towards China. He understood all the risks and possible negative outcomes.

China's new leader, Deng Xiaoping, also was a pragmatic leader and he saw that more openness to the global market and "warmer" relationship with USA would help to improve economy and lessen the threat of USSR. At the time China had a lot of inner problems to take care of so any additional international conflicts would have cost more instability inside of the state.

During the Cold War U.S. position towards China changed from seeing it as a mere threat to acknowledging its growing power and possible threat in Korean and Vietnam Wars to a more pragmatic approach.

⁴⁶ Kissinger, H, *Op. cit.* p. 101.

⁴⁷ Tudda, C. (2012) *A COLD WAR TURNING POINT. NIXON AND CHINA, 1969-1972.* Louisiana state university press: Baton Rouge. P.27.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.

2.2 U.S.-China Relationship After the Cold War

The end of Cold War seemingly removed the most important reason for U.S.-China cooperation – the USSR collapsed and was not posing any threat. However both states had stakes in trade and for U.S. China was an important factor in solving North Korea's problem and dealing with nonproliferation.⁴⁹ The tension between the states became bigger after the Tiananmen Square incident when U.S. posed sanctions on China and criticized the human rights violations in the state.

President Bill Clinton foreign policy towards China was different compared with President Bush Senior. Clinton saw the need to integrate China into the international system more than contain it. The weak and divided China was not favorable to U.S. at could have caused more problems. China's acceptance in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is considered to be the main legacy of the Clinton foreign policy towards China. China's becoming a part of WTO made it agree with international norms and rules. The economic opening was expected to lead to the political opening and changes as well.⁵⁰ This could also be seen as part of Containment Strategy because China had to agree with some of the Western based values and norms and it made China less offensive towards U.S. and more cooperative. Even though Clinton was in favor of engagement he harshly criticized human right violations in China and used economic means to contain China's military development. Because of a strong pressure from Clinton administration China became party of a Chemical Weapons Convention and made China to have stronger nonproliferation dialogs. Also Clinton upgraded Taiwan's defense abilities. It was done in order to keep Taiwan as an ally and constrain to the mainland China.⁵¹ So in order to make China more approachable Clinton administration used engagement more than containment. This was done to prevent China from becoming unstable and even more threatening.

George W. Bush administration had a harder position towards China. It did not see China as an adversary but China was not a friendly nation either. China was perceived as a state that could easily become a rival and even a security threat. Because of uncontrollably fast rise of China's economy, unstable domestic situation and unpredictable foreign policy China was perceived as a likely security threat to U.S. and its interests in the Asia-Pacific.⁵²

Before the 9/11 Bush administration kept cooperative relationships with China in order to sustain economic relationship and boost trade. In 2003 the trade between China and U.S. almost reached 200 billion U.S. dollars and Bush administration wanted to keep this growth.

⁴⁹ Blanchard, J.M.F, Shen, S., ed.(2015). Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-US Relations Change and continuity, causes and cures. London and New York: Routledge. P. 30.

⁵⁰ Osius, T. (2001) Legacy of the Clinton-Gore Administration's. *China Policy, Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 28:3, P. 126.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 129.

⁵² Song, Y. (2002). Relations Between China and America Since President George W. Bush's Visit to China, *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy*, 24:4, 352.

The US policy towards East Asia and Southeast Asia has generally focused on counter terrorism in the period after 9/11. U.S. was more concerned with the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. The relationship with China became more complicated because of Taiwan and its aspirations for the change in the status quo.⁵³

The Taiwan's aspiration for independence could have provoked a conflict with mainland China and at the time it was very inconvenient for the United States. Already having to fight in two wars in Middle East U.S. definitely did not need another big scale conflict.

On the other hand China saw the opportunity to get more technology and investment from United States so conducting positive relationship was in its interests. But it did not take long to rise tension in the economic sphere too. China's currency policy, which was not in favor of U.S., problems with subsidies and unsafe production coming to U.S. became the source of economic tension.⁵⁴

But the biggest problem in the U.S.-China relations became the rapid growth of investments in China's military modernization. China's growing militarization started posing threat to its neighbors and first of all Taiwan, to the interests of the USA and even could complicate the economic relationship in the region.

However, the relationship between both states were more cooperative than hostile because of the pragmatic politics used by both parties.

⁵³ Robert Sutter (2006) The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 15:48, 420.

⁵⁴ Blanchard, J.M.F, Shen, S.. ed.(2015). *Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-US Relations Change and continuity, causes and cures*. London and New York: Routledge. P.34.

2.3 U.S.-China Relations During Obama Presidency

In the second decade of 21st century China's economic, political and military growth has accelerated and given much more confidence for China in the Asia-Pacific region. This confidence can be seen in the growing number incidents connected to the territorial disputes during the Obama presidency terms. China has been feeling much more confident in the region because of its growing power and influence and the lessening attention from the U.S., which had to deal with two wars that were lasting more than a decade in the Middle East.

Being the core peace and security warrantor U.S. started feeling the pressure of its allies to keep their commitment. Also losing economic, political and military positions in the most dynamic and fastest growing region in the world would make U.S. economically and politically disadvantageous.⁵⁵

The growing economic, political and military pressure towards U.S. to keep the situation stable in Asia-Pacific and to sustain its positions in the region asked for new political approach towards Asia-Pacific region. The "rebalancing" or "Pivot" politics became the response to the China challenge and the time will show whether it is a proper response.

Using a term "Pivot" that was first used by the Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton in her publication in the *Foreign Policy* journal shows the vast importance given to the region. According to her, the future politics will be made in the Asia-Pacific region and it is to utmost importance to create a new forward orientated politics to the Asia-Pacific region.⁵⁶

It was even more emphasized by the first official visit made by the Secretary General. Her first official visits were made to Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and China. In this way the U.S. made a clear point that their priorities in Asia-Pacific are to strengthen the already existing alliances, create new ones and also create relationship with the rivaling powers.⁵⁷

The rivalry between U.S. and China during the Obama presidency reached new boundaries and the maritime disputes are more the result of economic growth of China and rivalry for influence in the region. Because majority of China's trade is done by the sea it is vital for Chinese economy to ensure secure ways to proceed with the sea born trade.⁵⁸

The U.S.-China relation during the Obama presidency are based on economic rivalry, the growing tension in the region because of the maritime conflicts and a creation of a new U.S. policy towards China. However, it might not always be clearly portrayed in the official U.S. position.

⁵⁵ Blanchard, J.M.F, Shen, S., ed.(2015). Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-US Relations Change and continuity, causes and cures. London and New York: Routledge. P.69.

⁵⁶ Clinton, H. (2011 10 11). America's Pacific Century. The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action.// <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/>. Last accessed: 2014 12 29.

⁵⁷ What Hillary did next? // <http://www.economist.com/node/21551105>. Last accessed: 2015 01 03.

⁵⁸ Blanchard, J.M.F, Shen, S., *ibid*, p.71.

3 POLICY TOWARDS CHINA IN OFFICIAL US POSITION

Official U.S. position towards China can be best seen in two main documents provided by the President administration. The National Security Strategy reflects the broad vision of future U.S. foreign policy and the annual State of the Union Addresses shows the main insecurities that U.S. has coming from domestic and foreign current situation. This chapter will official position towards PRC portrayed in National Security Strategies 2011 and 2015 and annual State of the Union Addresses given by Barack Obama since 2009.

3.1 The Analysis of National Security Strategy as Guidance for U.S. Foreign Policy towards China

National Security Strategy published by the executive branch as a declaration of main U.S. foreign policy goals in domestic politics and in the international arena. With the National Security Strategy the president and its administration declares the main points which should get the most attention and defines the main tools to achieve them. This document is set for U.S administration to communicate these ideas and tools for policy implementation to Congress, citizens of the United States and the international community.⁵⁹

In 2010 president's Barack Obama administration released their first national Security Strategy. According to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 it is a must for the president to submit a report to Congress every year to give the guidelines and strategies for the conduct of domestic and foreign policy⁶⁰. In the period of his first term of office Obama submitted only one national Security Strategy in 2010. In 2013 it was said that the new strategy would be submitted in the early 2014.⁶¹ The new Security Strategy has been submitted in the beginning of 2015 due to Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

The 2010 National Security Strategy was reported in the context of Global economic crisis and so called 'Arab awakening'. The Global crisis made an impact on putting more emphasis on domestic policy and economic issues, 'Arab awakening' and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan kept the attention on Great Middle East and the ongoing war on terrorism. The differences come in other sectors and approaches that have been introduced in the National Security Strategy that differ from

⁵⁹ De Young, K. *Obama redefines national security strategy, looks beyond military might.* // <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052701044.html?hpid=sec-politics//>. Last accessed: 2014.05.29.

⁶⁰ The National Security Strategy Report. // <http://nssarchive.us//>. Last accessed: 2014.05.25.

⁶¹ Wilson, S. *Obama to issue a new statement of U.S. national security strategy.* // http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-to-issue-a-new-statement-of-us-national-security-strategy/2013/11/29/cd6531f8-5937-11e3-8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html//. Last accessed: 2014.05.25.

National Security Strategies of George W. Bush. These differences and implementations come not only in overall posture of U.S. but also in new security threats included as requiring a more profound attention.

Obama's National Security Strategy is 52 pages long and contains four chapters: Overview of National Security Strategy, Strategic Approach, Advancing Our Interests and Conclusions. In these chapters the position towards China is also being stated and it will be examined in the following subsections.

The 2015 National Security Strategy was reported in the context of Russian military violence against Ukraine and the threat of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS). This time the Middle East get a lot of attention because of ISIS/ISIL movement. It also gives much more emphasis on Russia and its aggressive behavior against its European neighbors. China however is covered in a more modest manner making an emphasis on avoiding any unnecessary conflicts and tensions.

The 2015 National Security Strategy contains six chapters in 29 pages: Introduction, Security, Prosperity, Values, International Order and Conclusions. In order to better understand the position declared towards China and whether it had some significant changes during the five years that separate both Security Strategies, we have to examine both Security Strategies separately.

3.1.1 USA National Security Strategy 2010

In the overview there is an emphasis made on the shaping of the international system by combining the national security and national interests of the United States with its capabilities and values. It is also emphasized that the U.S. has the responsibility to shape the international arena and that it should focus on the reemerging of the U.S. power in the 21st century.⁶²

The need to renew the power of the U.S. comes from the changing world with its globalization and the new threats that come from it, the new emerging powers and the possible challenge from them to the U.S. power in all spheres, starting with economy and competitiveness in the global economy and finishing with the military strength.

What is interesting and new in this National Security Strategy is the new approach towards possible threats and rivals to the U.S. power in the international arena. The new approach is the engagement of rising powers in the international community. Those rising powers are described as 'other key centers of influence'⁶³. Those 'key centers of influence' are China, India and Russia, also Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia.⁶⁴ The most important thing here is that China is being mentioned first giving an impression that it is the most important 'key center' of all rising powers. This shows the importance given to China and not to the historical rival of 20th century – Russia. Russia is being pushed to the third place after India making it clear that the biggest challenge to the U.S. power according to Obama's administration might come from China's growing economic and military power and its influence in the world.

This strategy is pointing out the need of engagement even with the hostile states. This is a new approach compared with the previous George W. Bush politics. But even when promoting the new approach of engagement, U.S. still sees itself as the only power that could 'shape an international system that can meet the challenges of our time'⁶⁵ and in this way to ensure the world order and peace. Hilary Clinton while giving a comment about this Strategy also emphasized the need to keep U.S. power and position because, according to her, 'American leadership isn't needed less; it's actually needed more. And the simple fact is that no significant global challenge can be met without us'⁶⁶.

After giving an overview of overall strategy made it clear that U.S. is searching for new strategies to maintain its power in the changing global world with new emerging powers. The second chapter of National Security Strategy gives the strategic approach for the maintenance of U.S. interests which are:

⁶² National Security Strategy. // http://nssarchive.us/?page_id=8//. Last accessed: 2014.05.29. p.1.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 3.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 2.

⁶⁶ De Young, K. Obama redefines national security strategy, looks beyond military might. // <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052701044.html?hpid=sec-politics//>. Last accessed: 2014.05.29.

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
- A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
- Respect for universal values at home and around the world;
- An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.⁶⁷

China together with India – as the most populous states – are being seen as more engaging in the world.⁶⁸ Even if engagement is being seen as a positive thing it is also said in the Strategy that ‘new and emerging powers hold out opportunities for partnership, even as a handful of states endanger regional and global security by flouting international norms’⁶⁹. So emerging power are being watched and approached as possible threats to the contemporary world order and that’s why the leadership of U.S. is essential. China in this part of Strategy is mentioned as a one of the new ‘21st century centers of influence’⁷⁰. These centers (China, India and Russia) are not being mentioned as threats but as partners of cooperation. However these centers of influence also need the U.S. as a main partner to ‘advance constructive cooperation [which] is essential to the security and prosperity of specific regions, and to facilitating global cooperation on issues ranging from violent extremism and nuclear proliferation, to climate change, and global economic instability—issues that challenge all nations, but that no one nation alone can meet’⁷¹. U.S. according to the Security Strategy has to maintain its influence in the regional as well as global level especially in the context of emerging new power centers. China here is also mentioned first giving it more importance than the other two states that are being termed as ‘centers of influence’.

Engagement policy again is being declared as the essence in relationships with China and other emerging powers.

This following chapter – Advancing US Interests, points out the main interests of the United States that are security, prosperity, values and international order⁷². This chapter is the longest and the most detailed in the National Security Strategy. China is mentioned in this chapter in page 43 in the subsection ‘Building Cooperation with Other 21st century Centers of Influence’. Here China is again mentioned as the ‘center of influence’ together with India and Russia. The Strategy points out that these ‘centers of influence’ have mutual interests with the U.S. and that the best way to achieve them is through cooperation. The best way to achieve this deeper cooperation is through ‘regional

⁶⁷ National Security strategy. P. 7.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p.8.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 11.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² National Security Strategy. Ibid, p. 17.

organizations, new dialogues, and high-level diplomacy'.⁷³ It is again declared that China is a rival that U.S. can cooperate with but not the threat that needs to be contained.

Even though it is constantly stressed in this Strategy that China is a partner to cooperate to this chapter also gives new insights about China as a possible threat: 'We will monitor China's military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected'⁷⁴. The modernization and growth of China's military capacity is seen as a possible threat to the regional security because of security dilemma for its neighbors and because of a challenge to the military power of the United States in the region.

As a tool to engage China in deeper cooperation and lessen the growth of tension in the region U.S. are using Strategic and Economic Dialogue policy with China. What is interesting here is that U.S. is admitting that it will not be very effective in promoting human rights in China but it still considers mutual cooperation as the most essential in bilateral relations with China⁷⁵. Here economic interests and pragmatic policy of U.S. wins against its declaration of international morals and values. This shows that the importance of China and the rapid growth of its influence and power in the region is taken into consideration very seriously though U.S. is not abandoning its values and it declares also that 'we will be candid on our human rights concerns and areas where we differ'⁷⁶.

Although throughout the National Security strategy it was emphasized that China is important as a growing economic power, U.S. is not underestimating its military capacities and possible threats arriving from military ambitions.

China is not being mentioned in the Conclusions of National Security Strategy but it is pointed out that the United States of America have to adapt to the 'enormous challenges'⁷⁷ and the changing world order of the 21st century. These changes require to take into consideration new threats and in order to be possible to meet them U.S has to renew its leadership.⁷⁸ To maintain its position and leadership in this changing world U.S. is seeking new 'comprehensive range of national actions'⁷⁹. These new actions are mostly focused on promoting engagement as a long lasting and effective strategy. It was extremely important in 2010 when U.S. was tired of its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this context the policy of engagement was seen as a policy of peace in contrast with the policy of war of previous president George W. Bush.⁸⁰

⁷³ Ibid, p.43.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ National Security Strategy. P.52.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p.51.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ MacAskill, E. Barack Obama sets out security strategy based on diplomacy instead of war. // <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/27/us-national-security-strategy-report/>. Last accessed: 2014.05.29.

All in all the attention given to China in the Security Strategy in a period of U.S. being in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan shows Chinas importance to the U.S. foreign policy as a possible rival in international arena but it is also seen as manageable through cooperation, communication and diplomacy.

It is the first time that China together with India and Russia is called the ‘centers of influence’ in this way showing the U.S. as a part of multipolar world system than a unilateral leader of it. This also brings the attention to the possible threats arising from the rapid growth of Chinas economic, military and political power in the region as well as in the world.⁸¹ Even though this National Security Strategy does not emphasizes the possible threat of Chinas power but the importance given to China as a rising ‘center of influence’ throughout this Strategy makes it clear that U.S. is considering China to be one of the biggest rivals and challenges to its global domination in the 21st century.

⁸¹ Ibid.

3.1.2 USA National Security Strategy 2015

The Introduction of is very abstract, expressing the broad idea of USA importance over the worlds order and economic development. During the Introduction China has been mentioned once in page 4 as one of the factors that will influence the future power relations. Its growth was mentioned together with the India's potential and Russia's aggression as making a significant impact over the power balance, but it was not declared in more details what part of China's rise is going to affect the future power balance.

The reference to China can be felt in other parts of introduction such as mentioning of "Rebalancing" toward Asia-Pacific in page 2 and the threat caused by cyber-attacks, which can cause more disturbance over the global economy and can be resolved more easier with the help of major power or hindered by their action. This refers to the cyber-attacks on official U.S. sites which are mostly done by Chinese – around 90% of all cyber-attacks.⁸²

Another Problem that is mentioned is the economic rise of Asia, Latin America and Africa. According to the National Security Strategy it is not the economic rise that poses threat but the unpredictable nature of some states that can be unwilling to cooperate and would cause tension and possible conflict. As it was mentioned before, India, China and Russia are being pointed out as possible challenges to U.S.⁸³ However China was not distinguished as posing the biggest threat to the U.S. and its interests in the region.

In the Introduction it is admitted that today's situation is "fluid"⁸⁴ and it might change in a way that is not convenient for USA. In order to keep its position and to influence the course of the major international events, U.S. has to strengthen its positions, keep its allies and monitor the situation around the world.

Similar ideas are being expressed in the fallowing chapter – *Security*. The importance of alliances is being emphasized: "our allies and partners in other regions [...] are essential to advancing our interests".⁸⁵ The allies in other regions are specified – Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand as well as Philippines and Thailand. Except for the mention of U.S. NATO allies in Europe, other regions and allies from there are not being distinguished. This shows the importance of allies in Asia-Pacific. The main reason for U.S. to strengthen it alliances in Asia-Pacific according to the Security Strategy is to ensure security and enable prosperity in the region. Once again China was not

⁸² Sanger, D.E. U.S. Blames China's Military Directly for Cyberattacks. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/world/asia/us-accuses-chinas-military-in-cyberattacks.html?_r=0; last accessed: 2015 05 07.

⁸³ U.S. National Security Strategy 2015. P. 4. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf; last accessed: 2015 04 29.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 5.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p.

mentioned directly as a threat to the regional security or the interests of U.S. but the implications are there.

It seems that in the *Security* chapter it is avoided to clearly call China a possible threat to the U.S. security, but it is implied indirectly by pointing out cyber-security problem or the importance of avoiding escalation of the conflicts in East and South China Seas. The only time in this chapter that it becomes clearer that China is being seen as a serious threat is in the section *Air and Military Security*. Here China is being referred to as one of the parties together with ASEAN that can effectively and peacefully conduct the conflicts in South China Sea.⁸⁶ In this way China is being distinguished among other Asian nations, while the neighboring states are being put together under the “umbrella” of ASEAN. This shows the importance of China and its main role in territorial disputes in East and South China Seas.

The third chapter – *Prosperity*, emphasizes the importance of economic prosperity of the USA. As one of the main factors to reach it is the Trans-Pacific Partnership – an agreement that would set norms for trade and economic cooperation between 12 Asia-Pacific states.⁸⁷ This treaty does not include China so it would put some restrictions on Chinas trade. In this chapter China is not being mentioned separately, just the TPP that implies the containment features being used over China.

The *Value* chapter in page 19 declares the aim to spread Western values, defend human rights and movements of democratization just like in previous National Security Strategies. However National Security Strategy 2015 just like National Security Strategy 2010 states that sometimes USA will have to cooperate with states that do not practice the values of the USA but it will always advocate for the human rights and spread of the democracy. This is mostly directed to the U.S.-China relationship.

In the chapter *International Order*, the attention to the Asia-Pacific region is by far the biggest in the whole National Security Strategy 2015. It is again declared that U.S. is a Pacific power and that the rapid grow of Asia-Pacific region is one of U.S. main interests. The region is vitally important for its economic possibilities but it also is a place for serious territorial disputes and escalation of those disputes might induce security problems in the region causing fluctuation over the economic development.⁸⁸

The subchapter *Advance Our Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific* expresses the main points of Containment Strategy – the importance of military presence, the spread of Western values through strengthening regional organizations and using economic means such as TPP and strengthening relationship with the allies. All these features are being emphasized as essential for the Rebalancing

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 13.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 17.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 24.

policy of USA. The strengthening of East Asia alliances and creating new ones is especially being emphasized. USA declares that it would “focus [on] the deepening partnerships we are building in Southeast Asia including with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. We will uphold our treaty obligations to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, while encouraging the latter to return quickly to democracy.”⁸⁹ Even states that have democracy problems are important enough to keep as an ally.

In National Security Strategy 2015 the position towards China is described as constructive and it is declared that U.S. would welcome the peaceful and stable rise of China. This shows that U.S. do not want to provoke China or create tension with open declarations, but it would still use features of Containment Strategy would just call them necessary means for prosperity of the region. Although U.S. declares it wants a peaceful and constructive relations it also warns that China has to follow the International Law obey international rules. This shows the need to keep friendly and cooperation based relationship but at the same time to ensure that China plays according the rules. It shows that U.S. is prepared to try to constrain Chinas growth in the way most suitable for the interests of the United States.

All in all Obama administration pays a lot of attention to China and its rapid rise in East Asia. However China was not declared as the biggest threat to U.S. security and in this way United States try to avoid any kind of unnecessary provocations toward China.⁹⁰ But the features mentioned in the Security Strategy 2015 are clearly features of Containment Strategy. The new National Security Strategy also presents its Rebalancing policy towards Asia-Pacific in a separate subchapter and in this ways shows the importance of this policy in the context of U.S. foreign policy.

The official position towards China tries to avoid provocations and that can be very clearly seen in annual State of the Union Addresses given by the President. Annual State of the Union Addresses given by Barack Obama are being analyzed in the next subchapter.

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 24.

⁹⁰ Mazarr, M.J. The Pros and Cons of Obama's Restraint. Obama's new National Security Strategy shows that strategic restraint has advantages, as well as big limits.// <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/02/06/obamas-national-security-strategy-shows-benefits-and-limits-of-restraint>; last accessed: 2015 04 29.

3.2 Official Position of U.S. towards China in Official Speeches

The National Security Strategy pointed out the main vectors of action in the U.S. foreign policy and the possible threats and tools to deal with them. While trying to analyze the official position declared towards China in U.S. foreign policy it is very useful to analyze the annual State of the Union address given by the president to the Congress members at the start of every year.

According to the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 3 President of the United States has to give information about the State of the Union to the Congress annually⁹¹. These reports consider mostly of domestic problems but the president also gives information about military conflicts that U.S. is involved in and its position towards current global events and perspectives and also the aims to acquire national interests.

Since the first term in office in 2009 Barack Obama has given 6 State of the Union addresses. The first one which was given in February, 2009 technically doesn't count as a State of the Union address because it should be made in January. However all six addresses will be taken into consideration.

It is important to note that State of the Union Addresses give the most attention to the domestic problems. It is especially so in all six Obama's addresses because of the context of Global economic crisis. Nevertheless it is still a very important source of foreign policy priorities because they are also being discussed, mostly in the end of the address. These addresses can be analyzed dividing them in the terms in office. The first term in office contains four addresses made in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. The second term addresses were made in 2013, 2014 and 2015.

China has been mentioned in all these State of the Union addresses. It shows that China is being seen as an important player in the international arena and as an important actor to the national interests of the U.S. In address of 2009 which was mostly directed to discuss the economic situation in the context of Global economic crisis. The majority of the address was discussing domestic, economic problems and suggesting possible ways to solve them. Here China is being mentioned as the leader in making its economy energy sufficient⁹² or at least declaring the aspiration to do that.

In 2010 address of the Union china was mentioned twice. Again China was mentioned as a state leading in economic growth and innovations. This State of the Union address was also focused mainly on economic recovery and the reforms of economic financial sectors.⁹³

⁹¹ U.S. Constitution - Article 2 Section 3. // http://www.usconstitution.net/xconst_A2Sec3.html/. Last accessed: 2014.05.25.

⁹² State of the Union Address, February 24, 2009. // <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=85753>/. Last accessed: 2014.05.29.

⁹³ State of the Union address, January 27, 2010. // <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=87433>/. Last accessed: 2014.05.29.

In 2011 while addressing the Congress Barack Obama mentions China four times. It is four times more than in his speech in 2009. Again China is given as an example of a growing economy that is becoming stronger and relies on innovations and reforms: ‘nations like China and India realized that with some changes of their own, they could compete in this new world’⁹⁴. China is again seen as an economic rival which is leading in innovations, infrastructure and sustainable energy development.

The same pattern are seen in his last State of the union address made in 2012 in the end of his first term in office. Here China is also mentioned four times, but the context is more negative. Obama points out the negative impact that the growing economy of China has on the economy of U.S. the outsourcing of job places in China where labor force is cheaper is seen as taking work places from honest, hardworking U.S. workers. This creates a hostile position which is being depend when Obama talks about fighting against unfair players in global economy giving the example of China.⁹⁵ In way this position reminds of the economic and technological rivalry between U.S. and USSR but without the military aspect.

All in all Obama mentioned China in all four State of the Union Addresses in his first term in office. In all speeches china was mentioned in economic context in order to inspire citizens of the United States to not give up during economic difficulties and try to compete with rivals such as China. Although other countries were mentioned as economic rivals too, only China was mentioned consistently. This constant mention shows that for Obama and his administration China is an important international player but only in economy. Also especially in the last two addresses the context in which China is being mentioned becomes more negative creating an image of rival that doesn’t play according to the rules in international economy and has to be disciplined through legal methods.

There are only two State of the Union Addresses of Barack Obama’s second term in office. The first was given in 2013 and the second in 2014.

In the 2013 State of the Union report China is mentioned only once and in a positive lite as a leader in green energy development.⁹⁶ Here China is given as a positive example to be followed. The most important foreign event mentioned in this report are the meeting with Burma’s political activist Aung San Su Kyi, Russia’s engagement in reducing nuclear weapons and the destruction of what is left from Al Qaida⁹⁷. Compared with previous State of the Union reports this one is very domestically orientated.

⁹⁴ The State of the Union Address, January 25, 2009. // <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=88928//>. Last accessed: 2014.05.29.

⁹⁵ The State of the Union Address, January 24, 2012. // <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=99000//>. Last accessed: 2014.05.29.

⁹⁶ The State of the Union Address, January 12, 2013. // <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=102826//>. Last accessed: 2014.05.29.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

The 2014 Information about the State of the Union gave more attention to the foreign policy than the previous. This time China is mentioned twice but as always just in the context of economy. China is mentioned as not the best place to invest any more giving that U.S. is and should be the best place to invest in, but further China is also mentioned together with Europe as competitive players in international economy that do not stand still.⁹⁸ Again China is being compared in the sector in which it is leading to ignite rivalry and competitiveness of Americans. There are no indications of seeing China as military threat, but its growing economic power is seen as something that should be surpassed by the growing American economic power.

The 2015 State of the Union Address was again centered on the domestic problems. China firstly was mentioned in the context of the U.S. economic growth as an economic rival who is set to write the rules for the world's fastest growing region and in this way to cause trouble to the U.S. business and its workers. In order to avoid that Obama encourages more active position in regulation making for the trade in the Asia-Pacific region. This implies the faster implementation of the TPP.

While discussing the military insecurities, Obama stressed the need to not be hasty with the decisions. He also once again declared that USA is the leading force in the world and it will continue to do so in the future. This comment is like a response to the international debate about the rising leaders of the future international arena. The same confirmation can be seen in the National Security Strategy 2015 where it was said in the *Introduction* of the National Security Strategy 2015. It declares the "Strategic Restraint" towards international challenges, China included, but it does not mean U.S. is restraining from any kind of actions. Obama calls for the "smart leadership" which is combination of military power and diplomacy.⁹⁹ In this way U.S. does not declare the Containment Strategy as one of the element used against future rivals such as China.

Again China has been directly mentioned only trice. Some parts of the speech implies it is directed towards China, like the part about necessity to upgrade laws for cyber-attack prevention. Once again the most attention that is given to China is through the emphasis of it being the main economic rival in the most essential and fastest growing region in the world. Just like in the National Security Strategies, Obama is avoiding any unnecessary provocations but still keeps on pointing out the relevant of the rise of China and the possible economic threats it might cause to U.S. However it is not being discussed the security threat that China might impose on U.S. in military and political spheres. In this sense the official position is avoiding calling China the main threat to U.S. position in the world and addressing the military and political issues the rise of China posse on the USA global leadership. Even if it is not officially declared in order to avoid tension, the practice of U.S. foreign

⁹⁸ The State of the Union Address, January 28, 2014. // <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=102826//>. Last accessed: 2014.05.29.

⁹⁹ State of the Union Address, January 20, 2009. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=108031>. Last accessed: 2015.04.29.

policy shows strong presence of the Containment strategy being used against China in political, military and economic spheres. The following chapter will analyse the practical implementation of features of the Containment Strategy towards China.

4 IMPLEMENTING CONTAINMENT

Containment Strategy can be seen being implemented in three main levels: political, military and economic. The intensity of implementation differs in all three spheres. Political level contains the implementation of new foreign policy toward Asia-pacific region called “Rebalancing” or “Pivot”, military level contains of redistributing more military personnel and equipment to the region and strengthening the already existing U.S. military bases and the economic level deals with creating economic rules in the region that are the best for implementing U.S. interests. All three of these levels are being analyzed in the following subchapters.

4.1 Political Level

Implementation of Containment Strategy in political mostly contains of creating new approach to the Asia-pacific region and strengthening alliances.

During the first term Barack Obama’s administration developed a new strategy towards East Asia. “Rebalance” was supposed to be the name of the new strategy showing the shift of US attention from Middle Eats coming back to East Asia.¹⁰⁰ Later there were terms ‘pivot’ and ‘reinvigorate’ introduced too but the main term used is the ‘Pivot’. This term represents US focus on Asia-Pacific region as one of the most important regions for USA national interests. Although the term ‘Pivot’ is more known it was used by Secretary Clinton, while Barack Obama preferred ‘rebalance’. In this way it does not show that the attention will shift drastically from regions such as Middle East but it shows the more balanced distribution of attention between vitally important regions. The first time that Obama announced about the new policy was during his speech in Australia on November 17, 2011. In his speech, Obama expressed the importance of Asia-Pacific to the world economy and especially to economic and security interests of the USA.¹⁰¹ Another sing that shows the importance of the region was that first official foreign visits of Secretary Clinton were done to Asia-Pacific states – Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and China.¹⁰² The choice of Asia shows the importance of the region and that USA is focusing its attention towards it.

The ‘Pivot’ strategy was focused on the so called China ‘challenge’ – its fast economic and military growth that creates tension and the built up of distrust and suspicion among China’s neighbors and in USA. Even so US declares that ‘Pivot’ strategy is not created as a method to contain China, but as way for better cooperation and integration to the international system. Even so this

¹⁰⁰ Dewis, F. Pivot, Rebalance, or Reinvigorate? Words Matter in U.S. Strategy toward Asia. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2014/04/pivot-rebalance-reinvigorate-words-matter-us-strategy-toward-asia>. Last accessed: 2014 2 02.

¹⁰¹ Asian Strategic Review. http://www.idsa.in/system/files/book_ASR2013.pdf, p.3; last accessed: 2014 12 02.

¹⁰² Ibid, p.4.

strategy contains all the necessary components – military, economic, political and ideological.¹⁰³ The military component is mentioned first and shows the importance of military power in this strategy.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p.7.

4.2 Military Level

The growing economic and military power of China is accelerating the insecurity of its neighboring states. It is especially so for the states that China has territorial disputes with. The possibility of military conflict is not appealing to Chinas neighbors. In recent years China has modernized it's military and has the capability to use long range military forces.¹⁰⁴ These long range military forces contain naval missiles and land based air missiles. In the near future Chinas missiles might reach targets in 1900 kilometers from China. These technologies can pose threat to US too.¹⁰⁵

According to 'Pivot' strategy US military assets should be divided in ratio 60:40 between Pacific and Atlantic spheres.¹⁰⁶ Coming from 50:50 ration to 60:40 points out the importance that the regions have to US. For dealing with Chinas 'challenge' US has a three different stages:

- Integration. This would mean a deeper involvement of China in regional relations through negotiations and bilateral and multilateral negotiations avoiding the use of force while solving any arising problems and/or conflicts.
- Proactive deterrence. Involves strengthening the allies of US including deploying military forces while addressing main complains in the region such as freedom of navigation in international waters.
- Operational superiority. This stage would be reached only in cases of attack. For that the defensive mechanisms should be strengthened this includes strengthening the defensive mechanisms against missiles, submarines, cyber-attacks and/or terrorist attacks.¹⁰⁷

US already has military bases in Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Guam. There are approximately 50 US ships in the region every day that could be deployed. The military personnel in the region consist of: 55,039 in Japan, 28,500 in South Korea, 5886 in Guam, 1100 in Australia, 311 in Singapore, 1154 in Philippines and 366 in Thailand.¹⁰⁸ To strengthen its position US is strengthening ties with Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia.¹⁰⁹ Additional allies are needed to balance the power of China and contain its growth.

¹⁰⁴ Haddick, R. The Real U.S.-China War Asia Should Worry About: The "Range War". <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-us-china-war-asia-should-worry-about-the-range-war-10952>. Last accessed: 2014 11 29.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Asian Strategic Review. www.idsa.in/system/files/book_ASR2013.pdf, p.37; last accessed: 2014 12 02.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p.38.

¹⁰⁸ Kireeva, A. (2014) Regional Strategies and Military Buildup in East Asia and Indo-Pacific: A Russian perspective. National Maritime Foundation, Vol. 10, No. 2. P.37.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

Military capacities will be strengthened and relocated from Middle East (withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan) and will be used for deterrence against China and strengthening of neighboring states that are allies of US.

Alliances are also being strengthened during the Obama presidency. The main alliances between U.S. and East Asia states were made during the Cold War. In Asia-Pacific U.S. preferred signing bilateral and trilateral Mutual Defense Treaties and not Collective Defense treaties as in the case of Europe. The US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty which was signed on August 30, 1951 in Washington, D.C, ensured that both states would defend each other in any case of external attack.¹¹⁰

The US-Republic of Korea (ROK/South Korea) Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953, and became effective in 1954 and the same year the United States and Taiwan signed a mutual defense treaty. According to this treaty the US would provide protection for Taiwan in case of invasion by China.¹¹¹ Later the US has developed mutual security alliance with ASEAN.

Now the most important thing for U.S. is not to create more alliances in the region but to strengthen the ones that are already existing.¹¹² And in this way to strengthen the position in the region and ensure the security of the allies.

¹¹⁰ Thomas Lum, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests, CRS Report for Congress (April 5, 2012)

¹¹¹ Kireeva, A. (2014) Regional Strategies and Military Buildup in East Asia and Indo-Pacific: A Russian perspective. National Maritime Foundation, Vol. 10, No. 2. P.41.

¹¹² Ibid. P.35.

4.3 Economic Level

The rapid growth of China's economy was one of the most scrutinized topics of the end of 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Many scholars wrote about the impact of the economic rise of China not only to its nearest neighbors but also to the region and the global economy. One of the biggest concerns to United States is the possible threat that the rapid economic growth of China might have on U.S. interests in the region and its economy in general. To have a better understanding about the U.S. position towards China in the context of economy we should first examine the implication for the rapid growth of the economic power of China.

4.3.1 U.S. approach to the Rapid Growth of China's Economic Power

After the economic reforms made by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 the PRC economy started booming.¹¹³ It kept an annual growth rate of 9.9% for more than 30 years and its economy did not suffer as much during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and it survived the Economic crisis of 2008 much better compared with other states such as in European Union.¹¹⁴ China was the biggest contributor to the growth of world GDP with 14.5% in 2009 and became the second biggest economy in 2010.¹¹⁵

Being the world's biggest exporter and having the biggest reserves together with having almost no problems with internal and external debt shows that China still has space to grow. Also in 2012 China was the biggest foreign holder of U.S. debt owning about \$1.2 trillion in bills, notes and bonds.¹¹⁶ This makes USA feel more concerned about China and its position towards U.S.

Another effect of rapidly growing China's economic power is that China's economy becomes the economic integrator of Asian region. Growing China's economy stimulates the growth of neighboring states economies and gives more opportunities for China to project its influence in the region. Other Asian-Pacific states such as Republic of Korea, Japan, and Australia manufacture their own goods in China. Being the manufacturer of Asia and also investing in neighboring states makes China not only the leading state in economic growth but also an important integrator of regional economy.¹¹⁷

In the end of 20th century the leading economic power was Japan which was referred to as a lead in a "Flying Geese" pattern, however China might have the capability to be a "dragon" and not the leading "goose" because of its potential to sustain its economic growth for a much longer

¹¹³ The Economist. The second Long March. // <http://www.economist.com/node/12758848>; last accessed: 2015 04 20.

¹¹⁴ Wong, J. (2012). A China-centric economic order in East Asia. *Asia Pacific Business Review*, 19:2. P.286.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. P.287.

¹¹⁶ How Much U.S. Debt Does China Really Own?// <http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/moneymatters/ss/How-Much-US-Debt-Does-China-Own.htm>; last accessed:2015 04 20.

¹¹⁷ Wong, J. (2012). A China-centric economic order in East Asia. *Asia Pacific Business Review*, 19:2. P.286.

period of time. The possibility to become a “dragon” in leading Asia-Pacific in economic development and China's unpredictable nature worries USA and encourages it to take action to become a leading economic power in the region again. One of these methods is the Trans-Pacific Partnership which would help U.S. to once again become the main leading economic power in the region.

4.3.2 Trans–Pacific Partnership as a Method of Containment Strategy

In order to create an alternative arena for multinational trade negotiations, USA joined a Tran-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations in 2008. TPP became a good opportunity not only to avoid the slow and frequently ineffective World Trade Organization (WTO) as an arena for multilateral trade negotiation but also to use TPP as a mean to limit China's economic influence in the region.¹¹⁸

The TPP negotiations were started by four states: Singapore, Brunei, Chile and New Zealand. Now it has 12 members: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and USA.¹¹⁹ In 2012 these states accounted for roughly one third of world's trade¹²⁰ China being not included. That makes TPP one of the biggest and most influential trade agreements in the world and its impact to the global trade is becoming more and more significant.

As it was mentioned before, the growing economic power of China might attract its neighbor and create opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation helping to lessen historical and territorial tension in the region and show China in a more positive light strengthening its position in the region. Leaving China outside of the TPP would mean that USA which is now the main TPP initiator and plays the main role in negotiations could try to influence the economic policy for its own benefit and project U.S. influence more strongly in the region.

On the other hand if China decides to join TPP negotiations, it would have to agree with the regulations and normative that other parties have already agreed upon. This would force China to accept the game rules that are mostly set by U.S. and helps to protect U.S. trade and project power over the Asia-Pacific region. Either way, TPP is not that convenient to China as it is convenient to U.S.

¹¹⁸ Lu, SH. (2015) Impact of the Trans-Pacific Partnership on China's Textiles and apparel Exports: A Quantitative Analysis. *The International Trade Journal*, Vol. 29. P. 19.

¹¹⁹ TPP Issue-by-Issue Information Center. // <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-issue-issue-negotiating-objectives>; last accessed: 2015 04 29.

¹²⁰ Lu, Sh. *Ibid*, p. 20.

States such as Japan, Canada together with U.S. encourage the joining of China. Some officials in Japan have even expressed their believe that China might join TPP in 5 to 10 years because it could not accept some of the norms that would be in its disadvantage.¹²¹

Even though TPP could be a strong weapon in containing China's growing economic influence around the region, it also has its setbacks. First of all at this point the TPP negotiations are in

¹²¹ Rosenfeld, E. Major Asia-Pacific trade pact enters final stages. // <http://www.cnn.com/id/102517056>; last accessed: 2015 04 29.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The main purpose of the Containment Strategy is to help to keep the Balance of Power and prevent the aggressors/rivals from changing the balance of power for their own benefit. Main features of Containment strategy are deterrence, spread of universal (Western values) and strengthening alliances.
2. Since the end of Second World War U.S. policy towards China changed according to the change of international situation and China's position in the Asia-Pacific region. From being not relevant enough to be considered as a possible threat in the beginning of the Cold War to becoming one of the leverages in U.S.-USSR relationships in the middle of the Cold War and to being the biggest economic rival and a threat to U.S. economic, political and military security. The changes of the U.S. policy toward China were as dynamic as the changes of China's position and power in the region, but it has always been based on pragmatic needs of U.S. to maintain its influence in political, military and economic spheres in Asia-Pacific. The fastest growing and most dynamic region in the world is vitally important to the U.S. and its position towards China will vary and change according to the situation, but will keep the need to sustain its dominance in the Asia-Pacific. And even though China is being perceived as a threat it will not necessarily mean that the official position will portray the same position.
3. The official position Of the United States towards China during both terms of Barack Obama administration is cautious and avoids provoking any conflicts. The National Security Strategy in a very broad manner puts the guidelines for U.S. foreign policy but does not suggest any specific methods to deal with most of the challenges, China being one of them. The same could be said about Barack Obama's annual State of the Union addresses in which he addresses China as the biggest economic rival but not a security threat. However the official position declared in these document do not go together with the practical policy being implemented over the Asia-Pacific region.
4. Even though China is not being mentioned as a security threat to the United States Containment Strategy is being used towards China in political, military and economic spheres. The creation of new "Rebalance" policy towards China, relocation of military forces in the region, strengthening of regional alliances and creating new ones, and creating free trade treaties to ensure the interest of the U.S. and project its power over region at the same time preventing China of doing so. However these methods may not always work to the best interests as relocating military forces or trying to contain China's economic power in the region can cause additional tension. Said that it does not seem that U.S. might changes its current trajectory in conducting relationship with China and Containment Strategy will be used as part of U.S. policy towards China.

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