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**ZAINIČI KORĖJIEČIŲ PADĖTIS TAKEŠIMOS/DOKDO SALŲ
KONFLIKTO KONTEKSTE**

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Santrauka

Takešimos/Dokdo teritorinis ginčas tarp Japonijos ir Pietų Korėjos tęsiasi nuo 1952 m., kai Pietų Korėja vienašališkai nustatė vadinamąją “Syngman liniją (Taikos liniją)”. Už jos atsidūrusias Takešima/Dokdo salas Pietų Korėja ėmė administruoti, taip sukeldama Japonijos pasipiktinimą. Iki šiol ginčas vyksta su periodiškais paaštrėjimais, sukeltais vienos ar kitos šalies veiksmy. Tai gana plačiai aprašoma įvairioje mokslinėje literatūroje, dažnai nevenigiant subjektyvaus požiūrio demonstravimo arba savaip interpretuojant faktus. Dėl tos priežasties buvo svarbu atlikti esamos mokslinės literatūros analizę, kad tolimesniems tyrimams būtų suteiktas pagrindas nepaklysti gana klaidziam atvejo tyrimų kelyje.

Salos, dėl kurių konfliktuojama, turi dvejopą reikšmę – ideologinę ir ekonominę. Pastaroji yra objektyvi ir paremta prielaidomis, jog aplink salas glūdi gamtinių dujų bei naftos klodai. Taip pat pabrėžiama žuvininkystės svarba. Įdomesnė yra ideologinė ginčo reikšmė. Ji įgauna papildomų niuansų žinant, jog Japonijoje nuo Antro Pasaulinio karo pabaigos susidarė ypatingas socialinis darinys – Zainiči korėjiečiai. Tai yra korėjietiškos kilmės ir Korėjos (Pietų arba Šiaurės) pilietybės asmenys, nuolatos gyvenantys Japonijoje. Būdami didžiausia ne japonų grupė šalyje, šiandieniniame politiniame-socialiniame kontekste Zainiči korėjiečiai yra traktuojami nevienareikšmiškai. Spaudoje pateikiami įvairūs pranešimai apie konkrečiai prieš Zainiči korėjiečius nusiteikusių grupių (Zaitokukai) demonstracijas bei viešas diskriminuojančias akcijas verčia susimąstyti apie šios etninės grupės situaciją minėto konflikto kontekste. Šiuo metu Japonijoje populiarus neokonservatyvizmas neigia atsakomybę už buvusios militaristinės Japonijos veiksmus, propaguoja homogeniškos tautos idėjas ir tuo pačiu nemažina atstumo tarp japonų ir ne japonų.

Turint omeny minėtas aplinkybes ir neužmirštant 2012 m. vasarą įvykusio Takešimos/Dokdo konflikto paaštrėjimo, buvo atliktas tyrimas, kurio tikslas buvo išsiaiškinti Zainiči korėjiečių padėties kitimą priklausomai nuo Takešimos/Dokdo ginčo eigos. Giluminio interviu metu surinkus reikalingą medžiagą, o vėliau ją išanalizavus, nerasta pagrindo teigti, jog su apklaustaisiais Zainiči korėjiečiais buvo elgiama skirtingai, priklausomai nuo Takešimos/Dokdo salų konflikto eigos. Tokius rezultatus galėjo įtakoti įvairūs veiksniai, kuriuos didele dalimi galima sieti su identitetu, nes būtent patys Zainiči korėjiečiai yra identiteto konstruktas. Dėl to jų atsakymai galimai neatspindėjo faktinės Zainiči korėjiečių padėties.

Summary

Takeshima/Dokdo issue is a territorial quarrel between Japan and South Korea. Both countries have claims to the small islets since 1952, when Syngman Line (Peace line) was delineated by South Korea. It unilaterally took the active control of the islets thus starting the ongoing dispute. The course of the dispute is dynamic, with periods of relative tranquility and relative activity, which is caused by the actions of one or another conflicting state. Most recent flare-up occurred in summer 2012, but it may be said, that it was quietened down along with the election of new leadership in both South Korea and Japan.

The dispute itself is represented in still expanding scientific literature. In order not to be misled by subjective research, guidelines were made after a thorough analysis of scientific works was completed. Takeshima/Dokdo issue itself has a double-sided significance – economic and ideological. The prior is easy to determine because of the importance of fishing areas. Moreover, oil and natural gas mines are said to be in the area around the islets. More interesting aspect of this dispute is ideological one. For both countries it is a matter of principle, because for South Korea giving up would mean acknowledgement of Japan's superiority. On the other hand, Japan cannot give this issue up because it lays claims according to the bilateral agreements dating back to beginning of 20th century. It becomes even more complicated if Zainichi Koreans are taken into account. Zainichi Koreans is an ethnic group, whose formation started after the World War II. At present times, Zainichi Koreans is a largest non-Japanese citizens group in Japan. Media tend to represent them as a discriminated and disadvantaged part of the society. Various far-right groups, like Zaitokukai, organize discriminatory events publicly. Therefore, hypothesis was raised – Korean nationals in Japan feel more discrimination during the flare-ups of the Takeshima/Dokdo issue. In order to check it, a qualitative research, based on in-depth interview was conducted. Nevertheless, hypothesis could not be proven right. There may be few reasons for that; firstly, the unreliability of research field which is closely related to identity, social and psychological reasons.

Introduction

The summer of 2012 provided the world with plenty of events from East Asia region. Most prominent of them were directly connected with Japan's unresolved boundaries, which have become a long-lasting territorial disputes. While Senkaku islands issue has been relatively quietened down by simply buying them, for Takeshima/Dokdo¹ dispute it was only another one flare-up. No attempts to perform any act concerning Takeshima/Dokdo islands have slipped unnoticed by both sides, thus when a president Lee Myung Bak of South Korea² visited the islands, massive protests broke out in Japan. For an outsider, this act could be left without understanding. But this could happen only to those, who are not familiar with the context and with the importance of Takeshima/Dokdo islands to both countries, Japan and South Korea.

The roots of this dispute lie behind the events of 20th century when the world witnessed the formation and collapse of great countries, the course of two World wars with all their consequences. One of them is the shift in the national identity of citizens of former empires – from multiethnic to monoethnic, as it have taken place in postwar Japan³. Since monoethnic attitude is tightly connected to the nationalism, miscellaneous issues may occur among the majority ethnic group and minorities. It is noteworthy that there are almost no ethnically homogeneous countries on the globe. On the other hand, the minorities in most cases have their home countries, which may be (although not necessarily) the neighbours of their host country. The closer relations between these countries, the more spheres of everyday life is involved. Economic ties grow stronger, not to mention a possible consequence of the convergence of pop culture. But this is only one side of close relationship. In most cases, no matter how close the economic, political or cultural ties are, there will be unresolved issues as well. They can complicate the bilateral relations just because the object of the disagreement has a symbolic value to both of the countries. Therefore, there is a possibility, that the minority in the host country may face hostility from the nationalism driven majority (or, more likely, from the right-winged parties).

Having this in mind, **the problematic scope** was defined – in the states with strong nationalistic sense the ethnic minorities undergo discrimination, which is intensifying according to the interstate relations. In order to specify this topic, two countries had to be taken, which have

¹ Throughout all the text, a combination of Japanese name for islands 'Takeshima' and Korean name 'Dokdo' is used to escape unintentional external subjectivity.

² Although official name is Republic of Korea, 'South Korea' is used to clearly delineate the opposition to North Korea

³ Lie, J., *Zainichi (Koreans in Japan) diasporic nationalism and postcolonial identity*. University of California Press, 2008. P. 3 (hereafter – Lie, J., Zainichi)

unresolved issues and quite well defined ethnic minority originating from one country and currently living in another one. As long as the main interest here is paid to the East Asia region, Zainichi Koreans have been taken as a minority and Takeshima/Dokdo issue as a case in Japan-South Korea bilateral relations. This example contains few crucial points from the East Asia region, concerning Japan. At first, Takeshima/Dokdo islands; it is an unresolved territory, claimed by Japan and South Korea. Claims from both sides include various historical facts, legal precedents or even references to tradition. In spite (or maybe, because) of abundance of facts, no one side has convinced the opponent to give up on idea of including eventually the islets in one's territory. Therefore, the issue is ongoing since the San Francisco Treaty till now with interchanging periods of activity and relative tranquility. Other point – Zainichi Koreans; in a broader sense of a word, they are Koreans, permanently living in Japan. It is the largest ethnic minority in Japan and, according to the Korean authors, is constantly facing discrimination and limitations in everyday life. Dual nature of Zainichi Koreans raises miscellaneous questions, mainly concerning their identity. Thus, Takeshima/Dokdo islets, being a top priority to both Japan and South Korea and invoking various eruptions of nationalism, may be a benchmark to verify whether Zainichi Koreans are treated like Japanese or like Koreans. Consequently, a **hypothesis** may be raised - in Japan Zainichi Koreans undergo discrimination, which is intensifying according to Takeshima/Dokdo issue. Thus, **the objective** of this work is to find out whether Zainichi Koreans are treated differently by others in Japan according to the course of Takeshima/Dokdo issue. To do this, following **tasks** have been defined:

1. Using the social constructivism approach, to define the concept of Zainichi Koreans and analyze their peculiarities from socio-political approach;
2. Having analyzed the present scholarly basis of the research on the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute, to define the crucial points of the course of issue through historiographical approach
3. Using the crucial points of the issue, to analyze the dynamics of situation of Zainichi Koreans by implementing the in-depth interviews.

The relevance of such research is that it takes into consideration the latest events, concerning Takeshima/Dokdo issue not only from political, but also from social aspect. Until recently, the majority of the research has been accomplished on Takeshima/Dokdo issue and Zainichi Koreans separately. Both topics are represented by various authors from various viewpoints, for instance, from historical, political, and social ones but there is still a lack of multidisciplinary research on how Japanese-South Korea bilateral relations influence the unique phenomenon called Zainichi Koreans. Since there are not much qualitative analyses on Zainichi Koreans that could be used for such research, **an in-depth interview** was chosen as a method that

can provide most valuable data. Having concluded the interviews with Zainichi Koreans it becomes possible to analyze and interpret their situation in the context of Takeshima/Dokdo issue.

Structure of the thesis. This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part discusses and analyzes Zainichi Koreans as a phenomenon. Thorough analysis of historical development as well as of present social situation is presented there. Bearing in mind the fact, that Zainichi Koreans *per se* are represented differently in the literature of concerned sides and have quite well defined tendencies, there was a need to lay out thoroughly analyzed data. A considerable proportion about discrimination – the expected outcome of the treatment of Zainichi Koreans during the flare-ups of the Takeshima/Dokdo issue – is integrated here as well. As long as there are plenty of explanations and definitions of discrimination, in this thesis a model of discrimination, presented by Lippert-Rasmussen⁴, is used. The model is convenient, because it consists of three main conditions. When they are met, one can speak about discrimination, while being able to classify it. The second part deals with the territorial dispute over Takeshima/Dokdo islets. This issue is represented from three different viewpoints, and has no noteworthy analysis of the current literature yet. Just because the representation of the dispute differs according to the attitude of the author, the interpretations differ as well. Thus, the historiographical analysis was accomplished to determine which interpretations are of considerable scientific value; consequently, they may be used while researching on this issue by other scientists. The third part is for the empirical research – pointing out the main methodological aspects, presenting the research itself and analyzing the results. The thesis ends with conclusions.

As much as literature is concerned, both topics – Zainichi Koreans and Takeshima/Dokdo issue – are well covered and the amount of research keeps growing. Scientific works on Takeshima/Dokdo are thoroughly analyzed in the second part of this thesis; therefore a short analysis of the literature for Zainichi Koreans is needed as well. All minority-related topics have at least two sides of representation – supporting minorities and supporting the state’s position. In this particular case, Zainichi Koreans as a topic is not covered in almost any official Japanese discourse. This may be because, as John Lie stipulates, “Nationalist historiography and social science minimize the scale and salience of population movements across national borders. They tend to delineate a simple and singular trajectory of homogenous migration that misses the multiple and complex circuits of individuals and the differentiated and heterogeneous category of people”⁵. This trend may be directly transmitted to the very essence, that is, to majority-minority relations.

⁴ Lippert-Rasmussen, K., The badness of discrimination // Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2006. P. 167-185 (hereafter - Lippert-Rasmussen, K., The badness of discrimination)

⁵ Lie, J., Zainichi, p. 175

Zainichi historiography, contrary, “delineates a tragic arc of expropriation, exploitation, discrimination, and resistance”⁶. Such tendencies are corresponding to Korean historiography concerning Takeshima/Dokdo issue. In other words, it is not difficult to distinguish the dependency of scientific works. More important is to find dependable research, whether it is written by pro-Korean, pro-Japanese author or outsider. Such authors are J. Lie, S. Ryang, and other scholars contributing to the project “Japan Focus”⁷. Nevertheless, all scientific works in a full sense of a word are valuable and it is the researcher’s duty to see the usefulness of them using analytical approach.

⁶ Lie, J., Zainichi, p. 6

⁷ Japan Focus is a part of “Asia-Pacific” online scholar journal, dedicated to the East Asia region. Access via internet www.japanfocus.org

1. Zainichi Koreans

1.1 Ethnic minorities from theoretical approach

In modern states, minorities in a broader sense have become an integral part of society. Today, homogeneous states can be hardly found, therefore the amount of research on minorities are increasing. Nevertheless, in sociology the term ‘minority’ has a relatively stable definition, which is best expressed by A. Giddens: “members of a minority group are disadvantaged when compared with the dominant group - a group possessing more wealth, power and prestige - and have some sense of group solidarity, of belonging together”⁸. Obviously, there may be various minorities, according to different criteria. In this theses minority is an ethnic one, because the object, Zainichi Koreans, may be best fitted in this particular category. Giddens continues explaining “The experience of being the subject of prejudice and discrimination tends to heighten feelings of common loyalty and interests”⁹. Here, Giddens correctly uses a safe word “tends”, because group consciousness does not always play a major role in the life minority. State policy may be very powerful, if applied correctly, therefore the behavior of the minority group may change according to the need of government¹⁰.

Ethnic minorities are well defined in legal terms, too. The main document dedicated to it is “Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities”¹¹. Under international law, a more detailed definition is provided by Francesco Capotorti: “A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the State - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language”¹². Nevertheless, it is agreed, that “the existence of a minority is a question of fact and that any definition must include both objective factors (such as the existence of a shared ethnicity, language

⁸ Giddens, A., Sociology. P. 635

⁹ ibid

¹⁰ This aspect is discussed more in chapter 1.3

¹¹ United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 1992. Document online <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm>. Accessed 2013 05 05

¹² Office of the high Commissioner for human rights, United Nations Human rights. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/internationallaw.aspx>. Website accessed 2013 05 04

or religion) and subjective factors (including that individuals must identify themselves as members of a minority)”¹³.

Having these constraints in mind, Zainichi fall off from this group, because they are not the nationals of Japan. Although not a minority in a very sense of the word, they live their everyday life like a minority of any other country. Legally, almost all Zainichi Koreans can naturalize, but a considerable number of them still live unprivileged life, accompanied by various issues accredited to minorities¹⁴. Such living is making them a synonym of ethnic minority. In my opinion, the reasons for this convergence are hidden behind the concept of identity. This explanation requires a theoretical basis, and constructivism provides the most suitable approach in this case. Concerning this, Barkin cites Nicholas Onuf: “Constructivists see the facts of international politics as not reflective of an objective, material reality but an intersubjective, or social, reality”¹⁵. In other words, the reality, in broad context, is constructed by our perceptions and constraints which differ along our social, cultural, educational and other backgrounds. Identity is no exception. The way one sees himself is constructed by various limitations, which may be best explained using unconventional approaches, like constructivism. Taku Tamaki has issued a broad monograph, dedicated to identity issues between Japan and South Korea, therefore the theorization is mainly taken from this book¹⁶.

Concerning constructivism, Tamaki mainly uses Alexander Wendt just because his works “reflect the wider involvement of identity within constructivism”¹⁷. Wendt speaks about identity of states, but the model itself may be transferred to the level of society. Therefore, it may be used to explain the interactions between socially salient groups. At first, Tamaki explains Wendt’s statement “one cannot enact role identities by oneself” as a prerequisite for social interactions in order to understand one self’s conception¹⁸. In the example given, State A sends a request to State B and only when State B responds, State A can fully realize “who it is” in opposition to the “other”, giving a grave emphasis on the role of society¹⁹. The same with Zainichi Koreans – only when realized, how they are perceived by the ‘other’ – non-Zainichi Koreans, Japanese majority (or Japanese government), they can position themselves in a certain manner. A breaking point may be the moment, when Zainichi Koreans were granted the permanent residents’ right. Therefore,

¹³ Office of the high Commissioner for human rights, United Nations Human rights.

<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/internationallaw.aspx>. Website accessed 2013 05 04

¹⁴ See part 1.3

¹⁵ Barkin, S. J., Realist Constructivism // International studies review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sep. 2003). p. 326

¹⁶ Tamaki, T., Deconstructing Japan’s image of South Korea: identity in foreign policy. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 252 P. (hereafter Tamaki, T., Deconstructing Japan’s image of South Korea)

¹⁷ Tamaki, T., Deconstructing Japan’s image of South Korea. P. 21

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 23

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 23

Zainichi Koreans perceived that in Japan they can stay as long as they want. As a consequence, they still do. Following the logic, if the response to the inquiry given would change, so would the self-definition. In other words, if Japanese government would change attitude towards non-Japanese in the territory of Japan, according to that non-Japanese would change their identity and, subsequently, their actions.

Similar simulation may be presented from the point of view of non-Zainichi Koreans. As long as Zainichi Koreans act like non-Japanese majority, they will be treated respectively. It forms something like a magic loop, where both concerned groups position themselves differently. To escape it, that is to initiate a change, it must be agreed which one is to ask and which one is to respond. Absence of visible changes in last decades may infer that the *status quo* is optimal for both sides, Zainichi Koreans and non-Zainichi Koreans. Therefore, in nearest future, Zainichi Koreans are not to become an ethnic minority in a very sense of the word.

1.2 Ethnogenesis

The term Zainichi²⁰ (or Zainichi gaikokujin) means “permanently residing” (jap. 在日; 在日外国人). This term is a postwar legacy²¹ and is used to refer only to Koreans, living in Japan. In modern sense, there are two possible origins of Koreans – Northern or Southern, but the term does not specify it. For more specific situations, there are terms like Zainichi kankokujin (jap. 在日韓国人, Zainichi South Korean) or Zainichi chōsenjin (jap. 在日朝鮮人, Zainichi North Korean). In historical approach, Koreans in Japan started residing before the creation of South and North Korea. Thus in the time when the term was started to use there was no need and, probably, no possibility to specify, where a particular Korean is from. In contrast, modern community of Zainichi Koreans is fractured and when referring to a Zainichi Korean, one should use Zainichi kankokujin or Zainichi chōsenjin talking about pro-Southern and pro-Northern Koreans respectively to avoid confusion.

The origin of Zainichi Koreans should be dated back to the beginning of 20th century. To be more accurate, the breaking point should be the occupation of Korea in 1910, because this event had the most important impact for the social mobility of Koreans to Japan islands. Kwang-kyu Lee suggests dividing Korean migration to Japan into two periods:

²⁰ The Japanese words and names are written here in modified Hepburn romanization system.

²¹ Lie, J., Zainichi, p. 12

1. Free migration from 1919 to 1937;
2. Enforced migration after 1937²².

Since 1910, when Japan annexed Korea, the largest part of Koreans in Japan was students²³. Lee properly starts his periodization, because the academic community should not be considered as immigrants. But after the end of the WWI, Japan's economics improved therefore demand for human work force increased. For lower class Koreans it was an ability to earn more money, because the wages in Japan were by 30% higher than in Korea for unskilled manual labor in construction and mine work²⁴. The legal basis was also regulated to improve the immigration to Japan from other countries, Korea was no exception²⁵. Since laborers in the first period went to Japan having their contracts signed, they stayed there for approximately two or three years, but before the second period, there was an act passed, prohibiting Koreans with no particular job skills from working in Japan²⁶. Kwang-kyu, as a Korean and potentially subjective scholar, stresses the altered situation by saying that there were "worsened working conditions and apparently unequal wages in contrast with those given to Japanese"²⁷, but at the same time points out that "the pay was still higher than in Korea for the same work"²⁸. This created a particular situation when the supply was higher than demand. Consequently, there is a presupposition that the workers without particular job skills were employed illegally.

These restrictions for entering Japan were made in the break of WWII. After the Sino-Japanese war started in 1937, a set of acts came into effect: in 1938, "The national total mobility act", which meant that habitants of the occupied territories had to join the Japanese army; "The plan of using Korean labor" was passed by the Japanese cabinet in 1942 and "Outline in passing of Koreans in Japan" was passed by General Governor (highest local representative of Japanese government in Korean) was confirmed the same year²⁹. This enabled the enforced Korean migration to Japan and in 1937-1945 1519142 Koreans were incorporated in Japanese army³⁰. At the end of the war about 2 million Koreans were reported to be in Japan and that number decreased to about 600000 in the end of 1946³¹. This was the base for the modern Korean community in Japan.

²² Lee, K-kyu, Overseas Koreans, Korean studies series no. 19. (hereafter Lee, K-kyu, Overseas Koreans) P. 23

²³ Lee, K-kyu., Overseas Koreans. P. 24

²⁴ Ibid, P. 24

²⁵ Ibid, P. 25

²⁶ Ibid, P. 26

²⁷ Ibid, P. 26

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid, P. 27

³⁰ Ibid, P. 27

³¹ Kashiwazaki, Ch., The politics of legal status // Koreans in Japan. Critical voices from the margin, ed. By Sonia Ryang. Routledge, 2000. P. 20

1.3 Present situation and perspectives of Zainichi Koreans

In this thesis, when referring to Zainichi Koreans with separate state-dependency, there are two groups distinguished: pro-Southern and pro-Northern Koreans, not simply South or North Zainichi Koreans. This is done because of few reasons.

Firstly, the first generation Zainichi Koreans had only one home country, former Empire of Korea. But after the World War II (WWII), when the territory of former Empire of Korea was released from the empire of Japan, two separate countries formed – South Korea and North Korea. After the separation, both new states defined their citizens by criteria based on descent³². The same year, in 1948, South Korea issued a Nationality law, which stipulated *ius sanguinis* as a principle of acquiring South Korean nationality and therefore regarded overseas Koreans as its nationals³³. North Korea, on the other hand, had no Nationality law until 1963, but Korean descent was a sufficient criterion to gain a state membership³⁴. Until 1952, when the occupation of Japan ended, the residents of Japan were still technically its citizens, but in 1950 the Nationality Law of Japan came into effect – *ius sanguinis* also became the main criterion to gain the Japanese citizenship³⁵. This series of legal issuances does not clarify, whether the first generation Zainichi Koreans were Koreans or Japanese nationals. Those, who decided to stay in Japan after the WWII ended, after 1952 were left without passports – they had to register as foreigners and were issued by special permissions to reside in Japan. That means they were not Japanese nationals. But as long as they had no passports, they were not officially Korean nationals as well. After all, Japan would not recognize Korean nationality anyway until the Normalization act in 1965; it was the time, when the second generation Zainichi Koreans were about to be born.

Secondly, the legal and social representation of Koreans in Japan is complicated. Zainichi Koreans are divided into two distinct groups not only because of affiliation to a certain state. They have organizations (some denote them as ‘ethnic’³⁶, representing their interests in social affairs. Both of them have similar responsibilities – organizations control schools, various social

³² Kashiwazaki, Ch., The politics of legal status // Koreans in Japan. Critical voices from the margin, ed. By Sonia Ryang, Routledge, 2000. (hereafter Kashiwazaki, Ch., The politics of legal status) P. 22

³³ Kashiwazaki, Ch., The politics of legal status, P. 22

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid, P. 21-22

³⁶ Lie, J., Zainichi, p. 39

associations, even banks³⁷. Nevertheless, these organizations act separately and this may be the reason, why their social representation still has substantial space for improvement. Pro-Southern Zainichi Koreans` organization is called Mindan, and organization for pro-Northern Koreans is called Chongryun (Chochongreyon, Chongreyon). These organizations have distinct values, resembling to the official foreign policy objectives, staked by their respective states. The controversy here is that the members do not have to be loyal to the organizations. Although vast majority of Zainichi Koreans hailed from South Korea (~90%), in the late 1950`s most of Zainichi Koreans affiliated themselves with North Korea and said to be members of Chongryun³⁸. But the number of members began to decrease accordingly to the issues related to North Korea – failed program of returning Koreans to North Korea³⁹, negative image of North Korea`s regime and, for example, abduction of Japanese by North Korean agents. All in all, there can be no such concept as South Korean Zainichi or North Korean Zainichi, because Zainichi Koreans only can *affiliate* with a certain state, not *to belong* to it.

Today, there are about 636000 Koreans living in Japan. This number includes both pro-Southern and pro-Northern Zainichi Koreans. From a broader perspective, Zainichi Koreans is the biggest ethnic group currently residing in Japan.

People group	Quantity (individuals)	Proportion (percentage value)
Currently living in Japan (overall)	126,475,664	100%
Japanese	~124375664	~98,4%
Foreigners	~2100000	~1,6%
Koreans	~636000	~0,5%
Chinese	~506000	~0,4%
Brazil	312979	~0,2%

Table No. 1. Japan residents` ethnicity and largest ethnic minorities⁴⁰

As stated earlier, there are no minorities in Japan. There are only permanent residents with special permission to live in Japan`s territory. Japan`s nation are the citizens who have Japan`s citizenship. There are two ways of gaining it – first, abovementioned *ius sanguinis*; second,

³⁷ Lee, K-kyu., Overseas Koreans, P. 56

³⁸ Lie, J., Zainichi, p. 42

³⁹ Ryang, S., The North Korean homeland // Koreans in Japan. Critical voices from the margin, ed. By Sonia Ryang. Routledge, 2000. P. 50; Lie, J., Zainichi (Koreans in Japan) diasporic nationalism and postcolonial identity, p. 47

⁴⁰ Data taken from US Department of State Data base, source online <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm> page accessed 2012 05 09; Data about Republic of Korea from the webpage of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Source online: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/data.html>, page accessed 2013 04 05, data from 2012 August; Data taken from Japan`s Ministry of Justice report of Immigration Bureau, 2006. Data online <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/ib-01.html> page accessed 2012 05 09

naturalization. Of course, only the second means is eligible for all the foreigners, as well as for Zainichi Koreans. Process of naturalization and the requirements for it are stated in the Nationality Law of Japan⁴¹ and practically all Zainichi Koreans meet these requirements.




Chart No. 1. Number of naturalized Koreans⁴²

Obvious trend is that an increasing number of Zainichi Koreans are applying for the citizenship of Japan⁴². There are various reasons for that. First, the limitations for non-citizens of Japan make Zainichi Koreans everyday life complicated; especially for those, who find it important to travel abroad,

because having special permission makes traveling more restricted. Second, non-citizens of Japan are deprived from various social and political guarantees⁴³. Thirdly, the phenomenon of “third generation Zainichi Koreans” best depicts the peculiarities of being Zainichi. Absolute majority of third generation Zainichi Koreans have been educated in Japanese schools, speak perfectly Japanese, consume the pop culture products just like the Japanese nationals; what is more, a very minority of them have been to Korea (South or North), know Korean language only from mass media (that is, they do not use a colloquial Korean) and propagate Korean culture sporadically. While hesitating about naturalization, this set of values is a strong argument. All in all, naturalization may help Zainichi Koreans from the ambiguity of being officially Korean and by any other aspect Japanese.

But there is a possible negative outcome. In section about theoretical approach towards Zainichi Koreans I stipulated that this socially salient group is not likely to become an ethnic minority in the nearest future. But predictions may step even further. Having the facts of demographic tendencies in mind, I make a supposition, that in a long run, Zainichi Koreans as a unique group should cease existing. The explanation is as follows: descendants of the naturalized Zainichi Koreans automatically will be the Japanese nationals; as shown earlier, naturalization cases among Zainichi Koreans have an increasing trend; descendants of those Zainichi Koreans who will

⁴¹ The Nationality Law, art. 5. Data online <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tnl-01.html>, accessed 2013 03 24

⁴² Chart is taken from the annex of the article. Graph online <http://japanfocus.org/data/NozaAppen3.pdf>. Accessed 2013 03 25

⁴³ Ryang, S., Resident Koreans in Japan // Koreans in Japan. Critical voices from the margin, ed. By Sonia Ryang. Routledge, 2000. P. 4

not naturalize in nearest future will be even more “Japanized”, consequently, the trends of naturalization should be even more drastically increasing.

The tendency may be considered as a consequence of Japanese politics – dealing with minority implementing the model of assimilation – a theoretical model, which is described by Nortautas Statkus in his book⁴⁴. So to speak, government is keen to assimilate Zainichi Koreans rather than giving them special rights. It should be rational, because assimilation of 0,5% residents should have less negative consequences than consuming time and money for implementation of new laws. Moreover, assimilating Zainichi Koreans is beneficial, because by doing so, Japanese population increases without any additional efforts⁴⁵. Remembering that majority of Zainichi Koreans have attended Japanese schools, have used the public facilities all the time, the becoming Japanese citizens would pay back funds, spent on them.

Looking at a broader context, Zainichi Koreans are the victims of circumstances, having not many possibilities to act on their own. Ever since the first generation of Zainichi Koreans made their decision to stay in Japan, their freedom of actions was limited. This is no different in nowadays, because the environment, created by the national policy, dictates the possible options for them. One may say, that Zainichi Koreans make their decisions as they like – staying permanent residents or choosing to naturalize. But looking more thoroughly into this issue it becomes clear, that the possibilities left for Zainichi Koreans are only those, which are the best for the society itself.

1.4 Discrimination

A quite common ‘companion’ of the minorities is a phenomenon, called discrimination. There are various reasons for it to appear. In modern societies, various social groups exist. They can be based on the same race, sex, nationality or culture; they can be official or covert, legal or underground. These groups are called *socially salient groups*⁴⁶. People tend to link themselves to one or more groups while at the same time they are related to some groups by other people. This social peculiarity of linking other people to the groups (real or imaginable) is directly connected to prejudice. Prejudice itself is not harmful as long as it does not threaten the human to limit his or her freedom or rights. Such act when human rights are violated according to physical, biological,

⁴⁴ Statkus, N., Tapatybės politika etniniamis konfliktams reguliuoti. Versus Aureus, 2004. P. 131-133

⁴⁵ Japan is said to have negative fertility rate, 1,3, while the rate needed for population to replace itself is 2,1. United Nations Population division suggests allowing 500000 immigrants to Japan in next 50 years to keep the population just above the extinction, Steiner, N., International migration and citizenship today. Routledge, 2009. P. 123

⁴⁶ Lippert-Rasmussen, K., The badness of discrimination, p 168

cultural or any other feature is called discrimination. By the way, discrimination is not always bad, as Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen stipulates, according to Singer “to say that someone discriminates is simply to say, roughly, that he distinguishes, or differentiates, leaving it an open question whether this is bad”⁴⁷. But term “discrimination” almost inevitably bears a negative meaning. In this work the discrimination will be referred to as a negative phenomenon, not trying to spot neutral or positive aspects of it.

There are various schematic illustrations of discrimination, but the most generalized key of it is presented by Lippert-Rasmussen:

“X discriminates against (in favour of) Y in dimension W if:

- (i) X treats Y differently from Z (or from how X would treat Z, were X to treat Z in some way) in dimension W;
- (ii) the differential treatment is (or is believed by X to be) disadvantageous (advantageous) to Y; and
- (iii) the differential treatment is suitably explained by Y's and Z's being (or believed by X to be) (members of) different, socially salient groups”⁴⁸.

X’, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ in this formula can be both individuals and groups of individuals, as well as super-individuals such as governments, private companies, and social structures. Dimension ‘W’, as explained by Lippert-Rasmussen, is a specific, because discrimination is not an 'all-or-no-dimension' affair⁴⁹.

As long as Koreans in Japan are concerned, this formula can be filled in several different ways.

- First explanation:

‘X’ stands for Japan government, ‘Y’ – Japanese majority, ‘Z’ – Zainichi Koreans. ‘W’ here can be any social space – occupation, education, social mobility and so on and so forth. All three conditions, previously posted in the formula, fully complies the situation in Japan. Condition (i) is most generalized, emphasizing the differential treatment of Japan government between the Japanese majority and Zainichi Koreans in any social space. The instances of differential treatment are a matter of fact, largely depending on the attitude. As long as there will be two concerned sides in the issue of discrimination, there will be two different interpretations of particular situation as well. Condition (ii) is needed, because if it is not met, the discrimination itself would lose its purpose, so to speak. Discrimination

⁴⁷ Lippert-Rasmussen, K., The badness of discrimination, P. 167-168

⁴⁸ Ibid, P. 168

⁴⁹ Ibid, P. 169

without purpose is not necessarily a discrimination in the very sense of the word. More precisely, in this example, the discrimination from government should be called 'policy', because none of the formal regulations name their actions as discriminatory. Thus, inadvertent discrimination here is not the case, because policy of state is always rational and logic-based. On the other hand, perceived discrimination is not necessarily intentional – the self-identification may lead to the misunderstanding of treatment by others (in this case, the ethnic majority).

Condition (iii) states that differential treatment is suitably explained by non-discriminators being socially salient groups. In Japan, Japanese majority and Zainichi Koreans are well defined social groups thus the differential treatment between them can be clearly explained.

- Second explanation:

'X' – Japanese majority, 'Y' – Zainichi Koreans, 'Z' – any socially closer ethnic group. 'W' remains the same – any social space or situation. All three conditions are met here as well. But more important here is the social distance. The research on social distance started with Ernest Burgess and Robert E. Park in the early 1900s⁵⁰. These sociologists are credited with developing the concept - It involves people's feelings about others, depending who they are racially or ethnically or on their country of origin, and the closeness or intimacy of contact one might want to have with them⁵¹. The scale for measurement was introduced by Emory Bogardus soon after and it is being used since now⁵². The latest known social distance research on Japanese ethnic groups was concluded in 2009⁵³. 7 main minorities or ethnic groups were arranged according to their social distance. The results show that most accepted are Okinawans and the indigenous Ainu; least accepted are Chinese, Burakumin (descendants of outcastes), and Southeast Asians; Koreans and Nikkeijin from Brazil (returning descendants of Japanese emigrants) occupy a middle position⁵⁴. This may mean that from all major ethnic groups in Japan, Koreans are less acceptable than Ainu or Okinawans (who already are Japanese nationals) but more acceptable than Chinese, Filipinos (or other Southeast Asians) or descendants of pre-imperial outcastes. Consequently,

⁵⁰ Ball, R., Social distance in Japan: an exploratory study // Michigan Sociological Review, Vol. 230, Fall 2009. P. 105 (hereafter - Ball, R., Social distance in Japan)

⁵¹ Ball, R., Social distance in Japan, p. 105

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ The survey was accomplished in Shiga prefecture. 71 fully answered questionnaires were used. The respondents were predominantly young adults of both genders. Ball, R., Social distance in Japan, p. 108-109

⁵⁴ Ball, R., Social distance in Japan, p. 105

the discrimination against them should be in smaller degree, than, for example, against Burakumin or Filipinos. Therefore, 'Z' in a formula can be named as Ainu or Okinawans.

As a sociological phenomenon, discrimination has been researched and witnessed in various aspects. As much as socio-political area is concerned, discrimination due to race is the most common type of human rights' violation⁵⁵. According to the earlier explanation of the formula, discrimination is quite difficult to measure/notice due to unclear or mistakenly perceived actions by presumptive discriminator. Self-identifying as different (and seemingly oppressed) especially in the countries, where the notion of ethnical homogeneity is prevailing (e. g., Japan), may lead to the overestimation of present situation – it could be seen as more complicated than it may actually be. Due to that, the reliable data or statistics on the discrimination is hardly found. And even if found, it has to be used carefully.

On the other hand, there is a type of discrimination, which is more rarely met in global context, but it does exist. It can be called the ancestry/national origin discrimination. The most delicate instances of it are observed in these societies, where racial differences are practically invisible. In that case, for the presumptive discriminator, the preconditions for discrimination are only these of cultural or linguistic kinds. "Cultural" here means specific aspects of ethnic identity that may be observed in everyday circumstances – nutrition habits, dressing, participating in certain festivals, propagation of particular music and other. Of course, language that one uses can be the most obvious prove of belonging to specific ancestral group or minority.

Nevertheless, difficulties in spotting a member of group of certain ancestral group may arise. This is especially typical in the societies, where the individuals from the minority groups are assimilated. They may not use their mother tongue, participate in their specific festivals or propagate, for example, their folk music. The use of local pop culture and high-level assimilation make the members of the certain ancestral group almost indistinguishable from the majority. That means the discriminator is deprived of the objective reason to discriminate his victim. But there are instances that even absence of obvious reasons does not prevent the act of discrimination.

In such a situation I make a presumption that a collective memory may play a major role. As long as there will be a certain recollection about the former members of well-defined minority group, the people of different ancestry will be excluded from full integration into the community. Collective memory is a matter of common remembering, not one of a single member, thus its sustainability during the time is high. Consequently, the images that were formed in earlier times by

⁵⁵ Collection of statistics and graphs on the discrimination of minorities, <http://filipsagnoli.wordpress.com/stats-on-human-rights/statistics-on-discrimination/statistics-on-discrimination-of-minorities> Accessed 2013 03 16

the previous generations may have no primary meaning (which could have been more of practical calculations than simply because of superstition) nowadays anymore. A. Green speaks about a connection between memory and identity: “Memory functions as a mechanism that unites groups and cements identity”⁵⁶. Having said this it may be considered that Japanese majority, while excluding Zainichi Koreans, cement themselves, because by doing so they see a well-defined group, which is different from majority.

This presumption may be pretty much verified in Japan. For instance, T. Tsuda stipulates that ““Japanese blood” takes precedence over “culture” as the first and most fundamental criterion that determines who can be considered “Japanese”. This is shown in the case of the Korean-Japanese and other foreigners of non-Japanese descent, who can never be considered ethnically Japanese even if they are born and raised in Japan and have become culturally indistinguishable from the Japanese”⁵⁷. Undoubtedly, such an interpretation is a consequence of *nihonjinron*, theory of Japaneseness. But let us consider that the section provided is a reflection of normal treatment of ‘the other’. That would mean, even naturalized Japanese are not Japanese by the possession of blood. Therefore Japanese are die-hard nationalists/ chauvinists without possibility to change their attitude. Provided that “Derogatory attitudes are generally not openly revealed by the Japanese in discriminatory ethnic behavior except in certain social situations because of the dual structure of the Japanese self in which cultural norms discourage the direct expression of socially inappropriate inner feelings in public behavior”⁵⁸ one should almost never perceive that he is discriminated against. But it is not the case of Zainichi Koreans. Although nor their physical appearance, nor the pop culture they belong to are different from those of Japanese majority’s, they tend to claim being discriminated. High degree of similarity is a consequence of assimilation, but it is not intended to explain the sustainability of discrimination. If the assimilation would be a proper way of escaping discriminatory situations, there should be almost no third generation Zainichi Koreans who could complain about being discriminated. Apparently, let it be at a certain degree of exaggeration, there are various cases of discrimination not only perceived, but given as well⁵⁹. According to Tsuda’s

⁵⁶ Green, A., *Collective memory: Theoretical presuppositions and contemporary debates* // *Oral history*, vol. 32, no. 2. *Memory and society*, 2004. P. 38

⁵⁷ Tsuda, T., *The stigma of ethnic difference: the structure of prejudice and ‘discrimination’ toward Japan’s new immigrant minority* // *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1998. (hereafter Tsuda, T., *The stigma of ethnic difference*) P. 322

⁵⁸ Tsuda, T., *The stigma of ethnic difference*, p. 320

⁵⁹ Clark, G., *Antiforeigner discrimination is a right for Japanese people* // *Japan Times*. Article in the internet: <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2009/01/15/commentary/antiforeigner-discrimination-is-a-right-for-japanese-people/#.UUgpUBxQbzx>, accessed 2013 03 21;

A foreigner in her home // *The Economist*, 2011 03 10. Article in the internet <http://www.economist.com/node/18338862>, accessed 2013 03 21;

first quote, this was and quite surely will be in the future. And the second Tsuda's statement will be confirmed or denied after the research is accomplished.

If discrimination without objective cause is passive and proceeding for a long time, it may become a prejudice. Contrary to that, if there are instances of active discrimination during a long period of time it may become a permanent problem for a society, in which the discriminated reside. Such problems are occasionally deepened by those, who take various actions publicly against the discriminated. As long as the discriminated usually are *abnormal* compared to the majority, the far right activists are the ones, who mainly perform such acts. To make matters complicated, the right-winged parties have become extremely popular in political arena, winning elections to the Parliaments. In Europe, such instances are Greece, the Netherlands, France, and Hungary or even Nordic states like Finland and Norway. Nationalists there have a strong support consequently far-right movements find their ways to the Parliament⁶⁰. The main agenda of the far-right parties is, undoubtedly, strengthening nationalistic commonness among the fellow countrymen by promoting immigrant-free society (in most cases, casting anti-Muslim policy), EU skepticism, and a substantial part of populism.

As much as East Asia is concerned, far-right movement there is visible as well⁶¹. Recently, most prominent right-winged policy is being waged in Japan with the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) back in office⁶². Shinzo Abe is said to be a propagator of essential neoconservatism and that irritates the neighbouring countries, because neoconservatism denies the responsibility of wartime criminals. This is only one aspect of the modern right-winged policy in Japan. However, what is more important here, it is the extremist right groups in Japan. 右翼団体 – uyoku dantai (literally, “right-winged organization”) is a common term defining all right-leaning groups, operating in Japan. Differently from the European counterparts, Uyoku Dantai, because of election system peculiarities have very modest possibilities to make it to the Diet. In this way, they have to act in other spheres, not in a legislature. Since all Uyoku Dantai have similar socio-political attitude, it is crucial to pick out these groups, which are directly connected to the ethnic minorities. Out of all Uyoku Dantai, there is one specific group, which initiated quite recently, in 2006, and its main object is the Koreans in Japan. This group is called 在特会 – Zaitokukai (full name – Zainichi

Nozaki, Y. (et al.), Legal categories, demographic change and Japan's Korean residents in the long twentieth century // Japan Focus, 2010 09 10. Article in the internet <http://japanfocus.org/-Yoshiko-Nozaki/2220>, accessed 2013 03 25

⁶⁰ Europe's far-right. Culture matters more. Article in the internet <http://www.economist.com/node/21560294>, accessed 2013 03 19

⁶¹ Hogg, C., Discontent fuels Mongolia's far-right groups, article in the internet <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11141472>, accessed 2013 03 19

⁶² Narusawa, M., Abe Shinzo, a Far-Right Denier of History // The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 11, Issue 1, No. 1, January 14, 2013. Article in the internet <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Narusawa-Muneo/3879>, accessed 2013 03 19

Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai, Citizens' Group That Will Not Forgive Special Privileges for Koreans in Japan⁶³) and their activity is targeted against the Zainichi Koreans.

Discrimination in Japan against the 'others' has few strong premises. First, it is the viability of *nihonjinron* – a set of artificial although scientifically reasoned theories, explaining the otherness (which goes hand in hand with superiority) of Japanese people. Secondly, the official discourse stipulating Japan as monoethnic country, where the only citizens are Japanese nationals and people of other descent are not appropriate to them. Thirdly, this is quite tightly connected to a possible influence from collective memory, which only works if there is a common need to remember a certain fact/event. In this particular case it would be the remembrance of Koreans as second-class immigrants without education and only causing turmoil. Eventually, all these factors are reflected in modern representation of one's belief – creation of far-right groups, that focus their activity on expressing discontentment on non-Japanese nationals.

⁶³ Fackler, M., New Dissent in Japan Is Loudly Anti-Foreign, article in the internet http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/world/asia/29japan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&, accessed 2013 03 19

2. Takeshima/Dokdo issue

2.1. Territorial issues in broader context

Clear boundaries are one of the crucial characteristics for a state. Chiefly, boundaries between states are a matter of fact and they represent a bilateral agreement on that line. Nevertheless, issues do occur and there can be few reasons for that. First situation is, when the boundaries are violated by other state or states. This may usually lead to the conflict. But conflict may not arise, if the aggressor is by no means superior in terms of power (most commonly, army) than the victim and there are no logic reasons to use force to defend you. Secondly, conflicts may arise when the boundaries are not the result of bilateral agreements. That means the boundary between the two states was created by the third party without the consent of these two states. Even in this particular situation the conflict may be escaped if the states eventually agree on the mutually satisfying boundary. On the other hand, conflict may arise, if there are no mutually satisfying solutions. Furthermore, the territorial issue may endure for a long time, becoming a principle of the thing for both arguing sides.

Unresolved boundaries in most cases occur after splitting of one larger state. This may be witnessed in the cases of former Yugoslavia, after releasing the African colonies, after the dissolution of USSR and so on and so forth. In most cases, the state boundaries do not correspond to these of ethnical ones – a substantial proportion of citizens of a certain region have nationality of the neighboring country, although they have not migrated anywhere. Apparently, these citizens had no decision-making power while making new boundaries. As a consequence, they may not be quiet subordinates of the new government and the situation can become intense. Contrary to that the disputed territories may not contain people. In such cases it is important to know whether the disputed territory has anything to do with enhancing the state's power (economic, geopolitical), does it have any value (symbolic, historical, economic) or it simply is a means to demonstrate state's ambitions and unchanging principles against its opponent.

Disputed territories in many cases are brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and solved by implementing the case law. These cases are well described by Brian Taylor Sumner⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Sumner, B. T., Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice // Duke Law Journal, Vol. 53, No. 6 (Apr., 2004), pp. 1779-1812

as well as by Sean Fern⁶⁵. Difference between them is that Sumner presents a detailed overview of such cases, while Fern talks mainly about Takeshima/Dokdo issue, using other cases to illustrate the situation. Nevertheless, Takeshima/Dokdo issue may never get to the ICJ, because cases there can be solved only by the consent of all conflicting countries. While Japanese officials are keen to do so, South Korean opponents ignore such alternative of ending the dispute⁶⁶.

2.2. Peculiarities of Takeshima/Dokdo issue

Takeshima/Dokdo are small (total of 0.21 km²) islands in the middle of the Sea of Japan/East Sea. Often appearing on international maps as the Liancourt Rocks, Takeshima/Dokdo principally are two volcanic islets. Name “Liancourt Rocks” was given after the French ship “Liancourt” which “discovered”⁶⁷ it in 1849⁶⁸ and is used by various authors when expressing neutrality in this dispute. Neutrality and objective outlook cannot be omitted in this thesis, but name “Liancourt Rocks” does not demonstrate the close relation between the researcher and the object, which actually is close. Therefore, obeying the rule of objectivity, the name, used in this thesis, is combined of Japanese name Takeshima and Korean name Dokdo – Takeshima/Dokdo.

The two constitutive islands are practically inhabitable. As Japan’s Ministry of Foreign affairs points out, “they have scarce vegetation and drinking water resources”⁶⁹. Nevertheless, in 2004, 946 Korean residents have declared Takeshima/Dokdo the place of their residence⁷⁰. This fact clearly demonstrates that although being simple rocks, Takeshima/Dokdo bear a huge importance to South Korea. The islets have names – the larger is West island and the smaller, respectively, East island. Precise geographical position is as given: it is situated about 215 km from the Korean mainland, but only 92 km from inhabited Ulleungdo Island, which is administratively a county of Korea’s Kyung-sangbuk-do Province; while Takeshima/Dokdo is roughly equidistant from the Korean and Japanese mainlands, it lies over 157 km northwest of Japan’s Oki Islands⁷¹.

⁶⁵ Fern, S., Tokdo or Takeshima? // Stanford journal of East Asia affairs, vol. 5, number 1, winter 2005, pp. 78-89 (hereafter Fern, S., Tokdo or Takeshima?)

⁶⁶ Proposal of Referral to the International Court of Justice. Proposal online <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/proposal.html>, accessed 2013 04 07

⁶⁷ The word is put in quotation marks, because these islets were discovered only for the westerners. Local residents knew them long before, thus there was no need to discover it (author’s comment).

⁶⁸ Takeshima // Kodansha encyclopedia of Japan, 7, p.325

⁶⁹ Japan’s Ministry of Foreign affairs, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima> accessed 2012 11 27

⁷⁰ Sung-jae Choi, The politics of the Dokdo issue // Journal of East Asian Studies, issue 5 (2005), p. 483 (hereafter Sung-jae Choi, The politics of the Dokdo issue)

⁷¹ Japan’s Ministry of Foreign affairs, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima> accessed 2012 11 27

As stipulated in previous section, there can be various reasons for the territorial issues. Takeshima/Dokdo dispute is the one that was escalated after the dissolution of expansionist Japan Empire after the WWII. Because this territory has only two permanent residents (who moved to the islands in the late 1960's voluntarily – the islands initially were not habitable at all⁷²), the issue is not because of people there. Its principal value for Japan is questioned by some Korean scholars, stipulating that Senkaku and Northern territories (Kuriles) are more important for Japan than Takeshima/Dokdo⁷³. The geopolitical power here is disputed again, because firstly, the islands are extremely small; secondly, they are in the middle of Sea of Japan/East Sea and equidistant between Japan and South Korea – the countries are not hostile, contrary, they have very tight economic, cultural ties, thus there should be no need to demonstrate one's superiority against another. Symbolic value is important, because none of both countries would give in – that would mean the acknowledgement of rival's superiority. Historical value may be interpreted as Korea's resistance against Japan's imperialism, which made the Koreans suffer almost 40 years of occupation and cultural oppression. As long as islets will not be taken by Japanese, Koreans will maintain ideological equality with them.

Eventually, economic factor is what matters most. The economic aspects of this issue are best described in the research done by Min Gyo Koo⁷⁴. Author's study is based on economic interdependence between Japan and South Korea taking into consideration Takeshima/Dokdo issue. In the article, there are 4 periods distinguished, which appeared since 1952. All the periods (1952-65), (1977-78), (1996-98), (2004-05) have their own peculiarities and main events, which eventually were ended with agreements to work together for the sake of mutual benefit and mostly because of strong economic interdependence⁷⁵. Since the research is based on economic insights and attitude towards financial matters, it helps a lot while understanding the territorial disputes between neighbouring countries; especially, if these countries have strong economic ties, a similar perspective towards business and industry promotion.

Looking at the actual aspect, United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982, certainly marked a beginning of new period in the issue. As long as the islets lie in the midway between Japan and South Korea, the most important target is what subsists in and under

⁷² Ilbo, Ch., Solitary but happy residents of Dokdo island. Korea Focus, article online

http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/layout/content_print.asp?group_id=101566. Accessed 2013 04 08

⁷³ Hoon, L., Dokdo is South Korean territory // The foreseen and unforeseen in historical relations between Korea and Japan. Northeast Asian History foundation, 2009 (hereafter Hoon, L., Dokdo is South Korean territory). P. 452

⁷⁴ Koo, M. G., Economic Dependence and the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute between South Korean and Japan // Harvard Asia quarterly, Volume IX, No. 4. Fall 2005. p. 27 (hereafter - Koo, M. G., Economic Dependence...). P. 24-35

⁷⁵ Koo, M. G., Economic Dependence... P. 32

the sea. Both Japan and South Korea catch and consume large quantities of fish and the Sea of Japan is not an exception for fishery. According to Sean Fern's article "Tokdo or Takeshima? The International Law of Territorial acquisition in the Japan-Korea Island dispute", "In 1985, before the Korea-Japan fisheries agreement of 1998 in which both states agreed to regard the waters around Liancourt as neutral territory, total fish production was about 12 million tons. Under the 2002 Korea-Japan Fishery Agreement, South Korea was allowed to catch 149,200 tons of fish while Japan was limited to 94,000 tons. In January 2002, the actual fishing industry output by Koreans was 149,218 tons, while the Japanese caught 93,773 tons.⁷⁶ In comparison, in 2002 total amount of fish caught by Japanese, was 2,258,000 tons⁷⁷. Taking into consideration the unstable overall amount of fish in particular sea, the stock of fish is more than 5 times higher than whole Japanese offshore fishery is allowed to catch. This number obviously points out the undeniable economic value of the waters, surrounding Takeshima/Dokdo islands.

International regulations over the living and non-living resources in the sea are of great influence when referring to the Takeshima/Dokdo issue. In 1982 the United Nations introduced Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS grants the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for the countries, which are the parties of it. EEZ is most important in one aspect – states that have established sovereignty over offshore territory are granted an EEZ around the area, giving the state exclusive fishing rights and mining access to the seabed⁷⁸. The UNCLOS came to power in 1994, firing a much more intense row of repeated claims to the Takeshima/Dokdo islands⁷⁹.

Nevertheless, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the islets may be granted to the country, to which the islets would undisputedly belong⁸⁰. Because EEZ provides wide economical privileges in a certain territory, nor Japan, nor South Korea would be contented by giving them to an opponent.

Taking everything into account, Takeshima/Dokdo islets are small in terms of physical appearance, but of particular importance to both opponents in other aspects. In short time distance, it is not possible for the dispute to end, because none of the opponents are showing signs of cooperation.

⁷⁶ Fern, S., Tokdo or Takeshima? P. 81.

⁷⁷ Food and agriculture organization of the United Nations, Japanese coastal fishery co-management: an overview <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a1497e/a1497e20.pdf>, p. 222

⁷⁸ The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm, article 56.

⁷⁹ Selden M., Small Islets, Enduring Conflict: Dokdo, Korea-Japan Colonial Legacy and the United States, *The Asia-Pacific Journal* Vol 9, Issue 17 No 2, April 25, 2011. Internet access <http://www.japanfocus.org/-mark-selden/3520> (hereafter - Selden M., Small Islets, Enduring Conflict)

⁸⁰ Van Dyke, J. M., Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime Boundary // *Ocean Development & International Law*, issue 38, pp. 157–224, 2007 P. 196

2.3. The course of Takeshima/Dokdo issue

Although different authors differently provide us with particular details of the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute, yet, there are aspects which cannot be shown distorted or altered. It is the chronological course of the issue. Of course, even such an objective attribute may sometimes be interpreted differently, but some facts are hard to deny.

First of all, it has to be mentioned, that in spite of wide variety of research on Takeshima/Dokdo issue, there are very few of them, which contain a clear chronological timeline of the dispute. Although the majority of the articles and research do have a section for historical events, concerning Takeshima/Dokdo, they are extremely generalized, giving only few main dates – 1910 (occupation of Korea) and January 18, 1952 (introduction of a Rhee Line). Some authors, who are more ancient-orientated, often introduce the history of Takeshima/Dokdo belonging to one or other state since ancient times. Since the delineation of all the history of Takeshima/Dokdo is not the objective of this thesis, only the crucial points after the end of WWII are provided. Moreover, the more detailed course of this dispute would not be useful as long as the research was completed with 3rd generation Zainichi Koreans, who were born about 1980's. Therefore, they could not physically recollect the events that took place before their birth. It would essentially distort the research because it is mainly based on the experiences concerning Takeshima/Dokdo dispute.

Quite ironically, the most suitable chronological timeline of this issue is provided by professor of political economy, abovementioned Min Gyo Koo. While concluding the research, he used precise historical dates to delineate the crucial points of the course of the issue. Later, these dates were compared with trade balances between South Korea and Japan in order to see, whether the particular territorial issue influenced the economic ties of states. Basically, Koo's chronology covers well the events from the end of WWII till 2005, giving detailed descriptions of smaller events, dividing every flare-up into 'initiation', 'escalation' and 'de-escalation' modes. Nevertheless, Koo's provided timeline is not sufficient, because it does not involve the latest events, which may be the best recollected by the respondents.

Therefore, during last 17 years, 4 major rounds of dispute occurred:

1. In 1996-1998, adjusting the division of economic zones in Sea of Japan/East sea, Japanese Foreign affairs minister Yukihiko Ikeda officially announced that Takeshima/Dokdo belongs to Japan. This action started long lasting protests in South Korea, during which images of

Yukihiko Ikeda and flags of Japan were burned. The conflict was mollified, because new governments were elected in both Japan and South Korea. New leaders were interested in maintaining good relations, thus a bilateral treaty was signed.

2. In 2002-2004, soon after the World Football Cup in Japan and South Korea, Takeshima/Dokdo issue renewed because of new textbooks in Japan and issuance of postage stamps with Dokdo images in Korea. Textbooks contained information that Takeshima/Dokdo is an integral part of Japan. As a consequence, Korea issued a series of post stamps with landscapes of Dokdo; all stamps were bought out within 3 hours. Consequently, Japanese activists even tried to land on the Takeshima/Dokdo islands, but failed. The conflict was mollified mostly by USA, because at the same time North Korea was implementing a nuclear program and the attention had to be focused to regional security.
3. In 2005 Shimane prefecture announced “A national Takeshima Day” (February 22), which marked 100 anniversary of islets incorporation in Japan. As usually, nationalistic movements started in both countries but, again, flare-up was calmed down by mutual efforts.
4. In 2012 spring South Korea President Lee Myung Bak visited Dokdo/Takeshima islets, consequently starting major protests in Japan as well as in Korea. The new governments in both countries (president in South Korea and Diet in Japan) seek for bilateral relationship to be as good as possible, thus it can be said that the conflict is handled.

Therefore, excluding the earlier events which took place till 1990’s, these four crucial points mark the highest tension of the dispute up to date during last two decades.

2.4. Analysis of literature for Takeshima/Dokdo issue

Compared to, for instance, Senkaku islands dispute, Takeshima/Dokdo issue is not that intense but the literature dedicated to it is constantly growing. Thus, the reference to the historiography is crucial here, because in addition to accomplish the final qualitative research, there has to be at least basic understanding about the issue itself. Since every issue has at least two approaches, there will be at least two main blocks of opinions as well. Leaning too much on a single particular approach may result in subjectivity and only partial understanding of an issue. None of these outcomes are expected here; consequently, the historiographical analysis was accomplished.

Takeshima/Dokdo issue is discussed in various ways and in different types of literature. The absolute objectivity is almost impossible, thus the random resources cannot be trusted implicitly. Since there are few major concerned groups, the information is prone to differ in articles

they produce. In other words, it is vital to analyze the material and check its reliability. Thus the aim of research was to classify the material about Takeshima/Dokdo issue. The results of classification should facilitate the process of further investigations by creating the historiographical basis of research on Takeshima/Dokdo issue.

The main criteria to distinguish the articles were:

1. Use of names;
2. Use of terms;
3. Allowance for facts.

According to these criteria three groups of attitude can be distinguished:

1. Neutral.
2. Pro-Japanese;
3. Pro-Korean;

The overall amount of articles and studies varies according to the dependence to the abovementioned groups. The type of language, use of terms and names are tightly related to the author's point of view. For example, the name of the islands is triple – Liancourt Rocks/Takeshima/Dokdo, occasionally adding “islands” or “islets”, but almost never “rocks” (except the full name, Liancourt Rocks). The first name is predominantly used by international authors, who claim supporting the neutral position⁸¹. Name “Takeshima”, as a rule, is used by Japanese authors or those, who support Japanese stance. “Dokdo”, respectively, is mostly used by Koreans and those with pro-Korean attitude. The combination of names, “Takeshima/Dokdo” or vice versa, is preferred by the authors, who take a neutral position in the issue, but seemingly try not to be too alienated from the subject, when using the name “Liancourt Rocks”.

In the material concerning Takeshima/Dokdo issue, there are few specific terms, which have different equivalents in the three positions of attitude. For instance, in January 18, 1952, president of South Korea Syngman Rhee announced the division of Sea of Japan, by drawing a line, which should represent the real situation of South Korea in the marine aspect. This line is mostly called “Rhee Line” or “so-called Rhee Line”⁸². Second name, which is used in two different forms, is the East Sea⁸³ or the Sea of Japan. The first name predominantly appears in pro-Korean texts,

⁸¹ Fern, S., Tokdo or Takeshima?

⁸² Koo, M. G., Economic... p. 27

⁸³ Sung-jae Choi, The politics of the Dokdo. p. 465

while the second is more common for the pro-Japanese and neutral authors⁸⁴. More neutral usage of the names is a combination East Sea/Sea of Japan⁸⁵.

In addition, the stance of state itself matters. The independent scholars and writers, mostly try to give the reader the basic information about the issue, providing historical facts about the ongoing process of the dispute. The scholars, who meet the requirements to be in the neutral group, usually, are most reliable, because their research have the objective attitude towards the issue. Consequently, there are relatively less such articles for the creation of them is more time consuming and knowledge-requiring. Pointing out the differences between the attitudes, Michael Lev writes, “it is “about history, a previous war, and what Koreans emotionally consider to be unfinished business with Japan.” In this sense, Korea’s status as a former Japanese colony has complicated efforts to resolve the dispute”⁸⁶. For this reason South Korea’s writers, scholars, journalists have more aggressive position towards the issue, because it is a part of national pride. Japanese, respectively, “prefer to concentrate on the present and replace the past with a new, fruitful relationship”⁸⁷. Such a preference, stated by S. Fern, is easily explained by the ideology of neoconservatism, which is getting increasingly popular in Japan in nowadays. According to neoconservatism, the crimes of war time imperialist Japan are not considered as things to be sorry for or to feel guilty. On the other hand, Japanese could be more aggressive, because in this particular situation they are “victims”. From their point of view, “Takeshima is an inherent part of the territory of Japan”⁸⁸ and now it is occupied. But latter analysis shows, that Korean media and press are more active, fiercely reacting to any Japanese move or statement concerning Takeshima/Dokdo islands.

Because the overall amount of the articles and studies from all three groups is considerably abundant, only a certain part of the sources was used in this analysis. According to the main objective of analysis, the first requirement for the sources was to contain a part about historical events, concerning Takeshima/Dokdo issue. Second requirement for the publication was to be official; that is, only articles from scientific journals, studies and internet webpages of newsthesiss were taken. The third obvious criterion was the English language. Choosing the publications only in English was intentional because the Takeshima/Dokdo issue firstly needs to be presented to the global public. Both Japanese and Korean have their own perception about the “real” historical events and the present situation. But this is only one side of the coin. The other side is to convince

⁸⁴ Fern, S., Tokdo or Takeshima? P. 78

⁸⁵ Koo, M. G., Economic Dependence..., throughout all the article

⁸⁶ Fern, S., Tokdo or Takeshima? P. 80

⁸⁷ ibid

⁸⁸ Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/> accessed 2012 11 27

the rest of the world of their truthfulness. By no means, the easiest way to do so is to spread the notion in most common language, that is, in English.

Taking everything into account, every scholar's research are relevant, because every study adds something new to the existing base of knowledge. But only the use of critical thinking can help not to get lost in the present amount of data.

2.4.1. Takeshima/Dokdo issue in neutral approach

Neutral approach is most dependable, but at the same time it may have interesting controversies. That is why the first example is **“Territorial issue between Japan and Korea. Case of Takeshima/Dokdo”** by Seichu Naito⁸⁹. This professor Emeritus of Shimane University is a co-author of several other books about the Takeshima/Dokdo issue, but these works are not taken into consideration because they are written in Japanese. The present critique should be analyzed in more thorough way. First of all, the terms and names are used in neutral manner (East sea/Sea of Japan⁹⁰, Takeshima/Dokdo⁹¹, and Syngman Rhee Line⁹²). Secondly, the language used is formal, with no imperatives or verbs of high modality. But the controversy arises because the author expresses the attitude against the stance of government of Japan throughout the theses and arguments. He explained his position and the intentions of the critique in the Afterword⁹³, with statements like “As a Japanese citizen and historian, I appeal to the Japanese Government to use complete facts more than anything”⁹⁴ and “I have written this booklet based on historic facts and in the belief that it will serve the cause of an honorable Japan”⁹⁵. This would mean that author's position is pro-Japanese, but at the same time anti-Japanese-governmental. The contextual analysis of the text has shown some prospects of a pro-Korean attitude. For example, the Syngman Rhee Line was drawn without seeing any prospects of conclusion of fishing agreement, which was unfinished after San Francisco treaty came into effect, thus Korea had to take a self-protective measure⁹⁶. Such a statement is more

⁸⁹ Naito S., *Territorial issue between Japan and Korea. Case of Takeshima/Dokdo. A critique of the “10 issues of Takeshima”* published by the MOFA of Japan. Tokyo, 2008. 91 p. (hereafter - Naito S., *A critique of the “10 issues of Takeshima”*)

⁹⁰ Map, illustrating the position of Takeshima/Dokdo, Naito S., *A critique of the “10 issues of Takeshima”*. P. 6

⁹¹ Throughout the entire book. Ibid.

⁹² Ibid, P. 76

⁹³ Ibid, P. 86-89

⁹⁴ Ibid, P. 86

⁹⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶ Ibid, P. 79

like an expression of compassion than a scientific presumption. But this example should be considered as an exception which proves the rule of objectivity of the author.

Another author, according to the classification in this research considered as neutral, is **Mark Selden**. This prominent scholar is author and co-author of various books and research⁹⁷. Though the primary field of interests for M. Selden is China, he has carried out some works concerning Takeshima/Dokdo issue. In his article “**Small Islets, Enduring Conflict: Dokdo, Korea-Japan Colonial Legacy and the United States**” scientist tries to cope with the issue by analyzing the role of the United States. In this article author uses name “Dokdo” throughout the text; this would imply the support of pro-Korean attitude. But that is only according to the technical details. The contextual analysis provides a deeper understanding about Takeshima/Dokdo issue and the importance of international, not only bilateral, relations. The US is perceived as a dominant in international political arena, where the course of geopolitical changes cannot occur without its permission. For instance, “The Taft-Katsura Agreement, which formalized Japan's seizure of Dokdo and paved the way for annexation, was predicated on a US-Japan understanding in which Japan endorsed the colonization of the Philippines in exchange for US recognition of its annexation of Korea”⁹⁸; “(...) by leaving vague or unresolved the disposition and specific boundaries (...) the US in the San Francisco Treaty sowed the seeds of future conflicts that have plagued bilateral and regional relationships to the present”⁹⁹. Continuing on, the author puts in a quotation by Hara, who suggests that “deliberate vagueness in this and other territorial issues – failing to allocate islands to a specific nation and/or to pinpoint the latitude and longitude of territories – was John Foster Dulles' strategy to maximize US leverage via its ability to resolve conflicts that were sown precisely by the vagueness of treaty language”¹⁰⁰. Mark Selden's research contains valuable data and insights, which broaden the limits of issue encompassing not only the Sea of Japan/East Sea but the US, too.

Kimie Hara, “50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan's Territorial Problems”¹⁰¹, provides a detailed view of the legal aspect of Japan's territorial issues. As for Takeshima/Dokdo, the main emphasis is put on San Francisco treaty and its drafts. The step by step review of the progress of the drafts unveils the connections and continuity between the Yalta Blueprint, San Francisco Conference and San Francisco treaty. Syngman Rhee Line is

⁹⁷ Webpage of Mark Selden, <http://www.markselden.info/home>. Accessed 2012 11 23

⁹⁸ Selden M., *Small Islets, Enduring Conflict*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Hara K., *50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan's Territorial Problems // Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3. University of British Columbia, autumn, 2001. 361-382 p. (hereafter – Hara K., *50 Years from San Francisco*)

covered fully, too – not only in terms of geography, but in terms of Korean intentions, too. Unlike Naito, who claims Syngman Line being a self-defense, Hara discerns the negative consequence of the policy of US towards Korea. As much as the names and terms are concerned, the neutral position is sustained, for instance, "Rhee Line"¹⁰², "Takeshima/Dokdo" and "Takeshima" are used interchangeably. All in all, Kimie Hara provides a valuable research of the issue. The insights as well as objective attitude make this article a useful and dependable source while going deep into the Takeshima/Dokdo issue.

"Tokdo or Takeshima? The International Law of Territorial Acquisition in the Japan-Korea Island Dispute" by Sean Fern¹⁰³ covers various aspects of the issue, but the main attention is paid to the legal side, namely on the precedents which have occurred in the courts concerning the territorial disputes. For the sake of neutrality, author chose the name "Liancourt Rocks" instead of Dokdo or Takeshima. The article contains a plenty of information from the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Using this data author stipulates, that South Korea would eventually be successful in the international court, because under the case law, effective occupation (as it was in the case of Palmas island) is more sustainable claim than discovery or short time occupation¹⁰⁴. In spite of this conclusion, the article should be referred to as objective, because the insights are made only depending on the case law, not on the subjective interpretations of various facts.

2.4.2. Takeshima/Dokdo issue in pro-Japanese attitude

First of all, **Japanese official stance** has to be pointed out. In its website Ministry of Foreign Affairs states:

1. In the light of historical facts and based upon international law, it is apparent that Takeshima is an inherent part of the territory of Japan.
2. The occupation of Takeshima by the Republic of Korea is an illegal occupation undertaken on absolutely no basis in international law. Any measures taken with regard

¹⁰² Hara K., 50 Years from San Francisco. P. 374

¹⁰³ Fern, S., Tokdo or Takeshima? 78-89 p.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. P. 88

to Takeshima by the Republic of Korea based on such an illegal occupation have no legal justification¹⁰⁵.

Providing the basic guidelines, Japanese government allows the pro-Japanese authors continue on these prospects while making research and composing articles.

The most characteristic position is **“10 issues of Takeshima”**¹⁰⁶. Prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and printed in 2008, this pamphlet is the best example of Japanese official stance in this issue. The pamphlet has 10 different versions in ten most used languages in the world. The information in the publication is gathered from various libraries, archives, supported by historical events and international treaties from the beginning of 20th century. The arguments are put in the chronological order, which means that the basic flow of historical events may be traced from this publication. Needless to say, this is an iconic example of propaganda. Reliance only on this publication can lead to overweighted understanding of an issue. Though the sources used for explanations contain an objective historical value, the interpretations are subjective. Terms and names are subjective as well. Speech is emotional, the verbs are often used in imperative mood and of high modality (“This clearly shows that that island does not exist at all in reality”¹⁰⁷, “This clearly shows that Japan has regarded Takeshima as its territory since then”¹⁰⁸, “This illegal occupation is not acceptable in any way”¹⁰⁹). Regardless the fact that “10 issues of Takeshima” were issued by the government of Japan, it should only be used for basic needs.

Of course, there are more dependable sources than the previous. One of them is an article found in **Kodansha encyclopedia of Japan**¹¹⁰. The article is short, containing only the main geographical and historical facts about the islets. The dependence of Takeshima/Dokdo is expressed in rather objective way, saying that “Japan occupied the island for strategic reasons during the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05), and it was incorporated into Shimane Prefecture in 1905. Since the end of World War II, the Republic of Korea has claimed rights to the island and has control over it. Attempts to resolve the dispute have been unsuccessful, and the issue, more symbolic than real, reflects lingering tensions between the two countries”¹¹¹. Bearing in mind the objectivity of encyclopedias, this article is dependable. The nomination of encyclopedia itself stipulates that the

¹⁰⁵ Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, official website <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/> accessed 2012 11 27

¹⁰⁶ 10 issues of Takeshima, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008. 14 p. (hereafter - 10 issues of Takeshima)

¹⁰⁷ 10 issues of Takeshima, p. 4

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 6

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 13

¹¹⁰ Quinones, C. K., Takeshima // Kodansha encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 7, p.325

¹¹¹ ibid

information should have at least a small scale of subjectivity, though the use of terms and names proves it wrong. Nevertheless, the article can be used to get acquainted with the issue, though the information provided is scarce.

Koji Furukawa issued a wider publication “**Bordering Japan: Towards a Comprehensive Perspective**”¹¹². The article concerns the territorial disputes in a broader context among Japan’s neighbors, because author, distinctively from most of researchers, includes the airspace as a point of discussion. Furukawa stipulates that the US occupation policy is one of the main reasons for the present situation regarding the territorial issues¹¹³. Such a statement can be related to neoconservatism – perception of not being responsible for the actions taken by Imperial Japan. This perspective is clearly visible in the part dedicated to Takeshima/Dokdo – while most of historical overviews contain various disputable facts about Takeshima/Dokdo until 1905, Furukawa simply says that “It came under Shimane Prefecture’s jurisdiction in 1905”¹¹⁴, followed by large section about SCAPIN (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction), which in turn is followed by relatively small depiction of situation since 1952, when Syngman Rhee Line was drawn¹¹⁵. Such a laconic description is a consequence of the thesis itself – author did not try to give a detailed overview about all the conflicts. Apart from this, subjectivity is expressed in the use of names and terms. In addition, historical facts are omitted – author claims that Korean side bombed Japanese vessels when it tried to get closer to the islands¹¹⁶, but there is nothing said about the actions of Japanese side¹¹⁷. Taking everything into account, “Bordering Japan: Towards a Comprehensive Perspective” is helpful to perceive a broader context, but should be taken critically for its subjective attitude.

2.4.3. Takeshima/Dokdo issue in pro-Korean attitude

Korea’s government holds its **official position** by claiming that “Dokdo, the easternmost island in East Sea, is an integral part of Korean territory historically, geographically, and under

¹¹² Furukawa K., *Bordering Japan: Towards a Comprehensive Perspective* // *Journal of borderlands studies*, vol. 26, issue 3., University of Victoria, Canada, 2011. 297-314 p. (hereafter - Furukawa K., *Bordering Japan*)

¹¹³ Furukawa K., *Bordering Japan*. P. 297

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, P. 303

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, P. 303-304

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, P. 303

¹¹⁷ After Syngman Rhee Line was drawn, Koreans began to seize Japanese fishing vessels found within the line. In protest, Japan sent naval ships to expel South Korean fishermen who had been conducting fishing activities near the islands. A series of physical clashes including exchanges of gun and mortar fire ensued in the following years. Koo, M. G., *Economic dependence ...*, P. 27

international law. No territorial dispute exists regarding Dokdo, and Dokdo is not a matter to be dealt with through diplomatic negotiations or judicial settlement”¹¹⁸. In this statement there can be distinguished following aspects of subjectivity – use of names (Dokdo, East Sea) and categorical claiming (“No territorial dispute exists”). Apparently, the position of Korean government is a key position for all the authors, who support a pro-Korean attitude.

Easiest access to such material is through the internet and data bases. One of the sources with most abundant amount of pro-Korean articles is **Korea Focus**¹¹⁹. In this website, supported by the Korea Foundation, professors and scholars of various fields publish their articles. Trends of all publications are the same – articles about Takeshima/Dokdo contain subjective attitude, often emotional and categorical language is used. Predominantly, the articles discuss the issues of present day Takeshima/Dokdo. To sum up, Korea Focus holds the position of representative of Korean society. Consequently, the information derived should be taken critically.

Similar attitude is demonstrated in a large collection of articles “The foreseen and unforeseen in historical relations between Korea and Japan”, published by Northeast Asian History foundation. This issue was completed by collecting articles of Korean scientists. Topics cover wide variety of historical issues from Ancient times to Takeshima/Dokdo. Namely the last article, “**Dokdo is South Korean territory**” by Lee Hoon¹²⁰. The article itself does not present new facts, moreover, in the first page there is an address of Dokdo islands as an argument that these islands are truly and officially a part of South Korea¹²¹. In addition, the terms and names are subjective – “Dokdo”, “Peace Line” as well as the language is emotional. Nevertheless, there is an attempt to look at the issue from the objective approach. Author states that the international community is not convinced by Korean arguments, rather by Japanese – “the international community thinks that prior occupation is more important than historical facts in deciding which country possesses Dokdo”¹²².

There are studies that can be evaluated as more thorough and dependable ones. One of these, “**The politics of the Dokdo issue**”¹²³ by Sung-jae Choi, discusses the Takeshima/Dokdo issue in broader context, encompassing internal non-governmental factors, mainly in Korea¹²⁴.

¹¹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea, official website for Dokdo island http://dokdo.mofat.go.kr/index_en.jsp#. Accessed 2012 11 23

¹¹⁹ <http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design3/index.asp>.

¹²⁰ Hoon, L., Dokdo is South Korean territory, P. 451-464

¹²¹ Ibid, P. 451

¹²² Ibid, P. 462

¹²³ Sung-jae Choi, The politics of the Dokdo issue, 465–494 p.

¹²⁴ Ibid, P. 469

Using the subjective names and terms (“The Peace Line”¹²⁵, among others) author stipulates that for Japanese “Dokdo has been of secondary importance and interest”¹²⁶; probably indirectly trying to justify the Korean stance in the dispute and, in turn, mollify the Japanese claims (because they have more important territorial interests). The author demonstrates an opposite attitude to Mark Selden – she states an interesting idea about civic groups, which made the politicians act more fiercely while taking steps Japan vis-à-vis Dokdo¹²⁷. It may be said, that both in Korea and Japan, most active groups were the rightists, having a considerable influence to the elections, as long as governments before the elections used to escalate the issue¹²⁸. By instigating nationalistic feelings they had an indirect impact to the course of domestic and foreign policies. Such insights suggest an innovative author’s viewpoint while representing the issue. Taking everything into account, Sung-jae Choi’s study is of considerable value, because the dispute is seen not only as a matter of states (governments), but giving a more detailed view of the political map of connections.

Taking everything into account, the present situation of Takeshima/Dokdo issue is demanding for an accurate analytical insight. The dispute itself is multi-sided and is a consequence of principles of Japan and South Korea. But without thorough understanding, it would easily mislead the researchers. At the same time, the amount of literature dedicated to this dispute is constantly growing; consequently, it is vital to classify and analyze these articles, studies and publications in order to use the most suitable sources for the future research on this topic.

The historiographical analysis was accomplished to determine whether the sources are dependable and objective or misleading and subjective; the classification of the material was based on the use of terms, names and allowance for facts, because these criteria are the best expression of dependence of the author. The analysis showed that the material on Takeshima/Dokdo issue can be divided into three main groups: neutral, pro-Japanese and pro-Korean. The most dependable are thought to be the neutral ones, while pro-Japanese and pro-Korean publications have to be taken more critically than the prior category. In addition, this does not mean, that pro-Korean or pro-Japanese research and articles are all the same, intentionally hiding the facts and interpreting them in favour of their attitude. They do provide interesting and useful insights, but sometimes due to tendentious rhetoric and uniform objectives of the works they are difficult to notice.

¹²⁵ Sung-jae Choi, *The politics of the Dokdo issue*. P. 468

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* P. 474

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* P. 473

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* P. 481

3. Discrimination and the dynamics of the conflict through the eyes of Zainichi Koreans

3.1. Description of research

In order to accomplish the objective of this thesis, the third task “Using the essential points of the issue, to analyze the dynamics of situation of Zainichi Koreans implementing the in-depth interview methodology” has to be carried out. This methodology was chosen because of few reasons. First, a qualitative method in general and in-depth interview in particular is a crucial prerequisite when the scholarly basis is insufficient¹²⁹. Concerning the current topic, this is the case. As mentioned earlier, there are various research accomplished about Takeshima/Dokdo issue and Zainichi Koreans separately, but not about how both phenomena have interacted and effected the latter. Therefore, as a primary step for collecting the data, this type of research was chosen. Second, the research is aimed to find whether Zainichi Koreans have undergone acts of discrimination, according to the course of Takeshima/Dokdo issue. Qualitative research is more appropriate, because in this particular case there is a need to acquire information, concerning not only discrimination *per se*, but (1) the ways in which it has appeared, (2) what impact did it have to Zainichi Koreans interviewed and (3) what are their impressions about it. Third, alternative types of research (for instance, questionnaires) would not provide appropriate data, because they contain questions with limited availability of expressing one’s opinion about a certain question. Therefore, there would be no possibility of deepening into the problem.

The process of research has gone through few stages:

1. Making the key questions, concerning the main events;
2. Finding the respondents;
3. Accomplishing interviews with respondents via e-mail;
4. Analyzing the data collected.

All stages had their own peculiarities. Stage (1) required advanced knowledge about Takeshima/Dokdo and Zainichi Koreans. Owing to the earlier accomplished research on abovementioned issues, points of reference were easily recognizable, thus key questions were

¹²⁹ Boyce, C., Neale, P., *Conducting In-Depth Interviews: A Guide for Designing and Conducting In-Depth Interviews for Evaluation Input*. Pathfinder International, 2006. P. 3

created without additional efforts. During the interview respondents had to be asked about their relations with other Zainichi, their opinion about inner polarization (Mindan and Chongreyon), about their attitude towards Japan-South Korea relations, Takeshima/Dokdo issue and discrimination. The formulation of the questions and time of asking them depended on every case. Overall amount of questions for a single respondent did not exceed 12. Stage (2) inevitably involved the mediators, who provided the needed access to Zainichi Koreans. With substantial contribution from the head of Center for Asian Studies, Dr. Aurelijus Zykas, a possibility to contact with Ikumi Shiba¹³⁰ was granted. She is directly connected to Zainichi Koreans, because she is married to one. Consequently, Ms. Shiba said that she has a wide range of acquaintances among Zainichi Koreans; as a result she could recommend a few of them who could answer the questions given to them. Due to a variety of potential interviewees, a possibility to choose was given. Therefore, the requirements were set: interviewee has to be Zainichi Korean; interviewee has to have a basic understanding as well as writing skills in English; age, sex, location, education and occupation are not relevant; naturalized Zainichi Koreans are welcome. Eventually, 5 respondents sent back their first answers, thus interviews were continued with them. The interviews are marked 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', and 'e' due to anonymity of respondents.

In terms of time duration, stage (3) was almost equal to the stage (2). Considering the physical distance (and the difference in time) between Lithuania and Japan, communication via e-mail was chosen, because direct dialogues (via Skype or other chat systems) would have been too complicated to deal in terms of time; therefore, accomplish the interview itself. The communication had its own characteristics. Ms. Shiba was a mediator while sending questions to certain Zainichi Koreans and forwarding their answers back. First of all, the questions to Zainichi Koreans seemed inappropriate for Ms. Shiba. She insisted on full consent and coordination from Dr. Zykas. Once permission was granted, questions were forwarded to Zainichi Koreans. About a month later answers were received. Immediately after that, the questions to specify particular aspects were sent back to Ms. Shiba and (hopefully immediately) forwarded to the Zainichi Koreans. During the process, such intermediation seemed intentional, because the forwarding of answers would allow checking them. Bearing in mind the stance of Ms. Shiba as an official person, probably it would not be acceptable, that negative image about Japanese society could be formed. In order to escape

¹³⁰ Ms. Ikumi Shiba was cultural attaché in Lithuania 2008-2010. She founded agency "Yukari" to help promoting cultural, economic, tourism ties between Japan and Lithuania. While residing in Lithuania, she contributed a lot to interstate relations; now she is doing business in East Asia region.

overseeing, Ms. Shiba was asked to say to Zainichi Koreans write directly to me, but the reply was “some of them hesitate to send you back directly”¹³¹.

Another issue was about unwillingness of Zainichi Koreans to write their opinion in detailed manner. Most of their answers were short, lacking particularity. This was not answering that was initially expected, although few of interviewees did manage to provide exclusive and interpretable information. Doing any research there is a possibility of getting a ‘modified’ answer. While accomplishing a research on social distance in Japan, R. Ball noticed, that “(...) respondents often tend to give the presumed socially desirable answer, or what they think the interviewer wants to hear”¹³². That means, there is always a possibility of particular situation, let us call it ‘adverse answering’. Respondents, while adversely answering, provide information what they think is most desirable by the researcher instead of what the researcher actually wants to know. Needless to say, information gathered during such interviews is at least misleading. There may be various reasons for adverse answering – intentions to hide ambiguous information; unwillingness to expose negative aspects of inner environment; intentional desire to form a particular attitude about themselves or about the question of interest. Some authors claim that various issues arise due to facts, that “The interviewer usually does not share the same past, and in many contexts there may be less personal constraint on what may, or may not, be said”¹³³. Consequently, questions may be politically, culturally or socially inappropriate and answering them may feel the interviewee uncomfortable. In addition, answers may be transformed to fit the sturdy common sense. Thus, social problems like discrimination, instead of being highlighted, may be hidden. During interviews the respondents were informed about the purpose of the research. It was done intentionally, because Zainichi Koreans may not necessarily want to speak about everyday issues. International relations could be an approach, through which their mundane problems could be seen and understood differently, from a broader context. Nevertheless, having in mind all the constraints, interviews had to be conducted, because it is the only possible way to gather relevant information.

3.2 Analysis of the research

As stated earlier, the questions of the interview were designed to provide most relevant information about Takeshima/Dokdo issue and its impact for Zainichi Koreans. All five respondents

¹³¹ Extract from the correspondence with Ikumi Shiba, 2013 03 20.

¹³² Ball, R., *Social distance in Japan*. p. 110

¹³³ Green, A., *Collective memory: Theoretical presuppositions and contemporary debates // Oral history*, vol. 32, no. 2. *Memory and society*, 2004. P. 41

have different backgrounds concerning political, social or historic issues; therefore the basic knowledge about the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute or issues with other Zainichi Koreans differed. All questions may be grouped into few categories:

1. Basic information about interviewee;
2. Respondent's relations with other Zainichi Koreans;
3. Evaluation of Takeshima/Dokdo issue;
4. Discrimination issues.

The following passages are dedicated for analysis of the answers from the abovementioned categories.

3.2.1 Basic information about interviewees

Obeying to the main prerequisite, all interviewees are Zainichi Koreans (one of them has recently changed nationality from Korean to Japanese). They are the 3rd generation Zainichi (in their thirties), and able to communicate in English. On the other hand, that ability does not necessarily mean an ability to use it fluently. It infers, though an ability to choose among a variety of potential Zainichi Koreans was given, the 'ability should not be taken for granted because the chosen respondents nevertheless had some difficulties with main requirements, for example, use of language. And this is clearly seen in the answers, where verbs are often confused with nouns, grammar rules sometimes are ignored and the structure of sentences directly correspond to Japanese one¹³⁴. Unclear language means additional difficulties in understanding the precise meaning of the answer. But in most cases the meaning was identified using the context.

All respondents reside in main Honshu island, more precisely in Tokyo (Tokyo prefecture), Osaka (Osaka prefecture), Yokohama (Kanagawa prefecture, moved there from Osaka), and Narita (Chiba prefecture). Looking from the statistical point of view, all these prefectures are from the list of top ten mostly Korean populated prefectures¹³⁵. This may infer that the respondents live in more or less strong community (especially the one from Osaka, where even almost a Koreatown (a.k.a. Ikaino) is located, though it is not presented in practically any official tourism or informational booklets); therefore various events, having a symbolic value for both South Korea and Japan, may have a repercussion of a certain degree there. Of course, active participation and constant refreshing in political news and topicality is needed because indifferent mass shall not react to changes in

¹³⁴ See the Annex for full interview sheets

¹³⁵ Statistics of Korean population in Japan, data from year 2008. Article in the internet: <http://stats-japan.com/t/kiji/11618>, accessed 2013 03 15

interstate relations. But, once again back to statistics – the larger is community of Zainichi Koreans, the bigger is the opportunity to get in touch with active and politically/socially conscious Zainichi Koreans.

3.2.2 Respondents' relations with other Zainichi Koreans

Consequently, the questions about sociality were asked. Remembering statement of Giddens about the formation of common loyalty, presumption was raised, that if the community members have tight relations among each other, the community itself may be more salient. Therefore, the possibility to initiate and target the acts of discrimination is increasing along with the degree of sociality. Corresponding to that, all interviewees said they communicate with Zainichi Koreans in their vicinity. Zainichi Korean, who has recently been naturalized, said “I think it is important to have a good relationship with other Zainich Korean, so sometimes I meet them”¹³⁶. This supposes that his relationship with community deteriorated since he moved from Osaka or changed nationality. Moreover, he may no longer have a need for intense relationship with Zainichi Koreans, because he is no longer a member of former community.

Other form of fostering the sociality is being a member of Mindan or Chongreyon. Two Zainichi Koreans claimed recently belonging to Mindan, one ('d') said he was a member of Chongreyon earlier, other 2 Zainichi Koreans said they nor belong to these or similar organizations, nor try to do anything for the sake of sociality of Zainichi Koreans' community. All in all fostering of the sociality is not done by any of five respondents. This may infer that they are only passive observers of the interstate relations, having little or no interest in main Japan-South Korea events. Political and social passiveness decreases the possibility to get exclusive data about Zainichi Koreans in context of Takeshima/Dokdo issue, because passive observers should be less competent in distinguishing between flare-ups and calm periods of the issue and connect them with their own experience.

In a broader context, communicating with Koreans in Korean peninsula, there are some issues as well. Two respondents said having no connections with Korea (South or North); other two said that there are some relatives in mainland, but they have not done any efforts to contact with them; and the naturalized Zainichi said, that “I have been to Korea to study when I was university student and then made lots of Korean friends, so sometimes I visit to Korea to meet my friends and

¹³⁶ Extract from the interview 'c', 2013 03 15. Language of all answers was not corrected.

try to use Korean”¹³⁷. Respondent did not define, how often ‘sometimes’ mean. Therefore it may be said, that he meets the Koreans from the mainland as often as the local Zainichi.

Having this information it may be concluded that it is difficult to define, what are the peculiarities of Zainichi Koreans’ community. But from the current answers it is clear that only the naturalized Japanese, former Zainichi Korean, emphasizes the need to maintain connections between local Zainichi Koreans as well as with Koreans in mainland. Other Zainichi Koreans tend to communicate in the circle of closest Zainichi, but none of them said being active members of society.

3.2.3 Evaluation of Takeshima/Dokdo issue

When asked about Takeshima/Dokdo islets, opinions were different as well, for example one Zainichi Korean, who previously attended Chongreyon school said that “When I was a student in Korean school, I learned Dokdo is Korea’s islets by the school, but for me, Dokdo/Takeshima is small islets, so it doesn't matter if it's Korean’s or Japanese’s”¹³⁸. Other respondent provided an indifferent position: “Just I know the simple information of the news. I think it’s very complicated case, and I don’t have required information. So I can’t judge”¹³⁹. Naturalized Japanese, former Zainichi Korean stated that “I don’t know the history of Dokdo/Takeshima islets in detail, but I think Dokdo is Japanese islets because Japanese government always say “it is our islets.””¹⁴⁰. It is obvious, that the interest in this issue of symbolic islets is not well expressed. Mostly the basic knowledge is from the school or “checking the big topics through TV and the Internet”¹⁴¹. Concerning the previous flare-ups of the issue, only one respondent claimed being aware about it “I remembered all these events and I always think of what is right and what is wrong regarding protest both Korea and Japan have made”¹⁴².

Asking questions, concerning political issues is risky in few aspects. First, randomly chosen respondents may have nothing to do with it, even not being acquainted at all. Secondly, their political scope may be limited to local level, not being interested in international politics. Therefore, the answers may be incomplete and questions, looking from the respondents’ point of view, may seem inappropriate. Analyzing these particular answers, the tendency is obvious – respondents had

¹³⁷ Extract from the interview ‘c’, 2013 03 15

¹³⁸ Extract from the interview ‘a’, 2013 04 14

¹³⁹ Extract from the interview ‘e’, 2013 03 20

¹⁴⁰ Extract from the interview ‘c’, 2013 03 15

¹⁴¹ Extract from the interview ‘d’, 2013 03 13

¹⁴² Extract from the interview ‘b’, 2013 03 22

limited knowledge about the Takeshima/Dokdo issue and only when reminded about very specific events, they were able to reminisce about the latest ones. Nevertheless, these answers may infer, that Zainichi Koreans, although being in an ambiguous situation between Japan and Korea (South or North) do not emphasize the bilateral issues in everyday life. Most probably, it may be because the international relations do not affect them directly.

3.2.4 Evaluation of discrimination

The main outcome, which I was seeking to spot in the context of Takeshima/Dokdo issue, was the altered treatment of Zainichi Koreans. More particularly, the prediction was that Zainichi Koreans are more discriminated during the flare-ups of the issue, because the active rightist groups tend to express their attitude in quite an overt manner. In addition, Zainichi Koreans were asked, whether they felt being discriminated according to the course of Takeshima/Dokdo issue. Alas, none of the respondents could remember any cases of discrimination, concerned to the territorial dispute. Therefore, interviewees were asked about any discriminatory acts, imposed on them. Interviewee 'b' stated that "(...) mostly I don't feel that I am discriminated against because of my nationality"¹⁴³. Saying "mostly" may infer that there may be facts of discrimination but the respondent could not connect it with one's nationality. Only one of them told me, that in school days few Japanese slashed with knives a chimageogori – a special cloth that has to be worn in Korean schools¹⁴⁴. And even after that, respondent said being discriminated not because they were non-Japanese, but because they had to wear chimageogoris¹⁴⁵. Important notification – it has to be remembered, that all my respondents were 3rd generation Zainichi Koreans, therefore their identities, as stipulated in previous chapter, are complicated. Due to the peculiarities of identity, Zainichi Koreans may be unable to differentiate themselves from the majority of Japanese, thus the acts of discrimination are said to be due to exterior differences (in this particular case, the clothing).

Of course, the factor of adverse answering should not be forgotten. Previously discussed unwillingness to provide detailed answers may be projected to the creation of idealistic society, where Zainichi Koreans live together with non-Zainichi Koreans without having any negative attitudes towards them. On the other hand, messages in media may have formed a particular attitude towards Zainichi Koreans as well – legal oppression, discrimination by various far-right groups are sought after topics. They may represent the life of real Zainichi Koreans, but only of few of them.

¹⁴³ Extract from the interview 'b', 2013 03 22

¹⁴⁴ Extract from the interview 'a', 2013 04 14

¹⁴⁵ Extract from the interview 'a', 2013 04 14

But in order to clarify the missing points, a broader research has to be conducted, including more respondents. Consequently, at least some scale statistics could be provided on this issue, because till now, there are no reliable statistical data about Zainichi Koreans and their situation in terms of discrimination. All in all, the primary hypothesis of this thesis is proven negative.

Conclusions

1. Due to its complexity, issue of Zainichi Koreans has to be investigated using other than rationalist approaches. Social constructivism as a theoretical approach provides the needed attitude towards identity and its changeability; therefore, by implementing social constructivism such an ambiguous construct like Zainichi Koreans may be treated more accurately, involving not only social, but political peculiarities as well.
2. Zainichi Koreans is a particular minority group, according to the international law not an ethnic minority, because they are not nationals of the country they live in, Japan. As long as they reside in Japan, it is important to define their status and therefore Japanese officials forged the term “permanent residents”, providing Zainichi Koreans the right to live in Japan for unlimited time in exchange of political, social rights and occupational perspectives.
3. Takeshima/Dokdo issue is an ongoing territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea for small islets in Sea of Japan/East Sea. Ever since the islets have been unilaterally occupied by South Korea, the issue renews time after time, resulting in worsened bilateral relations and escalating of past issues. During last 20 years, 4 crucial points may be identified: 1996-1998, 2002-2004, 2005 and 2012. In most cases, the flare-ups were mollified by foreign countries or newly elected state leaders.
4. The course of the issue, as well as reasons for it or even basic information, differs according to the group, to which the scholar belongs – pro-Japanese, pro-Korean or neutral. After the historiographical analysis of the literature, it is apparent, that the belonging to a particular group of interest may be recognized by the use of names, terms and the allowance for facts. Having distinguished the key words, it is possible to identify the dependence of author, therefore, to use critically his or her work at the same time diminishing the possibility of being misled.
5. In order to find out whether Zainichi Koreans are treated differentially according to bilateral issues, in-depth interviews were used. Although this method provided noteworthy data, the reliability of it is challenged because of high level of subjectivity. Various obstacles like belated answers, unwillingness to answer in a detailed manner or limited interest of the interviewees in the bilateral issues of Japan and South Korea influenced the final outcome.
6. The results of analysis of the dynamics of Zainichi Koreans’ situation according to crucial points of Takeshima/Dokdo issue clearly show that there is no correlation between the course of Takeshima/Dokdo dispute and difference in treatment with Zainichi Koreans. What is more, no (except one case) discriminatory situations were said to have happened to

the respondents. Main reasons for such results may be connected to adverse answering which in turn is tightly concerned with identity. As long as 3rd generation Zainichi Koreans are assimilated at a certain degree, they may have their attitude towards social life in Japan altered. Seeing themselves as a part of society, where Zainichi Koreans live together with non-Zainichi Koreans without having any negative attitudes towards them may be the key to understanding the worldview of Zainichi Koreans.

7. To sum up, the hypothesis “Zainichi Koreans in Japan undergo discrimination, which is intensifying according to the course of Takeshima/Dokdo issue” is proven negative, because according to the research completed and analysis done, not even smallest acts of discrimination were found that could be connected to the course of Takeshima/Dokdo issue. Most influencing factor is thought to be the unreliability of the research field; therefore, to get more accurate data further research could be conducted, combining qualitative research with quantitative ones.

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