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**THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN IDENTITY AND LANGUAGE: A CASE  
FOR THE PRESERVATION OF LINGUAL MINORITIES**  
(Identiteto ir kalbos sąveika. Argumentai už kalbinių mažumų išsaugojimą)

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## SUMMARY

The thesis criticizes the attempts to construct a cosmopolitan society. It is stressed that the cosmopolitan project does not correspond to the contemporary cultural and social relief. We live in multicultural and multilingual societies which have more differences than similarities. However, there are certain threats to lingual minorities which may end up with the new tower of Babel. Therefore certain measures have to be undertaken in order to protect non-pivotal languages of the world. The thesis aims, firstly, to provide the justifications of the necessity to protect the lingual minorities; and secondly, to recommend what should be undertaken concretely. The close interplay between identity and language is stressed. It is also emphasized that lingual diversity could provide us with more cognitive and scientific knowledge and data than we could get in a unilingual society. In this way individual's identity would expand. The embodiment of collective/group-differentiated rights could ensure the safe existence of multicultural and multilingual society.

**Key words:** identity, language, cosmopolitanism, lingual minorities.

## SANTRAUKA

Šis darbas kritikuoja pastangas sukurti kosmopolitinę visuomenę. Prabrėžiama, kad kosmopolitinis projektas neatitinka šių dienų kultūrinio ir socialinio reljefo. Mes gyvename daugiakultūrinėse ir daugiakalbinėse visuomenėse, kurios turi daugiau skirtumų nei panašumų. Vis dėlto, egzistuoja tam tikros grėsmės kalbinėms mažumoms, kurios gali nulemti sugįžimą prie Babelio bokšto. Todėl, siekiant apsaugoti kalbines mažumas, turi būti imtasi tam tikrų priemonių. Šis darbas pirmiausiai siekia pateikti argumentų už kalbinių mažumų išsaugojimą bei nurodyti tai, ko turi būti imtasi konkrečiai. Yra akcentuojama glaudi sąveika tarp kalbos ir identiteto. Taip pat pabrėžiama, kad kalbinė įvairovė galėtų teikti mums daugiau kognityvinių ir mokslinių žinių bei duomenių, nei tai galėtų atlikti vienakalbė visuomenė. Tokiu būdu individo identitetas prasiplėstų, Kolektyvinių arba grupes-skiriančių teisių realizavimas galėtų užtikrinti saugų daugiakultūrinės ir daugiakalbės visuomenės gyvavimą.

**Raktažodžiai:** identitetas, kalba, kosmopolitizmas, kalbinės mažumos.

## PREFACE

The main problem of the thesis is the destiny of lingual and cultural minorities. It will be demonstrated that many prevailing political and social ideologies regarding the national and ethnic issues do not adjust their theories to the particularities of the contemporary world i.e. the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of mankind. Therefore, some cosmopolitan and liberal approaches are inadequate and have to be either rejected or supplemented because they spread various forms of standardization and seek to find out essential universal denominators which must be inherent to all the peoples. That threatens to undermine the cultural and linguistic diversity common to mankind and to make it homogenous. Thus, the aim of the thesis is to come up with more profound justifications and arguments for the preservation and protection of cultural minorities. New justifications and arguments for multiculturalism, multilingualism and pluralism should replace or supplement the prevailing ones that are vicious and improper. In addition to that, traditional liberal ideology which stresses individual rights has to be supplemented with collective or group-differentiated rights.

The method of the thesis is the analysis and comparison of the diverse approaches regarding the pivotal issues such as cognition, ethical and scientific basis for the construction of a cosmopolitan society, individual vs. collective/group-differentiated rights. Many different authors who represent probably, at first glance, incompatible disciplines, allow to consider the issues from many different angles and to come up with more reasonable conclusion and recommendations.

Many different authors from different philosophical fields were chosen in order to better present the problem of the thesis. Furthermore, the juxtaposition of different approaches allows to observe aspects of an issue that otherwise may be missed. For instance, Paul Feyerabend's or Ludwig Wittgenstein's insights can be very valuable while criticizing the scientific or moral foundations for the construction of a cosmopolitan society. Furthermore, John Gray, Naomi Klein, Friedrich Nietzsche and Guy Deutscher can suggest completely different attitudes towards the essence of language and possibilities of cognition. When we juxtapose their arguments with the arguments for multilingualism provided by the EU, we are able to better notice the drawbacks and narrowness of the latter ones. Finally, comparison of several different authors representing liberalism (Voltaire, Bertrand Russell and Will Kymlicka) can reveal the flaws of the ideology and helps to better understand the suggestions of Kymlicka. Such authors as John Stuart Mill and John Rawls have barely been used in the discussions on liberalism. It happened because Mill's theory was too radical and completely incompatible with the contemporary social and cultural reality; Rawls, in turn, pays little attention to the problématique of the thesis. Therefore, only several general ideas of each of them have been discussed in the thesis. The Lithuanian authors have not

been mentioned either, because discussions on the protection and preservation of cultural minorities and indigenous languages are not prevailing in the public sphere.

The thesis is structured so that the first part is a source of the further argumentation and criticism. In the first part two things are discussed: firstly, the dominant modern individualistic approach based on the scientific frame of mind; and secondly, the possibilities of cognition. In the course of the thesis these topics are discussed from various angles and serve as critical, recommendational or justifying insights. In general, the first half of the thesis aims at presenting approaches which are later criticized and refuted. The second half aims at providing justifications for the protection of cultural minorities and recommendations how to accomplish that.

# I THE MODERN CRITIQUE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNIVERSALISM AND MODERN INDIVIDUALISM

## 1. Introduction

There is a myriad of approaches of what are humankind, human being, human culture and human language. Some of them attribute the highest significance to the human artefacts, uniqueness and particularities; some of them, on the contrary, deny the possibility of the slightest importance of human existence and activity. There is no final definition of what is humanity as such, how should it function, how should it develop, if, of course, such things as ‘development’ or ‘progress’ exist at all. Various theories and approaches to some extent always have a direct or indirect effect in our daily lives: it might correct or change individual’s mindset; it might affect the interaction between different societies, cultures and states through being realized as legal acts. In the end, the only thing which is undoubted is that our modes of co-existence are based on the conventional acts. Since all these acts of the personal and communal development are all based on certain sets of beliefs and convictions which might have originated from the mistiest, haziest and the most feverish ideas, it may be useful to take a look at some of different approaches concerning humanity.

One of the most complicated conditions while surveying different points of view is to suspend the contemporary Western feeling of ‘common sense’ and not obey the propensity to differentiate approaches into, on the one hand, rational and logical, and, on the other hand, irrational and mystical. There should be no criteria for such a differentiation. That is to say, the criterion as such must always be engendered and justified by the possessor of power and thus, it is always lacking another possible conception of reality and consequently, it always tends to monopolize reality. The reckless refutation of illogical and irrational approaches can never pave the way towards the better explanation and understanding of reality. Quite on the contrary, the statements which at first glance seem improbable might enrich uniform and static conception of it.

The three interrelated issues are going to be discussed further: humanity and the role of language and culture. The three critical texts written by the prominent philosophers each of whom represents his own century respectively, Voltaire’s *Micromegas* (1752), Friedrich Nietzsche *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense* (1873) and Bertrand Russell *The Theologian's Nightmare* (1961) are going to be discussed. In the end of the part I will also discuss some ideas of Feyerabend. His and Nietzsche’s insights will allow us to better feel the contrast residing between different outlooks discussed in this part.

Some of the texts are not written in a standard philosophical manner and are rather fictitious stories. Nevertheless, they can help us to stand into the shoes of the modern philosophers and to overlook humanity from the philosophical highlands. However, despite the authority and

perceptivity of the authors, later I will argue that the contribution of their ideas to the human depository of knowledge is not so significant and that there is a great variety of other world-views which should be endowed with the same validity.

### **1.1 Accumulation and critical assessment of knowledge. Voltaire's approach**

Voltaire's *Micromegas* is one of the most representative writings of the Enlightenment. It is a mixture of social, political, philosophical and religious critique that is lighted up in the context of growing scientific knowledge, in fact, very modest and limited one. The core of his reflections is human being and his state of knowledge. In effect, it is undoubted that growing scientific knowledge in the age of the author to some extent influenced the general appreciation of human being and consequently, his position in the universe. The main character of the essay is called Micromegas and he represents a creature of supra-human intelligence who completely understands his own limitations and who dedicates all his relatively 'short' life to the pursuit of a good and right life.

The model of a perfect human being and the critique of the mundane wretchedness and stubbornness lie precisely in the character of Micromegas. In the light of relativism Voltaire demonstrates the real insignificance and futility of humanity's controversies over various unimportant issues which, in turn, are caused by the ideological incommensurabilities and personal interests hiding beyond them. Thus, Micromegas is exalted as a proper example for humanity.

One of the conclusions which might be drawn from the essay is that differences and frictions which divide humanity are all entirely artificial and meaningless. Our mundane problems seem without any sense in regard to the infinite universe and immense variety of extraterrestrial beings which possibly dwell in it. Nevertheless, what is a solution? Is it the acceptance of 'micromegian' kind of existential prosperity and its application to humanity? That would be the project of the Enlightenment which has never been realized and which denies all the rest of approaches which do not coincide with the standards and norms established by the Enlightenment. There can be, however, envisaged positive and negative facets of such historical proposal.

The negative aspect is that 'micromegian' kind of being inclines to base its identity on the scientific knowledge, the alleged logical and rational status of which can never be envisaged in advance just like it can never be entrenched after the acquisition of 'sufficient' quantity of data. In the last chapter I will demonstrate more exhaustively the deficiency of the terms 'rationality', 'factuality' and 'objectivity'. For the moment it is enough to mention that Voltaire was too optimist in respect to the scientific development.

What is positive about Micromegas is that he is always accumulating, assessing and accepting or refuting various opinions and never tries to take something for granted. That engenders a certain tension within Micromegas, because he can never acquire any narrow and final narrative which clarifies and classifies *the known*. Micromegas is being torn apart by ambiguous feelings: that of superiority and that of understanding that his cognitive capacities are limited by his circumstances and pre-present experience. In other words, he realizes that any change around him influences his experience and that his perception of the universe shifts respectively. The same motifs will repeat in Russell's theory.

The strong emphasis should be put on the expression *tension within one's personality*. As it has been mentioned above, certain tension and incertitude within one's personality is important because it does not allow one to dwell upon one fixed narrative of the world. Such a narrative is very dangerous, especially in our modern intermingled societies, because it always seeks to ascribe to the things certain distinguishing properties, such as 'good' vs. 'bad', 'right' vs. 'wrong'. The efforts to contain and combine several different perspectives within oneself are positive because such an action is a direct refutation of the acceptance of one solid, homogenous and uniform world-view.

It is obvious that Voltaire denies the importance of a concrete particular cultural background and focuses on the individual attempts to cognize the world. He refutes dogmatic and traditional approaches which tend to take everything for granted and as a stable and fixed explanation of reality.

According to Voltaire, identity has to be in a constant state of being acquired. The Saturnian (one of the characters in Voltaire's essay) who at first denied the possibility of the existence of such a miserable creature as human being later on had to change his opinion. Such a shift in knowledge inevitably changes the perception of self and the world. However, we should not agree that the way to the self-world-cognition goes through the refutation of the old and irrelevant. In other words, some sorts of human knowledge cannot be refuted just because they are incompatible with the modern rational thinking. The conclusion which might be drawn from Voltaire's essay is that rationality of the new human being dominates over the meaningless and obscure prejudices of the uncultivated people who are fettered by the old-term conventions and convictions. However, by accepting Voltaire's world-view we would bestow a groundless superiority on the modern reasoning which would keep 'engineering' our outside world without questioning its own premises and validity.

Hereinafter I will keep describing the image of the modern individual and this time the ideas of Bertrand Russell will be discussed. It is important to bear in mind that Russell's and Voltaire's outlooks do not differ significantly. Voltaire through his main character Micromegas has

emphasized the importance of the organization of knowledge according to the changing experience. In other words, permanent willingness and open-mindedness to the new experiences help to surpass the pitfall of prejudices. Russell is more radical than Voltaire and thus, as it will be argued later, he, contrary to his desires, did not succeed to surpass the pitfall of prejudices.

## **1.2 The modern image of the individual. Scientific foundation of a cosmopolitan society. Russell's approach**

In this chapter I will keep discussing the questions I posed above: the image of humanity, modern individual and society and their relationship with rationality and science. In his writings Russell is particularly concerned with science which is opposed to the traditional sets of beliefs and which is supposedly based on rationality. Consequently, the individuals of the new era (not only members of a scientific community, but ordinary citizens as well) should enter into the scientific state of mind. Therefore, a separation between individual and civic education should be made; certainly, the former kind of education should prevail in the modern society. Later on the differences between two modes of education will be explained more explicitly. For the moment it can be briefly mentioned that this separation has much to do with the relationship between science and traditional tenets. Finally, Russell sketches out the model of the future society which is merely cosmopolitan and which should be based on the idea of loyalty to the world and not to a specific State. The particular stress should be put on his modern orientation towards individualism, which will be discussed later on.

In one of his essays (*Theologian's Nightmare*) Bertrand Russell mocks a theologian who is the representative of the 'outdated' knowledge. What are the features of this kind of knowledge? First of all, it is undoubted and unquestionable geocentrism and 'humancentrism'. The theologian who dreamt that he died and went to heaven was absolutely sure that mankind was the supreme work of God. However, he was disillusioned by the creatures living in heaven that destroyed his religious convictions and beliefs about humanity, Creator, and afterlife.

There is no great necessity to unfold the entire story. The main point why it is interesting to briefly dwell upon this supposititious case is that it perfectly illustrates the collision between the modern and traditional notions of humanity and universe. In Russell's essay a strange extraterrestrial creature finally manages to find some parsimonious information about our planet which was supposed to be the centre of the universe; however, the following words coming out from the mouth of the 'scientific creature' reveal nothing but minuteness of our planet: "but I am quite at a loss to imagine why it has aroused any special interest. It closely resembles a great many other stars in the same galaxy. It is of average size and temperature, and is surrounded by very

much smaller bodies called 'planets.' After minute investigation, I discovered that some, at least, of these planets have parasites, and I think that this thing which has been making inquiries must be one of them"<sup>1</sup>.

Despite the difference of time when the essays of Voltaire and Russell were written, they both share the same doubts and motifs. The down-grading of the importance of humanity which is common to both essays is the direct consequence of the increase of scientific knowledge. To put it differently, the increase of scientific knowledge disillusioned some of the 'progressive minds' who on its basis refuted religious and cosmologic speculations. Consequently, science disenchanting humanity and provided it with an 'objective' method, knowledge and new standards of truth. Only science which is based on rationality and intelligence can uproot bigotry and all traditional world-views and tenets which are based on human desires, passions and the lack of rationality.

Although the pre-dominated religious importance and centrality of mankind turned out to be a pure chimera, the potential value of mankind still remained. In regard to the entire universe humanity, certainly, seemed like a cluster of parasites. This cluster, however, was not a uniform and homogenous. It was divided into many conflicting and incommensurable parts. Precisely, this diversity engendered by the different opinions based on passions and superstitions is at the core of the mockery in both essays. Diversity is conceived as something based on irrational convictions; it is something that deceives people and causes a lethal threat to the co-existence of humanity. In other words, people who follow this kind of convictions lead their lives in a wrong way both in personal and communal levels. Nevertheless, their lives may obtain value if they suspended their irrationality and began to live according to the rational dictate of reason. Once irrational propensities are rectified, people will lead a truthful prosperous lives based on intelligence.

It might be argued that in both cases humanity is conceived as a micro-whole in regard to the universe: it is a micro-whole in its diversity and heterogeneity, just like it is a micro-whole in its uniformity and homogeneity. However, the value of the latter is much more significant since it is scientifically and rationally orientated. Hence, the new type of human is exalted: the one who measures his opinions with rational criteria and manages to act according to his sterilized and purified opinions. Thus, Russell approaches the new form of society which has to correspond to the new demands of the epoch, namely the cosmopolitan society. Though, to be honest, as it will be mentioned a bit later, Russell rather treats cosmopolitanism as the project for the near future.

In order to better grasp the scope of Russell's intellectual project let's illustrate his notion of the modern individual and modern society with some of his quotations. The precise concepts and expressions will serve us later in demonstrating the deficiency and drawbacks of such an outlook.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/russell3.htm>

The scientific frame of mind, rationality, and the education of individual or citizen are highly interrelated and intermingled concepts. According to Russell, “the scientific state of mind is neither sceptical nor dogmatic. The sceptic holds that the truth is undiscoverable, while the dogmatist holds that it is already discovered. The man of science holds that the truth is discoverable though not discovered, at any rate in the matters which he is investigating (...) he does not conceive his discoveries as final and absolute, but as approximations subject to future correction. Absence of finality is of the essence of the scientific spirit. The beliefs of the man of science are therefore tentative and undogmatic” (Russell 1932, 23). In other words, the progressive mind is the mind of change which is capable of rejecting or changing its convictions. The new type of individual is that who does not dwell upon one fixed world-view and who is always ready to recklessly reject it.

Precisely in the clash between the modern and the traditional lies the distinction between individual culture and the education of the citizen. The source of the conflict is “the scientific attitude towards doubtful questions. Science has developed a certain technique, which is essentially a technique of discovery, that is to say, of change. The scientific frame of mind is, broadly speaking, that which facilitates discovery, not that which causes a man to have an unwavering belief in the present tenets of science. A well-educated citizen is likely to be incapable of discovery, since he will respect his elders and betters, reverence the great men of the past generations, and look with horror upon all subversive doctrines. The modern State, which is built upon science, is therefore in a difficulty. Some States prefer unorthodox people who invent new explosives, others prefer that their young men should be orthodox, and should carry on the great traditions of the past” (Ibid. 21-22).

Thus, at the moment we are dealing with couple of problems. Firstly, an ordinary habitant of a state who has no faculties for a scientific discovery can hardly absorb scientific way of reasoning and acting and therefore, cannot be a rational in a complete sense of the word (Russell 2004, 25). The second problem is the orientation of the State. What should the modern state desire: the ‘production’ of faithful citizens or a cultivation of cosmopolitan individual who most likely will transcend the national boundaries becoming a member of the global society and thus, will undermine the very idea of the State? I will later argue that a faithful citizen might be a hostage of national policy; however, the concept of cosmopolitan individual understood in the terms of Russell, is an illusion and individual might become a victim of a narrow and limited understanding as well.

Now let’s analyze what is rationality based on? In the beginning, Russell assumes “that there are facts” (Ibid. 35) and that “our beliefs are, however, often contrary to fact (...) The theoretical part of rationality, then, will consist in basing our beliefs as regards matters of fact upon evidence rather than upon wishes, prejudices, or traditions. According to the subject matter, a

rational man will be the same as one who is judicial or one who is scientific” (Ibid.). In the first chapter I have already mentioned that Micromegas’ positive features were permanent accumulation, assessment of knowledge and opinions, which, in turn, are accepted or refuted depending on the probability of their infallibility. He never falls down into the realm of certainty. Micromegas is not a slave of a fixed opinion; on the contrary, he is always opened to new experiences which might modify his convictions. He is an ideal type of the scientist and it is certain that Russell would like every ordinary person to take over Micromegas’ faculty of rational organization of opinion.

According to Russell, the rational organization of opinion can be defined “as the habit of taking account of all relevant evidence in arriving at a belief. Where certainty is unattainable, a rational man will give most weight to the most probable opinion, while retaining others, which have an appreciable probability, in his mind as hypotheses which subsequent evidence may show to be preferable. This, of course, assumes that it is possible in many cases to ascertain facts and probabilities by an objective method—i.e., a method which will lead any two careful people to the same result” (Ibid. 33). Thus, what we have here is the individual who is receptive to new experiences and who tests the truth of his convictions through the lens of factuality. His teachers are newly discovered facts which rectify his fallacies. Russell, actually, believes “that all solid progress in the world consists of an increase in rationality” (Ibid. 39).

We have just arrived at the description of what is rationality to Russell. We can also add that for Russell, “the control of our acts by our intelligence is ultimately what is of most importance, and what alone will make social life remain possible as science increases the means at our disposal for injuring each other” (Ibid.). As it has been mentioned above, believe in objective method, rationality and intelligence best represents the modern world-view. After the entrenchment of such Western, scientific, and modern outlook, there is no more place for any other non-modern, non-scientific, and non-Western outlook under the sun. They are intellectually eliminated because of their reluctance to conform to the changed rules of cognition. I will return to this problem later. For the moment, let’s get back once again to Russell’s cosmopolitan project.

Russell claims that “apart from national cohesion within the State, which is all that State education attempts to achieve at present, international cohesion, and sense of the whole human race as one co-operative unit, is becoming increasingly necessary if our scientific civilization is to survive. I think this survival will demand, as a minimum condition, the establishment of a world State and the subsequent institution of a world-wide system of education designed to produce loyalty to the world State (...) the most vital need of the neat future will be the cultivation of a vivid sense of citizenship of the world” (Russell 1932, 26-27). From the last passages it is obvious that Russell advocates individuality and that communal sentiment or any other forms of affinity are of much less importance. Although he agrees that the civil education better corresponds the needs of

the time, he thinks that individualism based on intelligence is the right way for all humanity (Ibid. 28). In one of the following parts I will argue that a similar point of view became dominant and was a direct inducement to the emergence of such documents like The Universal Declaration of Human Rights which basically emphasizes the individual facets rather than communal or those of group.

Individualism, rationality, scientific frame of mind, the project of cosmopolitan identity, and etc. have to be based on alleged universal dimensions of humanity. However, it seems that these phenomena can be achieved at the expense of traditional world-views and non-Western cultures; that is to say, through the entrenchment of the dictatorship of Western values. In the end, it has nothing to do with alleged universal values, but rather with reductionist universalism, which means that something is achieved through the imposition of one's standards and norms. All in all, the way to universalism should not be founded on the neglect of particularity.

### **1.3 Nietzschean refutation of the 'anthropomorphic' cognition**

Nietzsche's outlook is of great importance because his case provides us with one of the possible critiques of the scientific frame of mind which was inherent to both aforementioned philosophers. In fact, Nietzsche represents the radical criticism which refutes not only the scientific possibility of cognition, but the possibility of any cognition in general. In the following parts I will dwell upon other kind of critique of the scientifically orientated mind, which will be much more modest and which tries not to refute the scientific mind, but rather to treat it as one of many possible world-views. To put it differently, I will discuss an approach which criticizes not science as such, but its aspirations to become the unique and dominant world-view.

Some of the insights of Nietzsche will be valuable when we will analyze the concept of identity. Although Nietzsche's outlook is incompatible with the one which advocates science and rationality, these, at first glance, two different outlooks have originated from the same soil of Western civilization. In other words, despite all the differences, these outlooks are two sides of the same coin. Perhaps the refutation of knowledge and rationality can emerge only in the civilization where these phenomena already have certain status and basis. Therefore, it is important to stress that the value of the tension between different world-views lies not only in the *rivalry* between two or more conflicting approaches which, actually, belong to the same discourse, but also in a complete diversity of world-views which might not have any internal associations.

Our discussion on Nietzsche and his essay called *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense* should begin from binding it with Voltaire's and Russell's works. They all start their reflections from the stress of the worthlessness of humanity in regard to the entire universe. Later in the course of their essays Voltaire and Russell developed and revealed their arguments which supported

rational and scientific world-view. However, Nietzsche's path begins in the same fashion but develops differently. That shows that the authors, despite their discrepancies, are representatives of the same Western tradition.

Nietzsche begins his essay by the following words: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of "world history," but nevertheless, it was only a minute"<sup>2</sup>. Repercussion of the tones of relativism we have already heard, repeats again. However, the differences show up when Nietzsche begins to deal with the problem of human intellect. According to him, there is no right way for our intellect to achieve adequate knowledge and to construct a world-view which could at least arrive at a vague approximation to the grasp of reality. It is so not because of insufficient and underdeveloped scientific measures and not because of bias and flaws inherent to the conflicting interpretations of reality. The main and the only reason of impossibility to arrive at any explanation of reality lies in the arbitrary human intellect. The limitation and imperfection of the human capacities of cognition condemn human beings to wade forever through the mud of illusions, wrong images and conventions. In this regard, Nietzsche goes far beyond than Voltaire and Russell, since he denies the existence of the right way of knowledge acquisition.

What is the source of his scepticism? The first and probably the only reason of intellectual vagrancy and cognitive impotence is the legislation of language. According to Nietzsche, that "establishes the first laws of truth" (Ibid.). Human being designates things by virtue of language, however, since "every concept arises from the equation of unequal things" that gives origin to lie (Ibid.). "The liar is a person who uses the valid designations, the words, in order to make something which is unreal appear to be real" (Ibid.). It is obvious that human being is absolutely incapable to cognize reality; whatever are his efforts, reality and external things will be only another kind of anthropomorphic construction. Human being overlooks "what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts" (Ibid.). Every cognitive attempt is condemned to degenerate into a pure metaphor which, in fact, has nothing to do with the designator. To put it in Nietzsche's terms, "all the material within and with which the man of truth, the scientist, and the philosopher later work and build, if not derived from never-never land, is at least not derived from the essence of things" (Ibid.). Thus, human being is confined to his metaphoric realm and, contrary to Russell's hopes, human's knowledge is never subject to future correction, because every attempt will always be only another possible combination of words.

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<sup>2</sup> [http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/Philosophers/Nietzsche/Truth\\_and\\_Lie\\_in\\_an\\_Extra-Moral\\_Sense.htm](http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/Philosophers/Nietzsche/Truth_and_Lie_in_an_Extra-Moral_Sense.htm)

If we followed Nietzsche's argumentation, there is nothing which could literally be called "objective method", "objective fact" or "the most rational opinion/set of beliefs". Every human cognitive act is only an extension of anthropomorphic world to reality; nature and things do not provide humans with *facts*, but rather facts are a means designed by humans in order to 'conquer' reality. Thus, nothing which is objective, factual or rational can be found outside of human reason. Every word, to which these adjectives can be attributed, helps to organize and conceive reality after human's fashion. The fact of the innerness of the rational and the objective, virtually, eliminates any cognitive scope and ambitions.

Nietzsche, then, asks and answers the question: "What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and; anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions" (Ibid.).

Thus, we have found out what is a 'rational' being – it is a being which "places his behaviour under the control of abstractions" and who lies "according to a fixed convention" (Ibid.); we have also found out that in an anthropomorphic truth there is "not a single point which would be "true in itself" or really and universally valid apart from man" (Ibid.). Though we cannot talk about "true in itself", we can talk about the evolution and entrenchment of true in the society.

According to Nietzsche, the first thing which we get from our surroundings is an image which is later converted into a sound; this is a very simplistic explanation of how the world is conceptualized. We can suppose that the conceptualization of the world is inherent to all human societies, communities and tribes without any exceptions. Thus, we can infer that there is an immense variety of anthropomorphic versions explaining the world. Every anthropomorphic world-view has its own particularities which necessarily evolved by the same nietzschean scheme: firstly, human being "universalizes all these impressions into less colourful, cooler concepts, so that he can entrust the guidance of his life and conduct to them. Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept" (Ibid.).

Issues that are of great importance in this thesis are the possibility to cognize the world and the possibility of a certain world-view to survive in a politically determined world. We have just reached the general explication of how a cognitive process evolves. Nietzsche has paid attention to the psychological aspects of cognition. Bearing in mind all the said, we can move to another dimension of cognition, that is to say, to the political entrenchment of a certain world-view.

We remember from the first two chapters that a modern subject is prone to rationality which to some extent means the construction of sterilized and purified opinions. We also should recall the

expression ‘reductionist universalism’ which was explained as an objective to impose one’s standards and norms. Russell and Voltaire sought to dethrone traditional world-views; Nietzsche, in turn, sought to dispel pretensions to any kind of knowledge. Looking at the case superficially, we can notice at least three conflicting world-views. Each of them has their own arguments: religion encourages people to believe in God emphasizing the dispensability to prove or disapprove its existence by virtue of reasoning, or to put it more simply, religion stresses the supremacy of belief over reasoning; scientifically prone people emphasize the necessity of suspension of convictions and imagination, and advocate the idea of rational reason, while Nietzsche refutes everything which is possible to be refuted.

My aim was (and still remains) to demonstrate that the modern way of thinking is not the only one and therefore, there are no arguments for its privilege or entrenchment at the expense of other world-views. I will consistently return to this problem in the course of the thesis, but now it has to be understood that even if the modern model of rationality prevails or tends to become dominant in the contemporary world, that happens only because it is in possession of political power.

It has been shown that modern rationality is far from having a strong basis and that nietzschean outlook may make a ‘delicate conceptual edifice’ out of it. However, after such a destructive critique of modern rationality, it is high time for a ‘pinch’ of the constructive one. Yet it has to be underlined, that we will return to the nietzschean problem of the anthropomorphic world, which in one of the following parts, will be used as a justification for a preservation of minority and indigenous languages and cultures.

#### **1.4 Feyerabend’s critique of the monolithic scientific world-view. Advocacy of pluralism**

In the last chapter of the first part I am going to discuss Feyerabend’s attitude which is opposite to the scientific one. Feyerabend similarly to Nietzsche criticizes the dictatorship of the scientific world-view; however, on the contrary to Nietzsche, he does not claim that cognition is merely futile activity. Feyerabend is an adherent of diversity and pluralism and therefore, his arguments will be very important in the next parts.

It is not correct to think that Feyerabend treats science completely sceptically. The scientific attitude is one of many ‘products’ of Western civilization and its existence enriches our capacity to see the world differently. Thus, it is not the underestimation of science which is inherent to Feyerabend’s critique, but rather groundless ambitions of science to entrench itself as a unique and dominant world-view is being criticized.

I have already mentioned that the scientifically prone individual before acting has to sterilize and purify his mind and to reject certain, most likely, improper opinions. That is a right way to avoid prejudices. Nevertheless, Feyerabend thinks differently: “The attempt to increase liberty, to lead a full and rewarding life, and the corresponding attempt to discover the secrets of nature and of man, entails, therefore, the rejection of all universal standards and of all rigid traditions. (Naturally, it also entails the rejection of a large part of contemporary science.)” (Feyerabend 2010, 4). Thus, he hopes to defend a humanitarian attitude which supposedly, is being threatened by the scientific one. In fact, to be more accurate, he seeks to defend not only a humanitarian attitude, but all the rest of the world-views as well. The main point is that rigid standards violate individual’s right to decide which attitudes seem appropriate for the construction of his personal world-view. *The* scientific world-view, however, is not eliminated; but its pretensions to uniqueness, exceptionality, and righteousness are disposed of: “there is no ‘scientific world-view’; just as there is no uniform enterprise ‘science’ – except in the minds of metaphysicians, schoolmasters and politicians trying to make their nation competitive. Still, there are many things we can learn from the sciences. But we can also learn from the humanities, from religion and from the remnants of ancient traditions that survived the onslaught of Western Civilization” (Ibid. 261).

To sum up, Feyerabend’s goal is to defend non-scientific attitudes by revealing that there is no such thing as “an impressive and coherent edifice – ‘the’ scientific world-view” (Ibid. 256). Moreover, and most importantly, he very accurately expresses his position in regard to one of the most important concerns of this thesis, namely, the negation of other cultures through westernization and standardization: “I am against ideologies that use the name of science for cultural murder” (Ibid. xxii). Thus, we can assume that Feyerabend’s critique of science to some extent represents the advocacy of non-scientific attitudes. However, we should bear in mind that the suppression of other world-views, can be justified not only in the terms of science; sometimes it is necessary to look more profoundly at the core of the problem and to find there other sorts of interests.

What is then, wrong with *the* scientific world-view? Is it not sufficiently ‘rational’, ‘factual’ and ‘objective’? Does it not succeed in avoiding prejudices? Part of the answer, actually, lies in the question. In general, Feyerabend does not say: “There is much we can learn from *science*”; he rather says: “There is much we can learn from *sciences*”. By saying that he means that “*First-world science is one science among many*; by claiming to be more it ceases to be an instrument of research and turns into a (political) pressure group” (Ibid. xxi). Moreover, “science is never a completed process, therefore, it is always ‘before’ the event. Hence simplicity, elegance or consistency are *never* necessary conditions of (scientific) practice” (Ibid. 8). In other words, there is no such a single thing as science. Science is a very complex thing whose directions of development

depends on an uncountable number of contingencies, events, circumstances and personal idiosyncrasies (Ibid. xix).

Now as we know that there is no one science and that there are a lot of competing attitudes within it, we can ask a question about the validity of method and fact. Feyerabend agrees that “The wide divergence of individuals, schools, historical periods, entire sciences makes it extremely difficult to identify comprehensive principles either of method, or of fact”. (Ibid. 249). He tends to think that the way a rationalist sees a fact entirely depends on the education he has received: “a well-trained rationalist will obey the mental image of *his* master, he will conform to the standards of argumentation he has learned, he will adhere to these standards no matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and he will be quite incapable of realizing that what he regards as the ‘voice of reason’ is but a *causal after-effect* of the training he had received. He will be quite unable to discover that the appeal to reason to which he succumbs so readily is nothing but a *political manoeuvre*” (Ibid. 9).

The way we see something as a fact mainly depends on our ‘single-sided’ training. If we are prepared by the training system to see the world in ‘this’ and not in ‘that’ way, then we have somehow to decide which attitude of seeing is the best one. However, in this case subordination and hierarchization of competing world-views is not a solution, because such actions cannot manage without certain prejudices. According to Feyerabend, the only appropriate way is the establishment of the diversity of attitudes, because “prejudices are found by contrast, not by analysis” (Ibid. 15). By alluding to Mill and Bohr, Feyerabend justifies the necessity of pluralism: “a pluralism of ideas and forms of life is an essential part of any rational inquiry concerning the nature of things (...) *Variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge. And a method that encourages variety is also the only method that is compatible with a humanitarian outlook*” (Ibid. 25).

Thus, if we wish to approach a kind of objective knowledge, we must guarantee the diversity of various different assumptions, attitudes and systems of rationality. Sometimes Feyerabend uses the word ‘playful’ when he refers to the cognitive activity of individual. The cognitive playfulness is compatible with his most famous principle *anything goes*. That is very different approach from that of Russell, because Russell tends to reject every outlook which is ‘irrational’ and does not correspond to the cognitive requirements established by the Western scientific tradition. Feyerabend, on the contrary, states that “the world which we want to explore is a largely unknown entity. We must, therefore, keep our options open and we must not restrict ourselves in advance. Epistemological prescriptions may look splendid when compared with other epistemological prescriptions, or with general principles - but who can guarantee that they are the best way to discover, not just a few isolated ‘facts’, but also some deep-lying secrets of nature?” (Ibid. 4).

We can speak about to kinds of diversities. The first one may be found in Russell's theory. He admits that there are many competing trends within science and that they have to be validated or rejected depending on the level of factuality, rationality and objectivity. This kind of diversity belongs to the realm of reductionist universalism, because it takes rationality for granted and does not ponder its validity. The second kind of diversity is that which allows and accepts all possible ideas and forms of life and reasoning. The concept 'diversity' should not be oversimplified, since the fact that several ideas are competing within the framework of the same discourse does not mean 'diversity'. I will later argue that the tension of identity should originate precisely from the second kind of diversity. The nature of things and the nature of ourselves have more chances to be better and more profoundly cognized in the presence of pluralism of attitudes.

## **1.5 Conclusions**

The first part draws to lines of argumentation and criticism which will be elaborated in the following parts of the thesis. First of all, I have stressed the exaltation of individualism which is inherent to the modern philosophical and political mind. I claim that this is the reason why some approaches are not compatible with social reality where strong communal ties still prevail but are not taking into consideration. As I will argue in the end of the thesis, the individualistic approach has to be supplemented by the collective/group-differentiated rights. Moreover, Bertrand Russell claims that individual has to adjust his reasoning to the new circumstances, precisely, to become more scientific minded. That should be the basis for the creation of a cosmopolitan society which should correspond to the new requirements of people. However, as I have argued, science as a term is too vague and it cannot justify the creation of such society. Moreover, the emphasis which is put on the terms 'new circumstances', 'the scientific minded individual', 'new requirements' are oversimplified and do not take into consideration the diversity inherent to mankind.

The second line is that of cognition. One of the most important arguments for the preservation of minority languages and cultures will be, precisely, their ability to provide people with multifaceted, pluralistic seeing of the world and conditions to better know themselves. Moreover, I will argue later that the term 'tension within one's personality' may be, but not necessarily, one of the prerequisites of a new supplemented liberal approach advocated by Will Kymlicka.

## **II THE CRITIQUE OF THE MODERN VISIONS OF THE SOCIAL INTEGRITY: THE MORAL BASIS FOR THE CREATION OF A COSMOPOLITAN SOCIETY**

### **2. Introduction**

It might be objected that the idea of cosmopolitan society is not a modern way of social, political and cultural cohesion. It might be also added that the project of ‘one nation-one state’ is a true modern form political cooperation and that the idea of cosmopolitanism and global citizenship emerged in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This opinion would be partially correct, except one imprecision. The debates on cosmopolitanism accelerated in the 20<sup>th</sup> century; however, their origins seek deeper in history. Some adherents of the idea of cosmopolitanism try to dig out any evidence from the depth of the ancient history, for instance, they treat the empire of Alexander the Great as one of the first attempts to construct a political entity based on cosmopolitan ideals. However, such remote historical events are not at the core of the thesis.

In the first part I provided some images of humanity which were inherent to the Western philosophical mind. Voltaire and Russell, certainly in a different level, both were inebriated from the successful achievements of the scientific mind. Voltaire’s character Micromegas was indignant about the certainty with which small parasites living on the surface of the Earth asserted their alleged truths. He criticized the withdrawal into one’s own imagined world and reluctance to test its key premises. Thus, Voltaire indicated the way one’s reasoning should follow.

Russell went a bit far beyond coming up with the idea that human race had to make up one co-operative unit. Such a new form of cooperation was based on the premise that Western society had become scientific and thus it needs another kind of agglomerative form. According to him, a world-wide system had to be produced by education which should orientate towards the cultivation of individualism. Each individual, of course, is scientifically prone and understands and accepts the idea of allegiance to the cosmopolitan community. As I have argued in the first part, it is the manifestation of reductionist universalism. His cosmopolitan individual does not take into account any knowledge coming from non-Western cultures. Russell’s sight, while looking for universal values, does not go beyond the borders of Western civilization. For him science is a source of universalism; I called this attitude ‘reductionist universalism’.

When we speak about cosmopolitan or global citizen we usually point at the common values which link the individuals from different regions of the world together. That presupposes the search for universal values. The foregoing authors think that the Western scientific mind is a sufficient and proper source of such values. In this part I am going to discuss the cosmopolitanism based on

universal values and I am going to begin the topic with Kant's reflections on universal rights and values; then I will criticize this approach by rejecting morals as such; thirdly, I will discuss the contemporary dynamics of identity by juxtaposing two different and conflicting approaches: the cosmopolitanism and nationalism; finally, I will deny the possibility of acquiring a cosmopolitan identity and I will also demonstrate how some Voltaire's and Feyerabend's insights can be useful in identity building.

## **2.1 Kant's cosmopolitan project and imposition of Western standards**

Immanuel Kant in his essay called *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1796) stresses the necessity of some form of collaboration between states. Some people denominate Kant as a herald of cosmopolitanism, but I think that denominations are not important at all; the only label, however, which would be completely misleading talking about Kant, is a 'inventor' of universal values. I will elaborate the last statement in the next chapter.

The problem which troubled Kant was that of ensuring perpetual peace in the world and providing individuals with universally valid rights: "The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in *one* part of the world is felt *everywhere*. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual peace." (Kant 2010, 1243). Kant also argues that all persons have to be provided with the *right to the earth's surface*: "all men are entitled to present themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth's surface. Since the earth is a globe, they cannot disperse over an infinite area, but must necessarily tolerate one another's company. And no-one originally has any greater right than anyone else to occupy any particular portion of the earth" (Ibid.). Thus Kantian idea of a "universal right of humanity" if not as a direct outcome, at least, as an echo reverberates in various declarations on human rights issued in postwar Europe.

In fact, it is interesting that Kant did not advocate the idea of amalgamation of different peoples and even underpinned the idea of a *federation of peoples* claiming that "we are here considering the right of nations in relation to one another in so far as they are a group of separate states which are not to be welded together as a unit" (Ibid. 1241). Thus this federation of independent nations is based on constitutional agreement between them. Bearing in mind Kant's bigotry in terms of reason, it is surprising that the argument justifying the separateness of the states sounds like this: "*Nature* wills it otherwise, and uses two means to separate the nations and prevent

them from intermingling – *linguistic* and *religious* differences” (Ibid. 1245). It is strange because it would have been more probable if he had said that there is nothing what human reason cannot modify or improve, since linguistic and, particularly, religious differences can be overcome by reason without slightest obstacles.

On the other hand, reason along with nature performs a great role in warranting concord because it is “the highest legislative moral power” which “absolutely condemns war as a test of rights and sets up peace as an immediate duty” (Ibid. 1242). Thus human’s practical reason prescribes him certain duties; these duties, in turn, can be realized through laws which finally guarantee freedom and peace. This way of argumentation once again leads to the reductionist universalism which is based on Western values. For example, Kant claims: “This idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality” (Ibid.). Taking into consideration the fact that such an agreement is primarily based on reason which is a pure product of Western civilization, such a statement means that sooner or later all the non-Western civilizations would join this federation by enforcement. All other Western states have not become members under compulsion, because they were already in a judicial condition before their admission: “Yet while natural right allows us to say of men living in a lawless condition that they ought to abandon it, the right of nations does not allow us to say the same of states” (Ibid.). This is the purest version of the reductionist universalism, because lawless communities have to correspond to standards and norms established by Western civilization and have to abandon their lifestyle under compulsion.

## **2.2 Planetary citizenship and universal values**

Before starting to analyze how globalization affects national or ethnical identity, I am going to explain the notion of planetary citizenship and the role of universal values in constructing this form of citizenship. It is obvious that necessity for universal values and global ethics emerges because in the era of globalization different countries are being affected by various global changes whose solutions require common actions and efforts. Some theorists claim that the necessity to solve global problems requires an extension of moral horizon. In other words, in the contemporary world people cannot remain tied by the commitments, duties and responsibilities which serve only local interests. Global solutions require global mindedness and global ethics which has to be based on universal values. Therefore, a cosmopolitan consciousness and another form of political collaboration have to be produced. These processes may end up with the acquisition of a global identity and a new form of citizenship, namely, the planetary one.

The contemporary global problems are: disarmament, environmental sustainability, human welfare, protection of human rights and etc. It is obvious that the solutions of such problems cannot be related only to the change of moral attitude, and that institutional and structural changes are of no less importance as well. In addition to that, some theorists claim that a new political order requires not only the establishment of global and universal morality, but also a kind of universal solidarity. However, Janna Thomson is a bit more sceptical and claims that planetary citizenship cannot properly replace the solidarity which is common to particular groups of people. It would be better to understand the ideas of planetary citizenship and universal solidarity as a gradual motion from the local affinities towards the more and more global ones. Global ethics and citizenship do not pretend to uproot the 'parochial' sentiments, but rather to set up a supplementary set of duties and responsibilities which better corresponds the spirit and demands of the contemporary world. It means that local communities or nation-states before committing certain actions have to take into consideration the exigencies of the global system and thus modify their actions according to them.

Thomson, actually, grasps the problem of universal solidarity. She understands that citizenship cannot be based on abstractions and that its basis is a close relationship between individuals. In other words, the consent of a collective responsibility may be established between intimately related individuals. Therefore, the author proposes the idea of a generational continuum which makes citizenship more complex. In this way citizenship not only means a *present* responsible relationship with other individuals, but also involves commitments to other generations (both to those from the past and to those of the future). It is interesting that in this regard, nationalist ideology becomes more 'positive' than it is usually said to be. It becomes a sufficient basis for the protection of the actual things that are valuable. To put it differently, nationalism then is not perceived as potentially devastating power, but rather as a protective one, since it also manages to concentrate collective efforts in order to preserve common goods.

However, there are some misconceptions which do not allow achieving any kind of agreement between two opposite poles. Thomson claims that it is difficult to convince nationalists to obey universal values because they generally tend to give priority to the interests of their own community. That does not mean that they deny the possibility of the existence of universal values, they just promote their own ones. In some cases, this tension may transform into nationalist resistance and bigoted assertion of local values.

The first misconception lies precisely in this bewilderment. It seems that sometimes moral issues are stressed with an over-confidence and certainty because it is taken for granted that the adaption of certain values is sufficient in order to make some structural changes. However, it is not so. Moral values, norms and lifestyles are something which cannot be changed, modified or adopted

when needed. Usually it should take a long time to change some fixed beliefs and customs<sup>3</sup>. Values and norms are *practiced*, whereas laws are *obeyed*. Issued laws cause a fear of punishment and thus directs behaviour in one or another way. I do not claim that local values and norms are innate and cannot be changed in the course of life. However, local values and norms are *inherited, learned, and practiced* during a certain period of life and therefore, hardly changeable or modified. That is the reason why considering the issues of cosmopolitan identity or planetary citizenship we should rather focus on judicial facets of the question than on the moral ones.

The second misconception arises from the first one. As it has already been mentioned above, in one of the following parts I will focus on the question on individual vs. collective rights. Now I am going to briefly mention the initial fallacy<sup>4</sup> which causes the split. According to Thomson, classical cosmopolitanism puts the emphasis on the individuals who have to be respected as autonomous agents. This version of cosmopolitanism presupposes the idea that individual himself is able to create his own conceptions of the good. Therefore, laws must guarantee them a freedom of association and religion. In other words, it seems that individuals are creative and capable enough to determine the conceptions of the good, right and etc. on their own; this point of view is vicious because it simply eliminates the initial socialization and instruction imposed by the most proximate experiential surroundings.

Besides that, according to Thomson, a cosmopolitan society can be understood as an outcome of the development of political cooperation based on a new kind of a social contract. However, there is still an ambiguity. If we know that there is a tension between the nationalist and cosmopolitan points of view, how can we talk about a new form of a social contract assuming that the word 'contract' indicates a certain kind of agreement and consent? In other words, how can a social contract, which presupposes certain social and political cohesion, be a cause of both the tension and concord between nationalist and cosmopolitan outlooks?

The same imprecision is committed when Thomson claims that in order to accomplish some positive changes in the world, the planetary solidarity is not so necessary, although there would be no problems if it emerged. It is important to define the word 'solidarity'. Does it consist only of common interests and an agreement which lead to a certain action, or does it have something beyond the mere interests and quotidian necessities? In the first case, a planetary solidarity can be

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<sup>3</sup> This statement, actually, goes against Russell's or Voltaire's desire to construct an enlightened society whose members would be able to permanently test their beliefs and reject them if required. When we analyze our actual world which is full of ideological frictions and tensions we realize that their theories are far from being embodied and that completely other type of measures should be undertaken in order to solve global problems.

<sup>4</sup> In this case the word 'fallacy' has no pretensions to universality or objectivity. In here it simply expresses my opinion that certain things have been done with precipitation and contrary to the prevailing cultural and historical circumstances.

produced, but not through the moral but rather through the judicial means. Then the source of solidarity is only a legally binding law. In the second case, the creation of morally, consciously and sentimentally binding planetary solidarity is nothing but a delirium.

When we talk about universal values we should bear in mind several things. The first one I am going to elaborate in the next chapter. It claims that universal values or any values in general, belong to the field of ethics which does not coincide with the field of science. I have said previously that the label of “inventor” cannot be attached to Kant and it is so precisely because values cannot be *invented* or *discovered* and then applied or imposed. Later I will also argue that the word ‘value’ should not be used separate from its context. That is to say, any value assumes the meaning in a definite and well described context.

The second thing to some extent comes out from the said. If values cannot be discovered, they are geographically and historically determined. There cannot be any stable and fixed definition of what is value, because it changes depending on time and place. Then thirdly, we can come up with the conclusion that Western mind has no legitimacy to determine what should values be like or how to embody/impose universal values on the societies scattered around the world. That would presuppose westernization of non-Western lifestyles and an imperialistic spread of Western ideas. Thomson says that because of this reason some philosophers focus on Western societies and try to come up with the theories which could be applied specifically in this region. Nevertheless, the disregard of the problem does not eliminate it, because voluntary or non-voluntary interaction between Western and non-Western societies takes place and the problems must be solved.

There are also some other points of view advocating universal values. Sabina Alkire argues that there is such a thing as universal values because at the core of many our actions lay some values. For example, handshaking is not a universal form of greeting; however, it symbolizes and expresses friendship which, in turn, can be explained to any person with any cultural background. Thus, the ability to convey the essence of one’s ‘valuable’ action makes Alkire to state that perhaps values are not so different in distinct societies (Alkire 2001, 170).

There is an example which better illustrates the vagueness of Alkire’s theory. One of the universal values is traditional practice of a religion. Since the term ‘religion’ is too much generalizing, let’s say that one of the traditional values is the transcendental relationship with a deity. It is still too generalizing, but for the sake of argument we can assume that such a transcendental relationship is universal. However, this relationship manifests in such a big variety of forms that it becomes really doubtful if members of different societies could understand the ‘core’ of the value.

Moreover, there cannot be any single value which would not be interrelated with others. In other words, the set of values is a complex entity where an infinite combination of values may be

composed and where values may interact among themselves in a myriad of ways. For example, Protestants and Catholics have a very similar relationship with God, despite some variations in a low degree. However, it does not prevent them from tension in Northern Ireland where these different religious branches interact with different political outlooks. Precisely this complexity reveals the invalidity and vagueness of the efforts to ‘purify’ universal values through an academic activity. To put it more simply, there are always more distinctions than common denominators in the moral-social-cultural lives of different societies.

Until now we have been analyzing the question of cosmopolitan identity and planetary membership through the lenses of universal values and global ethics. It presupposes that the cosmopolitan identity has to be based on shared universal values. Before moving towards more ‘tangible’ justifications for the creation of a cosmopolitan society, I am going to make the last hit at the advocacy of universal values.

### **2.3 The critique of the possibility of the establishment of universal values. Moeller’s approach**

In the following two chapters which are designed to reject the existence of universal values, I am going to appeal to Hans-Georg Moeller and Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the first part of the second part I discussed the possibility of the emergence of a cosmopolitan identity and planetary citizenship through the imposition of universal values. Thus my goal is to demonstrate that there cannot be any planetary citizenship and any cosmopolitan identity based on universal values and global morals not only because there are no such things, but also because ‘value’ and ‘morality’ are very disputable and misty terms. In the third part I am going to discuss the question of an extension of national and ethnical identity which in the last part will turn out to be of crucial importance for making up our mind for the direction of the linguistic and cultural policy.

Hans-Georg Moeller in his book called *The Moral Fool: A Case for Amoralism* bitterly criticizes the attempts to base something on ethical and moral values. For him every moral justification of an action is of great danger because there have been plenty of cases when morality was used as a weapon in order to achieve one’s goals. However, we are interested in the aspects of his ideas which are more akin to our topic.

According to Moeller, ethics “is the science of how to make correct use of our own free will to establish a society based on reason. There is only one reason, and, accordingly, only one reasonable set of ethical rules. Reason is not historical or culturally relative. Strictly speaking, reason has no history and knows no cultural difference. Reason is universal, and if we are able to scientifically understand reason, we will be able to come up with definite guidelines for living

reasonably” (Moeller 2009, 80). This is a very accurate critique of all the aforementioned authors and their ideas. Voltaire, Russell and some of the contemporary thinkers are besotted with the power and potentiality of omnipotent reason. The reason, which produces moral prescriptions and which is able to construct a substantial basis for the flourishing of the society should be recklessly imposed on other cultures in order to cure them from their intellectual deficiency.

Moeller also criticizes the scientific scope of Kantian ethics “to turn philosophy into a real science”: “there is no one scientific moral system (like Kant’s or Bentham’s) that is generally practiced. Philosophers like Kant and Bentham stated that they had identified *the* basic principles for good behaviour that, if applied, would bring about a scientifically founded good society” (Ibid. 79). Perhaps there is no big necessity to criticize a project of scientifically founded society. Nevertheless, it is interesting to recall two ideas of mine from the thesis:

1. “it is important to stress that the value of the tension between different world-views lies not only in the *rivalry* between two or more conflicting approaches which, actually, belong to the same discourse, but also in a complete diversity of world-views which might not have any internal associations”;
2. “In other words, how can a social contract, which presupposes certain social and political cohesion, be a cause of both the tension and concord between nationalist and cosmopolitan outlooks?”

The goal of these phrases is to demonstrate that there is no final and definite consent on none of the things existing under the sun. World-views originated in Western world are neither compatible, nor comparable with the non-Western ones. However, we should also understand that there is no single and definite notion of what really is ‘Western world-view’, because within this strange *thing* there are also many conflicting, competing and particular outlooks. Neither do nation-states collaborate according to a social contract, nor is nation-state based on it. It would be more accurate to say that there is always a hustle and commotion of anxious minds which refuse to live according to the established regulations and seek to change the existing order. That is to say, permanent and structural changes in all areas happen not because of agreement but rather because of disagreement which is the main inducement to development.

Moeller says that “the scientific truths established by Kant, Bentham, and others are not actually practiced systematically in society” (Ibid. 78). Moeller continues stating that “the basic problem with academic ethics – and, in particular, with their modern founding fathers – is that it pretends to be a *scientific* endeavour. It pretends to be able to do actual research on values and norms of behaviour and to come up with concrete suggestions of what to do” (Ibid.). But we know two things: firstly, society does not function by following the guidelines set by Kant or other ethicists; secondly, there are no academic disciples of any philosopher who would completely

follow their prescriptions; there are, certainly, adherents who select, purify and adjust their theories to the actual circumstances. That demonstrates that moral prescriptions are not discovered and cannot have scientific status, otherwise society would follow them.

Moreover, values are not produced and imposed by armchair philosophers; quite on the contrary, moral values are professed by a concrete and limited group of people which expresses them in a concrete and familiar manner. Thus Moeller's point is that values then are not devoid of geographical and historical contingencies. Precisely these contingencies are the main reason of the alternation and dynamics inherent to structural societal changes, including the moral ones. Thus, "the supposedly categorical character of Kant's moral imperative makes it empty and inapplicable. It is supposed to be totally pure of empirical conditions but there are no ethics outside of empirical conditions. Once there is a moral question, it is always within an empirical context" (Ibid. 82). I am going to elaborate this idea later with Wittgenstein's insights.

To sum up, moral values cannot be invented while sitting by the writing-table, because morality has nothing to do with scientific activity and therefore the partisans of universal values should refrain from basing something on universal values. In addition to that, moral values should not be over-exalted or diminished, because in every case we have to take into consideration the empirical context where concrete values assume their meaningfulness. Otherwise, Moeller thinks that morality "can easily become not only ridiculously grotesque, but also socially dangerous since it easily leads to fundamentalist claims for its application" (Ibid. 88). This is a reasonable response to the proponents of rationality, objectivity and universality, who think that social-cultural-political entities should be based on these principles.

## **2.4 The rejection of moral judgments. Wittgenstein's approach**

Now I am going to focus on the analysis of the precise terms "value" and "ethics". Wittgenstein's goal is the rejection of absolute ethical judgments. However, his statements are not precisely what I want to claim. I suppose that his theory has deep and very valuable insights which are useful to the thesis, but he goes too far because he intends to insistently reject every absolute ethical judgment. My point is not so radical. I claim that though values are not universal and objective, they are meaningful and their meaningfulness and validity depends on a concrete empirical context which makes them such.

Wittgenstein says that he believes "the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no

science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense” (Wittgenstein 1965, 12). We may notice some similarities between Nietzsche’s scepticism on human capacities to cognize and Wittgenstein’s scepticism on the ability to make any absolute ethical judgment. They both, actually, name language as the main obstacle for cognition and consider it to be a source of fallibility. I think that they both tend to over-generalize the term ‘language’. If we take for granted that *any* language is incapable of expressing the essence lying at the core of the things, then we close ourselves in the cave of cognition. I do not claim that there is a language (or that one may be invented) that is capable of disclosing the true essence of the things. Even if there is not one, it does not mean that human is “running against the walls of our cage”. Perhaps we should relocate our interest from the attempts to cognize the essence of the things to the attempts to perceive the things from as many as possible different perspectives and aspects. Thus we arrive at one of the most important statements of the thesis: the value of cognition does not lie in the attempts to cognize an objective essence of the things, but rather to be able to perceive the ‘multifacetedness’ of the things. The perception of the “multifacetedness” of the things can be unearthed namely through the use of *languages*. Therefore, we should put a bridle on those who seek to invent a universal language or to reject the importance of many other supposedly primitive and underdeveloped languages. That has to encourage us to look at the policy of language from a quite different angle. First of all, bearing in mind the said, we now can understand the attempts to preserve the indigenous languages in absolutely other light; moreover, the problem formulated in terms of cognition provides us with more reasonable arguments and justifications for the promotion of the policy of multilingualism<sup>5</sup>.

Now it is time to come back to Wittgenstein’s arguments and to elaborate them. Let’s begin from the description of ethics. For him “ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable or, into what is really important, or I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living. I believe if you look at all these phrases you will get a rough idea as to what it is that Ethics is concerned with” (Ibid. 5). Wittgenstein aims to prove that “no state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge” (Ibid. 7). Therefore, he distinguishes between two kinds of judgments: “the trivial or relative sense on the one hand and the ethical or absolute sense on the other” (Ibid. 5).

The relative value means that terms like ‘good’ or ‘right’ are applied according to “a certain predetermined purpose and the word good here has only meaning so far as this purpose has been previously fixed upon. In fact the word good in the relative sense simply means coming up to a certain predetermined standard” (Ibid.). Therefore, things and persons may be qualified by the terms ‘good’ and ‘right’ if they fulfil the purpose ascribed to them in advance. For example, the

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<sup>5</sup> I will later briefly focus on the European policy of language which seems very simplistic and superficial.

expression “this man is a good pianist” has sense because it refers to his abilities to “play pieces of a certain degree of difficulty with a certain degree of dexterity” (Ibid.). The same applies if we ask someone the right road to somewhere. In this case the term ‘right’ depends on our wishes or necessities, because if I am on vacation I might wish to choose the road surrounded by forests and lakes and etc.; however, if I am late, I need the shortest possible road to my destination place. Thus, the term ‘right’ may gain quite different meanings; and its meaning is determined by the concrete situation and circumstances. We can recall Nietzsche’s phrase: “every concept arises from the equation of unequal things”<sup>6</sup>. It means that people sometimes misuse the terms, particularly those of moral categorization, and apply them incorrectly. Thus we should be more careful before founding, for instance, the project of cosmopolitan society on the basis of morality, because arbitrary predetermination of the moral ‘terms’ can confuse, and I am sure it does, our theories.

The problem which to some extent makes Wittgenstein’s theory inapplicable to the topic of the thesis is his excessive orientation towards factuality of the judgments of the relative value: “what I wish to contend is that, although all judgments of relative value can be shown to be mere statements of facts, no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value” (Wittgenstein 1965, 6). Although his arguments about the judgments of the relative value are insightful and relevant to the thesis, they are still lacking in some ways. For example, according to his theory, it would be incorrect to say that “this man is a good man”, because it implies an absolute value. However, the utterance “this man is a good basketball player” is correct because it comes from the *fact* that he has good basketball skills.

We have to keep in mind that the ability to see the world or a fact in *this* and not in *that* way highly depends on the training and instruction one has received in his life. In other words, even a judgment of relative value can be criticized and rejected if we admit that an adjective describes the *fact* which is, virtually, seen in the light of the training and instruction one has received. This problem was already discussed in the chapter on Feyerabend. The reason why Wittgenstein’s arguments are important to us is his explicitness and minuteness with which he investigates moral issues. His demonstrates that there cannot be any certainty in the usage of moral terms and that nothing can be recklessly and hastily based on these terms.

Soon I will discuss cosmopolitanism and nationalism from another angle. Before moving to this discussion I am going to shortly dwell upon some Wittgenstein’s arguments which will be of great importance when we will talk about the justification of the preservation of non-Western cultures and languages and our decision to accept certain ideology, for instance, national or cosmopolitan. The acceptance of any ideology, certainly, determines our cognitive stance and

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<sup>6</sup> [http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/Philosophers/Nietzsche/Truth\\_and\\_Lie\\_in\\_an\\_Extra-Moral\\_Sense.htm](http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/Philosophers/Nietzsche/Truth_and_Lie_in_an_Extra-Moral_Sense.htm)

*seeing*. I am going to argue that precisely the problem of *seeing* the world in *this* or *that* way may become a crucial argument for the acceptance or rejection of an ideology. I will argue that cosmopolitanism sometimes does not threaten national and ethnical groups, and that sometimes it is a matter of personal decision which side to choose. However, we should take into consideration the possible outcomes of the reduction of pluralism of world-views. A variety of world-views can instruct us to differently perceive the world (it is the main topic of the further parts); I will argue that the plurality of possible perceptions of the world and distinct modes of *seeing* it, no matter how deeply anthropomorphic they are, is an argument for the preservation and protection of the entire cultures and languages, or at least, some of their elements.

According to Wittgenstein, the word acquires its meaning in a concrete usage. Firstly, such adjectives as ‘beautiful’ and ‘good’ are attributed to something ‘tangible’ and tend to express a quality of a thing which can be experienced empirically: “A child generally applies a word like ‘good’ first to food” (Wittgenstein 1967, 2). Children learn words in order to show approval. The word becomes an interjection of approval in the game where it appears (Ibid.). Wittgenstein continues: “If I hadn’t learnt the rules, I wouldn’t be able to make the aesthetic judgement. In learning the rules you get a more and more refined judgement learning the rules actually changes your judgement” (Ibid. 5). Later on one is trained to use these words in more abstract situations, for example, a moral evaluation of an action requires the use of the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Thus our mind may get easily confused. Therefore, the introduction of the term ‘judgment of relative value’ is very helpful because it rejects the pretensions of the lost mind to judge something in an absolute sense.

The minute investigation of these issues is, if not ‘valuable’ then, at least, useful, because it displays the supremacy of a concrete and empirical investigation and the fallacy of theoretical and abstract investigation which detaches itself from the relation with a concrete case and context.


It is important to bear in mind that the rules which teach us a particular way of seeing the world change depending on a geographical and historical period: “The words we call expression of aesthetic judgement play a very complicated role, but a very definite role, in what we call a culture of a period. To describe their use or to describe what you mean by a cultured taste, you have to describe a culture. What we now call a cultured taste perhaps didn’t exist in the Middle Ages. An entirely different game is played in different ages” (Ibid. 8). Thus a ‘cultured taste’ may vary depending on the place and period.

It is important to stress that different cultures have not only different aesthetic tastes, but also different sets of ethical rules and different perception of the world which is influenced by certain language particularities. The ‘multifacetedness’ of the things which can be discovered by investigating different cultures by no means will provide us with an objective or factual cognition of

the world, but it will definitely undermine the one-dimensional, reducing and limitative perception of the world.

According to Wittgenstein, we see the world as we have been trained to see it. Training process helps us to perceive certain aspects of the world which our arrogant mind quickly proclaims to be a fact. However, can we eliminate other sights as false? I have already answered to this question many times: “No”. Moreover, the quote of Feyerabend which I have used in the first part states that: “*Variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge. And a method that encourages variety is also the only method that is compatible with a humanitarian outlook*” (Feyerabend 2010, 25). I do not agree that variety of world-views can warrant the objectivity of knowledge; however, it can certainly help to avoid close-mindedness and prejudices.

Wittgenstein also emphasizes an ‘aspectable’ seeing of the world and analyses this picture:



“The duck-rabbit”

In this picture one might see a duck or a rabbit, or both of them. Wittgenstein says: “The head seen in *this* way hasn’t even the slightest similarity to the head seen in *that* way – although they are congruent” (Wittgenstein 2009, 205). Thus the question of the boundaries between seeing, perception and training arises: “I’m shown a picture-rabbit and asked what it is; I say “It’s a rabbit”. Not “Now it’s a rabbit”. I’m reporting my perception. – I’m shown the duck-rabbit and asked what it is; I *may* say “It’s a duck-rabbit”. But I may also react to the question quite differently. – The answer that it is a duck-rabbit is again the report of a perception; the answer “Now it’s a rabbit” is not. Had I replied “It’s a rabbit”, the ambiguity would have escaped me, and I would have been reporting my perception” (Ibid.).

If I say “It’s a rabbit”, my utterance after some time may transform and sound like this: “It’s definitely a rabbit”. The second utterance conveys a conviction of much higher certainty. Could my

next step be the proclamation of the *fact* that I see a rabbit? Yes, it could. Wittgenstein uses the expression ‘aspect-blindness’ which means that the person who cannot see another aspect of a thing is aspect-blind.

## **2.5 Conclusions**

### 2.6

Reductionist universalism is based on one-dimensional seeing which might be overcome only by the promotion of the multi-dimensional seeing of the world. Multifacetedness is very valuable despite its anthropomorphicity, because it would make us to utter the phrase: “Aah, now I see it *that way*” more often. Precisely the astonishment which befalls after seeing a thing in another light is very valuable and the best remedy for prejudices. The cognition of a thing then is not a determined process, but rather, on the contrary, its proceeding and outcomes are undetermined and unexpected.

Therefore, we should reject our intentions to promote universal values and to categorize something using moral terms. There might be an infinite number of possible interpretations and aspects of an event and thus it should not be wedged in the framework of morals. It does not mean that event should not be investigated in depth from many different angles; it means that it should be refrained from proclaiming it as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in a moral sense.

# III IDENTITY: NATIONAL AND COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVES

## 3. Introduction

What is the future of nation-state, national/ethnic identity, political community, citizenship and democracy? Globalization has been permanently affecting concepts of these phenomena. There are a variety of different opinions over the issue. Usually approaches differ according to the position an author chooses. It happens because different authors have different key premises. I will try to survey some different positions, to present their assumptions and later on to combine some different approaches. Moreover, I will provide several examples. This chapter aims at demonstrating the tension between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. In the end I will come up with a conclusion that cosmopolitanism does not necessarily threaten and tends to undermine national identity. Although in the some of the last chapters I have already analyzed the problem of universal values, I will briefly dwell upon them once again.

The key term of this chapter is 'identity'. The definition of this term is important in a contemporary world, because various decisions and political acts are committed subject to them. For instance, if the concept of nationality defines a 'true' Lithuanian as white, born and living in Lithuania, speaking in Lithuanian, having suffrage and being a true member of Lithuanian political community, then it is obvious that an average Lithuanian would be surprised seeing a black guy going to the elections. That might provoke a national chauvinism which, actually, is an outcome of 'aspect-blindness'. Otherwise, if a definition of nationality is conceived as much more multiple and complex the potential probability of conflict and social tension decreases.

A great number of authors sought to show that identity is not something stable; quite on the contrary, it is fluid and permanently changing. I am going to discuss the situations and circumstances which make identity to change and acquire new allegiances. In the end I will raise the questions about what does it mean to be a cosmopolitan? What world-views and allegiances may contain cosmopolitan identity? And, is a cosmopolitan society something achievable, or is it a pure illusion which is improbable because of the infinite number of possible combinations of allegiances? These questions will introduce the fourth part in which I will provide rather philosophical analysis of identity which is based on the relation between identity and language.

### 3.1 Global impact on the extension of the national identity

The authors who sustain the idea of global identity and its complexity and hybridity firstly, emphasize the necessity to take care about global problems. As Scholte puts it, such forms of self-identification as faith, class, gender, race, age, sexual orientation and etc. go together with national principal making up a plural and hybrid identity (Scholte 2005, 225). Another reason of an extension of national identity is possible disasters: the environmental problems, climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, biodiversity loss, planet Earth's possible collisions with comets, problems of humanity as such (AIDS) (Ibid. 241). What has enabled the emergence of hybrid identity? Scholte emphasizes the role of global mass media which enables us to find out about what has happened in another part of the world (earthquake, volcano eruption or military engagements) as soon as possible (Ibid. 242). Other reasons which made the world to shrink are technologies of communication and improvement of transportation. According to Scholte, these supraterritorial connections have engendered nonterritorial identities and solidarities (Ibid. 255).

There are several possible ways to interpret nonterritorial identities. One way is to forge a notion of universal cosmopolitanism which seeks for identification with all humanity. Martha Nussbaum is inclined to choose this way. Another way is to claim that nonterritorial identity is part of a whole identity which is multidimensional and multilayer and that engagement to local identity still remains important. Scholte uses a very good concept – partial cosmopolitanism. It means that globalization has produced some changes in traditional understanding of identity but has not already replaced commitments to one's own state, community or society by commitments to whole humanity. Partial cosmopolitanism expresses shared forms for self-identification (faith, class, gender, race, age, sexual orientation, disability) which are scattered through all over the world regardless of countries, cultural or national limitations (Ibid. 226). Therefore, there are many people who have acquired a plurinational sense of self (Ibid. 230).

If we are to analyze the process of acquirement of identity in terms of John Tomlinson, we will come up with a conclusion that globalization not only that does not threaten national identity, but rather on the contrary, is an indispensable condition in producing it. In addition to that, we even may begin to justify the influence of globalization on national identity. It happens so when we admit that the identity is “a considerable dimension of *institutionalized* social life in modernity. Particularly in the dominant form of *national identity*, it is the product of deliberate cultural construction and maintenance via both the regulatory and the socializing institutions of the state: in particular, the law, the education system and the media” (Tomlinson 2003, 271). That is to say, identity is a tool for a social and political organization. Ethnic community which has not yet established a state seeks to impose one political-cultural-social order and local values on people.

Various methods might be used: power of media, education, interpretation of history, invention of myths, purification of language and etc. If we accept this treatment of identity, then we accept that identity is a merely artificial product imposed on the masses in order to achieve certain goals.

How does Tomlinson deny ‘the negative’ effect of globalization on national and local cultures? First of all, we have to change the common understanding of traditional community and its ‘pure’ culture. Usually traditional community is conceived as something static and immobile as if it was isolated from external world and its phenomena (Ibid. 272). According to Tomlinson, traditional community, however, exists in the world and it cannot escape or ignore changes of it. Traditional community is more or less permanently influenced by the processes of an external world and therefore, it is changing simultaneously with it. Thus, Tomlinson states that “globalization far from destroying it [cultural identity – *my remark*], has been perhaps the most significant force in *creating and proliferating* cultural identity” (Ibid. 270). An example which reveals that globalization has been consistently amplifying the concept of identity without us realizing that is “the fact that virtually all of the world’s six billion population today either enjoy or claim a national identity” (Ibid. 274). How is it possible without interference of globalization and the necessity for identity, imposed by modernity, to spread the idea of nationality through all different parts of the world? Imagine that a member of nation A and a member of nation B claim the uniqueness of their nations. Their identities are based on constructed imagination and shaped perception of what is reality like; they both ‘know’ their cultural identity and its alleged uniqueness. They might have been taught in school about their unique history and historical achievements; historians of their countries might have interpreted history in a proper way in order to produce an attractive story with which masses could identify themselves.

Probably it happened so because of the situation which required to find a solution. There are abundant examples of different types of nationalisms which had a mission to solve problems inherent to certain social and political context. The very idea of nationalism, however, was spread by virtue of globalization. For instance, the idea of nationality in South America was spread by intelligentsia which had been educated in Western educational system and which was aware of the models of identification of that period.

To sum up, globalization has been amplifying and changing the conception of identity for relatively long time. Even if some forms of identification seem too much close-minded or tend to create local particularism and emphasize the uniqueness of an ethnic community or nation, it *may* be an outcome of globalization and modernity. Depending on the situation identity may be constructed in a manner that is either closed or open. If local particularism of an ethnic community is being threatened by the external powers it might construct a ‘close’ identity which aims at the preservation of the local culture and identity. However, using Tomlinson’s terms the quotidian

penetration of localities (television, mobile phones, email, the Internet, international food culture) might engender open type for identification which will enrich existing local identity and will make it more complex. Nonetheless, this kind of perception of reality has to be constructed as well. I am going to illustrate it with an example. As I have already mentioned before, common memory can be achieved by differently interpreting the same historical ‘facts’ or events.

### **3.2 The Forgeability of Identity**

I am going to provide a hypothetical example of how Lithuanian identity has been constructed and how this construction might change its orientation if needed in the future. When Lithuanian nation was occupied by soviet regime history was used as a tool to unite Lithuanians, to strengthen their solidarity, to make one be proud of deep, great and glorious past of the nation. Many Grand Dukes who lived in the Middle-Ages were considered as true Lithuanians who while taking decisions always used to take into consideration the interests of Lithuania. The same stories are being told till now and the textbooks of history still emphasize the exceptional glory of Lithuanian nation.

These myths are taken seriously without any deeper critical analysis. Nobody pays attention to the fact that ‘Lithuanian’, ‘Lithuania’, and alleged ‘pro-Lithuanian policy’ exercised by Grand Dukes had completely different meanings than these concepts have now. Moreover, in Lithuanian history and in annual festivals we can see one date which is known almost to every ‘true Lithuanian’ but almost unknown to a well educated western European. Lithuanians *imagine* that the battle of Žalgiris (the battle of Grunewald) which took place in 1410 undermined the power of Teutonic Knights and demonstrated the invincibility of Lithuanian army to all Europe. In Germany, for example, only professional historians know this date and assess it in a much moderate way. They claim it was only one of many events which undermined the power of Teutonic Order. However, this example apparently demonstrates how state apparatus in concert with educational system can make people consciousness to imagine a historical ‘fact’ and thus, to strengthen national solidarity, sentiments and nostalgia for the glorious past.

There is another example of the construction of a ‘close’ identity which is prevailing in Lithuania. Usually when a Lithuanian wants to say something exceptional about his country, he mentions ‘the fact’ that Lithuanians were the last pagans in Europe. That is to say, Lithuanians were the last people in Europe who were baptized. This ‘fact’ of course distinguishes Lithuania of that period from all Christian concert of Europe.

Imagine that one day the necessity to create an identity based on common and shared European values and principles will emerge. Scholte states that “shared experiences like slave trade,

Islam, Christendom or the Ottoman empire are said to provide deep historical roots for present-day solidarity” (Scholte 2005, 236). In this case he talks about the possibility to produce a regional identity. As we see from his example Christendom might appear as an appropriate tool to form a pro-European identity. All we need is that historians would find ‘correct’ dates and events which would prove close contacts among European communities. Thus the story about the last pagans should evaporate and stories about unity with Europe should be invented or discovered (depends on one’s degree of belief).

We see how a construction of identity works. There is someone who sees the necessity to create one; there are instruments how to produce it; and finally, people who just have to imagine their past and the present unity. Identity consolidates and unifies; it constitutes a collectivity which *knows* reality. Nevertheless, later it may seem that the old identity is old-fashioned and the new one corresponding to the demands of a contemporary situation, might be forged. We see that identity serves as a tool to maintain loyalty to one or another political entity. I will later argue that pluralism could diminish the instrumental usage of identity. Moreover, we can reasonably fall in doubt if this forgeable identity is really identity in a true sense. I will answer to this question in the final chapter of this part.

### **3.3 Advocacy of the construction of the cosmopolitan identity**

The key premise Martha Nussbaum is that identity is forgeable. She feels the necessity to ‘modify’ the prevailing concept of national identity in a contemporary world, and thus she advises to improve educational system. According to her, education should be orientated in order to make people familiar with global problems and with processes happening in other parts of the world. That is to say, she sustains the idea of cosmopolitan education (Nussbaum 2002, 6). Talking about young Pakistan people she says that they “might possibly have been educated in a climate of respect for religious pluralism, the equality of women, and other values that we rightly prize, instead of having fundamentalist *madrasas* as their only educational alternative” (Ibid. xiii). Why is this so important? She thinks that Western education is the best possible alternative for the people from the third world. Why is it the best?

First of all, in the world where the interdependency of people has increased, universal values of justice and right are needed (Ibid. 5). People have to change their forms of living, their understanding of world and to commit to a global community which is a source of our moral obligations (Ibid. 7). Global problems such as pollution of the third-world nations, food supply and ecology require global planning, global knowledge, the recognition of a shared future (Ibid. 12). Western spirit and education are based on human rights and ‘universal values’, therefore, it fits best.

Once again let's return to the ethical issues. Hilary Putnam claims that moral philosophers usually are too much obsessed by the conceptions such as 'the good' and 'the right' which are too vague and hardly can be applied in our world. Our conceptions of what is good or what is bad, what is right or wrong always are influenced by our culture, traditions and language. Culture and traditions, Nussbaum could argue, can be replaced by cosmopolitan approach. Nevertheless, languages will not lose their influence so easily. In addition to that, there are many other factors which influence character, temperament and mentality of people living in different parts of the world. Therefore, to state that cosmopolitan definition of what is good/bad and right/wrong can be applied universally is too optimistic.

Richard Rorty in one of his articles speaks about 'ironists' and adherents of common sense. The first category of people is defined in this way: "their realization that anything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed, and their renunciation of the attempt to formulate criteria of choice between final vocabularies, puts them in the position which Sartre called "meta-stable": never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves" (Rorty 1996, 97). On the other hand, "to be commonsensical is to take for granted that statements formulated in that final vocabulary suffice to describe and judge the beliefs, actions and lives of those who employ alternative final vocabularies" (Ibid.).

Nussbaum's propensity to formulate and define the terms 'good' and 'right' has no other possibility than to believe in one stable and fixed determination of what it is. Moreover, we should expect that people from different parts of the world will conceive these concepts in an appropriate way. However, we have seen above that such phenomena as identity, definitions of the 'right' and 'good' are temporal and fluid. That is why the ironist's position seems more reasonable.

On the other hand, if we take ironist position, what ground do we have, if we have it at all? Putnam claims that we have our tradition which provides us with 'orientational instructions' (values, virtues, duties, responsibilities, concepts of the good and right) and which is always more intelligible than artificial cosmopolitan moral code. According to Putnam, inherited ways of life and moral beliefs can be assessed critically and some good elements could be saved while others neglected. We are always free to rethink and reinterpret our traditions: "critical intelligence and loyalty to what is best in our traditions, including national and ethnic traditions, are interdependent" (Putnam 2002, 97). Another important point which has to be stressed is that tradition always provides us with experiences of humanity which may be useful considering what should be done about global problems. According to Putnam, this consideration does not require 'universal reason' but critical assessment and learning from experience.

Another weak point in Nussbaum's theory of cosmopolitanism is the emergence of cosmopolitan democracy. She, actually, does not mention this expression, but we can infer it from her considerations. Given that all the people in the world are committed to one another, and that humanity's problems have to be solved then, the world has to be organized according to the principles of cosmopolitan democracy. However, these are only theoretical considerations which cannot be realized in empirical world.

Charles Taylor stresses that civic democracy requires strong identification on the part of citizens. Identity is obligatory in this case because only people who are mobilized on the base of it; who are convinced of profit of participation in a political society and who attach a vital importance to this participation can constitute civic democracy. Thus, mutual commitment to the common project, binding identity and successive mobilization are the most important elements of civic democracy (Taylor 2002, 119-120). It is obvious that Taylor refers to a local civil democracy. Thus democracy can be based on local identity which is particular and which therefore, is effective. Nonetheless, such identity does not exclude global problems and cosmopolitan approach. Taylor emphasizes that this kind of patriotism is open to universal solidarities (Ibid. 121).

Taylor's concept of identity is complex because it includes something which is inherited from social-political-cultural context and something which is acquired during the process of socialization (universal ideas, commitments to humanity). I consider commitments to humanity as acquired ones just because an individual from his childhood has to be deliberately taught about wider world and a variety of cultures, languages, races and etc. On the contrary, a personal observation of one's surroundings and personal experience of his daily life directly provide one with empirical knowledge. Knowledge which one has about his most approximate environment is empirical or directly experienced and thus can be called inherited knowledge; another part of identity is acquired because usually an individual cognizes a wider world and outlandish forms of life from books, stories and etc., but not from a direct empirical impact.

### **3.4 Traditional and conservative understanding of identity**

Now I am going to survey other kind of argumentation and appeal to Anthony Smith who advocates national identity, criticizes speculations on cosmopolitan identity and denies the possibility to create a global culture. This kind of argumentation stems from his belief that national identity and national culture cannot be produced artificially. Of course, he agrees that traditions might be invented and manufactured in order to serve specific interests. However, he stresses that these forged traditions can be imposed only on the community which already has a common experience, common past and history. Moreover, 'new traditions' and innovations cannot be

something radically new and must correspond to already existing experience of that community (Smith 2003, 279). That is to say, traditions cannot be imposed on community without common memory, without existing customs, cultural background and etc. There is no community in the world whose experience would be *tabula rasa*. Therefore, newly emerging traditions always have continuation with already existing cultural background. Community has always something subjective because of “common experiences and one or more shared cultural characteristics (usually customs, language or religion)” (Ibid. 280). According to Smith, there are three components of shared experiences:

- 1 a sense of continuity between the experiences of succeeding generations of the unit of population;
- 2 shared memories of specific events and personages which have been turning- points of a collective history; and
- 3 a sense of common destiny on the part of the collectivity sharing those experiences (Ibid.).

As we see, community always has its original subjective character and innovations can be inscribed only in the already existing context. Later with an example from Columbia I will prove that some artificial forms of solidarity might be imposed on highly divided society; however, it does not seem that the impact of these forms of solidarity could considerably affect the mindsets of different ethnic groups.

Let's get back to Smith's arguments. Why, according to him, a global culture cannot exist? First of all, global culture has no relation with past or at least it is very artificial; it has no common experience and common memories. Global culture is a mixture of eclectic values and customs. It has no subjective character and it has no origins (Ibid. 279). The term 'eclectic' implies that global culture unlike national culture is forged and cannot provide its *raison d'être* because it is timeless, it has no fixed place and no continuation. Global culture is like global economy and new kinds of political institutions which are constructed. On the contrary, “national cultures, like all cultures before the modern epoch, are *particular, timebound* and *expressive*, their eclecticism operates within strict cultural constraints” (Ibid.). That is to say, global culture has no historical and experiential background, it is like *tabula rasa*, on which new forms for self-identification, new eclectic values and customs are inscribed. Citizens of the world among themselves have no emotional connotations based on memory and history. “‘Nations’ can be understood as historic identities, or at least deriving closely from them, while a ‘global culture’ fails to relate to any such historic identity. Unlike national cultures, a global culture is essentially memoryless” (Ibid. 280). Smith shares quite similar point of view with Michael Walzer who claims that “no one has ever offered me citizenship, or described the naturalization process, or enlisted me in the world's

institutional structures, or given me an account of its decision procedures (I hope they are democratic), or provided me with a list of the benefits and obligations of citizenship, or shown me the world's calendar and the common celebrations and commemorations of its citizens. I am wholly ignorant" (Walzer 2002, 125).

As we see it is a big question of how should global culture or cosmopolitan identity look like; what could be a content of these conceptions and etc. As Smith puts it very accurately, global culture is not the same as global communications (Smith 2003, 281). That is to say, global communication is not sufficient for the establishment of close and depolarized relationships among people from different parts of the world.

Tomlinson's and Smith's approaches differ because of their different key premises. Tomlinson sustains the idea that identity as such, it does not matter if national or cosmopolitan, can be forged and produced artificially. Smith, in turn, stresses the difference between national culture and identity and cosmopolitan culture and identity. The later is really artificial, eclectic and produced with intention; the former has continuation with past, is based on more or less deep historical roots. National identity might be modified intentionally as well, but this modification always occurs on the already existing social-cultural background.

The question is if Smith does not tend to overestimate the influence of history in the process of constructing identity. On the one hand, history always is a source for this kind of construction. The aforementioned example about different accents put on the same historical events, illustrates that history may serve any interests. On the other hand, Smith emphasizing the role of history refers to the subjective side of national identity; identity which is rooted in the past brings memories from there. Sometimes it looks as if community would have experienced the past events itself. However, we know that it is impossible and that historical events are made vivid by professionals and that their true location is not memory itself, but rather imagination.

Thus, criticizing Smith I tend to stress the role of imagination rather than the role of memory. History itself can be used in different ways: it might set, at first glance, similar groups of people against each other by organizing their outlooks differently; or it might unite completely different kinds of people if necessary and if situation requires. However, in the creation of national identity deep history is not always crucial. I am going to illustrate it with an example. Although Smith overestimates the importance of deep history in identity building, we should agree with him, that artificial attempts to consolidate people (for instance, in the case of Columbia) will end up at best with a creation of certain common denominators between different ethnic groups and not with a final and fixed national identity.

### 3.5 Columbian case of identity building

This example is about Colombia of the XIX century and its endeavor to construct national identity. In the XIX century Colombia distinguished by its isolated regional identities and rivalries. That complicated the formation of a nation-state. Because of the strong regional identification it was very troublesome to construct and define Colombia as a nation. Thus, Columbia was like a patchwork of socially, culturally, politically, and regionally divided ethnic groups (Froysland 2006, 162). In addition to that, misery, mixed-race masses, social and cultural contrasts, degeneration and decadence “epitomized by vagrancy, alcoholism, poor hygiene, prostitution, and the spread of diseases” worried elites (Ibid. 163). “Despite a supposed lack of a sense of Columbian nationalism, Columbian elites did imagine a national community and attempted to form a fraternal spirit and a national identity during the late nineteenth century, thus exemplifying a strong correlation between nationalism and social and economic transformation” (Ibid. 163-164).

What was done in order to solve existing social problems? A national anthem and a coat of arms were adopted as symbols of the nation; the role of national government in the economy was expanded; public health and morality became very important; the supervision of education increased; the role of Catholic Church was expended (Ibid. 164). Moreover, some norms were prescribed in order to achieve national stability and progress; “the image of the ideal “citizen” and the renewed Columbian nation was constructed on the basis of class- and gender- specific notions, whereby moral and healthy individuals and their stable families constituted the basic cells required for the proper functioning of the social organism that was the nation” (Ibid. 165). Elites also tried to inculcate the concepts of “good”, “Catholic” morals and habits (Ibid. 168). The definitions of necessary notions were changed. For instance, “the conception of prostitution began to be reconfigured as the discourse was medicalized so that prostitution and the spread of venereal diseases could be regarded as perilous to society” (Ibid. 169); besides that, the term *raza* which means race was changed and applied not to a specific racial group, but to a whole Colombian population in order to create a vision of collective character (Ibid. 166).

Now I am going briefly depict the character of Colombian elite. I will provide several most representative extracts:

“More frequently, elites were reading the political, philosophical, and medical treatises published in Western Europe and the United States and travelling abroad to be educated in France, England, and the United States. Medical professionals and scientists also founded the Colombian Society of Medicine and Natural Sciences, which had connections with the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C.

Increasingly convinced of the utility of modern scientific notions and influenced by the

positivist school of thought, social Darwinism, and Lamarckian concepts, many medical practitioners and other elite (...) [they also adapted, - *my remark*] scientific theories of race and racial degeneration from European thought and applied them to Colombia and its people” (Ibid. 169).

Why is this example important? Smith argued that history was necessary for the formation of a nation. Moreover, critics of globalization tend to deny the fact that the solution of common problems can be a basis for a formation of cosmopolitan identity. The example of Colombia reveals that a depth and richness of history is not of such a big importance in the formation of a nation, because the lacking historical material might be ‘invented’. In Colombian case the existing social disharmony and moral chaos were the reasons that encouraged the formation of Colombian nation. Moreover, it also proves that social and economic interests are sufficient basis for the creation of fraternal spirit.

However, we know that Columbia at the moment cannot actually be considered a typical nation-state in a strict sense. It is ethnically and linguistically divided (there are about 80 living languages)<sup>7</sup>. Thus, can we really talk about the *national* identity which binds different people to one nation? Or should we talk only about some common denominators which link different ethnic and linguistic groups together in order to solve certain quotidian questions?

This example should confirm the forgeability of identity and could be used as an argument for the possibility to forge cosmopolitan identity. However, we see that in the end ethnical affinities and kinship prevails over the necessity to solve problems. This is the first obstacle for the formation of a cosmopolitan identity. The second reason I will name in the end of this part.

And finally, the depiction of the way Colombian elites acted demonstrates that Tomlinson is right claiming that nationalism is, in a sense, an outcome of globalization. Colombian elites were educated in Europe or in the USA thus, they were infected by prevailing ideas of that period which later on they sought to embody in their country. This means that the prevailing standards of the forms of political and social cooperation (these forms may be nationalist or global ones) are firstly, easily learned; secondly, certain endeavours to embody them are taken; and finally, the form of political and social cooperation are determined by historical circumstances. From the last statement we infer that therefore, nobody should underpin his political approach by arguments that have pretensions to be universally valid, because the origins of any approach are historical ones.

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<sup>7</sup> [http://www.ethnologue.com/show\\_country.asp?name=Colombia](http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=Colombia)

### 3.6 Identity as a source of the internal and external tension

I am going to tell now one real conversation between three persons from Spain. This example should let us to better understand how the tension between several conflicting world-views within one's personality, which was discussed in the first part, helps not only to expand one's own cognitive horizon, but also to overcome bigotry and to become a peaceful and well-functioning citizen.

One of the persons (person A) was born in The Basque country, grew up in a Basque family, and studied in the Basque language. Another guy (person B) was born in Vitoria (the Basque city), later moved to Valencia. He did not know the Basque language, but he learned some Valenciano while living in Valencia. He still felt sentiments for the Basque country and considered himself 'more' Basque than Spanish. The last guy (person C) was born in Pamplona (another semi-Basque city). He also graduated from the university where he studied in the Basque language. It is interesting that his parents were 'pure' Spanish who had come to Pamplona from two 'pure' Spanish regions. His parents wanted him to easier integrate into the Basque community and therefore took a decision to educate him in Basque, although they did not know the language. Now person C has no problems in communicating neither with the Spanish people, nor with the Basques because both peoples consider him as one of them.

These persons live in the same country (Spain); were born in the same autonomous region but despite that, tension was felt during the discussion on national issues. The person A asked the person B if he knew the Basque language; the person B responded that he did not. Then the person A asked if he considered himself a Basque or Spanish; the person B replied that he felt both, but maybe more Basque, and that he did not see any contradiction in that. Then the person C interrupted them and said that he also felt being both – a Spanish and Basque.

I asked the person C if he could tell me an example how was it possible to feel belonging to two different nations. He explained: "For instance, when I am in Lithuania or in other country communicating with foreigners I feel I am rather Spanish. However, in Spain usually communicating with Spanish I feel more Basque, because in the university I was educated as Basque and I understand them better; the Spanish people not always can understand the interests of the Basque people".

What do we see from this example? First of all, it is more than obvious that people might be set at variance by imposing on them different ideologies. The person A who has been living almost all his life in the Basque country has a very strict and accurate definition of what does it mean to be a 'true' Basque. The person B who had lived for a certain period of his life in a different region of

the country, did not have so strict and limitative definition of what is it to be a 'true' Basque. The person C because of his multiple experiences had the most temperate definition.

While discussing Voltaire's essay I underlined the positive aspects of the tension in one's personality. The example I have just told, contains two different kinds of tensions. First of all, it is a negative tension between people having two different identities. This external tension is one of the biggest reasons of many world-wide conflicts. The second tension we can find in the personality of the person C. He endeavours to contain two different forms of identification which in external, political arena are set in conflict. However, his example demonstrates the positive aspect of an endeavour to reconcile several different allegiances within oneself. We can be sure that his personal openness not only that increases his cognitive powers and thus provides him with a wider and more diverse *knowing* of the world, but also helps him to solve some concrete, and unfortunately, prevailing conflict problems.

Thus, person's C openness and ability to reconcile two different and conflicting outlooks within his personality, extends his cognitive horizon and also makes him more peaceful temperate. The fact that he is able to *see* certain problems from more angles makes him less bigoted and better citizen. Moreover, the example shows that the search for a common denominator which may reconcile conflicting groups or simply, an extension of identity does not annihilate national allegiances. However, the crucial question is how are we going to seek an expansion of identity? If we are going to assume the norms and standards forged exceptionally by Western civilization, then we can forget about pluralism and multifacetedness, because then there will be no internal tension encouraging us not to accept one definite explanation of the world and to continue our search.

### 3.7 Conclusions

In the second and third parts I have demonstrated that efforts to change the form of a society according to the scientific vision, universal values, global ethics, and common search for the solutions of global problems are not a sufficient basis for the construction of global or cosmopolitan identity. However, such terms as planetary citizenship, social contract and universal solidarity *may* be used under certain conditions.

If 'solidarity' means "unity or agreement of feeling or action, especially among individuals with a common interest; mutual support within a group<sup>8</sup>", then the term also might be applied universally. It presupposes a planetary citizenship which does not require assuming a cosmopolitan identity, but rather to commit oneself to certain actions. It simply appeals to an agreement between

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/solidarity?view=uk>

countries which helps to solve these or those problems. It does not threaten to national allegiances and does not seek to substitute them. Global citizenship based on universal solidarity simply indicates some common denominators which link different peoples together without imposing anything else except duties and responsibilities understood rather in a judicial than moral sense. In other words, partial cosmopolitanism does not deny national sentiments and does not seek to involve different people *spiritually*, but rather *reasonably*.

In this case I fully agree with Putnam's, Taylor's and Smith's ideas that local allegiances cannot be simply replaced by sentiments to a global society. Nevertheless, the law as a legally binding source may encourage people to behave in an appropriate way. The aforementioned example of Colombia proves it.

The second goal of the part was to challenge the opinion that globalization in concert with cosmopolitan ideology necessarily threaten to national/ethnic identity. It certainly depends on what kind of cosmopolitanism we chose to advocate. It is obvious that Russell's, Kant's and Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism seeks to intellectually occupy non-Western minds. That is why it was necessary to look at the key premises of these authors through the lenses of Moeller and Wittgenstein. Their arguments destroy the basis of the radical cosmopolitanism. Therefore, I sought to argue that multifacetedness has to be warranted in order to eliminate reductionist universalism.

The last example of the conversation between the three guys from Spain illustrates that openness and efforts to understand other perspectives allow us not to construct the best possible world-view, but rather to avoid dependence on the false one. In this case our identity certainly expands, but it is not threatened, since it is impossible to delete all the acquired memories and experiences; although as I will argue in the next part, there have been some efforts to commit that. I have argued that if we endeavour to understand other attitudes, then we become able to see the things from more angles which provides us with more possibilities and potentialities. Thus, the value of pluralism is that in this way we may be instructed to perceive the world differently or to put it in Rorty's terms, not to become commonsensical.

Another problem inherent to the writings of Russell, Kant and Nussbaum is an exaltation of individuality. Russell emphasized the importance of the cultivation of individual's intellectual powers; Kant emphasized the necessity to provide people with universally valid individual rights and also treated an individual as an autonomous agent who supposedly is not somehow bound to a particular cultural and traditional background; finally, Nussbaum came up with a conclusion that Western spirit and education that are based on human rights and 'universal values' have to be inculcated into the minds of non-Westerners.

We can notice several negative aspects of such proposals. Firstly, the authors reject non-Western traditions as inadequate and secondly, they deny the importance of inherited traditional and

cultural backgrounds and primary socialization. Precisely this kind of cosmopolitanism has to be criticized because it seeks to transport Western values and extirpate other peoples from their meaningful 'spiritual' environment. Taylor's and Putnam's arguments have exhibited that individuals are not able to create the conceptions of the 'good' and 'right' without growing up in a specific community. It does not mean that in later stages of life these convictions cannot be modified. That simply means that individual acquires his first experiences and perceptions through the participation in a daily activities of his community. Later I will criticize this attempt of 'decommunication' by appealing to Kymlicka's arguments for the preservation and protection of other lifestyles.

Finally, I want to briefly analyze the obstacle for the construction of a cosmopolitan society. I have already shown that people always are born in a certain social-cultural context. Therefore, they acquire their primary identity by living, learning and cognizing the world in a specific context. Of course, later they can criticize, assess, modify and improve their experiences and perceptions. However, as Amin Maalouf puts it, "I haven't got several identities: I've got just one, made up of many components in a mixture that is unique to me, just as other people's identity is unique to them as individuals" (Maalouf 2000, 2). Moreover, "my identity is what prevents me from being identical to anybody else (...) the clones would at least be identical only at the time of their "birth"; as soon as they started to live they would start being different" (Ibid. 10). Maalouf's statements do not undermine the possibility of becoming a cosmopolitan. However, I suppose that his arguments to some extent undermine the idea of the construction of a cosmopolitan society. He says: "through each one of my affiliations, taken separately, I possess a certain kinship with a large number of my fellow human beings; but because of all these allegiances, taken together, I possess my own identity, completely different from any other" (Ibid. 19-20).

Thus identity is something unique, personal and particular. There are an infinite number of possible combinations of allegiances determined by our own exceptional experiences that make up an identity. One, actually, may internalize certain abstract prescriptions of being a member of the X nation and by practicing them to feel part of it. This is a matter of personal decision. The thing is that nations usually have fixed rules and prescriptions which if acquired let one to become a member of a nation. A cosmopolitan, on the contrary, does not find such pre-wired prescriptions and rules that could be his source of identification. One may identify oneself with certain aspects of a human cultural heritage such as literature, art and etc. Moreover, one may be inclined to political activity. However, in any case, a cosmopolitan will be only an eclectic who will select and acquire only some elements of an infinite human heritage. Because of the incredible number of possible combinations of elements of identification two cosmopolitans might have few things in common. As I have said above, global duties and responsibilities are not enough for the construction of a

cosmopolitan society. In other words, according to Maalouf, identity is the sum of various affiliations, and the affiliations of one cosmopolitan are not congruent with those of the other.

In addition to that, Maalouf notices another obstacle for the building a cosmopolitan identity: “never have men had so many things in common – knowledge, points of reference, images, words, instruments and tools of all kinds. But this only increases their desire to assert their differences (...) The ever-increasing speed of globalization undoubtedly reinforces, by way of reaction, people’s need for identity” (Ibid. 93). Thus these are the main hindrances to the formation of *the* cosmopolitan identity; there can be only a cosmopolitan identity which is unique and inherent to only one individual in the world.

In the fourth part I am going to discuss the relationship and interaction between identity and language. The analysis of this interaction is of great importance if we want to come up with the arguments for the preservation of non-Western cultures and languages. Firstly, in the next part I want to display how language in general can determine the way we see the world. All the world-views are actually instructed, that is to say, individuals are incapable of creating an attitude devoid of all external influences. Language, external world, historical circumstances, academic literature and etc. are the factors that form our mindsets. Therefore, in the beginning it is important to understand how the language can predestine our identities.

## **IV LANGUAGE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR IDENTITY AND MEMORY**

### **4. Introduction**

In the fourth part I am going to analyze the conceptions of identity, memory, consciousness and their interaction with the language. This part is important because after the analysis of the interaction we will be able to move to particular considerations on how culture and language affects human thinking and his self-hood. The fourth part will analyze how multilingualism provides us with abundance of ideas about the world and things around us; moreover, I will argue that knowing more than one language improves our cognitive capacities which are useful for the cognition of the world and ourselves. All these reflections will also serve as justifications for the preservation of minority cultures and languages.

I am going to begin the part with the analysis of the conception of identity. The arguments of John Locke, John Gray and Naomi Klein will be provided. The first two authors will allow us to better understand the anatomy and structure of identity. Furthermore, I will discuss Gray’s opinion about language and its influence on identity building. All these reflections will be very valuable

while discussing Klein's case where she writes about attempts and experiments to destroy and replace already existing self-hood with an artificial identity. The consequences of these attempts will demonstrate us how important are our senses which capture the signals of an external world and how important is the language which allows us to work the data up and to perceive it.

#### 4.1 Locke's conception of identity

John Locke is an author whose theory can contribute greatly in understanding not only the structure of identity but also to explain how the manipulation of self-hood, which I will discuss later in this part, works. Locke alone would not be sufficient to understand how the process of self-determination and self-understanding works. Thus later I will appeal to John Gray who reveals the importance of the language in the process of constituting selfhood and, particularly, its importance constituting memory. Their insights will help us to better understand the methods applied by the CIA and the psychiatrists who sought to break the resistance of people and to change their identity.

First of all, Locke wants to make clear the distinction between the terms 'person', 'man' and 'substance' which are the names for three different ideas. It is important because we can attribute identity to each of these things and then it is easy to get confused, because identity changes its sense according to the term it was attached to. In other words, we can talk about man's identity, identity of substance and person's identity and in each of these cases *identity* means different things (Locke 1854, 463). We are concerned only by the personal identity.

According to Locke, a person is "a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places" (Ibid. 466). A person is able to exist in different times and places only because of his consciousness which is inseparable from thinking. Consciousness is the key concept in Locke's theory of identity because it helps to perceive that one does perceive. Hence, a person is the one who is intelligent, conscious and able to perceive himself in the present moment. Therefore, sensory abilities such as hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, meditating, willing and etc. are very important because "thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himself that which he calls self" (Ibid.).

However, it is not only the capacity to perceive oneself as existing in the present that constitutes personal identity. The ability of consciousness to extend itself "backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person" (Ibid.). Thus, a person whose personal identity reaches "no further than consciousness reaches" (Ibid. 470) is that who perceives his existence in the present, remembers past actions, thoughts and events as part of the constitutional elements of his identity, and who is able to make projections about his future. It is very important to

emphasize these two things: the understanding that the past actions and deeds are the essential elements of self-hood and the ability to make the projections of the future. The first aspect will be important when I will discuss the psychological experiments with people; the second aspect should be explained by reference to John Gray's reflections on the language role in the constitution of identity. Gray's insights can also easily explain the attempts to change and to reconstruct the identity. I will come back to these issues a little bit later.

Another important question is what happens when consciousness is interrupted? Locke's answer to this question can be related to the problem of "sensory deprivation" which I will soon discuss as well. In fact, when Locke talks about the interruption of consciousness he has in mind other kind of "deprivation" which causes interruption of consciousness, for instance, sleep or inebriation. When we lose our "sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing" (Ibid. 467). Locke states that only being conscious we can perceive our present thoughts and actions which make us self now; moreover, we "will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come (...) the same consciousness uniting those distant actions in to the same person" (Ibid. 468).

Thus, several most important aspects need to be underlined. Firstly, it is consciousness which enables one to perceive oneself as the same person who has been to different places in different time; in other words, consciousness unites and binds our recollections into wholeness. Secondly, senses stimulated by the things of an external world are very important because then one realizes as existing in the present. And finally, Locke stresses the importance of memories and projections of the future that also constitutes self-hood.

## **4.2 Linguistic determination of identity**

It is obvious that in the contentions regarding identity, usually the existence of identity is taken for granted. In other words, identity is perceived as something inherent to a human being as an essential inner set of orientation in the world. In the second and third parts I spoke about various possibilities of preserving a national identity, expanding identity, producing a cosmopolitan identity and etc. In all these discussions the term 'identity' was taken for granted as if it was clear and obvious what it is. Locke revealed us a little bit more about what is identity and how it works. Gray, in turn, tries to eliminate clearness and says that identity is a pure chimera whose existence and falseness is determined by the use of language.

Gray stresses a fluid character of our identities: "We are all bundles of sensations. The unified, continuous self that we encounter in everyday experience belongs in *maya*. We are programmed to perceive identity in ourselves, when in truth there is only change. We are hardwired

for the illusion of self” (Gray 2003, 76). Locke mentioned the human ability to weave everything, for example past experiences and thoughts, in a coherent wholeness; Gray, conversely, claims that human being is unable to perceive himself as a coherent unit. One constructs his identity by using random fragments of perceptions which are “picked out from an unfathomable richness” (Ibid. 71). Therefore, we can never attain the complete selfhood of ourselves. An image we have about ourselves is vague, fragmentary, random and deceitful. Gray illustrates his deliberation on human identity by the quotation of David Hume:

“I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement (...) Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind”<sup>9</sup>.

What is the source of the falsity and delusion of identity and our perception of self-hood?

Gray quotes Hume and claims that at any point we are able to capture that single and stable idea of self-hood because it is in a permanent flux and motion. However, Locke argued that we feel ourselves because we have an ability to weave together our past events and to project our future. Thus, the source of fallibility and uncertainty of self-hood is the language, because humans “use language to look back on their lives and call up a virtual self. The illusion of enduring selfhood arises with speech. We acquire a sense of ourselves by our parents speaking to us in infancy; our memories are strung together by many bodily continuities, but also by our names; we contrive shifting histories of ourselves in a fitful interior monologue; we form a conception of having a lifetime ahead of us by using language to construct a variety of possible futures. By using the language we have invented a fictive self, which we project into the past and the future – and even beyond the grave. The self we imagine surviving death is a phantom even in life” (Gray 2003, 77).

We see that Gray is much more sceptical than Locke. The latter simply explains how identity is built and how it functions, while Gray tends to undermine certitude with which we usually discuss the topics related to identity. Identity is like a reservoir which contains memories, stories about ourselves or the outer world, and projects of future plans (which are always affected

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/web%20publishing/TreatiseI.iv.vi.htm>

by our gained experiences) and all these things are enabled by the use of language. To be more accurate, Gray, actually, originates this linguistic delusion from the phonetic writing system.

Gray does not think that precisely the capacity to use the language separates people from animals. It is rather “the crystallization of language in writing”, because it “gave humans the power to preserve their thoughts and experiences from time (...) Writing creates an artificial memory, whereby humans can enlarge their experience beyond the limits of one generation or one way of life. At the same time it has allowed them to invent a world of abstract entities and mistake them for reality. The development of writing has enabled them to construct philosophies in which they no longer belong in the natural world” (Ibid. 56). Thus, the phonetic writing system empowered human to transcend the boundaries of our natural world and to plunge into the marsh of abstractions and non-sensuous entities. The ability to construct and then to believe in an artificial reality may undermine the pretensions of the ideological systems to create the ‘best fitted reality’ on the basis of rationality and objectivity. It seems then that such things as objectivity or rationality are but constructions enabled by a language transcending natural boundaries of an empirical world; then objectivity and rationality are nothing but the impositions of human standards and propensities on the outer world.

Gray states that “philosophers from Plato to Hegel have interpreted the world as if it was a mirror of human thinking. Later philosophers such as Heidegger and Wittgenstein went further, and claimed that the world is a construction of human thought. In all these philosophies, the world acquires a significance from the fact that humans have appeared in it. In fact, until humans arrive, there is hardly a world at all” (Ibid. 53). Later he adds: “The pictographs of Sumer were metaphors of sensuous realities. With the evolution of phonetic writing those links were severed. Writing no longer pointed outwards to a world humans shared with other animals. Henceforth its signs pointed backwards to the human mouth, which soon became the source of all sense (...) throughout its long history, Chinese thought has been nominalist – it has understood that even the most abstract terms are only labels, names for the diversity of things in the world. As a result, Chinese thinkers have rarely mistaken ideas for facts” (Ibid. 56-57).

Gray accuses Western philosophers of being idealists and solipsists. They may think that the language can mirror the world; or that they can impose human standards on the world and thus, humanize it; or, finally, they, being unsatisfied with the existing world, create an alternative one and withdraw to it. Gray does not criticize the Chinese mind that did not confuse facts for ideas and abstractions.

However, my point is that there are no facts, but rather ideas about facts. Furthermore, language cannot explain the world and the things, but it can mirror them. As I have argued before, the world is an anthropomorphic creation and its image is determined by our languages and

cultures. The world and things become picturesque because of our abilities to colour it by our different culturally and linguistically determined experiences and perceptions. In other words, to all different cultural and linguistic groups the world is a 'givenness' and this 'givenness' is perceived differently. Thus, the value of different languages and cultures is that they can provide us with 'instruments' to *see* the world differently.

All in all, our fictive self-hood depends on the ability to call up certain statements or certain sentences which determine us. In other words, our conception of ourselves depends *also* on the learned sentences we know about ourselves. In certain situations, when we need to define ourselves we just need to call up certain linguistic definitions which inform us about who we are; it, by no means, wants to say that the existence of what we are, our social roles and etc. are enabled only by the use of language; it wants to say that usually when we are asked to tell who we are, we 'extract' certain fixed definitions of our self-hood from memory and tell them not consciously, but rather habitually. This kind of reliance on the fixed definitions indicates our limitative understanding of self-hood and reveals how much we rely on the fixed linguistic conventions.

We have discussed the conceptions such as 'identity', 'memory', 'consciousness', 'language', and we have also seen how they are interrelated and interdependent. Moreover, we have stressed the fact that senses are of crucial importance for the constitution of self-hood. In the next chapter I am going to analyze the case when certain methods were invented and applied in order to eradicate one from one's identity and to impose another kind of self-perception. The foregoing issues will let to better understand how it was done.

### **4.3 Eradication and instillation of a new identity**

I am going to discuss the methods designed to interrupt the functioning of one's consciousness and hereby to destroy existing identity. After the ruination of one's self-hood new forms of identification were trying to be imprinted. An *instillation* of a new identity concerns us a lot because this process was based on a linguistic manipulation and persuasion. That will also help us to understand a close interplay between language, consciousness, identity and memory.

This chapter for the most part is based on the book of Naomi Klein called *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. In the beginning of the book she talks about the methods designed to deprive one's identity that are based on the sensory deprivation and annihilation of memory. Later she goes on and explains that quite the same methods can be applied on a mass of people under suitable circumstances. Klein begins the story with analysis of the professional activity of psychiatrist Ewen Cameron who, according to her, played "a central role in developing contemporary U.S. torture techniques" (Klein 2007, 29).

Psychiatrist Ewen Cameron had an object to rebuilt new personalities. The *new* person had to be more perfect because ‘faulty’ minds and ‘inappropriate’ reasoning, according to his plan, had to be erased. Cameron thought that this goal could be achieved “by inflicting an array of shocks to the human brain” (Ibid. 29). In other words, he supposed that torture could help achieve “complete depatterning” which meant the state of ‘clean’ mind i.e. *tabula rasa*, a person who has no features of preexistent personality.

The first stage of changing the personality had to be “shock and awe” which supposedly should have lead to the eradication of personality; later on, various types of recorded messages were played to “patients shocked and drugged into an almost vegetative state” (Ibid. 31-32). There are cases when patients had to listen the recorded tapes (which had to teach new statements about themselves, for example, “You are a good mother and wife people enjoy your company” and etc.) “for sixteen to twenty hours a day for weeks” (Ibid. 31-32).

We recall from the Locke’s theory that sensory abilities and consciousness are very important for the perception of self-hood, because sensory abilities allow us to orientate in different places and in different time and consciousness is responsible for organizing our perceptions in a coherent whole. Cameron distinguished “‘two major factors’ that allow us to ‘maintain a time and space image’ – that allow us, in other words, to know where we are and who we are” (Ibid. 36). These factors are *our continued sensory input* and *our memory*. Thus, the theory of “sensory deprivation” consists in the attempts to annihilate memory and sensory input. Electroshock was used in order to achieve the first goal and isolation boxes served to deprive one from sensory input. He also sought to make his patients to lose their sense of time, for example, by “changing meal times and serving soup for breakfast and porridge for dinner” (Ibid.). All in all, “he blasted brains with everything he could think of—electricity, hallucinogens, sensory deprivation, sensory overload—anything that would wipe out what was and give him a blank slate on which to imprint new thoughts, new patterns” (Ibid. 331).

There was also another scientist Dr. Donald Hebb who was director of psychology at McGill University. His aim was to ascertain if “intensive isolation interfered with the ability to think clearly” (Ibid. 35). His ideas were crucial to the theory of interrogation because he proved that sensory deprivation made people more susceptible to “brainwashing” and lowered their intellectual efficiency (Ibid. 34). He concluded that people after being isolated for a certain period tend to accept stupid ideas much more receptively; for example, students who earlier did not believe in ghosts and were academic people, after his experiments used to become more receptive to the aforementioned ideas. There were even cases when after experiments they became interested into the questions which earlier had seemed senseless. Thus, Hebb proved that torture or shock can

make people more obedient and to make them accept the ideas which earlier would have seemed stupid.

Thus, the methods designed to change personal identity, erase one's memory, interrupt consciousness and later on to imprint the new personal information were: sensory deprivation or sensory overload, isolation and etc., and linguistic persuasion. That caused disorientation and regression (Ibid, 333).

To sum up, "the shock doctrine mimics this process precisely, attempting to achieve on a mass scale what torture does one on one in the interrogation cell" (Ibid. 16). The sensory abilities are affected by the use of hoods, earplugs, shackles, strobe lights, blaring music, beatings and electroshock. The goal is to make a person stop thinking rationally and tell the secret information or renounce his former beliefs. In this way consciousness is interrupted and reality cannot be explained by words. In fact, "a state of shock, by definition, is a moment when there is a gap between fast-moving events and the information that exists to explain them" (Ibid. 458). In other words, a person is not able to explain reality, make a coherent understanding of what is going on by creating a narrative. Thus, a person goes crazy and it becomes easier to manipulate him. The same can be applied to the larger conglomerations of people. Klein summarized Cameron's attempts to clean personal identity and produce a new identity in this way: "no matter how doggedly he shocked, drugged and disoriented, he never got there. The opposite proved true: the more he blasted, the more shattered his patients became. Their minds weren't "clean"; rather, they were a mess, their memories fractured, their trust betrayed" (Ibid. 47).

#### **4.4 Conclusions**

We have surveyed several theories concerning identity, consciousness, memory and their dependence on the language. The fourth part aimed at describing the general principles of the structure and anatomy of identity. Usually in the contentions about social, political and judicial issues an oversimplified and superficial notion of identity prevails. The inner mechanism of its constitution and inner processes are usually not taken into consideration. I have not pretended to thoroughly analyze these conceptions and inner interaction. My aim was to briefly sketch out the mechanism of self-hood.

Thus this part aimed at the explaining the inner processes of identity. The next part will aim at describing the inner structure of mind which is determined by the use of a concrete language. We are going to transport from the anatomy of identity to the anatomy of mind which, in fact, are closely related issues. When we are thinking or summarizing our impressions and experiences we do it by using a concrete language; when we talk the way we perceive and organize the world and

the relations between the things, is determined by a concrete language which, in turn, is determined by a concrete culture and its unique experiences of the world. Certainly, it is the realm of an anthropomorphic world, but as I have argued, I do not see why should this fact eliminate or diminish our endeavours to cognize the world from the different angles. Later in the end of the thesis I will draw some parallels between Klein's theory and some cases concerning the politics of indigenous people.

# V THE LINGUISTIC IMPACT ON THE COGNITIVE HUMAN APPARATUS

## 5. Introduction

In this part I am going to discuss the interplay between language and culture and how this interplay affects the way we see the world. Guy Deutscher, the author whose insights I am going to use in this part, asks: “does the need to pay constant attention to certain aspects of experience train speakers to be especially sensitive to certain details or induce particular types of memory patterns and associations?” (Deutscher 2010, 156); “If we hold language up as a mirror to the mind, what do we see reflected there: human nature or the cultural conventions of our society?” (Ibid. 9). I will try not only to answer these questions but also to provide several examples reinforcing the answers.

Nietzsche argued that language imprisons us and that by using it, we deceive ourselves, because language does not allow to cognize the outer world. Our knowledge is fake, since it is produced by deceitful language. Gray argued that language enables us to grasp the sense of self-hood, however our self-conception is chimerical, because we are existing, experiencing and perceiving at the present moment, and the existence of the past and the future is enabled by the use of language. In other words, language helps us to transcend the boundaries of the present moment and it leads us to the realm of abstractions. Therefore, there is nothing certain about our fictive image of self-hood.

But Wilhelm von Humboldt thinks conversely: “The difference between languages is not only in sounds and signs but in world-view. Herein is found the reason and ultimate goal of all the study of language” (Ibid. 135). Deutscher adds: “the complexity of some areas of grammar reflects the culture of the speakers, often in unexpected ways” (Ibid. 20). Thus, let’s analyze how languages affect our memory, perception and self-hood through their peculiarities.

Firstly, I am going to discuss Deutscher’s expression ‘freedom within constraints’ which seeks to explain the interplay between nature, culture and language which has an impact on our peculiarities of cognition and perception. Secondly, I will return once more, to the issue of universalism. I will argue that even if academician’s efforts to find something universally valid are not completely in vain, still the source of universalism cannot flow from Western civilization. And finally, I will provide some justifications for the preservation of lingual minorities.

## 5.1 Language and its impact on cognition and perception

According to Deutscher, “one of the jewels in the crown of the twentieth century was the recognition of the fundamental unity of mankind in all that concerns its cognitive endowment. So nowadays we no longer look primarily to the genes to explain variations in mental characteristics among ethnic groups. But in the twenty-first century, we are beginning to appreciate the differences in thinking that are imprinted by cultural conventions and, in particular, by speaking in different tongues”(Ibid. 232). It means that kind of pluralistic approach was implemented, since it was understood that the cognition of human being cannot take place between the four walls of the laboratory. Anthropologists began to analyze how cultural and social conventions may influence the way the world is conceptualized and perceived. Naturally, the questions about the differences of the world’s perception of distinct societies emerge.

There were many attempts in history to explain the perceptual differences both in geographical and historical dimensions. Some ‘scientists’ thought that different perception of the world, which is inherent to the ancient languages, is not culturally, but biologically determined. That presupposed the racial inequality and the down-grading of underdeveloped societies. However, it was Humboldt who noticed that “in principle, any thought can be expressed in any language. The real differences between languages, he argued, are not in what a language is *able* to express but rather in ‘what it encourages and stimulates its speakers to do from its own inner force’” (Ibid. 136). In other words, as a linguist Roman Jakobson put it “‘Languages differ essentially in what they *must* convey and not in what they *may* convey.’ The crucial differences between languages, in other words, are not in what each language allows its speakers to express – for in theory any language could express anything – but in what information each language obliges its speakers to express” (Ibid. 151).

For instance, a phrase “Yesterday I visited my neighbour” does not oblige a person to specify the sex of the neighbour. However, in some other languages, a person would be obliged, though unwillingly, to specify this information; for example, in French the words *voisin/voisine* would be used.

Since languages oblige speakers to unwillingly convey certain information which is essentially inherent to the structure of a language, certain habits of mind are instilled on memory, attention, perception, and associations (Ibid. 22). “When a language forces its speakers to pay attention to certain aspects of the world each time they open their mouths or prick up their ears, such habits of speech can eventually settle into habits of mind with consequences for memory, or perception, or associations, or even practical skills” (Ibid. 152). Various experiments on how mother tongue affects human’s abilities to orientate in space and to remember the location of the

things, to attribute certain qualities to things and etc., were carried out. Some of them I am going to mention very soon.

I have already mentioned that many scientists were trying to find a definite answer which explains what forces humans to think in such and such a way. Some of them sustained the idea that nature itself determines the way humans conceptualize the world, others stressed the exceptional influence of a language. Deutscher takes a moderate stance and claims that “the framework of freedom within constraints (...) provides the best way to grasp culture’s role in shaping the concepts of language more generally, and even its grammatical system. Different cultures certainly are not at liberty to carve up the world entirely at whim, as they are bound by the constraints set by nature – both the nature of the human brain and the nature of the world outside” (Ibid. 95). In other words, we cannot completely withdraw to the realm of the anthropomorphic and ignore the world as a ‘givenness’, because there always has to be something given for our senses that carve up the received stimuli in this or that way. Furthermore, after the birth an individual inherits not only a specific cultural and linguistic background which shapes his mind, but also he is dropped into a specific natural environment which also to some extent determines his mind. Thus in the end it seems that specific natural environment and specific cultural and linguistic background work in concert.

The most frequent discrepancies between different languages are the names for the colours. Some time ago, linguists thought that the ancient languages did not have sufficient names of the colours because they simply saw the world differently. They thought that in the course of history, human retina developed and began to distinguish different hues and thus the names for the new colours emerged. However, many small tribes were discovered and the same happened – they did not have some specific names of colours in their vocabulary. Various hypotheses have been made.

Here is one of them: “people in primitive cultures (...) have no occasion to manipulate colours artificially and are not exposed to a systematic array of highly saturated colours, only to the haphazard and often unsaturated colours presented by nature. So they have not developed a refined vocabulary to describe fine shades of hue. We don’t see the need to talk about the taste of a peach in abstraction from the particular object, namely a peach. They don’t see the need to talk about the colour of a particular fish or bird or leaf in abstraction from the particular fish or bird or leaf. When we do talk about taste in abstraction from a particular fruit, we rely on the vaguest of opposites, such as ‘sweet’ and ‘sour’. When they talk about colour in abstraction from a particular fruit, they rely on the vague opposites ‘white/light’ and ‘black/dark’. We find nothing strange in using ‘sweet like a mango’, or ‘sweet like a banana’, or ‘sweet like a watermelon’. They find nothing strange in using ‘black’ for a wide range of colours and are happy to say ‘black like a leaf’ or ‘black like the sea beyond the reef area’” (Ibid. 74-75).

Thus the ancients and people from the small tribes are able to see the different shades of colours, though they do not have appropriate words in their languages. This conclusion undermines the hypothesis of the biological development. But still, what could be an explanation for the lack of the word ‘blue’, the colour whose usage is so common to us? Deutscher claims that “the cultural significance of blue (...) is very limited (...) blue is extremely rare as a colour of materials in nature, and blue dyes are exceedingly difficult to produce. People in simple cultures might spend a lifetime without seeing objects that are truly blue. Of course, blue is the colour of the sky (and, for some of us, the sea). But in the absence of blue materials with any practical significance, the need to find a special name for this great stretch of nothingness is particularly non-pressing” (Ibid. 92).

This explanation illustrates how our cultural conventions and natural ‘givenness’ work in concert and determine our limits of expression without, actually, reducing one’s abilities to understand a concept which does not exist in one’s language. However, the results of various experiments “lead to a conclusion that few would have been prepared to believe just a few years ago: that speakers of different languages may perceive colours slightly differently after all (...) it now seems that the vocabulary of colour in different languages can be the *cause* of differences in the perception of colour” (Ibid. 232). But it has to be stressed that it has nothing to do with different biological development. On the one hand, it seems that a visual perception may not be affected but rather inspired to choose a certain answer by a mother tongue (Ibid. 222). That is to say, one’s mother tongue simply creates a conceptual framework which may oblige one to grasp certain aspects of a thing. On the other hand, there is some evidence that mother tongue, indeed, affects a visual sensation.

“It has been shown, for instance, that a perfectly grey picture of a banana can appear slightly yellow to us, because the brain remembers bananas as yellow and so normalizes the sensation towards what it expects to see (...) it is likely that the involvement of language with the perception of colour takes place on this level of normalization and compensation, where the brain relies on its store of past memories and established distinctions in order to decide how similar certain colours are. And although no one knows yet what exactly goes on between the linguistic and the visual circuits, the evidence gathered so far amounts to a compelling argument that language does affect our visual sensation” (Ibid. 231).

We have seen how natural contingencies may influence the richness of a vocabulary of a language which, in turn, may influence our visual perception. Now we still have to demonstrate what impact mother tongue has on the associative and ‘memorative’ patterns. Firstly, I will provide two examples of how mother tongue affects our associative pattern.

In German and Spanish there are many nouns that have different genders. Thus an experiment was carried out with German and Spanish speakers who were asked to attribute the

properties such as weak/strong, little/big and etc., to the selected nouns which were of different gender. “On average, the nouns that are masculine in German but feminine in Spanish (chairs and keys, for example) got higher marks for strength from the Germans, whereas bridges and clocks, which are masculine in Spanish but feminine in German, were judged stronger on average by the Spanish speakers. The simple conclusion from such an experiment would be that bridges do have more manly connotations for Spanish speakers than for German speakers (...) German speakers tended to describe bridges as beautiful, elegant, fragile, peaceful, pretty, and slender; Spanish speakers as big, dangerous, long, strong, sturdy, towering” (Ibid. 210).

There was also a similar experiment carried out on French and Spanish speakers. “The participants in this experiment were asked to help in the preparation of a film in which some everyday objects come to life. Their task was to choose the appropriate voice for each object in the film. They were shown a series of pictures, and for each one they were asked to choose between a man’s voice and a woman’s voice. Although the names of the objects were never mentioned, when French speakers saw the picture of a fork, most of them wanted her to speak in a woman’s voice, whereas the Spanish speakers tended to choose a male voice for him instead. With the picture of bed, the situation was reversed” (Ibid.).

Deutscher agrees that we cannot draw any strict conclusions from such an experiment. We still cannot state that languages force us to see the world in a precise way; nonetheless, we can be quite sure that mother tongue ‘proposes’ certain associative elements which we may attribute unconsciously. In other words, these examples are suggestive and inducing to keep investigating and searching for more convincing proofs.

Language in collaboration with nature creates standards, norms, classifications and associations which to some extent are imposed on us. In the previous part I also discussed the relationship between language and memory. In this part I will illustrate how precisely, the structure of a language determines what is kept in a store of past memories. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that “speech habits, imprinted from an early age, can create habits of mind that have far-reaching consequences beyond speaking, as they affect orientation skills and even patterns of memory” (Ibid. 192-193). But before providing the examples I am going to return to the topic of universalism. In the beginning of the essay I argued that the ambitions to find universal values are in vain. In the following chapter I will firstly undermine the pretensions of Western philosophical mind to usurp the approaches to the universal cognition.

## 5.2 Drawbacks of the Western cognitive tradition

In the first part of the thesis I described the intellectual climate of Western philosophy and its scope. The scope was to pave a royal road to ‘rationality’, ‘objectivity’, ‘factuality’, and, of course, ‘universalism’. Our behaviour, actions, convictions and beliefs then should be measured with the aforementioned principles and modified, rejected or approved and then applied. I criticized this one-dimensional outlook in the previous part, and now I am going to criticize Western cognitive universalism.

According Deutscher, “philosophers and psychologists from Kant onwards have argued that all spatial thinking is essentially egocentric in nature and that our primary notions of space are derived from the planes that go through our bodies. One of the trump arguments for the primacy of the egocentric coordinates was of course human language. The universal reliance of languages on the egocentric coordinates, and the privileged position that all languages accord the egocentric coordinates over other systems, was said to parade before us the universal features of the human mind” (Ibid. 163). Thus, we see that the eagerness to discover a stable universal fundament on which the human mind would be based, misled philosophers and psychologists and caused a completely opposite effect – an immersion into a marsh of prejudices. The main reason of such ignorance was, definitely, the lack of data about different cultures and languages, and perhaps, intellectual megalomania.

In 1768, Immanuel Kant even wrote a paper “on the primacy of the egocentric conception of space to language and mind” (Ibid.). But later, it turned out that there were many languages around the world which did not use the egocentric coordinates. As Deutscher puts it, “we have simply mistaken the familiar for the natural: the egocentric system could be paraded as a universal feature of human language only because no one had bothered to examine in depth those languages that happen to do things differently (...) languages that rely primarily on geographic coordinates turn out to be scattered around the world, from Polynesia to Mexico, from Bali and Nepal to Namibia and Madagascar” (Ibid. 169). This case reveals how narrow-minded and untenable are always our pretensions to proclaim definite and final truths without trying to take into consideration many contradictory facts or even without trying to search for ones.

I will dare to provide a long, yet very representative and didactic quotation of Deutscher: “Needless to say, the languages of illiterate tribes, without great works of literature or any other redeeming features, were seen as devoid of any interest, primitive jargons just as worthless as the primitive peoples who spoke them (...) In fact, from the seventeenth century onwards, the writing of learned treatise on ‘universal grammar’ was very much in vogue. But the universe of these universal grammars was rather limited. Around 1720, for instance, John Henley published in

London a series of grammars called *The Compleat Linguist; or, An Universal Grammar of All the Considerable Tongues in Being*. All the considerable tongues in being amounted to nine: Latin, Greek, Italian, Spanish, French, Hebrew, Chaldee (Aramaic), Syriac (a later dialect of Aramaic), and Arabic. This exclusive universe offered a somewhat distorted perspective, for – as we know today – the variations among European languages pale in significance compared with the otherness of more exotic tongues. Just imagine what misleading ideas one would get on ‘universal religion’ or on ‘universal food’ if one limited one’s universe to stretch between the Mediterranean and the North Sea. One would travel in the different European countries and be impressed by the great divergences between them: the architecture of churches is entirely different, the bread and cheese do not taste at all the same (...) these intra-European differences are ultimately minor variations in essentially the same religion and the same culinary culture” (Ibid. 132).

Now we can hear certain repercussion coming from the first part when I claimed that pluralism of ideas cannot take place in the same intellectual setting. In fact, Nietzsche’s and Russell’s ideas, despite obvious differences, are two sides of the same coin. If we really wish to broaden our intellectual and cognitive horizon, we need to change currency and then to start on our journey. Otherwise, we will remain kings of our intellectual cells.

Let’s take a look at an alternative system of orientation. Europeans are accustomed to use egocentric system of orientation which means that “the coordinates rotate with us whenever and wherever we turn. For Guugu Yimithirr, the axes always remain constant” (Ibid. 168). The speakers of Guugu Yimithirr “regardless of visibility conditions, regardless of whether they are in thick forest or on an open plain, whether outside or indoors, whether stationary or moving, they have a spot-on sense of direction (...) even when they were taken to dense forests with no visibility, even inside caves, they always, without any hesitation, could point accurately to the cardinal directions. They don’t do any conscious computations: they don’t look at the sun and pause for a moment of calculation before saying ‘the ant is north of your foot’. They seem to have perfect pitch for directions. They simply feel where north, south, west, and east are” (Ibid. 172). The geographic system of orientation *forces* the speakers to be always aware of directions and environmental clues.

Furthermore, it is not only an ‘odd’ and ‘unusual’ relation with the environment which is obliged by the specific language. A lot of experiments revealed that the speakers who use egocentric system of orientation also memorize the things differently. That is to say, “speakers of egocentric languages like English overwhelmingly chose the egocentric solution, whereas speakers of geographic languages like Guugu Yimithirr and Tzeltal chose the geographic solution” (Ibid. 184). For instance, imagine that in the hotel there are two rooms which face each other; all the things (tables, chairs, TV-set, bed and etc.) in both rooms are put ‘in the same place’. If a speaker, who uses egocentric system of orientation, enters the room, he sees that a table is *in front of* him, a

bed is *on the right* and a TV-set *on the left*. Now, if he goes to the opposite room he sees no difference: a table is still *in front of* him, a bed is *on the right* and a TV-set *on the left*. However, for a speaker of Guugu Yimithirr these rooms would be absolutely different, because a table in one room may be in the north, and in another room a table is in the south. Thus we can draw a conclusion that two speakers of two different languages do have two different perspectives which are determined by their mother tongues.

Deutscher says that in this case “we should turn to the maxim ‘freedom within constraints’ as the best way to understand culture’s influence on the choice of coordinate systems. Nature – in this case the physical environment – certainly places constraints on the types of coordinate system that can be used sensibly in a given language. But there is considerable freedom within these constraints to select from different alternatives” (Ibid. 190).

There is an abundance of the examples which would make us to question our conception of ‘normality’. From the foregoing examples we can understand that a language because of its peculiar structure obliges us to tell certain kind of information, to orientate in a certain manner, to memorize the surroundings in a particular way and to associate certain properties to the things. We do not have sufficient data in order to draw strict conclusions and to state that cultural and linguistic conventions definitely impose certain habits on mind, although it seems so.

We have approached one of the justifications for the preservation of lingual minorities. The world and the external things are a ‘givenness’ whose existence I do not tend to analyze. The limitedness of such efforts has been already demonstrated; I do not seek to withdraw to the realm of scepticism (like Nietzsche) either; I am rather inclined to analyze the way these things are reflected in different cultural and linguistic settings and how other cultures and languages can enrich our conception of the world and thus, to avoid prejudices. The following example illustrates that: the anthropologist “Levinson asked some informants if they could think of clues that would help *him* improve his sense of direction, they volunteered such hints as the differences in brightness of the sides of trunks of particular trees, the orientation of termite mounds, wind directions in particular seasons, the flights of bats and migrating birds, the alignment of sand dunes in the coastal area” (Ibid. 173). After all, who can dare now to bravely claim that this or that thing is universal?

### 5.3 Conclusions

Our understanding is not limited by our mother tongue. There can be nothing in other language which could not be expressed in another. Thus, a language does not limit our intellectual capacities. Language can force us to specify some details, to cause certain associations, to notice those aspects which are skipped by other languages. All in all, even if a language does not reduce

our capacities, through the frequent usage of certain peculiar forms one might acquire such habits of mind that are not well developed in the mind of the other person (for instance, the habit of the spatial orientation).

Furthermore, precisely in the comparison of different languages we can best notice that the basis of the 'natural' are always the conventions one has been brought up on. "What common sense finds natural is what it is familiar with" (Ibid. 234). In the example which I mentioned in the third part, where three guys were discussing their national allegiances, we saw that the guy who was the most peaceful and who was accepted by two confronting parts, did not belong in the realm of the 'natural'. He was able to consider the issue from at least several distinct perspectives which was an obvious outcome of his pluralistic education which, certainly, included the studies of the languages.

This has been a very intra-European example. There are no doubts that other languages could provide us with a very interesting data about the 'unnatural'. However, Deutscher laments: "The conventional predictions are that within two to three generations at least half the world's six thousand or so languages will have disappeared, especially those remote tribal tongues that are really different from what seems natural to us. With every year that passes, the notion that all languages do things essentially like English or Spanish is becoming closer to reality. Soon enough, it may be factual correct to argue that the 'standard average European' way is the only natural model for human language, because there are no languages that substantially diverge from it. But this will be a hollow truth" (Ibid. 193). In addition to that, "Today, it is clearer to most linguists that the only languages that can truly reveal what is natural and universal are the hosts of small tribal tongues that do things very differently from what we are used to. So a race against time is now under way to record as many of these languages as possible before all knowledge of them is lost forever" (Ibid. 235).

There are also some scientific arguments for the preservation of the remote indigenous tongues. "Since there has been hardly any serious research into the possible relation between the structure of society and the structure of language, all this is very much on the level of perhaps and maybe. Nevertheless, there may still be a chance to move beyond mere speculation, if linguist set about studying the languages and cultures of the indigenous tribes that still survive in remote corners of the globe, from the Amazon rainforests to the highlands of Papua New Guinea (...) At present, only a dedicated minority of linguists is engaged in documenting those 'exotic' languages. So there will have to be a radical shift in attitude if the languages and their rich oral tradition, as well as the chance to learn about the relationship between language and culture, are not to be lost forever" (Deutscher 2005, 273-274). Moreover "we know so little about how the brain works (...) If we knew more, we would simply observe directly what goes on in the brain and would then be able

to determine precisely how nature and culture shape the concepts of language, or whether any parts of grammar are innate, or how exactly language affects any given aspect of thought” (Ibid. 237).

Deutscher emphasizes that there has to be a ‘radical shift in attitude’ which could help to preserve indigenous languages and thus to expand our knowledge. Previously I have mentioned the problem which is caused by an inadequate exaltation of individualism. In some of the parts I criticized this view and I will elaborate it in the last part. The main point will be that individual rights precariously devalue and diminish the influence which certain communities have on the primary socialization of their members. Therefore, collective rights should be guaranteed as well. Of course, this statement causes a big variety of problems, for instance, the co-existence of the two communities which have extremely different customs, in one state. However, the validity and quantity of the arguments against collective rights by no means eliminate the inadequacy inherent to the individual rights.

I have mentioned some different kinds of justifications for the preservation of lingual minorities. I really tried to be egocentric and to claim that “we need to preserve these languages because they can provide more data about US” or “... about OUR cognitive abilities” or “... because WE can broaden our intellectual horizons” or “... it can help OUR science to develop” and etc. As a true Westerner I have not even bothered to find any justifications which should be useful and profitable for the minorities themselves. Nonetheless, I am going to fix this error in the last part.

# VI THE POLICY OF THE PROTECTION OF LINGUAL MINORITIES: MAIN PRINCIPLES, CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 6. Introduction

In the first part I tended to distinguish two lines of the subject which have accompanied us in the course of the thesis and which have lead us to a certain critical conclusions. The first aim of the part was to depict the intellectual climate of the modern philosophy and the exaltation of individual which is inherent to it. Certain conclusions come out of it, namely, that individual has to rely on his own ability to reason and to manage to build an appropriate *vision* of the world and things. The basis of an ‘appropriate vision’ is the entrenchment of the scientific approach. That presupposes that a new form of societal organization has to appear. Thus the idea about a new cosmopolitan society consisting of independent and autonomous individuals who are able to build up a world-view on their own has emerged. That means the entrenchment of Western values, standards and norms and rejection of alternative world-views. As Feyerabend puts it “the ‘progress of knowledge and civilization’ – as the process of pushing Western ways and values into all corners of the globe is being called – destroyed these wonderful products of human ingenuity and compassion without a single glance in their direction. ‘Progress of knowledge’ in many places meant killing of minds” (Feyerabend 2010, xxi).

Westernization and its critique went along with the problématique of cognition. I tried to demonstrate optimistic and sceptical attitudes towards human possibilities to cognize. The first one is based on the same scientific methods; the second one is that of Nietzsche. Feyerabend’s arguments again were used in order to undermine these two conceptions. First of all, his arguments undermine ambitious and pretentious scientific endeavours to monopolize the field of cognition; secondly, he still defends the possibility to cognize, however, he advocates the pluralistic outlook which can equip us with a multifaceted *sight*.

These arguments were crucial for the justification of the preservation and protection of lingual minorities, since I tried to show the connection between the data coming from the investigations of indigenous languages and the respectively increasing knowledge about the world and ourselves. On the other hand, the term ‘increasing knowledge’ sounds ambiguously, since we rather refute our prejudices and wrong opinions than find out something extremely qualitatively new. Moreover, the arguments of the first part undermine the possibility to base a cosmopolitan society on the scientific grounds, because there are various frictions, incommensurabilities and contradictions between the *sciences* which reveals the fluid and unstable character of ‘science’.

In the second and third parts I sought to criticize another kind of basis for the creation of a cosmopolitan society. At first, my aim was to criticize the attempts to base a cosmopolitan society on the basis of universal values. I not only that rejected this possibility, but also undermined any attempts to justify something on the basis of values, because there is a threat that morals may be used as a weapon by the most powerful. Moreover, I also casted doubt on the attitude that some transnational processes should and will replace national or ethnic identity. Certainly, these processes to some extent broaden people's horizon and expand their knowledge beyond the communal boundaries. Nonetheless, artificial and learned knowledge cannot (completely) replace affinities and allegiances acquired while living in a certain cultural and social setting. I will come back to this point in the course of the sixth part.

In the fourth and fifth parts I firstly tried to reveal the interplay between self-hood and language, to interlink language and memory and then, to provide several examples illustrating how lingual and cultural conventions in concert with natural 'givenness' impacts our perceptual apparatus. These examples also undermined attempts to find out universal denominators common to all mankind; moreover, they demonstrated the superiority of intentions to cognize ourselves and the world in a way which is pluralistic, multifaceted, unlimited and unfettered by a specific civilizational demands.

Sadly, the prevailing attitude in European language policy has a strong 'pragmatic' and quite limitative aspect. Of course, like Deutscher puts it "the primary purpose of language is to allow effective communication, a flow of ideas and information between minds" (Deutscher 2005, 63). However, it depends on how we interpret this statement. We can engage in the protection of lingual minorities but at the same time support the idea of *lingua franca* which is a medium of intercommunal communication; or, we can decide to build a tower of Babel, to shed our peculiarities on behalf of homogeneity.

After rejection of the project of the creation of a cosmopolitan society, it is time to propose and defend some other form of social cooperation. I demonstrated that a cosmopolitan society cannot be constructed nor on the scientific and ethical basis, neither it will emerge because of the proliferation of individuals with transnational allegiances. However, the contemporary situation and global processes inevitable change the relief of society. Therefore, the social and cultural form of cooperation which I advocate should be based on multiculturalism. Multiculturalism presupposes that mankind consists of many diverse cultural entities and that the value of mankind lies precisely in its diversity. No doubts, there are many common denominators linking different societies together. Nonetheless, these common duties, responsibilities and commitments are not a sufficient basis for the emergence of a cosmopolitan society. Multiculturalism does not tend to search for universal aspects inherent to mankind; it rather tends to solve *real* problems by judicial measures.

The multicultural stance seems to be the most moderate one, because nor does it reject national/ethnic allegiances, neither promotes it cosmopolitanism. It simply encourages the openmindedness of nationalistically minded people and promotes beneficial intercultural collaboration. Moreover, it does not necessarily reject the role of the state, since it is possible to obtain positive changes within its framework.

In the next chapter I am going to sketch out the general approach of the EU language policy. I will demonstrate that the arguments they choose for the promotion of a linguistic diversity are superficial and not convincing, and that they have to be supplemented by the more profound ones. Otherwise, our fate is the return to the Babel, which means unilingual society. I will also provide some suggestions proposed by Jean Laponce.

In the final chapter, I will come back once more to the discussion on individual vs. collective (or group-differentiated) rights. This chapter will be the final chord of the thesis whose aim was to propose supplementary arguments for the preservation of indigenous and minority languages, on the one hand, and to indicate measures that should be undertaken in order to accomplish the object, on the other.

## **6.1 Motives for the promotion of multilingualism in the European Union**

The aim of this chapter has no claims to be a deep analysis of the EU language policy. I am going to simply quote the principle motives found in the publications issued by the EU. As it will turn out these motives do not pretend to be very sophisticated. Moreover, I am going to mention what kind of language policy the EU has undertaken and what may be its consequences in a long run.

The prevailing motive for the promotion of multilingualism in the EU is market-orientated: “Alongside the impact of neo-liberalism in driving the knowledge economy, education is also being liberalised. This is hardly surprising. Many developments in educational legislation and policy exemplify such processes. The notion of a highly centralised command system of education, generating a common policy for all students and schools, is giving way to decentralised systems, based on a market-led conception of education”<sup>10</sup>.

Since education is, first of all, market-orientated and tries to correspond to market’s demands, the following motives should not be surprising:

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<sup>10</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/eu-language-policy/docs/diversity\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/eu-language-policy/docs/diversity_en.pdf)

- “For EU citizens seeking to move around in order to find work, the language of a neighbouring country might be more appropriate. This is why the European Commission is encouraging people to learn two foreign languages if possible on top of their mother tongue.
- EU citizens have the right to live and work in a member state other than their home country. Having created the world’s largest single market, the EU enables people to go to where the jobs are, thereby helping achieve the aim of making the EU the world’s most competitive knowledge-based economy.
- Knowing other European languages is the key to real mobility in the EU. It enables you to take maximum advantage of job, study and travel opportunities across the continent. It helps give your company a competitive advantage in international business.
- Knowing languages is good for business.
- As the mastery of languages is now a key skill in an increasingly demanding labour market”<sup>11</sup>.

Thus multilingualism is not treated as an object, but rather as a tool designed to improve job possibilities, encourage mobility, facilitate business development and simply, to be able “to go where the jobs are”. In the next chapter I will argue that this kind of reasoning might be dangerous for the survival of the non-pivotal languages in Europe<sup>12</sup>.

What are the measures undertaken in order to realize multilingual project? Here are some of them:

- The “EU actively supports the use of minority and regional languages as part of Europe’s cultural reality”.
- A new plan of action was set up: “The message of the Action Plan is that, while learning one language in addition to your mother tongue is good, learning a second additional language is even better. It also argues that the younger you start, the better. (...) relying on one *lingua franca* alone is not enough”.
- “While recognising the emergence of English as the most widely-spoken language in Europe, the Union also wants to make sure that this does not become, over time, a factor limiting linguistic diversity within its frontiers. This is why the Commission’s Action Plan has set the target of ‘mother tongue-plus-two’. According to a survey, 26% of Europeans

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<sup>11</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/45/en.pdf> - 7,10,14 pages.

<sup>12</sup> The future of the non-pivotal European languages is not, actually, the key issue of the thesis. However, I want to stress that attention should be paid not only to the disappearance of the exotic languages, but also to the language policy concerning small European languages and the destiny of immigrant languages; these languages, though may not be in peril at the moment, may achieve this stage in a near future. Besides, I would argue that the promotion of studying the ancient languages would also contribute to the extension of our intellectual horizon. It is obvious that my proposals have nothing to do with the logic dictated by market demands.

claim to know their own language and two others. The challenge for the EU is to expand this base solidly and effectively, in as short a time as possible”<sup>13</sup>.

In theory, these actions look perfect. However, danger lies elsewhere. First of all, people’s mobility abolishes fixed linguistic boundaries and thus, the first or the second foreign language begins to dominate over mother tongue. As Laponce argues, that is a step towards the tower of Babel. Secondly, the EU is an international organization which seeks to translate and interpret all the documents (the EU spends over 1 billion Euros per year for translation and interpreting); however, other intergovernmental organizations such as The Council of Europe and NATO publish official documents only in English and French. Thus it may be a question of time when the big powers will refuse to sponsor the postponement of the advent of the Babel. It might be that everything will end up with the project of integration and assimilation of the countries speaking in non-pivotal languages.

Jean Laponce has some interesting insights about the language issues. In effect, some of his arguments do not necessarily have to be taken literally because it is questionable whether they correspond to the contemporary world and its reality. Nonetheless, his arguments could be applied in the non-European context.

## **6.2 The threat of the tower of Babel and possible solutions of the problem**

Jean Laponce’s arguments can be applied not only in the European context but also in Canada, USA and elsewhere. That is to say, he is not only sensitive to the problems of small European languages, but also to the problems which are faced by the First Nations in Canada, or by the tribes in Papua New Guinea. In this chapter, I am going to shortly discuss the problems Laponce notices in the contemporary world, and the solutions he proposes.

Discussing some aspects of the EU language policy I was critical about market-orientated motivation to promote multilingualism. In a long run economic and business interests should not encourage multilingualism, but rather to substitute it for unilingualism; that is to say, to increase the status of the *lingua franca* or other dominant languages. Laponce also notices this problem: “If they [languages – *my remark*] meet, they form hierarchies, and in the long run (...) the strong reduce the effectiveness of the weak and eventually eliminate them”<sup>14</sup>. In here we confront with the so called Law of Babel which “tells us that the various languages brought together in a single city were moving toward unilingualism by way of a bilingualism involving a *lingua franca*” (Ibid.).

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<sup>13</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/45/en.pdf> - 12, 15, 22

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2004/Laponce.pdf>

The problem is that if we reduce the value of language to the usefulness in solving business issues or to the simple instrument of communication we, sooner or later, will come up with a conclusion that multilingualism reduces the effectiveness of communication<sup>15</sup>. In this way, the efforts of the EU to postpone the advent of the new Babel are vain or to put it in Laponce's terms "Even if the new Babel wrap itself in multiculturalism, it still remains Babel" (Ibid.). Moreover, not only increased communication and economic interests can lead to the new Babel. He notices that in some countries the penetration of a dominant language into the private domain has augmented significantly. Thus we have arrived at his proposals.

Laponce takes Switzerland as an example: "The most systematic example of a territorial solution to language contact is offered by Switzerland, which has divided its own territory by rigid linguistic internal boundaries that separate French, Italian, and German. Switzerland tells its citizens: you can move freely across the whole territory of the state, settle where you want, and vote wherever you settle, but your language is not transportable across linguistic borders, at least in the public domain<sup>16</sup>". Thus, he sustains the idea of isolation of languages based on geographical division. He says: "strong fences make good neighbours" (Ibid.). Such small Babels should help to avoid or to postpone the advent of the bigger one. Laponce's principle is this – not to superpose, but to juxtapose bilingualism<sup>17</sup>. But how that should be done?

Laponce claims that the protection of lingual minorities cannot be accomplished without the intervention of political authority. Thus a policy of *laissez faire* should be limited<sup>18</sup>. As he puts: "Marshal Lyautey once said, when the French Academy was debating the definition of the word 'language,' that a language was a dialect with an army and a navy. We should add that, even in the absence of an army or a navy, a language can be helped significantly, at least in the short and medium terms, by the support it receives from a government - local, regional, or national (preferably all three) - a government that can determine language use in the schools and in the public service. Such government support is all the more crucial at a time of globalization when a minority language can rely less and less on unregulated social and geographical isolation to guard its borders"<sup>19</sup>. However, Laponce does not deny the importance of *lingua franca* and claims that it is a good instrument to be heard beyond one's linguistic walls.

It is hard, actually, to believe that suddenly all the countries of the world would realize Laponce's idea to divide the territory according to lingual principle. However, his arguments on the reduction of a policy of *laissez faire* are very valuable. In the fourth part I mentioned the

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<sup>15</sup> [www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-de-science-politique-2001-3-page-483.htm](http://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-de-science-politique-2001-3-page-483.htm).

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2004/Laponce.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> [www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-de-science-politique-2001-3-page-483.htm](http://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-de-science-politique-2001-3-page-483.htm).

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.sciencesociales.uottawa.ca/crfpp/pdf/debat/Laponce.pdf>

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2004/Laponce.pdf>

experiments carried out with patients when psychiatrists sought to disorientate them, to annihilate their memory and to achieve ‘complete depatterning’ of self-hood. Later the same methods were applied on a larger scale – the pre-capitalist societies were shocked and disorientated in order to impose one’s standards. Klein claims that capitalists seek their goals in this way. Therefore, the shift in the prevailing attitude of *laissez faire* would be useful for the preservation of the weak.

As Henri-Dominique Lacordaire put it, "between the weak and the strong, between the rich and the poor, between the lord and the slave, it is freedom which oppresses and the law which sets free". Thus in order to avoid the ‘complete depatterning’ of the lingual and cultural minorities, let’s see how Will Kymlicka can supplement Laponce’s ideas. The main Kymlicka’s point is that minorities should be granted group-differentiated rights which should protect them from the dominant powers.

### **6.3 Group-differentiated rights as a means to protect lingual and cultural minorities**

Will Kymlicka does not speculate about the emergence of a cosmopolitan society. He tries to adjust his theory to the social reality which is that approximately 184 independent countries of the world contain about 600 language groups and 5000 ethnic groups (Kymlicka *Multicultural Citizenship* 1995, 1). Another thing which he emphasizes is that “most organized political communities throughout recorded history have been multiethnic, a testament to the ubiquity of both conquest and long-distance trade in human affairs. Yet most Western political theorists have operated with an idealized model of the polis in which fellow citizens share common descent, language, and culture” (Ibid. 2).

In effect, the problem is double. On the one hand, monolithic social view which was inherent to John Stuart Mill and supports unilingual, uninational and unicultural vision of society, which then supposedly has better chances to pursue democratic ideals; and the cosmopolitan approach (elaborated in the second and parts) which does not take into consideration the diversity which is intrinsic to mankind and seeks to reduce it to the Western standards. Kymlicka takes a social reality as it is and rather tries to adjust theory to practice than vice versa.

Thus, Kymlicka’s claims that “a liberal theory of minority rights, therefore, must explain how minority rights coexist with human rights, and how minority rights are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy, and social justice” (Ibid. 6). In other words, Kymlicka criticizes the prevailing liberal approach that only individual rights have to be guaranteed and seeks to promote group-differentiated rights as well.

Vernon Van Dyke also criticizes prevailing liberal approach and its representative John Rawls: “the society to which his theory of justice applies is a society of individuals; he assumes that all societies are alike in that they consist of individuals and not of groups” (Kymlicka *The Rights of Minority Cultures* 1995, 48). He also tries to adjust his theory to the contemporary circumstances: “considering the heterogeneity of mankind and of the population of virtually every existing state, it is also necessary to think of ethnic communities and certain other kinds of groups, and to include them among the kinds of right-and duty-bearing units whose interrelationships are to be explored” (Ibid. 31).

How does this situation reflect in the legal acts? According to Kymlicka, “basic human rights such as freedom of speech, association, and conscience, while attributed to individuals, are typically exercised in community with other, and so provide protection for group life. Where these individual rights are firmly protected, liberals assumed, no further rights needed to be attributed to the members of specific ethnic or national minorities (...) Guided by this philosophy, the United Nations deleted all references to the rights of ethnic and national minorities in its Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Kymlicka *Multicultural Citizenship* 1995, 2-3).

Therefore Kymlicka advocates “group-differentiated rights - such as territorial autonomy, veto powers, guaranteed representation in central institutions, land claims, and language rights” (Ibid. 109). Why group-differentiated rights are better than ‘collective’ ones? According to Kymlicka, “the term ‘collective rights’ is so unhelpful as a label for the various forms of group-differentiated citizenship. The problem is partly that the term is too broad, and partly that it fails to distinguish internal restrictions from external protections. But a deeper problem is that it suggests a false dichotomy with individual rights (...) Group-differentiated rights can be accorded to the individual members of a group, or to the group as a whole, or to a federal state/province within which the group forms the majority (...) All group-differentiated rights (...) are accorded on the basis of cultural membership. But some are accorded to individuals, some to the group, some to a province or territory, and some where numbers warrant” (Ibid. 45).

External protections protect not only groups and collectives, but also their members from the internal restrictions imposed by a group. Therefore, group-differentiated rights are superior to the individual ones because they try to encompass and protect not only a separate individual but also to “promote equality between the minority and majority” (Ibid. 52).

What are the motives for the protection of minority cultures? Kymlicka claims: “the modern world is divided into what I will call ‘societal cultures’, whose practices and institutions cover the full range of human activities, encompassing both public and private life (...) a *societal* culture – that is, a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life,

encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language. I have called these ‘societal cultures’ to emphasize that they involve not just shared memories or values, but also common institutions and practices (...) In the modern world, for a culture to be embodied in social life means that it must be institutionally embodied – in schools, media, economy, government, etc.” (Ibid. 75-76).

Cultures provides people with a meaningful ways of life and moreover, “people’s capacity to make meaningful choices depends on access to a cultural structure” (Ibid. 84). Therefore, “in developing a theory of justice, we should treat access to one’s culture as something that people can be expected to want, whatever their more particular conception of the good” (Ibid. 86). In Kymlicka’s theory individual is not separable from his society. Of course, he might create his own conception of life; however, a very strong assumption is made that not all individuals may want to do that. Therefore, justice in conjunction with historical agreements, aesthetics and educational benefits serve as justifications for the preservation of minority cultures (Ibid. 123). It has to be stressed that Kymlicka tends to underline rather a legal aspect of the preservation than the abstract aesthetic and educational arguments.

Several other things have to be mentioned as well. Kymlicka also argues that common denominators, commitments, duties and responsibilities that link different societies together do not make up a sufficient basis for the creation of a cosmopolitan society. Scholte argues that there are some transnational elements of identification which in a long run may expand and undermine the national identity. However, Kymlicka does not agree with that. He says that “the marginalization of women, gays and lesbians, and the disabled cuts across ethnic and national lines – it is found in majority cultures and homogenous nation-states as well as national minorities and ethnic groups – and it must be fought in all these places” (Ibid. 19). In other words, problems which are common to the great majority of different societies are not enough to cover all the rest of peculiarities. Planetary citizenship may be something what makes people to transcend their differences and encourage them to search for solutions. Nonetheless, to transcend does not mean to renounce. Kymlicka even claims that globalization, in fact, has a contrary affect than it is usually thought – it “has made the myth of a culturally homogenous state even more unrealistic, and has forced the majority within each state to be more open to pluralism and diversity” (Ibid. 9). Therefore, “we should distinguish ‘patriotism’, the feeling of allegiance to a state, from national identity, the sense of membership in a national group. In Switzerland as in most multination states, national groups feel allegiance to the larger state only because the larger state recognizes and respects their distinct national existence. The Swiss are patriotic, but the Switzerland they are loyal to is defined as a federation of distinct peoples. For that reason, it is best seen as a multination state, and the feelings

of common loyalty it engenders reflect a shared patriotism, not a common national identity” (Ibid. 13).

Kymlicka’s insights about patriotism and citizenship are very valuable. He actually, expresses a completely different approach than that of the enthusiasts of cosmopolitanism who seek to abolish the differences between peoples and do not see any motive for its preservation.

## 6.4 Conclusions

There is a long way from the arguments for the preservation of minority cultures and languages, to the legal embodiment of the preservation. In the sixth part I argued that the market-individually-orientated approach is not the correct one and that it cannot provide reasonable arguments the preservation of minority cultures. Usually the authors who support the cosmopolitan approach have a completely different life from the rest of the people. Kymlicka noted that in the course of history there were many authors who did not adjust their theories to social reality.

Therefore, at this point of history we should renounce delirium about a cosmopolitan society and to look for the solutions which could create not spiritually but legally bound cooperative entity. The contemporary EU language policy is highly superficial and has no deep arguments for the preservation of languages. Languages are not considered as the object, but as a tool for the development of economy. This kind of reasoning is dangerous because it looks for the best solutions which are the best for a certain limitative approach. Therefore, the shift in attitude would at least guarantee the postponement of the advent of Babel.

In order to accomplish the foregoing objectives, we need to promote the liberal approach advocated by Kymlicka. I am now going to cite two of Kymlicka’s most representative quotations that have much to do with the ideas from the first part of the thesis:

“We have two preconditions for leading a good life. The first is that we lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life. Individuals must therefore have the resources and liberties needed to lead their lives in accordance with their beliefs about value, without fear of discrimination or punishment. Hence the traditional liberal concern with individual privacy, and opposition to ‘the enforcement of morals’. The second precondition is that we be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in light of whatever information, examples, and arguments our culture can provide. Individuals must therefore have the conditions necessary to acquire an awareness of different views about the good life, and an ability to examine these views intelligently. Hence the equally traditional liberal concern for education, and freedom of expression and association. These liberties enable us to judge what is valuable, and to learn about other ways of life” (Ibid. 81).

And also: “a liberal society, by contrast, not only allows people to pursue their current way of life, but also gives them access to information about other ways of life (through freedom of expression), and indeed requires children to learn about other ways of life (through mandatory education), and makes it possible for people to engage in radical revision of their ends (including apostasy) without legal penalty (...) A liberal society does not compel such questioning and revision, but it does make it a genuine possibility” (Ibid. 82).

In the first part I discussed Russell’s and Voltaire’s cases of knowledge acquisition, refutation of prejudices and tension within one’s personality. I treated ‘tension within one’s personality’ as a highly positive thing. However, it is important how it is realized. If we provide people with certain methods which supposedly lead to the acquisition of ‘right’ knowledge, then we undermine all liberal principles. On the other hand, if we ensure the conditions for the acquisition of any unlimited and unreduced knowledge, and do not force people to necessarily follow the prescribed guidelines, but seek them to inform and not necessarily to agree, then, we construct a theory which considers people’s needs, interests and propensities. Such a liberal attitude does not pretend to abolish the diversity of cultures and languages, treats them as equal and worth preserving; such an attitude is also the prerequisite for pluralism.

## CONCLUSIONS

It has been demonstrated that the prevailing individualistic approach is not sufficient and that when it does not take into consideration the diversity inherent to mankind, the theory becomes vicious. Therefore, traditional individualistic liberal approach has to be supplemented by the collective/group-differentiated rights. The improved liberal approach could better correspond to and defend the contemporary multicultural and multilingual societies. The promotion and defence of multiculturalism has been stressed after the rejection of the project of the construction of a cosmopolitan society. It has been demonstrated that the scientific and ethical basis for the emergence of a cosmopolitan society is not sufficient. Moreover, global phenomena rather encourage self-differentiation than homogenize different national/ethnic societies. Therefore, a new form of solidarity that is legally binding and based on common duties, responsibilities and commitments is possible; however, that is not enough for the emergence of a cosmopolitan identity.

A cosmopolitan society will not emerge in the near future and thus, we have to live in a multicultural one consisting of a myriad of different social, cultural and lingual entities. However, there are certain threats to the existence of this kind of society. The EU language policy significantly lacks in the justificational argumentation for the promotion of multilingualism. That may lead us to the tower of Babel, which means unilingualism and the decline of diversity, pluralism and richness which is nowadays still inherent to mankind. Therefore, a new kind of arguments has to be found.

There are cognitive, scientific, intellectual and peace-guaranteeing inducements for the protection of minority cultures and languages. In addition to that, Kymlicka's liberalism presupposes that there may be people who are confident with their primary socialization and therefore cannot be forced to renounce their beliefs and commitments, so long as these do not contradict the basic human rights.

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