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**SOFT POWER DILEMMA IN THE CASE OF JAPAN'S POSITION IN THE
SIX-PARTY TALKS. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLE
HEADLINES IN *THE JAPAN TIMES* AND *YOMIURI SHIMBUN***

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ŠVELNIOSIOS GALIOS DILEMA JAPONIJOS POZICIJOS
ŠEŠIAŠALĖSE DERYBOSE ATVEJU. *THE JAPAN TIMES* IR *YOMIURI*
***SHIMBUN* STAIPSNŲ ANTRAŠČIŲ PALYGINAMOJI ANALIZĖ**

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Summary

The object of this thesis is Japan's position in the Six-Party Talks as an example case of the concept of soft power dilemma and the representation of this position in Japanese dailies *The Japan Times* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* (読売新聞) during the period of the Six-Party Talks (2003–2007). Soft power dilemma concept was presented by political scientist from South Korea Geun Lee, who compared Japan's and China's positions in the Six-Party Talks. This thesis is using Lee's idea for the **hypothesis** that Japan's position towards North Korea led to soft power dilemma, and tests it by the content analysis of two Japanese newspapers' article headlines. The **aim** of the thesis is to analyze the media representations of Japan's position in the Six-Party Talks through the theoretical approach of soft power dilemma. The **objectives** are: to present the conceptual framework of soft power dilemma by Lee, which combined soft power and two-level games theoretical framework; to analyze the reasons of why Japan's policy in the Six-Party Talks resulted in soft power dilemma by pointing out international and domestic factors influencing Japan's position; as well as to analyze how Japan's position in the Six-Party Talks is presented in its media by comparative content analysis of the article headlines from two dailies, *The Japan Times* and *Yomiuri Shimbun*.

The thesis came to the conclusions that soft power dilemma concept, which is a part of the whole Lee's theoretical framework of soft power theory, represents the situation when soft power strategy exercised by the country on both domestic and international level brings favorable results to that country on domestic but not international level or vice versa. After analyzing the international and domestic factors shaping Japan's policy in the Six-Party Talks, one can see that Japan's position in the Six-Party Talks was affected by Japan-United States relations, Japan's relations with other East Asian countries, and security issues, related to North Korea. Meanwhile the domestic factors include political organs, interest groups, media and public opinion. The latter factors gave stronger impact on society and adopted a rather negative approach towards North Korea, which confirms statement that Japan's emphasis of the abduction issue during the Six-Party Talks is a soft power strategy for accumulating support domestically, but did not give positive results internationally. The comparative newspaper headlines analysis showed that major issues are security and abduction issue. What is more, the articles reflected negative or neutral image of North Korea in both newspapers which led to the result that the escalation of the issue of abduction worked for Japan as soft power category aiming at accumulating support domestically, but failed to strengthen its position internationally. All these factors led to what Lee called soft power dilemma.

Santrauka

Šio darbo objektas yra Japonijos pozicija šešiašalėse derybose kaip švelniosios galios dilemos sąvokos atvejis ir šios pozicijos atvaizdavimas Japonijos dienraščių *The Japan Times* ir *Yomiuri Shimbun* (読売新聞) antraštėse šešiašalių derybų metu (2003–2007). Švelniosios galios dilemos sąvoką pristatė Pietų Korėjos politologas Geun Lee, lygindamas Japonijos ir Kinijos pozicijas šešiašalėse derybose. Darbe Lee idėja, jog Japonijos pozicija Šiaurės Korėjos atžvilgiu šešiašalėse derybose yra švelniosios galios dilemos atvejis iškelia kaip darbo hipotezė, kuri tikrinama šią poziciją sąlygojusiu faktorių bei minėtų dienraščių antraščių analize. Darbo tiklas yra išanalizuoti Japonijos pozicijos šešiašalėse derybose atvaizdavimą Japonijos spaudoje, pasitelkiant švelniosios galios dilemos koncepsiją. Darbo uždaviniai yra pristatyti švelniosios galios dilemos sąvoką Lee švelniosios galios teorijos kontekste; pateikti Japonijos poziciją lėmusių išorinių ir vidinių faktorių analizę; taip pat atlikus Japonijos dienraščių *The Japan Times* ir *Yomiuri Shimbun* antraščių palyginamąją turinio analizę pateikti išvadas, kaip Japonijos pozicija reprezentuojama Japonijos spaudoje.

Darbo rezultatai parodė, jog švelniosios galios dilema, kuri yra Lee siūlomos švelniosios galios teorijos struktūros dalis, apibūdina situaciją, kai valstybės vykdoma švelniosios galios strategija tarptautiniu ir lokaliu lygmenimis atneša palankius rezultatus lokaliame lygmenyje, bet nepalankius tarptautiniame lygmenyje ir atvirkščiai. Tai pat, išanalizavus išorinius ir vidinius faktorius, sąlygojusius Japonijos poziciją daugiašalėse derybose, pastebėta, jog šią poziciją įtakojo santykiai su Jungtinėmis Amerikos Valstijomis, taip pat santykiai su kitomis Rytų Azijos valstybėmis, bei pavojus šalies saugumui, kylantis iš Šiaurės Korėjos. Tuo tarpu vidiniai faktoriai apima politinius organus, kaip pavyzdžiui valdančioji Liberalų demokratų partija ir Ministro Pirmininko kabinetas; taip pat interesų grupes, daugiausiai susidedančios iš organizacijų, besirūpinančių Šiaurės Korėjos vykdytų Japonijos piliečių pagrobimų atvejų eskalavimu; bei spauda ir viešoji numonė, kurios yra glaudžiai tarpusavyje susijusios ir viena kitą įtakojančios, bei prisidėjusios prie neigiamo Šiaurės Korėjos įvaizdžio formavimo Japonijos visuomenėje. Japonijos dienraščių antraščių lyginamoji turinio analizė parodė, jog daugiausiai randama straipsnių skirtų Japonijos piliečių pagrobimų ir saugumo problematikai, kuriuose pateikiamas neigiamas Šiaurės Korėjos įvaizdis. Minėtų temų, ypač pagrobimų, eskalavimas spaudoje veikė kaip švelniosios galios priemonė, siekianti gauti vidinę paramą, bet nesugebėjusi sutvirtinti Japonijos pozicijos tarptautiniu lygmeniu. Visa tai lėmė, jog Japonijos švelniosios galios strategija baigėsi švelniosios galios dilema.

1. INTRODUCTION

During the last decades of the 20th century one can find many examples of regionalization processes in East Asia, which started from the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1960s and gradually came to the idea of formation of Asian Monetary Fund, proposed by Japan in 1997.¹ These processes show the growing understanding and wish of East Asian countries to collaborate within the region, thus strengthening it at least economically. This might also be a great opportunity for East Asian countries to extend their influence within the region. Therefore countries like Japan and People's Republic of China (hereafter China) are interested in taking part in these processes.² For Japan they provide opportunities to maintain its status as economically strong and attractive country in the region. Moreover, by strengthening its position in the East Asian region, Japan may become less dependent on the U.S. in international relations.

One of the fields where Japan has been playing a considerable role within the region is the multilateral talks on North Korea nuclear issues, also known as the Six-party Talks (hereafter often the SPT). Originally started in 2003 it has been one of the most important negotiations on security issues in East Asia that gathered together six countries, the United States, Japan, two Koreas, China and Russia to negotiate the nuclear disarmament of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter often North Korea). For Japan participation in these negotiations provides the opportunity to settle disputes with North Korea, mainly the security threat, posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons, and the issues related to the 17 Japanese nationals who were abducted by North Korea in 1970's and 1980's. Japan's relations with Korean Peninsula have been complicated by the legacy of wars, occupation, huge human losses and devastations brought to Korea by Japan before and during the World War II (hereafter often WWII), and its reluctance to deal with those issues openly. While the relations with the Republic of Korea (hereafter often South Korea) have been improved during the last two decades, at least in the economic field, the ones with North Korea have come to a stalemate. Therefore the multilateral talks give the opportunity to Japan to improve its relations with Korea Peninsula. Moreover, the SPT provides Japan a possibility to secure its role in the region.

¹ Grimes, W. (2011). The Asian Monetary Fund Reborn? Implications of Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization. *Asia Policy*, No. 11. P. 86.

² Ashizawa, K. (2006). Tokyo's Quandary, Beijing's Moment in the Six-Party Talks: A Regional Multilateral Approach to Resolve the DPRK's Nuclear Problem. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73:3 (Fall). P. 411-432.

However, Japan chose to stick to a very strict position towards the issues with North Korea in the SPT, due to which she hardly took advantage of any of the above listed opportunities.

All these issues put together, Japan's wish to maintain its role in the East Asian region, its complicated relations with Korea Peninsula, North Korea's security threat, combine them with the Japan's domestic political situation, lead to the reasons for why and how important the SPT is to Japan, and why she has been sticking to a very strict position towards North Korea, which has made her a spoiler of the SPT.³ Unfortunately, many of other political scientist, interested in the SPT process tend to concentrate more on the roles of the U.S. and North Korea, as the most important actors in the negotiations, and pay much less attention to Japan, regarding it as just one of "the Other Four" parties⁴. However, this is only one side of the coin, and in order to see the other, one should take a closer look to the rationale behind Japan's position as well as to compare it to the rationale behind the positions of the other parties. By looking at the reasons of its position, one would see the whole specter of factors shaping Japan's foreign and domestic policies.

Therefore this thesis concentrates on Japan's position in the SPT and the rationale behind it. The previous studies of Japan's policy in the SPT include works of Okano-Heijmans,⁵ who approaches this question through Japan's economic diplomacy, Kuniko Ashizawa⁶ looking at it through the analysis of decision making processes in its domestic policy, and Linus Hagström,⁷ concentrating on Japan's position towards North Korea in the context of its foreign policy and virtual alliance with the U.S. Moreover, the latter author denies the assumption that Japan was acting as an obstructionist or spoiler of the negotiations,⁸ arguing that the other parties did not do enough to reach a compromise either. All of these scholars point out that Japan's position in the SPT was mostly shaped by its concentration on its national interests.

³ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2008). Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea. *Japan Focus*, 21(Oct.).

⁴ Rozman, G. (2007). *Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States*, London: Palgrave and Macmillan.

⁵ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2008). Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea. *Japan Focus*, 21(Oct.); Okano-Heijmans, M. (2009). Projecting Economic Power: Japan's Diplomacy towards North Korea. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 21*, (February).

⁶ Ashizawa, K. (2006). Tokyo's Quandary, Beijing's Moment in the Six-Party Talks: A Regional Multilateral Approach to Resolve the DPRK's Nuclear Problem. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73:3 (Fall). P. 411–432.

⁷ Hagström, L. (2008). Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy. *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 7: 1. P. 131–154.

⁸ Such assumption was made by Okano-Heijmans (in Okano-Heijmans, M. (2008). Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea. *Japan Focus*, 21(Oct.)), Ashizawa (in Ashizawa, K. (2006). Tokyo's Quandary, Beijing's Moment in the Six-Party Talks: A Regional Multilateral Approach to Resolve the DPRK's Nuclear Problem. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73:3 (Fall). P. 411–432.), etc.

Differently from the above mentioned analysis, this thesis approaches Japan's position in the SPT through soft power theoretical framework. According to Joseph S. Nye, who was the first to introduce this theory, the main aspect of soft power is that it is used to make others change their behavior or the way of thinking in a way favorable to the country, applying soft power, and achieve that by non-violent and non-material means.⁹ One of the fields where countries tend to exercise their soft power is international negotiations, as in many cases there are countries trying to solve certain matters peacefully. The SPT presents a good example of such negotiations. Since the main goal of the SPT is to solve North Korea's nuclear crisis peacefully, without using military force or economic sanctions, it is safe to state that participating countries are employing soft resources there. Despite this fact, there have been few attempts to approach the SPT through soft power theory.

One of such attempts was done by Korea political scientist Geun Lee, who used the SPT to test his approach to soft power strategies.¹⁰ What is important in Lee's approach is that he introduced a conceptual framework for Nye's soft power theory, applied the theory of two-level games¹¹ when analyzing soft power strategies, which gradually led to the concepts of soft power synergy and soft power dilemma, and tested the latter concepts on the positions of Japan and China in the SPT.¹² According to Lee, the concept of soft-power dilemma represents a situation when a country's soft power strategy gives positive results on a domestic level, but fails to do so on international level, or vice versa. Meanwhile soft power synergy describes the situation when soft power strategy brings positive results on both, domestic and international level.¹³ Lee points out that Japan's excessive stress on its domestic policy concerns, mainly the abduction issue, reduced its possibilities to exert its soft power in the multilateral talks thus resulting in soft power dilemma. Meanwhile, China managed its soft power strategy successfully on both levels thus resulting in soft power synergy.

However, Lee did not go deeper in his analysis to see the actual reasons for Japan's position, but rather just presented a well structured theoretical framework for further research. Therefore this thesis uses theoretical framework for analyzing the rationale of Japan's position in the SPT, but concentrates not on comparison with other parties' soft power strategies, as Lee did, but rather on pointing out the main factors, influencing this position and analyzing representations of this position in

⁹ Nye, J. S. (2008). *The Powers to Lead*. New York: Oxford University press.

¹⁰ Lee, G. (2010). The Clash of Soft Powers Between China and Japan: Synergy and Dilemmas at the Six-party Talks. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 34 (2). P. 113–138.

¹¹ Putman, R. D. (1998). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-level Games. *International Organization*, 42 (3). P. 427–460.

¹² Lee, G. (2010). The Clash of Soft Powers Between China and Japan: Synergy and Dilemmas at the Six-party Talks. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 34 (2). P. 113–138.

¹³ *Ibid.* P. 124.

Japan's media thus providing new material for Lee's concept of soft power dilemma. Therefore, this thesis uses Lee's idea for the **hypothesis** that Japan's position towards North Korea led to soft power dilemma, and tests it by the content analysis of two Japanese newspapers' article headlines.

Therefore the **aim** of this thesis is to analyze the media representations of Japan's position in the SPT through the theoretical approach of soft power dilemma. The **objectives** of the thesis are:

- 1) to present the conceptual framework of soft power dilemma by Geun Lee, which combined soft power and two-level games theoretical frameworks;
- 2) to analyze the reasons why Japan's policy in the SPT resulted in soft power dilemma by pointing out the main factors, international and domestic, influencing Japan's position;
- 3) to analyze how Japan's position in the SPT is presented in its media by comparative content analysis of the article headlines from two dailies, *The Japan Times* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* (読売新聞).

In order to achieve the above mentioned goals, the **method** of quantitative content analysis is implied in the empirical part of the thesis. Political and social scientist Harold D. Lasswell, formulated the core questions of content analysis, in the first half of 20th century as: "who says what, to whom, why, to what extent and with what effect".¹⁴ Later on these questions were expanded and methodological frameworks were created. This thesis is based mostly on the methods of content analysis proposed by the main specialists of this field, Klaus Krippendorff,¹⁵ and Robert P. Weber.¹⁶ A more detailed explanation of content analysis is presented in the last part of the thesis.

Quantitative content analysis was chosen for this thesis because it provides a good methodological framework for the analysis of newspaper article headlines, by calculating the frequency of certain keywords, position of the article in the newspaper, attempting to trace the goal of the message, the audience, receiving the message, the impact of the message to the audience, etc. The reason for selecting newspaper headlines for empirical research is their specific role and impact on the newspaper readers. As Elly Ifantidou points out, newspaper headlines seek to summarize and attract attention to the full-text newspaper article.¹⁷ This means that the headline of the article is what helps reader to decide whether or not he/she will read the whole article. With this in mind, one can state that headline includes the most important information of the article. Furthermore, in order to attract readers

¹⁴ Lasswell, H. D. (1927). *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. London: MIT Press.

¹⁵ Krippendorff, K. (1986). *Content Analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

¹⁶ Weber, R. P. (1985). *Basic Content Analysis*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

¹⁷ Ifantidou, E. (2009). Newspaper Headlines and Relevance: Ad Hoc Concepts in Ad Hoc Contexts. *Journal of Pragmatics*, Vol. 41. P. 699–720.

headlines tend to be memorable and effective with the use of certain linguistic features.¹⁸ Another reason for choosing to analyze only the headlines is the large quantity of the articles related to the Japan's position in the SPT issues that were found in the selected dailies. Therefore in order not to go out of the limits of a master thesis only newspaper headlines are analyzed in this work.

In order to achieve the initial aim, the paper is grounded on information found in books, journals, Internet websites and two newspapers.

The academic literature, used for this paper, varies from that dealing with the processes of the SPT to that concentrating on Japan's domestic policy issues. There are not many works analyzing Japan's position in the SPT apart from the ones mentioned above. On the other hand, Japan's position towards North Korea is well represented in works analyzing Japan-North Korea relations. Interestingly, these relations by some authors are viewed as Japan's attempts to begin a more independent foreign policy from the U.S. These are the works of Rozman¹⁹ and Hagström,²⁰ who point out the way Japan was conducting its own policy towards North Korea and the reasons why it failed.

The works devoted to the Japanese domestic politics analysis²¹ concentrate on the different kind of policies, led by three different prime ministers, during the rule of which the SPT took place. Whereas, those devoted to Japan's foreign policy during the SPT period concentrate on its clashes with both Koreas²² or the growing competition with China, whose role is more significant in the negotiations²³. More thoroughly Japan's relations with the other SPT parties are analyzed in articles dealing with the SPT issues as well. Ford and Kwon goes as far as calling Japan-North Korea relations as "Sleeping with the Enemy",²⁴ referring to security and abduction issues. Because of their importance the latter issues are being at least mentioned by most scholars referring to the SPT. The other important point in this context, pointed out by some scholars is Japan's ambitions and

¹⁸ Develotte, C., Rechniewski, E. (2001). Discourse analysis of newspaper headlines: a methodological framework for research into national representations. *The Web Journal of French Media Studies*, Vol. 4: 1 (November). <http://wjfms.ncl.ac.uk/joed4.htm>. Accessed 20th April, 2012.

¹⁹ Rozman, G. (2007). *Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States*, London: Palgrave and Macmillan. P. 27–51.

²⁰ Hagström, L. (2006). The Dogma of Japanese Insignificance: The Academic Discourse on North Korea Policy Coordination. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3 (Fall). P. 387–410; Hagström, L. (2008). Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy. *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 7: 1. P. 131–154. Hagström, L. (2009). Normalizing Japan. Supporter, Nuisance, or Wielder of Power in the North Korean Nuclear Talks? *Asian Survey*. Vol. 49: 5 (September). P. 831–851.

²¹ Govella K., Vogel S. (2008). Japan in 2007: A Divided Government. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 68:1 (January/February). P. 97–106; Park G., Vogel S. (2007). Japan in 2006: A Political Transition. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 67:1 (January/February). P. 22–31.

²² Rozman, G., Lee, Sh. (2006). Unraveling the Japan-South Korea "Virtual Alliance". *Asian Survey*, Vol. 66:5 (September/October). P. 761–784.

²³ Lee, G. (2010). The Clash of Soft Powers between China and Japan: Synergy and Dilemmas at the Six-party Talks. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 34 (2). P. 113–139.

²⁴ Ford, G., Kwon, S. (2008), *North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival*, London: Pluto Press. P. 169–198.

competition with China.²⁵ Most of the articles, dealing with the SPT issues tend to view it in the context of “the Other Four”, referring to Japan, South Korea, China and Russia, as keeping the middle position between the US and North Korea.²⁶ There are several authors who pay attention to domestic factors, playing important role in shaping Japan’s position in SPT, by pointing out positions of political actors,²⁷ and interest groups, mostly related to the abduction issues,²⁸ towards North Korea.

Besides academic literature, this thesis is based on information from primary sources, such as Internet website of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs²⁹, dealing with Japan-North Korea relations as well as with the issues on the SPT, as well as websites dealing with the abduction issue³⁰ that help to reveal the position of Japanese citizens towards this issue. As the main corpus of the research the article headlines from *The Japan Times* and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, related to North Korea issues, are analyzed and compared in order to find out the attitude towards these issues presented in Japan’s media. The latter newspapers were chosen for the analysis because of the different audience they are directed at. *The Japan Times* is published in English and is directed towards international audience, which is also illustrated by its slogan “The World’s Window on Japan”³¹. It is also one of the most neutral Japan’s newspapers towards Japanese political parties and their positions and often reflects different opinions on the same subjects. In comparison, *Yomiuri Shimbun* is conservative or even centre-right newspaper, thus it reflects the position of the ruling party at the time of the SPT. It is also the largest newspaper in Japan, being issued twice a day. This is one of the reasons, why the number of articles, related to the SPT issues in this newspaper is nearly ten times bigger than that in *The Japan Times*, making it difficult to conduct a qualitative analysis of newspaper articles. For this reason, only the morning edition of *Yomiuri Shimbun* articles is used for the analysis. A comparative content analysis of the above mentioned newspaper headlines will present the different attitudes towards the issues of the SPT and the different ways they are presented.

²⁵ Blank, S. (2011). Rethinking the Six-Party Process on Korea. *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 20 (1). P. 88–122.

²⁶ Rozman, G. (2007). *Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States*, London: Palgrave and Macmillan. P. 27–51.

²⁷ Hughes, C. H. (2006). The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions Towards North Korea: Domestic Coalitions And Systematic Pressures. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3 (Fall). P. 455–481.

²⁸ Williams, B., Moberand, E. (2010). Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 69: 2 (May). P.507–536; Johnston, E. (2004). The North Korean Abduction Issue and Its Effect on Japanese Domestic Politics. Working Paper no. 101. Japan Policy Research Institute. <http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp101.html>. Accessed: May 1st, 2012.

²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/>

³⁰ Abduction of Japanese Citizens by North Korea. <http://www.rachi.go.jp/en/index.html>; <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abduction/index.html> . THINK <http://think.s52.xrea.com/THINK/>.

³¹ *The Japan Times*. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/>

The above mentioned objectives led to the following **structure** of the thesis. The main body consists of four parts. The first part presents the historical background for Japan's participation in the SPT by looking through its relations with North Korea and the process of the SPT itself. Meanwhile second part of the thesis corresponds to the first goal, and therefore, concentrates on the theoretical framework of soft power dilemma by Geun Lee. Firstly, it presents Lee's conceptual framework of soft power theory, comparing it with Nye's approach to soft power, thus pointing out Lee's contribution to this theory. Secondly, it explains the concepts of soft power synergy and soft power dilemma, which is the core concept of the thesis. The third part connects Lee's theoretical approach to Japan's position in the SPT case answering to the second goal of this work by analyzing international and domestic factors, which influence Japan's position in the SPT thus resulting in soft power dilemma. It consists of two chapters; first one concentrates on peculiarities of Japanese foreign policy, its close alliance with the U.S. and Japan's attempts to conduct a more independent foreign policy which constitute the international factors shaping Japan's position in the SPT. Meanwhile the second chapter looks deeper into domestic factors, such as policies of Japanese Prime Ministers, role of non-governmental organizations, and media, influencing Japan's position in the SPT. The fourth part of the main body corresponds to the third goal by presenting a comparative content analysis of headlines found in selected Japanese dailies, *The Japan Times* and *Yomiuri Shimbun*. While using this method the attitude towards main issues in the SPT and North Korea are presented. In the beginning the method of content analysis is presented and the aspects for the above mentioned newspapers' headlines analysis are pointed out. The following chapter presents the analysis itself. The last part of the thesis presents the conclusions.

Due to the limits of a master thesis, there are many topics that are not covered in this work. For example, the reaction of the other states to Japan's position in the SPT or the comparison of Japan's soft power strategy with other parties' soft power strategies in the SPT are not thoroughly covered. Moreover, the Lee's theoretical approach is not compared with other scientists' dealing with soft power theory, approaches. The method of content analysis is also not covered fully, but just the method used in the analysis of this thesis is presented. The uncovered topics might be analyzed in further research of Japan's position in the SPT.

The results of this work can be useful for further applications of Lee's theoretical frameworks for soft power theory, as well as further research of the processes of the SPT or Japan-North Korea relations.

2. THE SIX-PARTY TALKS WITHIN THE JAPAN-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

This part of the thesis seeks to look through the historical background of the SPT and Japan-North Korea relations, by pointing out the main features of the latter relations in one or another way might have contributed to Japan's position towards its northern neighbor.

2.1. Japan-North Korea Relations before the Six-Party Talks

As Okano-Heijmans notes, the Japan-North Korea relations revolve around an array of international, regional, bilateral and domestic issues.³² For North Korea Japan has been a second biggest enemy after the U.S. for two reasons. Firstly, it is closest ally of North Korea's archenemy, the U.S., and secondly, because of Japanese colonial occupation at the beginning of the 19th century that lasted until the end of WWII.³³ For Japan, North Korea to this day is the last country in the region with which it has not settled its colonial and war issues,³⁴ as well as one of the major threats to its security. As Oh and Hassig point out, there has been a mutual need for rapprochement of the two states. Having been neglected by its allies, China and Russia, North Korea began to feel the need for capital and technologies to save its economy, while Japan wanted to normalize its relations with North Korea in order to reduce the security threat.³⁵

Even though the first rapprochements between the two governments took place in 1950's, no considerable results were achieved until March of 1989, when Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita expressed "deep remorse" to all Koreans for the past aggressions and suggested that Japan would welcome improved relations with North Korea.³⁶ Knowing that Japan has been paying so-called compensation for occupation to South Korea, and consequently expecting to get it as well, North Korea accepted Japanese proposal and invited Japan's delegation for a visit.³⁷ A delegation consisting of both, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (Jimintō) and the opposition Japan Socialist Party (later

³² Okano-Heijmans, M. (2009). Projecting Economic Power: Japan's Diplomacy towards North Korea. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 21*, (February). P. 7.

³³ Oh, K., Hassig, R. C. (2000). *North Korea: Through the Looking Glass*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. P. 160.

³⁴ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2009). Projecting Economic Power: Japan's Diplomacy towards North Korea. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 21*, (February). P. 8.

³⁵ Oh, K., Hassig, R. C. (2000). *North Korea: Through the Looking Glass*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. P. 160.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Ford, G., Kwon, S. (2008), *North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival*, London: Pluto Press. P. 176.

Japan Social Democratic Party) visited Pyongyang in September, 1990, and issued a communiqué, in which all three parties promised to resolve the problems and normalize the relations between the two states.³⁸ This question was discussed in eight rounds of talks, and also included the issue of reparation paying to North Korea by the Japanese government. The talks suddenly broke down in 1992 due to North Korean commando's confession of the abduction of Japanese woman.³⁹ Though, some scholars, as Hagström⁴⁰, Ford and Kwon,⁴¹ points out, the real breaker of the deal was the United States that presented a proof of Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions to Japan. One may say that it was in the interests of the U.S. not to allow further rapprochement of the two states without the U.S. participating in it. According to Hagström, the "tough stance" actually indicates Washington's exercise of power over Tokyo, which as a loyal ally, exercised power over North Korea as a part of the U.S. strategy.⁴² Oh and Hassig also add two more reasons: the unfavorable Japanese public attitude towards paying reparations to North Korea, and South Korea's and the U.S. concerns that their leverage to force North Korea to engage in political and economic opening would be reduced by an early normalization of Japan-North Korea relations.⁴³

The following years were marked by the nuclear crisis, which was North Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (hereafter often NPT) in 1992 and Nodong missile test in 1993 together with the confrontation over its suspected nuclear missile program in 1994, which raised distrust and serious security concerns to Japan.⁴⁴ Even though in 1993 after the elections in Japan, the relatively conservative liberal democrats lost the majority to a traditionally more sympathetic to North Korea socialist party,⁴⁵ no significant progress in normalization of relations was achieved. Nevertheless, Japan had followed the U.S. in its engagement with Pyongyang since 1994 by providing humanitarian aid and considerable funds to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

³⁸ Oh, K., Hassig, R. C. (2000). *North Korea: Through the Looking Glass*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. P. 160.

³⁹ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2009). Projecting Economic Power: Japan's Diplomacy towards North Korea. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 21*, (February). P.13.

⁴⁰ Hagström, L. (2006). The Dogma of Japanese Insignificance: The Academic Discourse on North Korea Policy Coordination. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3 (Fall). P. 391.

⁴¹ Ford, G., Kwon, S. (2008), *North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival*, London: Pluto Press. P. 176.

⁴² Hagström, L. (2006). The Dogma of Japanese Insignificance: The Academic Discourse on North Korea Policy Coordination. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3 (Fall). P. 392.

⁴³ Oh, K., Hassig, R. C. (2000). *North Korea: Through the Looking Glass*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. P. 161.

⁴⁴ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2009). Projecting Economic Power: Japan's Diplomacy towards North Korea. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 21*, (February). P. 12.

⁴⁵ Oh, K., Hassig, R. C. (2000). *North Korea: Through the Looking Glass*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. P. 162.

(hereafter often KEDO) projects, aiming to resolve North Korea's nuclear problem.⁴⁶ Japan had also agreed to restart the normalization talks, but the test-firing of a Teapong-1 ballistic missile over Japanese airspace in 1998 had brought the negotiations to a halt. Tokyo cut its financial aid to KEDO programs.⁴⁷ Interestingly, this is one of very rare cases when Japan disagreed with the U.S. on a security issue, although eventually she gave up to the pressure and de-froze financing of KEDO.⁴⁸

Even though there have been speculation on whether it had been a missile or a satellite brought by a three-stage rocket, the incident served as a demonstration of North Korea's ability to launch and deliver warheads over long distances⁴⁹ as well as a marking of Kim Jong Il's inauguration as the re-elected chairman of the National Defense Commission.⁵⁰ Combined with the cases of North Korea's spy boats entering Japan's waters, and dead bodies clothed in North Korean military uniforms being washed up the shores of Japan⁵¹, as well as nuclear tests in China in 1995, it is not surprising that Japan was getting seriously concerned about its security. North Korea's nuclear issue was widely criticized in Japanese media arousing a huge public discontent with Japan's neighbor, which played a significant role in shaping Japan's position towards North Korea in the future.

When looking at Japan's actions during and after the first nuclear crisis, they might seem to be quite passive and mainly following the U.S. led policy towards North Korea. However, as Hagström points out, this was not always the case. While the sanctions option was seriously considered in the U.S., after North Korea had left the NPT, Japan was not enthusiastic about it. Moreover, it was rather reluctant to act without the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council, where the threat of a Chinese veto blocked any progress.⁵² Even when the Clinton administration was secretly considering the possibility of staging a preventive attack on North Korea, Japan together with South Korea reacted negatively. The rationale behind such reaction was the fear of possible counter attack from North Korea.⁵³ In this case the U.S. had no other choice as to come up with the diplomatic solution, because it could not start a war without the support of its allies. The author also adds that this kind of Japanese

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* P. 13.

⁴⁷ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2009). Projecting Economic Power: Japan's Diplomacy towards North Korea. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 21*, (February). P. 13.

⁴⁸ Sakai, H. (2001). Continuity and Discontinuity of Japanese Foreign Policy toward North Korea: Freezing the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1998. *Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific. Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration*, New York: Palgrave. P. 75.

⁴⁹ Ford, G., Kwon, S. (2008), *North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival*, London: Pluto Press. P. 176.

⁵⁰ Oh, K., Hassig, R. C. (2000). *North Korea: Through the Looking Glass*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. P. 163.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* P. 164.

⁵² Hagström, L. (2008). Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy. *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 7. No. 1. P. 145.

⁵³ *Ibid.* P. 146.

“inertia” during the 1994 crisis could be described as jeopardizing relations with the U.S. and therefore pose threat to their alliance.⁵⁴ However, the allegedly launch of a missile in 1998 had suddenly changed Japan’s mind on imposing sanctions to North Korea, which she later levied after the U.S. had promised to take a firmer stance towards North Korea’s ballistic missiles and to consult closely with Japan and South Korea.⁵⁵

The beginning of the following decade witnessed some positive movements towards the improvement of Japan-North Korea relations. Interestingly, the initiative was taken by Japan separately from its major ally, the U.S. The initiative to resume the normalization talks was taken by the Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi in the early 2000’s and resulted in the first bilateral summit in the history of Japan-North Korea relations.⁵⁶ The first summit meeting became significant for two more reasons. Firstly, the so-called “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration” was signed by the leaders of both countries. The declaration stated that both countries “would make every possible effort for an early normalization of the relations”.⁵⁷ Other issues in the declaration also included Japan’s apology for the damage and suffering imposed to Korean people during its colonial rule and the reparation issues, status of Korean residents in Japan, security issues in order to keep peace and stability in the region, etc.⁵⁸ Here Hagström notices an interesting thing that the Japanese negotiations did not raise any of the U.S. concerns in the talks,⁵⁹ and went against the concept of the “Axis of evil” declared in the same year by the Bush administration and which again shows Japan’s attempt to enhance its own independent foreign policy.

Another reason why the Japan-North Korea summit became important is Kim Jong Il’s confirmation of abductions of 13 Japanese nationals during 1970’s and 1980’s.⁶⁰ The Japanese officials already since the beginning of 1990’s have been suspecting that North Korea had been involved in abductions of Japanese nationals, but this was the first time when North Korea’s official confirmed these suspicions.⁶¹ Only five of the 13 abductees were allowed to go to visit Japan, whereas

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 147.

⁵⁶ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2008). Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea. *Japan Focus*, Oct. 21. http://japanfocus.org/-Maaike-Okano_Heijmans/2929. Accessed 8th December, 2011.

⁵⁷ Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html. Accessed 8th December, 2011.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Hagström, L. (2008). Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy. *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 7. No. 1. P. 147.

⁶⁰ Japan-North Korea Relations. May, 2004. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/relation.html. Accessed 5th December, 2011.

⁶¹ Ford, G., Kwon, S. (2008), *North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival*, London: Pluto Press. P. 178.

the faith of the rest eight remains unclear. North Korean officials claimed they were dead, but refused to disclose more information about the circumstances of their alleged deaths. According to Ford and Kwon, Kim's confession turned out to be counterproductive⁶² and became the number-one issue in the future Japan-North Korea negotiations. The Japanese media quickly picked up and publicized the topic, which caused a huge dissatisfaction of the public. The abduction issue became the primary question during the SPT that took place the following year.

All in all, Japan-North Korea diplomatic relations are often explained by the metaphor of "carrots and sticks", but in the period before the SPT one can notice that Japan was not willing to use more "sticks" than "carrots", as it was reluctant to implement the sanctions when the US was thinking of them. It looks like Japan was more interested in maintaining peace and quiet in the region, whereas North Korea was trying to get as much as it could from its neighbor. Moreover, after the collapse of the communist regime in Europe, North Korea began to feel the threat to its own regime survival which resulted in its closing from the outside influence. Consequently, it also started losing its strategic allies and feeling lack of energy and food supplies. Japan's aid or "compensation" was of crucial importance to it. On the other hand, getting too close to its former enemy might pose a great danger to communist regime in North Korea. As some observers point out, North Korea is not that unpredictable, because as soon as its domestic situation worsens, it becomes more willing to engage into any negotiations, or tries to provoke other countries to start negotiations with it.⁶³

Thus one can conclude that the North Korean missile test provocations are the signs of despair rather than actual aggression. On the other hand, Japan started to engage into diplomatic relations with North Korea following South Korea and the U.S. Interestingly, this engagement, however complicated it was, show several attempts of Japan to lead its own foreign policy, separately from the US. Therefore, one can conclude that the beginning of Japan-North Korea diplomatic relations were led by the mutual interest in cooperation, but due to several major issues on the both sides, the co-operation did not last long.

The following chapter deals with the processes of the SPT and main issues raised there.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2008). Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea. *Japan Focus*, Oct. 21. http://japanfocus.org/-Maaike-Okano_Heijmans/2929. Accessed 8th December, 2011.

2.2. The Six-Party Talks

Before going deeper into Japan's position during the SPT let us see how it started. Officially the reason for holding the multilateral talks was the second nuclear crisis. It began in October, 2002 when the USA intelligence reported the existence of a clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU) weapons program in North Korea, which led to the U.S. demands of complete disarmament before going into any kind of negotiations. North Korea refused to do so thus violating the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed in 1994.⁶⁴ Then China stepped forward and tried to convene the both conflicting sides for the trilateral talk. As the U.S. administration refused to meet bilaterally with North Korea, the talks were expanded up to six members, also including South Korea, Japan and Russia.

Having six parties instead of three would help to satisfy Japan and South Korea's desires not to be bypassed when it came to matters of Northeast Asian security.⁶⁵ Even though the common aim of the multilateral talks was the solution of North Korea's nuclear issue, all participants had their own goals that they wanted to achieve. While North Korea was mostly interested in preserving its regime and getting as much as it could from the talks, the other five participants saw the multilateral talks as an opportunity to voice their concerns on the security issues in East Asia as well as strengthen their positions in the region.

The first round of the SPT started in the end of August, 2003 in Beijing. According to Rozman, it was treated as a starting point and did have a clear lineup on any side of the participants.⁶⁶ The following rounds from February 2004 to September 2005 were marked by the strict U.S. position, which essentially was an ultimatum and the other four negotiating parties (except North Korea) tried to soften the U.S. position.⁶⁷ The U.S. were demanding *complete verifiable irreversible disarmament* (CVID), and was not promising anything before this was achieved. North Korea, on the other hand, was demanding security guarantees and normalization of relations with the U.S. prior to any disarmament.⁶⁸ Japan and South Korea appeared somewhere in the middle between the U.S. and China with Russia, which were favoring a milder approach to North Korea.

⁶⁴ Park, J. S. (2005). Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 28 (Autumn). P. 75.

⁶⁵ Grzelczyk, V. (2008). Six-Party Talks and Negotiation Strategy: When Do We Get There? *International Negotiation*, Vol. 14. P. 99.

⁶⁶ Rozman, G. (2007). *Strategic Thinking about the Korean nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States*, London: Palgrave and Macmillan. P. 16.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* P. 18.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* P.3.

After the third round in June 2004 there was a prolonged silence nearly for a year until July 2005, although there was brief reanimation to the search for a solution in the mid-2005. Bush kept the focus on the big picture of denuclearization where he insisted that the lineup was five against one. While North Korea repeatedly refused to commit itself in writing to abandoning nuclear weapons, although its officials were repeating that they did not wish to have them. After Koizumi had hardened Japan's position towards the North, Japan strengthen its alliance with the U.S. while South Korea sided with China and Russia advocating a step-by-step approach to the solution of the crisis.⁶⁹

Since the U.S. and Japan with strict positions appeared in the minority, it became easier to negotiate the milder approach, which resulted in the *Joint Statement* adopted on September 9th 2005 during the second phase of the fourth round. The important aspects of the Statement are respect North Korea's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy (which has been opposed by the U.S. for many times), and the agreement that the "Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps <...> with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action".⁷⁰ These aspects are important to the extent that they appeal to a milder approach to North Korea, however even the language used in the Statement represent distrust rather than moving forward in the negotiations. For example, the U.S. and Japan agreed to take "steps to normalize their relations"⁷¹ with North Korea, instead of just "normalize relations"⁷². Moreover, the issue of light water reactor, which was promised to North Korea as an alternative source of energy in 1994 Agreed Framework, was to be discussed "at an appropriate time"⁷³, which in reality meant not until North Korea's nuclear weapons are gone.⁷⁴ And since the coordination steps are supposed to be taken in "action for action" principle, no tangible result could be achieved if North Korea did not abandon its nuclear program, or at least that is how the U.S. saw it.

In October 2006 North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon, despite the warnings not to do so. From this moment the crisis saw preparation for enforcement of sanctions, while the U.S. agreed with China in the lead to make an attempt to make use of six party talks to reach a settlement. It finally

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* P.22.

⁷⁰ Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks. <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm>. Accessed on 9th December, 2011.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Rozman, G. (2007). *Strategic Thinking about the Korean nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States*, London: Palgrave and Macmillan. P.23.

⁷³ Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks. <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm>. Accessed on 9th December, 2011.

⁷⁴ Rozman, G. (2007). *Strategic Thinking about the Korean nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States*, London: Palgrave and Macmillan. P.23.

resulted in the February 13th Joint Statement⁷⁵, which was promising some improvement of the crisis. According to the statement, North Korea was to refuse its nuclear weapons and let the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspect its nuclear weapon basis. In return it would receive humanitarian aid and emergency energy assistance. It would also begin bilateral talks with Japan aiming at “taking steps to normalize their relations” in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration. In addition to that, five groups were formed dedicated to settle most important issues, such as denuclearization (led by China), economic and energy cooperation (led by South Korea), peace and security (led by Russia)⁷⁶, and two bilateral groups dedicated to normalization of relations between North Korea and the U.S. and North Korea and Japan.

The U.S. president George W. Bush commented the February 13th SPT session as representing “the best opportunity to use diplomacy to address North Korea’s nuclear problems. They reflect the common commitment of the participants to a Korean Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons.”⁷⁷ At the beginning it seemed that the parties were moving towards the solution even though not all of the promises were kept. The sanctions for North Korea were gradually lifted, and the normalization talks were carried on. However, there were disputes between North Korea, which claimed that by providing the report of its inventory it had fulfilled its part of the bargain and was waiting for the promised aid, and the U.S., which stated that the inventory list was incomplete and that there would be no aid until North Korea provided the complete list.

The last official talks of SPT took place in the end of September 2007. In 2009 North Korea launched a satellite, but in this case, the SPT were not held. The newly elected U.S. president Barack Obama condemned this action, which was followed by the sanctions for North Korea. The latter refused to again participate in the multilateral talks.

At the moment no further multilateral talks are taking place, even though it seems that China and Russia would be interested in resuming them. On the other hand, since there are certain changes in leadership taking place, for instance change of North Korea’s leader, as well as newly elected president in Russia, and the upcoming president elections in the U.S., South Korea and China, one can expect some changes in the SPT as well.

⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/action0702.html. Accessed on 9th December, 2011.

⁷⁶ Rozman, G. (2007). *Strategic Thinking about the Korean nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States*, London: Palgrave and Macmillan. P.25.

⁷⁷ Statement on the Six-Party Talks. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 43 Issue 7, 2007 02 19. P. 149-150.

All in all, the SPT represent a multilateral framework designed to deal with the North Korea nuclear issues, but in the end has not achieved any tangible results. The participating states were more interested in pursuing their own goals rather than were trying to achieve a compromise. Moreover, it does not seem that some of the participants even were willing to solve the North Korea's nuclear issue. This is obviously seen in the position of the U.S., to which existence of nuclear North Korea fulfilled the set of "axis of evil"; or the position of China to which the SPT served well to establish its positive image as an active mediator between North Korea and the other four parties, even though it has been criticized for not taking any bolder actions towards North Korea. Russia seems interested in the SPT because of economic and political reasons; the railway and natural gas pipeline connecting Korean Peninsula to Russian territory would bring a lot of profit. What is more, participation in such important multilateral negotiations attributes to strengthening its position in the region, although this latter statement can be addressed to all participants. North and South Koreas seem to be the only parties that would want to come to a solution in the SPT. South Korea feels serious security threat from its northern neighbor, while North Korea needs the energy and food supplies. Even though Japan also feels security threat from North Korea, it put abduction issue as its priority, which does not lead to any compromise with the North. This aspect also indicates that Japan is not aiming at solving the nuclear issues, but is following its own soft power strategy.

3. SOFT POWER DILEMMA

Soft power theory itself was first time introduced by Nye in 1990, which was the time just after the turning down of the Berlin Wall, the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War. At this time scholars of international relations were searching for models to explain the ongoing processes as the existing ones were not able to give all the answers. It was also the time when Francis Fukuyama proposed an idea of „The End of History?“ which was followed and opposed by Samuel P. Huntington in his „Clash of Civilizations“. What is more, this period spurred the development of new branches of neoliberalism, neorealism, constructivism and other theories of international relations. And it was this context that gave rise to the idea of soft power, which has been thereafter widely used in the field of international relations.

It would not be correct to say that soft power theory introduced by Nye is a new concept in theories of international relations. As Lee points out, there were other scholars in the past, like Gramsci and his cultural hegemony, Bordieu and his symbolic power⁷⁸, Foucault and disciplinary power and other distinguished scholars, who paid attention not only to material, but also non-material power resources.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, this kind of non-material aspects of power did not get enough attention until the end of Cold War, when it became clear that material sources of power do not necessarily play major role in the actual power that states can exercise in international arena. Therefore, soft power theory is important as it broadened the understanding of some aspects of international relations, such as non-violent and non-coercive ways of influencing others.⁸⁰ Despite this fact, Nye’s theory still has a lot of drawbacks that were pointed out by a number of political scientists⁸¹.

This part of the thesis focuses on one of these scientists, Geun Lee, and the concepts of soft power dilemma and soft power synergy, which he introduced together with a whole conceptual framework of soft power theory. In order to get a better understanding of the concepts one should firstly get acquainted with the Lee’s soft power conceptual framework. According to Lee himself, his

⁷⁸ Bordieu, P. (1989). Social Space and Symbolic Power. *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 7:4 (spring). P. 14–25.

⁷⁹ Lee, G. (2009). A Soft Power Approach to the “Korean Wave”. *The Review of Korean Studies*, Vol. 12: 2 (June). P. 123–137.

⁸⁰ Lee, G. (2009). A Theory of Soft Power and Korea’s Soft Power Strategy. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.21:2 (June). P. 205–218.

⁸¹ See K. Ogoura, G.M. Gallaroti, P. Bilgin, etc.

conceptual framework is a kind of extension of Nye's soft power theory.⁸² He extended Nye's theory in terms of definition and categorization.

3.1. Lee's Definition of Soft Power

Lee's conceptual framework helps to solve several problems in Nye's concept of soft power. Nye has been criticized for not presenting a structured theoretical framework for his theory. Therefore there appear questions about how to measure the soft power and how to define it.⁸³ In this case Lee's model can offer some answers. Lee defines soft power as a "power to construct the preferences and images of self and others through ideational or symbolic resources that lead to behavioral changes of others".⁸⁴ As one can see, Lee defines soft power according to its resources, which means that a power is regarded as soft power when soft, non-material resources are used, whereas in the case of hard power, hard, material resources are employed.⁸⁵ Therefore he calls it a "resource based theory of soft power".⁸⁶ On the one hand, Nye also pays attention to the resources of soft power, such as attractive culture, ideology, and international institutions. However, as he concentrates more on co-optive and non-violent nature of soft power, it makes it sometimes harder to distinguish from hard power, as was noticed by Ogoura.⁸⁷ In this case, Lee's definition of these two powers according to their resources makes it easier to separate them, and solves the problem of how to define a power when hard resources are used to create attractiveness, or soft resources are used to force others to change their behavior.

Secondly, Lee proposes a model of how soft resources can be diverted into soft power. He emphasizes that tendency to identify soft power with possession of soft resources is misleading, since mere possession of the resources per se does not automatically mean the exertion of soft power. Analogically possession of hard resources does not mean the use of hard power.⁸⁸ For instance, just because the U.S. has one of the strongest military in the world does not mean that it is exerting its hard power on other countries, unless it is actually using it for military purposes. Moreover, it seems that the

⁸² Lee, G. (2009). A Theory of Soft Power and Korea's Soft Power Strategy. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.21:2 (June). P. 211.

⁸³ See G. Lee, G. M. Gallaroti, P. Bilgin, etc.

⁸⁴ Lee, G. (2010). The Clash of Soft Powers Between China and Japan: Synergy and Dilemmas at the Six-party Talks. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 34 (2). P. 116.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Lee, G. (2009). A Theory of Soft Power and Korea's Soft Power Strategy. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.21:2 (June). P. 211.

⁸⁷ Ogoura, K. (2006). The Limits of Soft Power. *Japan Echo*, Vol. 33(5). P. 50.

⁸⁸ Lee, G. (2010). China's Soft Power and Changing Balance of Power in East Asia. *Center for U.S.-Korea Policy Workshop*. <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/7.LEEGeun.pdf>. Accessed 10th April, 2012.

U.S. military strength provides a sense of security for many countries, which makes it attractive rather than coercive. Thus the idea or sense of security is already a soft resource, which can be turned into soft power.

The model of soft resources being diverted into soft power involves three stages: a) application of soft resources, b) cognitive process of the recipients, c) soft power production.⁸⁹ Assuming that the applicants of soft power want to change the recipients' preferences, behavior etc. in the way favorable to applicants, soft resources would be used to create whether new ways of thinking or attractiveness or fear in the minds of the recipients in the short-term. This diversion process is summarized in the table below (Table 1).

Table 1. Diversion from soft resource to soft power

(1) Application of soft resources => Fear => Coercive power (or resistance)
(2) Application of soft resources => Attractiveness, Safety, Comfort, Respect => Co-optive power
(3) Application of soft resources (theories, interpretative frameworks) =>New ways of thinking and calculating => Co-optive power
(4) Socialization of the co-optive power in the recipients => Long term soft power in the form of "social habits"

Source: Lee, G. (2009). A Theory of Soft Power and Korea's Soft Power Strategy. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.21:2 (June). P. 212.

According to Lee, when the recipients feel fear or threat from the applicant's soft resources, these resources are likely to divert into coercive power and possibly cause resistance, meanwhile, when the soft resources create attractiveness, safety, comfort etc. they would produce co-optive power. Moreover, if theories or interpretative frameworks are applied as soft resources and accepted by the recipients, the latter will begin to think and calculate in new ways. Finally, the last way of exerting soft power is the most cost-effective one, since it produces long term co-optive power by creating "social habits" in the recipients.⁹⁰

However, while in theory this definition of soft power seems to be logically well framed, it contains some confusing points. According to Lee's definition, if soft resources are used, soft power is exercised, whereas in the case of hard power, hard, material resources are used. In this case if economic market, which is considered as hard resource, is used to attract other countries, according to Lee's definition it should be considered as exertion of hard power. Having this in mind, China's economic growth, which is attractive to others, should also be considered as an example of China's

⁸⁹ Lee, G. (2009). A Theory of Soft Power and Korea's Soft Power Strategy. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.21:2 (June). P. 214.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* P. 215.

hard power. However, while dealing with the case of China's soft power, Lee shifted his focus from power resources to the nature of soft and hard powers, which is attraction and coercion, admitting that soft power is not always created by soft resources.⁹¹ What he states now is that the nature of soft power is attraction, while the nature of hard power is coercion, which means that when a country attracts other by its military weapons, it is using its soft power, whereas, when a country coerces others by provoking certain ideas or guilt, it is using its hard power.⁹²

To some extent this definition of soft power sounds similar to the way Nye defined it, as well as it contains the same problem of how one can measure attractiveness. Moreover, it already contradicts to Lee's original concept of soft power, and, since Lee came up with this amendment in his later work, it is not included into his conceptual framework of soft power theory. In this case it is difficult to understand how the whole framework would change. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion this work is based on Lee's original definition of soft power.

3.2. Categories of Soft Power

The soft power diversion process will most likely depend on the goal for which soft power is attempted to exercise in the first place. Therefore Lee also divides soft power into five categories according to the policy goals the actors want to achieve. It means that each of five categories represent a goal to achieve which soft power is used. Moreover, in order to achieve a certain goal by soft power states tend to use "attraction". The latter term Lee borrowed from Nye, according to whom, attraction is one of the main aspects of the soft power, because a country can exert its soft power when it is attractive to others in certain ways. However, as many scholars point out, state's attraction should be considered not only from the viewpoint of the side exercising soft power, but from the side, receiving its influence as well.⁹³ By doing so one can come to a conclusion that the country receiving the influence is not necessarily attracted by the soft power sources of the influencing country, but is rather acting according to its own needs and interests. In this case Lee tries to solve this problem by looking at the reasons for countries to want to be attractive, and associates use of soft power with the goal for being attractive to others. What is more, he looks at the non-leading countries' reasons for using soft power. What Lee notices in this case is that Nye's focus on attraction suits well to the leader countries

⁹¹ Lee, G. (2010). China's Soft Power and Changing Balance of Power in East Asia. *Center for U.S.-Korea Policy Workshop*. <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/7.LEEGeun.pdf>. Accessed 10th April, 2012.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ See K. Ogoura, G.M. Gallaroti, P. Bilgin, etc.

as they are interested in attracting many followers, but does not explain why lesser powers, which do not have many followers and are not in leading positions most of the times, would need to be attractive and what influence they would want to exert on others.⁹⁴ Therefore it is important to look at the policy goals a country wants to achieve, according to which this country shapes its attractiveness and exerts a certain kind of influence.

While Nye’s soft power theory is criticized for being centered at the U.S. case, which is a leading country, Lee expands Nye’s approach by offering to look at the position of non-leader states and their reasons to use soft power. This difference in the two approaches probably comes from the different perspectives of both scholars. Nye created his soft power theory from the perspective of a leading state, whereas Lee came up with his ideas looking from South Korea’s perspective, which is a non-leading state, and hardly aims at becoming one.

Stating that the main trait of attractiveness is pulling others favorably toward oneself rather than pushing them away, Lee arranges soft power categories on a scale of passive to active attractiveness.⁹⁵ Passive attractiveness involves those political and security goals that can be achieved mainly by passively creating one’s own attractive images and perception, whereas active attractiveness include those political and security goals that are achieved by actively projecting one’s attractiveness towards others.⁹⁶ These five goals can be seen in the table below (table 2).

Table 2. Soft Power and Policy Goals: Scale of Passivity and Activity of Attractiveness



Source: Lee, G. (2010). *The Clash of Soft Powers Between China and Japan: Synergy and Dilemmas at the Six-party Talks*. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 34 (2). P. 121. (Numeration added by the author of the thesis)

Soft power categories belonging to the passive side of the attractiveness include soft power to improve external security environment by conveying the peaceful and attractive images of a country, and thus reducing its threat, and soft power maintain unity of a community or community of countries by creating attractiveness of the unit such as the nation-state or a regional community.⁹⁷ Example of the soft power used for threat reduction might be China’s recent escalation of the idea of “Harmonious

⁹⁴ Lee, G. (2010). *The Clash of Soft Powers Between China and Japan: Synergy and Dilemmas at the Six-party Talks*. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 34 (2). P. 117.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* P. 120.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

society” and “Harmonious world” which serves to minimize threatening images of country in the past while projecting a peace-loving country image.⁹⁸ The soft power strategy in this case would include use of such soft resources as national slogans, policy proposals, and public diplomacies that helps to project attractive image of a country. Meanwhile a soft power to maintain unity of a community or community of countries includes such resources as imperial museums, rituals, common language, inventions of traditions and common lifestyles, and other kinds of non-material resources, which signify unity of a community. One example of this category would be EU’s efforts to establish common institutions and a common constitution.⁹⁹

On the active side of attractiveness are soft power to mobilize support on both international and domestic levels, and soft power to manipulate other countries’ way of thinking and preferences by projecting attractive ideas, values, norms.¹⁰⁰ The first soft power category on the side of active attractiveness is support mobilization on international level, which is used in order to get other countries’ support for one’s foreign and security policies by making those policies look legitimate and attractive. It is necessary for an effective leadership in mobilizing collective actions among countries. One of the examples might be theories of Just War or manipulating of images of enemies by news media, etc. This type of category is important in order to save the cost of hard power, because burden sharing can be done among coalition partners.¹⁰¹ Meanwhile, soft power used to mobilize support on a domestic level aims at increasing approval ratings of a leader or domestic support of a government by projecting the attractiveness of a country to a domestic audience.¹⁰² Examples of this category would be creating national heroes, invoking patriotism by international sports competition, or showing outstanding performances of a leader in international summits or conferences in order to increase leader’s domestic popularity.¹⁰³

Finally, the last category of soft power aims at more direct consequence of changing preferences and behaviors of others by using ideational resources. Soft power of this category might be theories, concepts, or discourses spreading to other countries so that they adopt a specific way of

⁹⁸ Lee, G. (2009). A Theory of Soft Power and Korea’s Soft Power Strategy. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.21:2 (June). P. 210.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* P. 211.

¹⁰⁰ Lee, G. (2010). The Clash of Soft Powers Between China and Japan: Synergy and Dilemmas at the Six-party Talks. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 34 (2). P. 120–121.

¹⁰¹ Lee, G. (2009). A Theory of Soft Power and Korea’s Soft Power Strategy. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.21:2 (June). P. 210.

¹⁰² Lee, G. (2010). The Clash of Soft Powers Between China and Japan: Synergy and Dilemmas at the Six-party Talks. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 34 (2). P. 120–121.

¹⁰³ Lee, G. (2009). A Theory of Soft Power and Korea’s Soft Power Strategy. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.21:2 (June). P. 211.

thinking. International celebrities, such as Nobel Prize winners, famous politicians or human rights activists, etc. can also play an important role in spreading theories and discourses.¹⁰⁴ One example of this category is Japan's developed "flying gees model", which was spread in Northeast Asian countries as a model for economical development.

Despite this quite detailed classification of soft power sometimes it is still difficult to decide which kind of goal the country wants to achieve and which type of soft power it is using. For instance, North Korea's slogan of "strong and big nation" (Kangseong Daekuk) presents an intimidating image towards other countries and accelerates North Korea's isolation from international community, which might be interpreted as failed attempt to use the first category of soft power aiming at threat reduction. On the other hand, it works well as soft power for mobilizing support domestically.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, this categorization is useful for a country to decide which kind of soft power it wants to exert and what goals to achieve. Since it is introduced in the article discussing possible soft power strategies for South Korea, it might have been author's intention to approach soft power categories this way. On the other hand, sometimes it can be complicated for political scientists to decide which soft power category a certain country is using and what are its goals, especially having in mind that countries often do not have clearly defined political goals, or that they might differ on a domestic and international level.

3.3. The concept of soft power dilemma

As was mentioned above, Lee separated soft power categories used for domestic and international purposes, but he also added that most of the time soft power exertion affects both levels.¹⁰⁶ He backed this statement with two-level games theory, proposed by Putman. The main idea of this theory is that politics of many international negotiations should be conceived as a two-level, domestic and international, game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring governments to adopt favorable policies, while politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. Meanwhile, on the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, at the same time minimizing the adverse consequences

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* P. 210.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* P. 209.

¹⁰⁶ Lee, G. (2010). The Clash of Soft Powers Between China and Japan: Synergy and Dilemmas at the Six-party Talks. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 34 (2). P. 122.

of foreign developments. Both levels should be taken into consideration by central decision-makers, as long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.¹⁰⁷

As Putman noticed, the complexity of this two-level game is that certain moves that are rational for a player on one level might be impolitic for the same player on the other level.¹⁰⁸ This means that certain political decisions or a certain position in international negotiations of the same politician may be met favorable on domestic level, but negatively on international level or vice versa. Therefore it is important to look who the actors on both levels are and how they affect certain country's position in negotiations. Moreover, it is also important to see how the country's representative manages to maintain a balance on both levels.

Having the above mentioned in mind, one can think that if a country is exercising its soft power in international negotiations, it also works on both levels, or using Lee's framework, two categories of soft power would most likely be exerted. For instance, one can take a relationship between first and fourth categories, the first one aiming at improving country's security environment by creating peaceful images of that country, and the fourth one mobilizing support for domestic policy issues.¹⁰⁹ This relationship might be described as soft power synergy or soft power dilemma. In the first case, when a country's soft power goals on both, domestic and international levels bring positive results, means there is a synergistic linkage between domestic and international goals, which produces soft power synergy. According to Lee, China's role in the SPT represents a good example of soft power synergy, since its role as a mediator in multilateral talks serves well to country's image on the international level, as well as produce positive response in domestic politics.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, when state's government focuses more on appealing domestic public rather than maintaining a positive image internationally, it could lead to soft power dilemma.¹¹¹ The above mentioned case of North Korea's slogan serves as a good example of this phenomenon. Most of the times, countries that tend to resort to nationalistic ideas in order to get domestic approval ratings do not succeed in maintaining attractive image on international level and eventually may end up with soft power dilemma. One more example of soft power dilemma is Japan's position in the SPT, which will be discussed in the following chapters.

¹⁰⁷ Putman, R. D. (1998). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-level Games. *International Organization*, 42 (3). P. 434.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Lee, G. (2010). The Clash of Soft Powers Between China and Japan: Synergy and Dilemmas at the Six-party Talks. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 34 (2). P. 122.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* P. 137.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* P. 122.

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To sum up, Lee's conceptual framework of soft power theory is useful for political scientists in four important points. Firstly, he provides a well structured definition of soft power by approaching this concept according to its sources, making it easier to discern soft power from hard power. Secondly, he offers the framework of how soft power resources are diverted into soft power, or to put it in other words, how the soft power is produced. Thirdly, he proposes soft power classification according to the policy goals to achieve, making it easier to see for what purposes and by what means countries are exerting their soft power. Lastly, he presents a model how two different soft power strategies can produce different results on domestic and international level, which serves well in analyzing certain country's position in international negotiation.

This part of the thesis presented the approach towards soft power theory by Korean political scientists Geun Lee, emphasizing his conceptual framework, concepts of soft power synergy and soft power dilemma, and the comparison of his approach to Nye's concept of soft power. It was pointed out that while Nye presents a more the U.S. centered, or the leading state, perspective of the use of soft power, Lee looks at it from the perspective of non-leading states, emphasizing the reasons for them to use the soft power. Thus Lee divides soft power into five different categories according to their goals and defines it according to the resources used. Moreover, by employing Putman's two-level games theory, he discusses the use of soft power on international and domestic levels with the help of the concepts of soft power synergy and soft power theory. The latter concept refers to the case when country's soft power strategy brings positive results on domestic (or international) level, but does not work on international (or domestic) level. The case of Japan's position in the SPT can serve as an example for this.

4. FACTORS SHAPING JAPAN'S POSITION IN THE SIX-PARTY TALKS

As was pointed out in the previous part, countries participating in international negotiations employ soft power on both, international and domestic levels, which may result in soft power synergy or soft power dilemma. This part of the thesis deals with the case of Japan's position that resulted in soft power dilemma. In order to find out the reasons for this, one need to look at the factors shaping Japan's position in the SPT on both levels as well. According to Lee, Japan's policy in the SPT was based on two simple ideas: close cooperation with the U.S. hardliners, and maintenance of a tough stance on the abduction issue.¹¹² This is obviously reflected in Japan's position towards North Korea: North Korea's denuclearization and solution of abduction issue. The first idea corresponds to one, but very important international factor shaping Japan's position in the SPT, i.e. the virtual alliance with the U.S., while the abduction issue is a domestic factor for Japan's position towards North Korea.

However, those two factors represent just the tip of the iceberg, but do not point out the reasons for Japan's position. Therefore the goal of this part of the thesis is to analyze the reasons for Japan's position in the SPT by pointing out international and domestic factors influencing this position. In order to achieve this goal, firstly, it is necessary to look deeper into development of Japan's foreign policy after WWII, thus pointing out its main features and changes regarding the virtual alliance with the United States. Secondly, a deeper insight into domestic factors shaping Japan's position in the SPT is presented. These factors consist of political parties, interests groups, media and public opinion.

4.1. International Factors Influencing Japan's Position in the Six-Party Talks

As was mentioned above, Japan's position in the multilateral talks was closely related to the position of the U.S., its virtual ally when it comes to foreign policy. However, the review of Japan-North Korea relations showed that Japan did not always use to agree with the U.S. Moreover, there have been cases, when Japan, differently from the U.S., took a milder stance towards its northern neighbor. Therefore there arises a question whether Japan's position in the SPT is influenced by that of the U.S., or is Japan

¹¹² Lee, G. (2010). The Clash of Soft Powers Between China and Japan: Synergy and Dilemmas at the Six-party Talks. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 34 (2). P. 136.

acting on its own. In order to answer this question one need to understand the main features of Japan's foreign policy after the WWII and reasons for keeping strong ties with the U.S.

There is a considerable amount of academic literature devoted to Japan's development after the WWII. Many of them emphasize its remarkably fast recovery in economy, but give less credit to its foreign policy¹¹³. The main features of Japan's foreign policy would be alliance with the U.S. and stress on security issues,¹¹⁴ and considerable attention to economic relations with other countries¹¹⁵, to what Okano-Heijmans refers as to Japan's diplomatic policy,¹¹⁶ and the use of soft power.¹¹⁷ Moreover, most of those scholars, analyzing Japan's foreign policy agree that Japan is rather a passive player in international relations, or to put it in other terms, a "reactive state". This term was first time used in reference to Japan by Kent Calder in 1988, arguing that Japanese foreign policy is largely affected and shaped by the foreign (especially the U.S.) pressure, otherwise called *gaiatsu*.¹¹⁸ Basically, his idea was that Japan was constructing its foreign policy not independently, but rather reacting to the actions of other countries, mainly the U.S. On the other hand, 15 years later Calder published another article, analyzing Japan's attempts to become a post-reactive state, acknowledging that there can be seen changes in the country's foreign policy.¹¹⁹ According to the author, such factors as growing economic power, interdependence with Asia, nationalistic attitude in domestic and foreign policies play major role in shifting Japan from reactive to a post-reactive, or more independent in shaping its foreign policy, state.¹²⁰

All these factors also serve as stage for Japan's soft power. But firstly it is important to find the reasons for Japan to use its soft power, or to put it in other words, to look attractive to others. The reasons might be seen in Japan's situation after WWII. It is viewed as an aggressor by its neighbors', its only formal ally is the U.S. since the signing of Japan – United States Security Treaty in 1952,¹²¹

¹¹³ Drifte, R. (1990). *Japan's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge; Hook, D. G. (2001). *Japan's international relations: politics, economics and security*. London: Routledge; etc.

¹¹⁴ Cooney, K. J. (2007). *Japan's Foreign Policy since 1945*. New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc.; Hook, D. G. (2001). *Japan's international relations: politics, economics and security*. London: Routledge; etc.

¹¹⁵ Miyashima, Y. (2001). *Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific*. New York: Palgrave; Tanaka, H. (2009). *Japan's Foreign Policy and East Asian Regionalism*. New York: Council of Foreign Relations; etc.

¹¹⁶ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2009). Projecting Economic Power: Japan's Diplomacy towards North Korea. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 21*, (February).

¹¹⁷ Otmazgin, N. K. (2008). Contesting Soft Power: Japanese Popular Culture in East and Southeast Asia. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 8. P. 73–101; Lam, E. P. (2007). Japan's Quest for "Soft Power": Attraction and Limitation. *East Asia*, Vol. 24. P. 349–363; etc.

¹¹⁸ Calder, K. (1988). Japanese Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State. *World Politics*, Vol. 40: 4(July). P. 517–541.

¹¹⁹ Calder, K. (2003). Japan as a Post-Reactive State. *Orbis*, (Fall). P. 605–616.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.* P. 608–610.

¹²¹ The treaty was revised and amended in 1960.

and it has no army. Interestingly, this background helped Japan to rise as one of leading economies in the world.

Article 9

When in 1947 the U.S. imposed a new constitution on Japan, which became also known as the “peace constitution” because of the Article 9 that renounced war “as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes,”¹²² Japan was deprived of the right to have an army. This article by some scholars is interpreted as the greatest limitation for Japan to maintain its own independent foreign policy, as it officially cannot take part in any bilateral or multilateral alliances.¹²³ As a country with no army, Japan became dependant on the U.S. in terms of security. At the beginning the U.S. was also interested in keeping Japan as its major ally in East Asia in order to prevent the spread of the communist states’ influence. However, with rapid economic growth and the change of the generation of policy makers in Japan, there appeared demands to develop a more independent foreign policy and to be responsible for country’s security themselves. This claim does make sense having in mind that already in 1950’s Japan has established the so-called Self-Defense Forces, which is a disguised version of an army, and since 1990’s is participating in peacekeeping operations under the flag of the United Nations, to which it also contributes a large sum of money (second to the U.S.).¹²⁴

On the other hand, as a country with no official army, Japan concentrated on economic development and directed its foreign policy towards that direction as well. This policy is also known as Yoshida Doctrine, named after the Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who was the first to discover the usefulness of the Article 9.¹²⁵ This doctrine was the basic principle of Japan’s foreign policy during the Cold War. While the U.S. was taking care of Japan’s security, by keeping its forces in the country, Japan was focusing on economic development.¹²⁶ Thus Japan managed to build an image of peaceful and economically strong state, which became its soft resource. Subsequently, it was successfully used by politicians in the international arena as the first category of soft power, as by concentrating on non-military economic relations with other countries Japan developed attractive and peaceful image of

¹²² Constitution of Japan. <http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html>. Accessed on 8th December 2011.

¹²³ Cooney, K. J. (2007). *Japan’s Foreign Policy since 1945*. New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc. P. 33.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* P. 32.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.* P. 36.

¹²⁶ Hook, D. G. (2001). *Japan's international relations: politics, economics and security*. London: Routledge, P. 12.

itself. However, while it did attributed a lot to Japan's image in the international arena, it did not, however, make her position in the international arena any stronger.¹²⁷

Relations with other East Asian Countries

On the other hand, employing of first category soft power strategy served as a bridge to improve the relations with the countries in East Asian region. Japan's relations with its neighbors were complicated by the historical memories of WWII and Japan's aggressive policy during the inter-war period, and by Japan's reluctance to openly deal with the issues. Therefore, with the spread of models of Japan's economic development, as well as culture and other knowledge frameworks in the East Asian region Japan successfully exercised the fifth category of soft power to exert influence on other East Asian countries.

One of the first bold attempts to employ soft power strategy in East Asian region was the introduction of the famous "Fukuda Doctrine" in 1977, named after another Japanese Prime minister Takeo Fukuda. It marked emergence of Japan's leading role in East Asia to help combat financial crises, nuclear proliferation, human rights violations, terrorism, environmental degradation, and energy security.¹²⁸ These actions were accelerated by the rapid economic growth in 1970's and change of generation in policy making sector on Japan's side, and with the growing economic instability and declining role of leadership in international relations on the US side. What is more, Japan made attempts to start bilateral relations with its neighbors, Russia, both Koreas, and China. Scholars point out that these attempts were accelerated by economic reasons. On the one hand Japan needed strong trading partners and energy supplies, on the other hand, she had a soft resource of successful economic development model that she was ready to export. These attempts show Japan's willing to strengthen its position within the region.¹²⁹ Moreover, the Japanese started questioning its strong dependence on the U.S. Such cases as the "Nixon Shock", marked by strengthening of Sino-U.S. relations, served as a sign to Japan to start looking for a more independent stance in international arena, as well as to seek for closer relations in the East Asian region.

Furthermore, Japan started engaging in peacekeeping operations organized by the United Nations, was contributing aid to post-Soviet countries, after the collapse of the USSR, because of its economic power it increased its role in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Tanaka, H. (2009). *Japan's Foreign Policy and East Asian Regionalism*. New York: Council of Foreign Relations. P. 1-2.

¹²⁹ Rozman, G. (2003). Japan's North Korea Initiative and U.S.-Japanese Relations. *Orbis*, (Summer).

international financial institutions, its companies and enterprises were among the most capable in the world. Investment and trade flows give Japan by far the dominant economic role in Asia, and Japanese aid and investment were widely sought after in other parts of the world.¹³⁰ Many expected that it is only a matter of time when such a strong economic power transformed into greater political power.

Security Issues

What is more, since 1990's one can sense the rising nationalistic spirit in Japan directed at the U.S., and a wish to have a more independent stance internationally.¹³¹ This does not mean, however, that Japan's alliance with the U.S. became any weaker. The events on the 1990's, such as the first North Korean nuclear crisis (1993–94) and the Taiwan Straits crisis (1996), that posed threat to Japan's security, urged her to expand the alliance's mandate beyond mere defense of the Japanese archipelago to also include regional peace and stability.¹³² Therefore one can say that despite the rising nationalism, Japan remains cautious about its alliance with the U.S., especially when it comes to security issues.

The beginning of new millennium brought even greater challenges for international security with the spread of terrorist attacks after the 9/11, which led to further strengthening of the alliance due to the rising feeling of insecurity on Japan's side. It also marked bigger challenges in economic sector with the significant rise of China's economic and political power, posing threat to that of Japan's. Within this context Japan started feeling that it should take bolder actions in international arena in order not to lose its position to China in economic sector and to guarantee its security from the neighboring threats. One of these threats has been posed by North Korea, a country with which Japan probably has more friction points than with any other.

Interestingly, North Korea's security threat might also be favorable for Japan by providing it a reason to establish official army. This kind of debates intensified after the terrorists attacks of 9/11 in 2001. Following the U.S. president's Bush's call, "You're either with us or with the terrorists", Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi quickly agreed to join the U.S.-led coalition that invaded Afghanistan.¹³³ This was followed by the second nuclear crisis in North Korea, and the number of supporters for Japan becoming a "normal state" increased.

¹³⁰ Hook, D. G. (2001). *Japan's international relations: politics, economics and security*. London: Routledge. P. 11.

¹³¹ Calder, K. (2003). Japan as a Post-Reactive State. *Orbis*, (Fall). P. 611.

¹³² Tanaka, H. (2009). *Japan's Foreign Policy and East Asian Regionalism*. New York: Council of Foreign Relations. P. 2.

¹³³ Arase, D. (2007), Japan, the Active State? Security Policy After 9/11. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 67, No.4 (July/August). P. 570.

According to the opinion poll, organized by the biggest Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun*, in 1991 people favoring the amendment of the Constitution Article 9 comprised 33%, while in 2004 this number reached 65% and 22.7% opposed.¹³⁴ This shows that even the Japanese society started changing its attitude towards the issue. Of course one may argue that this number is increasing due to the nuclear issues in North Korea. However, Arase points out that even before nuclear crisis Japan was encouraged by the U.S. and the United Nations (U.N.) to get involved in various military missions. In order to maintain good relations with both, Japan did not want to refuse.¹³⁵ Until the nuclear crisis this kind of movement in Japan would be opposed by its neighbors, mainly China and both Koreas, who still have not forgotten the imperialistic ambitions of Japan during the WWII. Therefore the nuclear threat, posed by North Korea provides also a welcome justification to the Japanese government for the enhancement of Japan's security capabilities.¹³⁶ This raises a question if Japan actually is interested in denuclearization on Korean Peninsula, especially when its biggest economic rival, China might have profit from it.

To summarize up, even though Japan's foreign policy after WWII is often referred to as a policy of a "reactive state", it gradually starts moving to a post-reactive state status at the end of the 20th century. Main reasons for this turn are related to economical, security, and political issues in and outside Japan. Models of Japan's economic growth have been used as soft resources and helped her to establish herself as one of the strongest economies in the world, as well as one of the biggest creditors in East Asia. It also contributed to the use of first category of soft power to create a peaceful and attractive image of the country, which helped to improve the relations with other East Asian countries, and to conduct a more independent foreign policy. On the other hand, after the Asian economic crisis in 1997, as well as with repeatedly occurring global economic crisis on one side and the rise of China on the other, Japan's economic growth model became much weaker and does not bring the result it was expected. Therefore it is important for Japan to look for other effective resources in order to maintain its position in the international arena. Moreover, in the cases regarding security issues Japan is still dependent on the U.S. support. Since security issues are interrelated with political ones, Japan tends to maintain close alliance with the U.S. in international negotiations as well.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* P. 572.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* P. 573.

¹³⁶ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2009). Projecting Economic Power: Japan's Diplomacy towards North Korea. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 21*, (February). P. 13; Ford, G., Kwon, S. (2008), *North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival*, London: Pluto Press. P. 178.

Combining the above mentioned with the results from the review of Japan-North Korea relations one can say that Japan-United States alliance is of equal importance to both of the countries, because each of them needs the support of the other. Moreover, it is clear that Japan since 1990's in most cases has been developing a more independent foreign policy except in cases concerning security issues. Therefore the following subchapter is devoted to analyze the North Korea's security threat as a factor for shaping its position in the SPT.

4.2. Domestic Factors Influencing Japan's Position in the Six-Party Talks

When it comes to domestic factors influencing Japan's position in the SPT, many authors¹³⁷ point out Japanese policy makers' tendency to follow the domestic demands for solution of abduction issue, as well as negative public attitude towards North Korea, because of the mentioned issue. However, these are just a couple of the whole specter of domestic factors shaping Japan's policy towards North Korea. Unfortunately, there are not so many studies devoted to this question, as most of scholars tend to concentrate on international rather than domestic influences to Japan's position towards its northern neighbor. The authors, who take a closer look into the processes in Japanese domestic politics and its relations with North Korea, point out several major factors, influencing those relations, which are Prime Minister's office and the ruling LPD, as well as MOFA, interest groups (especially related to the abduction issue), role of media and public opinion.¹³⁸ The work of Christopher W. Hughes is very important to this thesis, since it presents a thorough analysis of domestic groups involved in Japan-North Korea relations until 2006 and their positions towards economic sanctions to North Korea.¹³⁹ The authors point out seven domestic factors influencing Japan's policy towards North Korea: MOFA, Prime Minister's Office, LDP, coalition and opposition parties, local government, *Chōsen Sōren* (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), and business interests.¹⁴⁰ Even though the author does not include certain interest groups, related to the abduction issue, public opinion, and media as separate factors, he mentions them in his analysis. The role of interest groups for abduction issue is

¹³⁷ See Lee, Ashizawa, Okano-Heijmans, Rozman, etc.

¹³⁸ Hughes, C. H. (2006). The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions Towards North Korea: Domestic Coalitions And Systematic Pressures. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3 (Fall). P. 455–481; Okano-Heijmans, M. (2009). Projecting Economic Power: Japan's Diplomacy towards North Korea. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 21*, (February). P. 1–44; Nakagawa, R. (2005). The Revival of "Northeast Asia" in Japan: Why Have Japanese Opinion Leaders Begun to Speak of Northeast Asia"? *Ritsumeikan International Affairs*, Vol. 3. P. 81–104; etc.

¹³⁹ Hughes, C. H. (2006). The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions Towards North Korea: Domestic Coalitions And Systematic Pressures. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3 (Fall). P. 455–481.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

analyzed in Brad Williams and Erik Mobrand's¹⁴¹ work, comparing the responses to the abduction issues in Japan and South Korea. When all those works combined one can see a whole picture of domestic factors influencing Japan's position in the SPT.

Since the goal of this chapter is to find the reasons for Japan resulting into soft power dilemma during the SPT, the development of the position of each factor towards North Korea is not analyzed thoroughly. The above mentioned factors are grouped into three groups of political organs, interest groups, media and public opinion.

Political Organs

First attempts of Japan to engage with North Korea after the WWII were taken since 1950's mostly by Japanese Communist Party and Social Democratic Party, who played the main mediating role between the two countries until 1980's. However with the changes in North Korea's domestic policy (inception of leader's personality cult) even these parties addressed criticism to the North.¹⁴² Later attempts to engage North Korea are seen since 1990's by MOFA, recognizing the potential benefits for Japanese and regional security and wishing to solve conflict with its northern neighbor. Moreover there were some politicians, especially from the ruling LDP, who maintained individual relations with North Korea's elites, *Chōsen Sōren* or *Chongryon*.¹⁴³ Therefore closer relations with North Korea might have been beneficial for both sides. However, the role of MOFA in maintaining relations with the North gradually diminished due to constant political scandals and disruptions. Moreover, as Hughes points out, many politicians in MOFA or the LDP were not willing to maintain relations with North Korea or North Korean organizations in Japan, because that would have decreased their popularity domestically.¹⁴⁴ What is more, such factors as North Korea's missiles flying over Japan's territory, the abduction issue, as well as economic difficulties of *Chōsen Sōren*, which slowed down the flowing of money to politicians, were responsible for declining wish of Japanese policy makers to engage North Korea.¹⁴⁵ This resulted in quite negative attitude towards relations with North Korea.

¹⁴¹ Williams, B., Mobrand, E. (2010). Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 69: 2 (May). P. 507–536.

¹⁴² Nakagawa, R. (2005). The Revival of “Northeast Asia” in Japan: Why Have Japanese Opinion Leaders Begun to Speak of Northeast Asia”? *Ritsumeikan International Affairs*, Vol. 3. P. 91.

¹⁴³ Hughes, C. H. (2006). The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions Towards North Korea: Domestic Coalitions And Systematic Pressures. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3 (Fall). P. 467.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* P. 467.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.* P. 470.

On the other hand, the beginning of 2000's brought some changes to Japan-North Korea relations with Koizumi's initiative. One of the reasons for this initiative is the change in generation of LDP politics, which is less dependent on factional financial support and with no links to the *Chōsen Sōren*.¹⁴⁶ According to opinion poll, conducted just after Koizumi's visit to North Korea in 2002 reveal that Prime Minister's diplomatic actions were met favorably by the Japanese society, although the way Koizumi handled the abduction question was not met that positively.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, as Hughes notices, throughout his term as Prime Minister Koizumi was trying to restrain domestic anti-North Korea pressure, even though it did not bring a long-term results.¹⁴⁸ One can argue that Koizumi's actions show his realization that closer Japan-North Korea relations may be bring positive results to Japan. On the other hand, by approaching North Korea by herself, Japan could conduct a more independent foreign policy from the U.S. and Koizumi would get credit for that.

However, Koizumi's attempt to approach North Korea seems to be just a break before further containment towards North Korea in Japan's policy. Already the second Koizumi's visit to North Korea in 2004 was met with criticism domestically by pointing out failure to reach any result on abduction issue.¹⁴⁹ Poor handling of the latter issue in multilateral and bilateral talks raised dissatisfaction with Koizumi's government, but, on the other hand, was successfully used by his counterpart Abe Shinzo to gain the public support. The abduction issue gradually became Abe's long-time project that helped him rise to power. It is said, that Abe encountered the abduction issue for the first time around 1988, and gradually began to support family members of the abductees.¹⁵⁰ He got involved with some organizations devoted to abduction problem, and used media and public attention for escalation of abductions.¹⁵¹ As the leader of the Liberal Democrat Party, Abe adopted a tough approach towards North Korea by continuously demanding a solution to the issue.¹⁵² He asserted that

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.* P. 472.

¹⁴⁷ 70% Positive on Koizumi Trip: Poll. *The Japan Times*, 2004 05 25.

¹⁴⁸ Hughes, C. H. (2006). The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions Towards North Korea: Domestic Coalitions And Systematic Pressures. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3 (Fall). P. 469.

¹⁴⁹ Liberal Democratic Party. Okada attacks Prime Minister on North Korean visit and pension issue. 2004 05 25. <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/040608/02.html>. Accessed: May 1st, 2012.

¹⁵⁰ Johnston, E. (2004). The North Korean Abduction Issue and Its Effect on Japanese Domestic Politics. Working Paper no. 101. Japan Policy Research Institute. <http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp101.html>. Accessed: May 1st, 2012.

¹⁵¹ Williams, B., Moberg, E. (2010). Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 69: 2 (May). P. 518.

¹⁵² Okano-Heijmans, M. (2008). Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea. *Japan Focus*, Oct. 21. http://japanfocus.org/-Maaik-Okano_Heijmans/2929. Accessed 8th December, 2011.

the abduction issue is a priority over denuclearization in the SPT.¹⁵³ This statement alone shows Abe's preference of rallying domestic, rather than international support, because the SPT help North Korea's denuclearization as priority.

On the one hand, the constant repetition of the abduction issue during the SPT served well for spreading the problem in the international level. On the other hand, however the strict position, leading to no compromise in the multilateral talks unless the abduction issues are solved, was not contributing to settling of the nuclear issue.

Okano-Heijmans points out another important detail. As North Korea was mostly interested in normalizing its relations with the U.S. and refused to make any concessions until and only when Washington agrees to it, Abe realized that Japan's position in the SPT would not bring many difference.¹⁵⁴ To put it in other words, Abe had virtually nothing to lose in the STP, but he could gain a lot domestically, therefore sticking to its strict position on the abduction issue was a strategically convenient move. What Abe has not foreseen, was that its strategic ally, the U.S. might adapt a milder position towards North Korea.¹⁵⁵ This was what exactly happened in early 2007 with the signing of February 13 Joint Statement, which signified a movement towards possible solution of the nuclear issue while that of the abduction was left behind. This is what Okano-Heijmans calls a "Bush shock" in comparison to the "Nixon shock" in 1970s, which market the normalization of the Sino-U.S. relations.¹⁵⁶

In Japan, however, the abduction issue has been escalated to such a level that the newly elected Prime Minister Fukuda was forced to take it into account in order to be able to stay in power. Luckily for Fukuda, the year 2008 was very passive time in regards to the SPT, because no meetings were arranged. Contrary to Abe, Fukuda regarded the SPT as a meaningful forum to address larger issues of concern. In June 2008 a breakthrough seemed to be apparent, since Pyongyang agreed to reopen the investigation into the abductees issue if Tokyo promised to lift some sanctions. However, the promises were not kept no substantial result was achieved.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ Pempel, T. J. (2011). Japan and the Two Koreas: the Foreign Policy Power of Domestic Politics. *Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia*, ed. Söderberg, M. New York: Routledge.

¹⁵⁴ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2008). Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea. *Japan Focus*, Oct. 21. http://japanfocus.org/-Maaik-Okano_Heijmans/2929. Accessed 8th December, 2011.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Okano-Heijmans, M. (2009). Projecting Economic Power: Japan's Diplomacy towards North Korea. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 21*, (February). P. 15.

According to Hughes¹⁵⁸ and Nakagawa,¹⁵⁹ for the opposition parties, as well as for the Japanese local governments the solution of abduction and security issues were more important than normalization of relations with North Korea. This means that most of Japanese policy makers keep to the same or similar position towards issues with North Korea.

Interest Groups

Such strong persistence to this position is also influenced by the activities of some interest groups. Besides the groups dealing with the abduction issues, there are right wing nationalists who also advocate a hard-line stance towards North Korea, some business companies that are interested in maintaining economic relations with the North, and North Korean community organization, whose role diminished due to economic difficulties.

The abduction issue has become widely escalated in Japan partly because of the activities of various organizations that sprang out in the end of 1990's. There are three main closely interconnected organizations, which via lobbying and public relations activities have ensured prominence of the abduction issue in Japan.¹⁶⁰ These groups are: the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea or *Kazokukai*, the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea or *Sukūkai*,¹⁶¹ and the Parliamentary Members Alliance to Help Japanese Allegedly Abducted by North Korea or *Rachi Giren*.¹⁶² The first one was founded by the family members of the suspected abductees in 1997 with the formal lead of the father of the youngest abductee, Megumi Yokota.¹⁶³ This organization is closely related to *Sukūkai*, “a coalition of non-profit organizations which shares the common goal of rescuing all the victims abducted by North Korea” founded in 1998.¹⁶⁴ It comprises around 39 local NGO's and one youth organization and represent the abduction cases by North Korea from all over the world, including South Korea, China, etc.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, this group is particularly active in pursuing public relations and lobbying activities, including organizing

¹⁵⁸ Hughes, C. H. (2006). The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions Towards North Korea: Domestic Coalitions And Systematic Pressures. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3 (Fall). P. 479.

¹⁵⁹ Nakagawa, R. (2005). The Revival of “Northeast Asia” in Japan: Why Have Japanese Opinion Leaders Begun to Speak of Northeast Asia”? *Ritsumeikan International Affairs*, Vol. 3. P. 94.

¹⁶⁰ Williams, B., Moberg, E. (2010). Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 69: 2 (May). P. 518.

¹⁶¹ The National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea. <http://www.sukuukai.jp/narkn/>. Accessed: May 1st, 2012.

¹⁶² Williams, B., Moberg, E. (2010). Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 69: 2 (May). P. 518.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* P. 513.

¹⁶⁴ The National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea. <http://www.sukuukai.jp/narkn/>. Accessed: May 1st, 2012.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

seminars and conferences, publishing newsletters on abduction issue worldwide, thus spreading the public awareness, together with *Kazokukai*, about the issue. What is more, *Sukūkai* has been broadcasting radio programs in North Korea, in both Korean and Japanese, under the banner of “Free North Korea Broadcasting” since 2003.¹⁶⁶ The funds are raised through sales of various symbolic items, such as blue ribbon badges, books, flags, towels, as well as donations and attendance fees. The blue ribbon is the symbol of civilian campaigns devoted to the abduction issue, with the blue color representing the Sea of Japan (East Sea) that “separates separates the abductees homeland of Japan and North Korea” and also the color of the sky, the only “endless link between the abductees and their families”.¹⁶⁷ It is said that through their public relations campaigns and donations the total revenue amounts to tens of millions of Japanese yen, although it has decreased lately.¹⁶⁸ Like the right-wing groups, *Sukūkai* also bitterly criticizes and opposes politicians, media and others whom seem to being too soft to North Korea.¹⁶⁹

Meanwhile the third group, *Rachi Giren*, was established in 1997 comprising of Diet members to provide political support the Japanese rescue movement, but also included members from Japan-North Korea Friendship Parliamentary League which made it difficult for the group to present a unified opinion on the issues related to North Korea. This resulted in group’s reorganization with the hard-line approach to North Korea favoring members.¹⁷⁰ Subsequently, this group played an important role in rallying the support for the abduction issues in political level, as well as provided opportunity for certain politicians, like Abe, to conduct their public relations campaigns.¹⁷¹

Apart from public relation campaigns and lobbying the above mentioned groups created a network of similar civil organizations, and what is more, their experience has become as example to those similar organizations to put pressure on politicians in other issues as well.¹⁷² On the one hand these organizations manages to raise public awareness on the abduction issue not only in Japan but worldwide. On the other hand, many of them tend to keep to hard-line approach towards North Korea

¹⁶⁶ Williams, B., Moberand, E. (2010). Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 69: 2 (May). P. 514.

¹⁶⁷ The Abduction of Japanese Citizens by North Korea. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abduction/campaigns.html>. Accessed: May 1st, 2012.

¹⁶⁸ Williams, B., Moberand, E. (2010). Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 69: 2 (May). P. 514.

¹⁶⁹ Johnston, E. (2004). The North Korean Abduction Issue and Its Effect on Japanese Domestic Politics.” Working Paper no. 101, Japan Policy Research Institute. <http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp101.html>. Accessed: May 1st, 2012.

¹⁷⁰ Williams, B., Moberand, E. (2010). Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 69: 2 (May). P. 515.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.* P. 516.

¹⁷² *Ibid.* P. 519.

and Japan-North Korea related issues, such as Koizumi's visit to the North, the SPT, etc., and express sharp criticism to such actions. This means that politicians, involved with North Korea issues do not have much freedom of action if they do not want to arouse criticism.

One may wonder on the influence of pro-North Korea groups in Japan. As Hughes pointed out, the role *Chōsen Sōren* as a channel for bilateral ties with the North has decreased in mid-1990s, when the Japanese policy makers took their own initiative to start bilateral relations.¹⁷³ Business groups that used to be interested in engaging with North Korea in economical relations from the 1970s, got disappointed because of large amounts of debts North Korea is unable to repay. Some small and medium scale enterprises, however, still maintain trading relations with North Korea, and have expressed concerns about the negative consequences for their companies due to economic sanctions to North Korea. Unfortunately, their role in Japan-North Korea relations is not strong enough to make any effect.¹⁷⁴

This situation resulted in a dominant one-sided position towards North Korea, expressed by the many interest groups and, which also contributed to rise of more nationalistic ideas in Japanese society. These processes were also accelerated by role of media and public opinion.

Media and Public Opinion

Media and public opinion are closely related factors, because one can argue that public opinion is to a large extent shaped by mass media, which was the case of Japanese attitude towards North Korea. Hyun Gu Lynn argues that the domestic situation in Japan, such as political scandals, relatively easily convinced audience, etc. presented mass media an opportunity to shape political agendas, as well as frame the presentation of information. He says that media is most effective on foreign policy when media coverage is "indexed" or matches the policy agenda of a domestic elite.¹⁷⁵ Talking about Japanese society, one can say that one of its features is a group mentality, which means that the society is oriented towards a group rather than individual. This was noticed by anthropologists Ruth Benedict¹⁷⁶ and Chie Nakane.¹⁷⁷ Robert V. Levin argues that this kind of group oriented society is

¹⁷³ Hughes, C. H. (2006). The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions Towards North Korea: Domestic Coalitions And Systematic Pressures. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3 (Fall). P. 476.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.* P. 477–478.

¹⁷⁵ Lynn, H. G. (2006). Vicarious Traumas: Television and Public Opinion in Japan's North Korea Policy. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3. P. 483–508.

¹⁷⁶ Benedict, R. (1994). *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company.

¹⁷⁷ Nakane, C. (1992). *Japanese Society*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company.

easy to convince and to manipulate.¹⁷⁸ Media is one of the best tools to achieve this, therefore Japanese policy makers and interest groups were using it for their own purposes.

According to Lynn, who has conducted the analysis of public opinion presented in Japanese television on Japan's policy towards North Korea, the effect of media in shaping public opinion can be linked to the quantity, regularity, and intensity of coverage.¹⁷⁹ He presents the example of presentation of North Korea's missile test of 1993 and 1998 in Japanese media, which appeared very often, presented a lot debates about Japanese defense policy thus emphasizing fear and danger. Another example about the depiction of the abduction issues in the media that included sympathetic figures, dramatic episodes, and clearly identifiable villains. The story of abducted Megumi Yokota is the most escalated by media and lobby groups.¹⁸⁰ Apart from that there appeared comic books (*manga*), and documentary animation about Megumi's abduction.

According to Japan's propaganda of the abductions in its media studies, one of the main "propagandists" was the neo-conservative LDP, to whom the latter issue helped to raise support in elections.¹⁸¹ This tactics of using media tools to get public support was widely and successfully used by Koizumi before and during his term as Prime Minister. First of all, he became Prime Minister by using public discontent of the political scandals that MOFA officials were involved, and during his term he also used media to get popularity.¹⁸² This is an obvious example of the fourth category of soft power, used in order to get domestic support. And it seemed to be working. Koizumi is the third longest served Japanese Prime Minister, who is also famous for mastering the use of public relations to get public support. One of such actions might have been Koizumi's official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which is a controversial issue in China and South Korea, but viewed favorably from Japanese nationalists.¹⁸³ On the other hand, his engagement with North Korea, even though a bold attempt for Japan's foreign policy development, did not bring positive results domestically. Koizumi's successor Abe was even better in using media tools to gain domestic support.

¹⁷⁸ Levine, R. (2003). *The Power of Persuasion, how we are bought and sold*, New Jersey: John Willey & Son. P. 11

¹⁷⁹ Lynn, H. G. (2006). Vicarious Traumas: Television and Public Opinion in Japan's North Korea Policy. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3. P. 488.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ Dačiola, V. (2011). Japonijos propaganda 2002 – 2011: Šiaurės Korėjos inicijuotų japonų pagrobimų atvejis. Master Thesis. Vytautas Magnus University.

¹⁸² Hughes, C. H. (2006). The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions Towards North Korea: Domestic Coalitions And Systematic Pressures. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3 (Fall). P. 476; Dačiola, V. (2011). Japonijos propaganda 2002 – 2011: Šiaurės Korėjos inicijuotų japonų pagrobimų atvejis. Master Thesis. Vytautas Magnus University.

¹⁸³ Seaton, P. (2008). Pledge Fulfilled: Prime Minister Koizumi, Yasukuni and Japanese Media. *Yasukuni, the War Dead, the Struggle for Japan's Past*, ed. Breen, J. New York: Columbia University Press. P. 163.

What Abe did, was using not only media, but also engaging with interest groups to rally support. The above mentioned interest groups were behind the abduction related propaganda as well. They criticized politicians with a soft approach to North Korea, advocated economic sanctions to the North, published information about the abductions, and publicized it on Internet.¹⁸⁴ It means that these groups were managing the flow of information about the abductions, and since the information was negatively reflecting North Korea, the general public opinion was also negative. The abduction question was raised in the media nearly at every Japan-North Korea encounter after 2002, such as returning of five abductees, testing of the ashes of Megumi Yokota which proved to be not her, issue of the daughter of Megumi Yokota, etc.¹⁸⁵

In this situation hardly any policy maker would succeed or even want to go against this public opinion, because of the fear of receiving a lot of criticism. As Rozman pointed out, North Korea's issues serve as source for raise nationalist spirits.¹⁸⁶ On the one hand, the SPT and the abduction issue can serve as soft resource to get support in domestic policy. On the other hand, even if politicians do not to use this resource, they cannot ignore it because of its importance to Japanese public.

To sum up, after analyzing the domestic factors influencing Japan's position in the SPT one can notice that in the beginning Japanese policy-makers show willingness to engage with North Korea, or were attempting to use fifth category soft power, in order to change its preferences by offering bilateral talks. However, due to gradually deteriorating image of North Korea, presented in media and by various interest groups, engagement with North Korea began to be perceived negatively by public opinion. On the other hand, the critique of engagement with North Korea, especially employing the abduction issue was viewed positively. Thus policy-makers used the latter tool as a soft resource to get the domestic approval rates. This was even more intensified with the interest groups getting involved and media being used in order to shape public opinion. However, once shaped, public opinion is not easy to change especially when the issue is that important. Therefore there is very little chance that any Japanese policy could change public attitude towards North Korea's issues.

¹⁸⁴ Lynn, H. G. (2006). Vicarious Traumas: Television and Public Opinion in Japan's North Korea Policy. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79: 3. P. 489.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ Rozman, G. (2003). Japan's North Korea Initiative and U.S.-Japanese Relations. *Orbis*, (Summer). P. 538.

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In conclusion, it seems that Japan was aiming at exerting at least two soft power categories, one for gaining domestic support, exerted through the abduction issue, while the second one is creation of an attractive image of itself internationally, and thus strengthen its position in the region. What is more, for Japan a possibility to begin bilateral relations with North Korea might have served as positive result helping it to conduct a more independent policy from the U.S. However, North Korea by its confession diplomacy not purposely presented what later became a soft power resource to Japan's policy makers willing to get domestic approval ratings. On the other hand, this soft resource resulted backwards to the North since it virtually eliminated any chances of bilateral engagement without solving the abduction issue. What is more, this abduction issue as a soft resource backfired to Japanese policy makers themselves since due to its escalation by media and interest groups it is difficult for political parties to make any changes. While in domestic politics the soft power seems to be working, because the powers escalating the abduction issue gets a lot of attention, it has become an issue in international negotiations, thus resulting in soft power dilemma. This dilemma would not be solved if Japanese negotiators in the SPT would just agree to remove the abduction issue from the negotiation table, since then it would not be met favorably domestically and most likely would not be approved. It could be solved only if North Korea agrees to solve the abduction issue or if this issue stops being so important in Japanese domestic policy. Unfortunately, none of these options are likely to happen soon, at least in Japan's case, because, as it was pointed out, it does not seem interested in actually coming to a solution in the SPT, and even seems to be profiting from nuclear North Korea. Meanwhile, North Korea is more desperate for foreign aid; therefore one might say it is more likely for North Korea to make concessions to Japan.

5. REPRESENTATIONS OF JAPAN'S POSITION IN THE SIX-PARTY TALKS IN THE JAPAN TIMES AND YOMIURI SHIMBUN

This part analyzes media representations of Japan's position in the SPT by the content analysis of the articles headlines from two Japanese dailies, *The Japan Times* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* published during the period of multilateral talks 2003–2007. The objects of the analysis are reflections of Japan's position towards North Korea's denuclearization and abduction issues presented in two Japanese dailies with the reflections of Japan's position towards North Korea's denuclearization and abduction issues presented in the above mentioned dailies. As the previous part has shown, Japanese policy makers and interest groups were using media as means for spreading their soft power to accumulate support, by using the abduction issue as soft resource. However, this resulted in very strict public opinion towards North Korea, thus affecting Japan's position in the SPT which finally resulted in soft power dilemma. The goal of this part of the thesis is to test Lee's concept of soft power dilemma in Japan's position in the SPT case by analyzing and comparing newspaper headlines from the above mentioned dailies.

The reason for selecting newspaper headlines for the analysis is their peculiar function to attract readers' attention at the same time summarizing the content of the article. According to Christine Develotte and Elizabeth Rechniewski headlines do not only summarize the content of the article, but also suggest the way how the reader should understand a certain issue: "With much press news drawn from external news agencies and shared with competitors, the headline is a newspaper's opportunity to stamp its individuality on what is otherwise a mass-produced product."¹⁸⁷ The latter statement implies that a headline is like a business card for a newspaper, especially the one on the front page, because their role is to invite reader to buy a newspaper. Therefore many details of how it is formulated, the word order, disposition, letter size, etc. are very important.¹⁸⁸ Because of its importance, headlines will receive the most attention in the analysis. In addition such details, as the page of the article, the readership, the circulation, etc. are also important variables and should be

¹⁸⁷ Develotte, C., Rechniewski, E. (2001). Discourse analysis of newspaper headlines: a methodological framework for research into national representations. *The Web Journal of French Media Studies*, Vol. 4: 1 (November). <http://wjfms.ncl.ac.uk/joed4.htm>. Accessed 20th April, 2012.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

included into content analysis.¹⁸⁹ Before proceeding to the results of content analysis, the methodology is introduced.

5.1. Methodology

As a systematic method to study mass media, content analysis was introduced by Harold Lasswell in 1927 as a means to study propaganda. A little bit later he presented the media content analysis principles as looking at “who says what, through which channel, to whom, with what effect”.¹⁹⁰ Since then the methods of content analysis were expanded and widely used by the scholars of different fields. To this day there is a lot of way to define content analysis. For instance, Weber described content analysis as “a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text”.¹⁹¹ Meanwhile Krippendorff emphasized reliability and validity in content analysis, stating that it is “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context”.¹⁹² Then according to Holsti, content analysis is “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specific characteristics”¹⁹³ Those authors were speaking about the methods of content analysis as a whole and paid attention to questions of how reliable and valid the results would be.

What is more, Kimberly Neuendorf defines content analysis as a “summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the specific method <...> and is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented”, suggesting that content analysis is a quantitative rather than qualitative research. According to the author, content analysis is summarizing, and applicable to all contexts.¹⁹⁴ On the other hand, some scholars say that Neuendorf’s definition content analysis is quite narrow.¹⁹⁵ Shoemaker and Reese do not agree with such a strict definition of content analysis. In their approach they divide content analysis into two traditions: the behaviorist tradition and the humanist tradition. The first one is mostly concerned with the effects that content produces and this approach is the one pursued by social

¹⁸⁹ Macnamara, J. (2005). Media content analysis: Its uses, benefits and Best Practice Methodology. *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal*, 6: 1. P. 11.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁹¹ Weber, R. P. (1985). *Basic Content Analysis*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. P. 9.

¹⁹² Krippendorff, K. (1986). *Content Analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. P. 21.

¹⁹³ Riffe, D., Lacy, S., Fico, F. G. (1998). *Analyzing Media Messages Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. P. 19.

¹⁹⁴ Neuendorf, K. (2002). *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. London: Sage Publications.

¹⁹⁵ Macnamara, J. (2005). Media content analysis: Its uses, benefits and Best Practice Methodology. *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal*, 6: 1. P. 3.

scientist, while the humanist approach looks backwards from media content to try to identify what it says about society and the culture producing it.¹⁹⁶ This dual view of the media also helps explain the debate over whether mass media *create* public opinion, attitudes and perceptions or *reflect* existing attitudes, perceptions and culture.¹⁹⁷ According to Shoemaker and Reese, mass media do both.

Despite the wide variety of definitions, they represent the similar approach to quantitative analysis of the chosen text. Without going into deeper discussions upon the definition of content analysis, this thesis focuses on the method of quantitative analysis.

Framework for content analysis

The content analysis used in this thesis is based on the methods proposed by two scholars, Krippendorff, one of the main theoretic of content analysis methodology, and Neuendorf's supplementation to the latter analysis. Firstly, Krippendorff presents simple framework for content analysis consisting of six basic concepts:

- 1) The data as communicated to the analyst;
- 2) The context of the data;
- 3) How the analyst's knowledge partitions his reality;
- 4) The target of content analysis;
- 5) Inference as the basic intellectual task;
- 6) Validity as ultimate criteria of success.¹⁹⁸

These concepts represent the questions which a researcher should ask himself before starting the analysis, such as what data will be analyzed, what is the context of the data, how are the data related to analyzed topic, what do the researcher want to know from the analysis, how the researcher is going to make inferences, are the results valid. A similar, but more detailed model is presented by Neuendorf, who divides the process of content analysis into nine steps:

- 1) Theory and rationale;
- 2) Conceptualized decisions;
- 3) Operational measures;
- 4) Coding scheme;
- 5) Sampling;
- 6) Training and initial reliability;

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.* P. 4.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ Krippendorff, K. (1986). *Content Analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology.* Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. P.26.

- 7) Coding;
- 8) Final reliability;
- 9) Tabulation and reporting.¹⁹⁹

The first step is to decide what content and why it will be analyzed. Second step is the creation of variables, or units of analysis to be researched, which would present a basis for a research framework. In order to get more accurate results, one should include multiple variables into analysis. For instance, such variables like positive, negative and neutral are very abstract and subjective concepts and tell little about the likely meaning and effects of a text. The variables of content analysis are messages expressed as words or phrases (“violent, “leader”, etc.)²⁰⁰ The third step is meant for dealing with the operational measures by making sure that variables are measured well and that there is internal validity, which is when measures match conceptualization of a scholar. The fourth step is a creation of code book or code list with detailed explanation of what concepts are represented the variable. According to Macnamara, a code book should establish all the messages that are relevant, positive and negative.²⁰¹ What is more, code book may establish certain categories of issues or topics, or may identify names of certain sources to be analyzed with the issues or messages.²⁰² Most of scholars suggest that one should to be as specific as possible when coding, because the specification of the analyzed concept makes it easier to identify it and to present valid results.²⁰³

The following step is used to provide a sample frame by dividing the data according to general information such as time period, issue, page, channel etc. and checking if census of the content is possible. After doing that, the sixth step is training and making sure if the coders work together with the coded variables.²⁰⁴ The last two steps are devoted to calculation and presenting results of content analysis. This kind of framework is widely used for media content analysis as well.²⁰⁵

¹⁹⁹ Neuendorf, K. (2002). *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. London: Sage Publications.

²⁰⁰ See Neuendorf, Macnamara, Weber, Krippendorff, etc.

²⁰¹ Macnamara, J. (2005). Media content analysis: Its uses, benefits and Best Practice Methodology. *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal*, 6: 1. P. 9.

²⁰² *Ibid.* P. 10.

²⁰³ Macnamara, J. (2005). Media content analysis: Its uses, benefits and Best Practice Methodology. *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal*, 6: 1. P. 9; Neuendorf, K. (2002). *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. London: Sage Publications; Krippendorff, K. (1986). *Content Analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications; etc.

²⁰⁴ Neuendorf, K. (2002). *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. London: Sage Publications. P. 83.

²⁰⁵ Macnamara, J. (2005). Media content analysis: Its uses, benefits and Best Practice Methodology. *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal*, 6: 1. P. 11.

What is stressed by many scholars is the degree of reliability and validity.²⁰⁶ Since the method of content analysis involve coding usually by one scholar, which leaves the danger for subjectivity. Moreover, since it presents quantitative analysis, scholars tend to interpret the results in a way more favorable to their research. In order to avoid such mistakes scholars should select easily discernable codes and variables. The variables cannot overlap among different codes.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, a qualitative analysis may also be conducted in order to make sure that the results are reliable and valid.

Research corpus

This part concentrates on the way the media presented news related to Japan-North Korea relations during the SPT. The data for the analysis were collected from two Japan's different dailies.

First of all, the two dailies have different audience. *The Japan Times* is published only in English language, declares having no affiliation to any political parties or to any other Japanese newspaper, and introduces as “Worlds Window on Japan”²⁰⁸, which suggest relative objectivity of the news presented in the newspaper. What is more it seems to be more directed to foreigner readers rather than local Japanese, which makes it a representative of news from Japan to the world. On the other hand, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, except its English edition, is directed to Japanese readership, and is said to be a rather pro-neo conservative newspaper, meaning it is might not present an objective opinion on Japan-North Korea relations. Comparison of the article headlines in those two newspapers is expected to reveal the different ways of presenting similar messages between those newspapers, or to be more concrete, different way of presenting news related to Japan's position towards North Korea.

Because the selected newspapers for the analysis differ greatly in their size, readership, circulation, etc. different keywords were used for collecting the data. Main reason for this is the difference in their size. *Yomiuri Shimbun* has the circulation of more than 1000 000, which is the largest not only in Japan, but in the world as well, whereas the circulation of *The Japan Times* is only around 40 000.²⁰⁹ Therefore, in order to get a substantial amount of the articles one need to consider what keywords and what time limits should be used. The time limits are the same for the both newspapers, from the beginning of the SPT in August 23rd 2003 until the end of it in September 30th 2007. The selected keywords, on the other hand, differ per newspaper. For *The Japan Times* keywords

²⁰⁶ Krippendorff, K. (1986). *Content Analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications; Macnamara, J. (2005). Media content analysis: Its uses, benefits and Best Practice Methodology. *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal*, 6: 1; Neuendorf, K. (2002). *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. London: Sage Publications.

²⁰⁷ Krippendorff, K. (1986). *Content Analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. P. 129.

²⁰⁸ *The Japan Times*. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/>. Accessed: May 1st, 2012.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*.

“Korea” and “Pyongyang” were used, with manually crossing out the data that was unrelated to Japan’s position towards North Korea and the SPT, and the 316 article headlines matched these keywords. Meanwhile, in the case of *Yomiuri Shimbun*, initially the keywords *Kitachōsen* (北朝鮮, North Korea) and *Rokkakokukyōgi* (6か国協議 the SPT) were inserted. Moreover, only morning edition, which tends to concentrate on latest news, political, international business, features of culture, lifestyle, environment and sport,²¹⁰ was chosen and the regional editions were excluded from the research. This resulted in 1344 article headlines correspond the chosen keywords. However after manually reviewing the results, it was noticed that many of the headlines talk about the processes of the STP rather than depict Japan’s position, therefore the search was further narrow down to the keywords representing main points in Japan’s position in the SPT, which are *rachi* (拉致 abduction) and *kaku* (核 nucleus) which matched 607 headlines.

The second step in content analysis, according to Neuendorf, is to select the variables for coding. However it should be remembered that the 607 newspaper headlines from *Yomiuri Shimbun* are already coded as representing “abduction” and “security issues” in the SPT. Whereas the headlines from *The Japan Times* still represent “Korea” or “Pyongyang”. In order to be precise one should sort the articles from *The Japan Times* as well but then their number would decrease even more and would be more difficult to conduct the analysis. However one should not forget that the headlines were sorted differently.

When the data is collected they need to be coded by using the variables and sort data accordingly into different categories. After reviewing the collected data, the training part of the analysis was conducted, during which possible variables were collected. The collection of variables was done by counting the frequency of certain possible keywords. Finally several keywords were selected for each category.

There are various ways of categorizing collected data, in this thesis it will be divided into two categories, *abduction* and *security*. The first two categories represent the main points in Japan’s position, while the third one represents the outcome of that position. These categories are concepts described by variables, words or phrases reflecting the same meaning as the concept. The *abduction* concept is described by words reflecting the case of the abductions of the Japanese nationals conducted by North Korea, f. e. abduct (or any other version of the word abduct) or *rachi*, as it is called in Japanese, names of the abductees and their family, *kazokukai* or NARK as it is known in English abbreviation. Meanwhile, *security* concept, although very broad, in this context is used not only to

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

describe North Korea's security threat to Japan, but North Korea's nuclear weapons overall. Therefore it is coded with words representing nuclear threat, missile issues, as well as nouns and adjectives that describe insecurity, such as threat, fear, terrorism, as well their Japanese counterparts *kiken* (危険), *kenen* (懸念), and *tero* (テロ) etc.

Also for the sake of convenience the cited newspaper article headlines in the text will be marked with the capital letter Y (*Yomiuri Shimbun*) and JT (*The Japan Times*).

The following step is to conduct a content analysis and present the data. The process of analysis involves counting the keywords, and ascribing them to certain category.

5.2. Content Analysis of Article Headlines in The Japan Times and Yomiuri Shimbun

First of all let us have a look at general results of the analysis. As the two main questions in the analysis are representations of Japan's position towards abduction and North Korea's nuclear issues it is useful to know how many articles related to those issues one can find in both newspapers. The Figure 1 bellow shows the results of the research. Since the total number of articles differs greatly between the two newspapers, the table was made according to percentage of the number of the article headlines per category. It also should be noted that the percentage of headlines from *Yomiuri Shimbun* was calculated with the original amount of headlines, which is 1344. As one can see from the Figure 1 the biggest percentage of articles devoted to security issues is found in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, but there also is the lowest percentage of articles devoted to abduction issue. Whereas, *The Japan Times* contains the similar amount of articles related to both topics. The reason for this difference is the size of *Yomiuri Shimbun* and the fact that every single detail related to the SPT is reflected in the newspaper.

The table 3 bellow presents the distribution of articles related to the discussed issues throughout the period of the SPT.

Table 3. Articles Headlines concerning Abduction and Security Issues in *The Japan Times* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* (2003-2007)

	Abduction (<i>The Japan Times</i>)	Abduction (<i>Yomiuri</i>)	Security (<i>The Japan Times</i>)	Security (<i>Yomiuri</i>)
2003	6	5	8	16
2004	18	14	9	51
2005	7	41	9	116
2006	10	26	17	137
2007	19	58	8	141
Total	50	146	51	461

Source: Made by the author of the thesis according to the analysis of article headlines from *The Japan Times* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* (2003-2007)

As one can see, the numbers are rather small in 2003, because the analysis does not cover the whole year of 2003, but only the period from the beginning of the multilateral talks in August 27th. Interestingly, looking at the table 3 one can notice that the number of articles devoted to both issues in *Yomiuri Shimbun* is gradually rising every year, whereas the number of articles in *The Japan Times* keeps fluctuating. In this case one should remember that the numbers on *Yomiuri Shimbun* side do not represent the overall amount of the articles devoted to security and abduction issues published within the given period, but just those articles that were published with reference to North Korea and the SPT. On the other hand, the gradually rising number of the mentioned articles suggests that Japanese media was continuously putting the security and abduction issues together with the articles devoted to the SPT. While this seems to be logical that this news are intertwined and should come together, the gradual increase of such tactics might also reflect Japan's growing interest in the discussed issues.

By looking at the results one may argue that since there is more data on security the presumption that Japan was sticking to the question of the abductees which resulted in a soft-power dilemma would be wrong. On the other hand, the as all the data used here are dealing only with the SPT and North Korea, all the additional material that would include indirect influence to the policy makers is not presented. Moreover, there are many headlines where the both issues overlap. While this makes the analysis even more difficult, it does present the results that if the matters are intertwined, they might be of equal importance. Therefore, one should conduct the analysis with having this fact in mind.

Nevertheless, in order to get a better understanding about the matter one should look at the categories one by one.

Security Issue

The solution of North Korea's nuclear issues was the main goal in the SPT. Moreover, for Japan it was very important, because it felt real danger coming from North Korea. Therefore security, or nuclear issues was one of the main topics in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, and not the least important in *The Japan Times*. This chapter analyzes the representation of Japan's security issues in the two Japanese newspapers. The analysis is conducted by counting the frequency of the keywords representing the attitude towards the security problems caused by North Korea to Japan. The main keyword for this category is a word "nuclear" or "kaku" in Japanese. This keyword was selected because it represents the basic problem in the SPT, nuclear North Korea. It was mentioned for 429 times in the article headlines. But it is not the only one.

One more important variable for in this category is missile use. During the SPT period it was counted to be used in the articles for 49 times, 44 of which were mentioned in 2006, when North Korea conducted a missile test. For the Japanese, to who this episode was not the first one, reacted sharply and put sanctions on North Korea. These missile tests prompted not only criticism but strong call for sanctions for North Korea (f. e. Y204, Y223, Y216 etc.). For example one can see the headlines of the *Yomiuri Shimbun* express reactions like this: "The Launching of the Missile, "Scary", "No Way Really", "Stop the Funds" and Adverse".²¹¹ Or "North's Launch of the Missile is a Serious Challenge to the International Community."²¹² And other similar exclamations flooded the newspaper coverage. For instance, during the 6th of July alone, just a day after the launch of the missile, there appeared 11 stories about this misdeed of North Korea in the morning edition of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*. Similar situation can be seen in the article headlines of *The Japan Times* (JP170, JP171, JP175), for example: "Highest alert planned for N. Korea nuke test" (JP173), "Japan eyes more North Korea sanctions" (183) etc. On the other hand, one can notice that in *The Japan Times* during the year 2006, apart from condemnation of nuclear test (JP195), there appeared articles calling for rational thinking or cautious approach in the given situation (JP191) as if trying to appease the nation. They also might be the response to Japan's considerations of increasing its military capacities that are growing in this period. Meanwhile *Yomiuri Shimbun* concentrates on rather international attitude and possible actions towards North Korea, especially that, of the U.S., China, the United Nations and other international institutions (Y221, Y224, Y226, Y232, Y230 etc.).

²¹¹ 北朝鮮ミサイル発射 「怖い」「まさか本当に」「資金封じ」で苦境, *Yomiuri Shimbun*. 2006.07.05

²¹² [社説] 「北」ミサイル発射 国際社会への重大な ちょうせん 挑戦だ, *Yomiuri Shimbun*. 2006.07.06

This is just one of the examples of worrying attitudes towards North Korea regarding security issue. Therefore the other variables of the concept of security include many words showing insecurity. For example, widely used “insecure” nouns and adjectives in the headlines of *The Japan Times* as “dangerous” (JP1), “threat” or “threatening” (JP5, JP129, JP138, JP261), and “terrorism” or “terrorist” (JP50, JP283, JP314). Interestingly, some article headlines are showing doubts in the real danger from North Korea: “Does North Korea pose a strong threat to Japan?” (JP138), or “North Korea: Threatening or Threatened? Defusing the dangers of nuclear proliferation” (JP261). Which one cannot find among the articles of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*. Looking at *Yomiuri Shimbun* the most often used words signifying insecurity are fear (懸念 *kenen*) and terrorism (テロ *tero*). There most widely used is “fear”, found in 24 cases (Y63, Y76, Y82, Y84, etc.) sometimes accompanied by adjectives like “strong” (強い *tsuyoi*) (Y123, Y63 etc.) or “deep” (深い *fukai*) emphasizing the effect. This word mostly used in 2005 with the word “nuclear” and 2006 (when the missile was launched), but not in 2007. The word “tero” is used 13 times especially in cases the U.S. decision to remove North Korea from the list of terrorist supplying countries (Y389, Y431, Y446, etc.). Most of such articles appeared in 2007 and are closely related to the abduction issue, because removal of North Korea from the mentioned list meant complications for the solution of the abduction issue to Japan.

Again, like in the missile case, the difference between the two dailies is that *The Japan Times* is reporting a specter of different opinions about the threat posed by North Korea, whereas *Yomiuri Shimbun* is concentrating on reporting the official positions of Japan and other parties, as well as international institutions. One common feature for both of these newspapers is that there was not found any words with positive meaning towards North Korea. Of course it is exactly what one can expect having in mind that complicated relations between these two countries. On the other hand, what might sound good for North Korea, does not sound good to Japan. A good example of this could be North Korea’s removal from the list of terrorist supporting countries by the U.S., which was met negatively in Japan.

It should be noted that even though the number of words signifying insecurity is not high in comparison to the number of articles, the fact that they appear in the headlines attributes to the impression the reader gets. All in all, the security threat from North Korea is widely escalated in Japan’s press, especially in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, which presents a lot of data from multilateral and bilateral talks, as well as the speeches, presented by the representatives of all the six parties. Even though it does not use a lot of insecurity arousing words in the headlines, the constant use of such

keywords as “nuclear” and “missile” does not create a friendly or even neutral image for its northern neighbor.

Abduction Issue

Abduction is the next category in this analysis. As was shown in the table 3, the number of headlines, related to the abduction issue in the SPT grew annually in the *Yomiuri Shimbun* which might signify that Japanese media and Japanese policy makers (who were cited by the media) began to escalate this issue more often within the context of the SPT, or to the end of the SPT, when Japan received a so-called “Bush shock”, when the U.S. adopted a softer approach towards North Korea. Japan was not obviously satisfied with this, which was expressed in public press.

The variables for this category, besides the word for abduction itself, included names of abductees, such as Megumi (Y479), or the Yokota family (Y507, Y513, Y562, JP134, JP135, JP159, etc.), and Hitomi Soga (Y516, JP99, JP225), as well as interest groups of abductees’ families, such as *kazokukai* (Y487, Y501, Y543, etc.). Usually, the most escalated story among the abductees’ stories, is the one about Megumi Yokota, especially after it was revealed that her ashes that were returned to Japan were actually not hers (Y479, JP155), it caused a big dissatisfaction among the Japanese and the Yokota’s parents, who urged government to take any actions (JP135, JP136, Y513, Y562, etc.) and there appeared the hopes that: “North Korea may get deadline to fully explain Yokota's fate.” (JP136). Similar atmosphere may be felt in the headlines of *Yomiuri Shimbun* as well, as can be seen from the headline: “the bones belong to different person than Megumi, this strengthens ideas for sanctions on North Korea<...>”²¹³.

Another important variable for this category is the interest groups, such as *kazokukai*, whose role is depicted as the active civilians fighting for the solution of the problem, by paying visits to government officials (Y501, Y580, Y543, etc.). One can always spot the opinion on the abduction problem next to the headline about the results in the SPT.

Unfortunately, the selected data does not reveal much of their activities. There are only five headlines talking about the interest groups in the selected *Yomiuri Shimbun* articles and only families are mentioned in *The Japan Times*. This limitation might have occurred due to reduced number of article headlines from the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and not efficient information in the headlines of *The Japan Times*.

²¹³ 「遺骨」めぐみさんと別人 強まる北朝鮮制裁論 対話の限界、浮き彫り, *Yomiuri Shimbun*. 2004.12.09

Nevertheless, the number of article headlines is still sufficient enough to see role of abductions in the SPT. One of the indicators of such role is a word appearing for 12 times together with the word *rachi* or abduction, this word is “priority” (優先 *yūsen*) (Y463, Y524, Y567, etc.). In some cases it is used by other parties, criticizing Japan giving priority to the abduction rather than denuclearization (Y579). The latter finding confirms Lee’s argument that because of sticking to its position towards the abduction issue, Japan began alienating itself from the other parties.

One can notice that while the variables of the security issue were showing “insecurity”, the ones for the abduction issue are emphasizing sympathy to the victims of the abductions, as well as stressing Japan’s strict position towards this issue. This is noticed in both newspapers.

There is also a number of variables that can be ascribed to both categories, but are rather the result of the above mentioned categories. These are the examples encompassing Japan’s relations with North Korea. A pair of variables depicting Japan-North Korea relations during the SPT are “sanctions” (制裁 *seisai*) and “aid” (支援 *shien*). In the article headlines of *Yomiuri Shimbun* one often finds the word “sanction” close to the word “abduction issue”, especially in the last years of the SPT (Y479, Y491, Y494, etc.). Similar situation is with the word aid, only the demand is to “cut aid” to North Korea (Y430, Y350, etc.).

Interestingly, in the headlines of the articles from *The Japan Times* the words “sanctions” and “aid” are one of the most often used words, with “sanctions” used 22 and “aid” 13 times. But again “aid” is used in both senses, positive and negative. The “aid” section refers to Japan refusing to give aid to North Korea and abductees’ families pleading not to send it (JP272, JP273, etc.), though until 2005 one can still find cases of Japan giving humanitarian aid to North Korea (JP49, JP83, JP104, etc.). One of the main rationales for not giving aid is that the aid is probably being used for regime survival, rather than for its original purpose (JP49).

After having analyzed the article headlines from two Japan’s dailies, one can see there is a difference between them not only in size and public, but because of size and public. *The Japan Times* provides a different spectrum of opinion towards the issues. For example, what can be noticed is that during the year 2006, apart from condemnation of nuclear test (JP195) there appeared a number of articles calling for rational thinking or cautious approach in the given situation (JP191) as if trying to appease the nation. They also might be the response to Japan’s considerations of increasing its military capacities that are growing in this period (JP204). There is also a tone of critical evaluation of the threat posed by the North. *Yomiuri Shimbun* on the other hand presents the official opinion, although one cannot charge it with subjectivity. The latter newspaper presents a lot of information on the SPT

from all the official sources in Japan and other parties, as well as international organizations, therefore it is a good source to get the substantial amount of information, but on the topic.

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To sum up, the results of the analysis have showed what has been expected. The analysis aimed at looking into media representations of Japan's positions in the SPT. This position was represented by two categories, security and abduction. According to the results of the data analysis, the variables for both of the categories are closely linked together and therefore difficult to analyze separately. On the other hand this is also a result showing that for Japan, nuclear and abduction issues are of equal importance. Moreover, the analysis of the variables for security category showed the use of adjectives and nouns, such as *danger, threat, fear, terror, missile* representing "insecurity", which attributes to the negative image of the country. Furthermore, the analysis of variables for the abduction category varies from the word "abduction", the names of abductees, their family members, to the words like "priority" representing the high priority of the abduction issue to Japan's policy makers. Furthermore, often used words as sanctions and aide (used negatively) also represent Japans position in the multilateral talks in a sense that gradually Japan was more eager for sanctions than for aid.

Having the above said in mind, it is obvious that Japan's media did not present even a neutral image of North Korea. Even *The Japan Times*, that tends to be a rather independent newspaper and publish articles that do not agree with the dominant public opinion, maintains the mainstream media opinion on abduction issues. Moreover, since analysis showed the importance of abduction issue to Japan in the negotiations during the SPT, which she did not change even after being abandoned by the U.S. it might be concluded that Japan does put is national interest over international ones. Even though this is nothing new, and many states put their national interests firsts, in Japan's case the national interest resulted in its isolation from the rest of the parties. This is what Lee calls soft power dilemma. In the newspaper headline analysis it the mentioned variables worked as soft resources and managed to shape people's preference. At the moment it is difficult to change it, because, according to Lee, this kind of soft power is most time consuming, but most influential once you are done.

CONCLUSIONS

After having analyzed Japan's position in the SPT one can come to these conclusions:

1. Japan's engagement with North Korea after WWII was slow and encountered several major issues, such as the unsolved problems related to the legacy of Japan's occupation from North Korea's side and the security and abduction issues from the Japanese side. In Japan's relations with North Korea before the Six-Party Talks one can find the attempts of Japanese policy makers to enhance their foreign policy independent from that of the U.S.
2. The main points in Lee's theoretical approach to soft power theory are:
 - a) presented a well structured definition that helped to solve the problem of distinction between soft and hard power, and compiled a conceptual framework of soft power categories according to the goal for which the soft power is used;
 - b) applied the theory of two-level games to the soft power theory and came up with the concepts of soft power synergy and soft power dilemma. The soft power dilemma represents the case when country's soft power strategy works on domestically, but fails internationally (and vice versa), while the soft power conducted on both international and domestic levels bring positive results, and the second, when it which is very useful in analyzing countries' exercise of soft power in international negotiations.
3. Foreign factors', shaping Japan's position in the Six-Party Talks, such as dependence on the U.S., relations with other East Asian countries and security threat from North Korea, analysis showed that this position was influenced by Japan's wish to strengthen its position in East Asian region, thus exerting a more independent foreign policy from the U.S. This is the example of the first category of soft power.
4. Domestic factors', shaping Japan's policy in the Six-Party Talks, such as the policy-makers, consisting of the leading Liberal Democratic Party, and the Prime Minister Cabinet, the interest groups, consisting mainly from groups taking care of abduction issues, media and public opinion, analysis showed that all these factors concentrated on the escalations of the abduction issue, due to which it became the priority issue for Japan in the Six-Party Talks. Therefore in order to get domestic support the policy-makers had to press for the solution of the abduction issue during the Six-Party Talks. This is the example of the fourth category of soft power.
5. According to the analysis of the newspaper headlines in the two Japanese dailies, *The Japan Times* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* the abduction and security issues are emphasized and the negative images of

North Korea are presented, with the use of words signifying “insecurity”, such as *threat* and *fear*, while talking about the abduction issues, stories of abductees, or activities of the interest groups are depicted thus arousing sympathy, or stressing the importance of the latter issue for Japan. The both newspapers, despite difference in their size, audience presented similar negative image of North Korea, although *The Japan Times* included several articles with more critical views towards North Korea.

6. The results from the analysis of the article headlines of two Japanese dailies confirmed the statement that Japan gave priority to the abduction issue in the Six-Party Talks. By combining these results with the ones from the analysis of factors, shaping Japan’s position in the multilateral talks, one can conclude that the abduction issue, because of its escalation in Japan, became the most important question for Japanese policy makers in order to get the domestic approval ratings, and also the issue that separated Japan from the rest of the participants in the Six-Party Talks, thus bringing Japan’s soft power strategy to soft power dilemma.

The above mentioned results may be used for further research of this topic that may include qualitative analysis of newspapers’ editorials that would give a view of the opinion stated in the Japanese media. What is more, one can choose to analyze other sources, depicting Japan-North Korea relations, including the position and attitude of North Korean community in Japan towards the processes of the Six-Party Talks. Furthermore, since the change of the leadership in the majority of the Six-Party members is taking place at the moment, the multilateral talks might be renewed and the new insights into these processes will be necessary.

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214. Japan could 'clam down' on N. Korea. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20050120a4.html>
215. Japan plans to tighten screws on North Korea.
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<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20050220fc.html>
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272. Abductees' families protest possible N. Korean aid.
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275. Tokyo positive but still cautious about new six-party deal.
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276. North Korea prefers Bush? <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20070315gc.html>
277. Abe, Li agree to cooperate on N. Korea. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20070217a4.html>
278. Nuclear uncertainties linger. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20070219kn.html>
279. Talks on N. Korea eyed for March. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20070225a8.html>
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290. Efforts on six-party talks still snagged. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20060412a2.html>
291. North Korean resident pair now listed as '70s abductees.
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294. China presses Japan for energy aid to N. Korea. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20070429a3.html>
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305. North Korea raps Japan participation in nuclear talks. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20070702a2.html>
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<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20070930a4.html>
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<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20071001a3.html>
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<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20071101a5.html>
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Article Headlines from the *Yomiuri Shimbun* (2003-2007), Dealing with the Issues of the Six-Party Talks:

1. 2003.08.29 6か国協議 米朝、3度目協議は^{みおく},見送り 米「核は
たこくかん^{ぐずす},多国間」,崩さず
2. 2003.08.30 6か国協議合意 「北の核」解決へ^{たいわわくぐ},対話枠組み^{いじ},維持
文書化は見送り
3. 2003.09.03 6か国協議進展へ北の核凍結が前提／日韓フォーラム閉会
4. 2003.09.06 北朝鮮の核開発問題 「6か国協議で解決可能」 カーター氏が基本合意
構想
5. 2003.09.06 北朝鮮の核・段階解決策 米「イラク専念」狙う 大統領選控え、危機
軽減
6. 2007.09.27 北朝鮮核問題、6か国協議通じ平和的な解決を 米韓外相が会談
7. 2003.10.30 6か国協議 訪朝中の中国・呉氏、早期再開を北朝鮮に迫る 核開発に
“警告”も
8. 2003.11.07 北朝鮮「安全の保証」2段階で 「6か国協議中」「核解決時」／米政
府検討
9. 2003.11.14 討論会「北朝鮮の核問題と日米韓3国協力」 北との対話、継続を
10. 2003.11.23 KEDO、軽水炉建設停止 米朝枠組み合意が崩壊 核協議「6か国」
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170. 2005.09.23 6か国共同声明 「北の軽水炉」記述、弁明躍起 米首席代表「核放棄先決」強調
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172. 2005.10.13 北の核放棄検証で常任理事国が役割 ヒル米国務次官補が見解
173. 2005.10.22 胡主席の訪朝 対北朝鮮で成果狙う中国 「核放棄」調整焦点
174. 2005.10.23 核燃料提供されれば、使用済み燃料棒を国外再処理 北朝鮮が容認示唆

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176. 2005.10.30 胡・中国主席、投資協力拡大を提案 対北朝鮮 「核」では隔たり
177. 2005.11.01 6か国協議、難航必至 米「核放棄の自発的申告を」 北朝鮮「軽水炉提供が先」
178. 2005.11.08 6か国協議あす再開 核放棄、難問先送り？ 共同声明の履行手順、米朝に隔たり
179. 2005.11.12 [社説] 6か国協議 核開発戦略に固執する北朝鮮
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181. 2005.11.16 北の核問題促進へ APEC議長国・韓国が文書を検討
182. 2005.12.22 北朝鮮核問題担当大使を新設／政府
183. 2005.12.27 北朝鮮の核保有宣言に韓国大統領が激怒 「融和策放棄だ」 側近反対で見送りに

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186. 2006.04.06 「北朝鮮、統一まで核開発継続」 防衛研究所研究官がY I E Sで講演
187. 2006.04.14 北朝鮮、「核」盾に米をけん制 外務次官が金融制裁解除迫る
188. 2006.04.21 米中首脳が会談 ブッシュ米大統領、北朝鮮の核への「影響力」求める
189. 2006.05.02 北に核計画廃棄迫る 2プラス2共同声明採択
190. 2006.06.20 日米首脳会談の議題 北朝鮮やイラン核など、連携強化確認へ
191. 2006.07.05 北朝鮮ミサイル発射 「^{こわ}怖い」「まさか本当に」 “資金封じ”で苦境
192. 2006.07.06 北朝鮮ミサイル発射 米、北と2国間協議拒否
193. 2006.07.06 北朝鮮ミサイル発射 中国「重大な懸念」
194. 2006.07.06 北朝鮮ミサイル7発発射 北、孤立覚悟の暴挙 「力で交渉」もくろむ
195. 2006.07.06 [社説] 「北」ミサイル発射 国際社会への重大な挑戦だ
196. 2006.07.06 北ミサイル発射 東南アジア諸国も憂慮 タイ首相「6か国協議再開仲介も」
197. 2006.07.06 北ミサイル発射 欧州各国、強く非難
198. 2006.07.06 北ミサイル発射 米、6か国協議で対処 日本と連携強化 中韓に支援抑制要請へ
199. 2006.07.06 北朝鮮ミサイル発射 中国、危機回避に全力 外交圧力強化も
200. 2006.07.06 北朝鮮ミサイル発射 北、強硬路線「軍事優先で国の尊厳守る」 平壤市内は平穏
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203. 2006.07.07 ミサイル発射 胡主席、北に自制求める 米中首脳が電話会談
204. 2006.07.07 北朝鮮ミサイル発射 安保理どこまで圧力 制裁決議めぐり激しい応酬
205. 2006.07.07 北朝鮮ミサイル発射 中国、米朝対話再開へ本腰

206. 2006.07.07 北朝鮮ミサイル発射 ヒル米次官補歴訪へ 中国に圧力要望
207. 2006.07.07 「平壤宣言違反」北朝鮮あて書簡 自民・山崎氏、インドネシア大統領に
208. 2006.07.07 日中ガス田局長級協議 北ミサイル問題も論議へ
209. 2006.07.08 ミサイル問題 北へ働きかけ強化 ヒル米次官補、中国と一致
210. 2006.07.09 北ミサイル発射 米政権、強気崩さず 民主は弱腰印象 世論も懸念共有
211. 2006.07.11 ミサイル発射問題 中国訪朝団、「北」説得が本格化
212. 2006.07.11 北朝鮮ミサイル問題 「6か国協議」再開必要 外務省幹部と一致／米
国務次官補
213. 2006.07.11 きょうから南北会談 「経済支援問題」先送り、ミサイルなど協議
214. 2006.07.12 ミサイル発射問題 胡・中国主席、北朝鮮を説得 常任副委員長に「停止」迫る
215. 2006.07.12 北朝鮮制裁決議先送り 中国の“時間稼ぎ”懸念 米の要請で猶予了承／
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218. 2006.07.12 ブッシュ米大統領会見 「6か国」枠組み優先 北ミサイル問題「友邦と協力」
219. 2006.07.12 北朝鮮高官「金融制裁解除なら6か国協議復帰」 ミサイル自粛は演習
中止条件
220. 2006.07.13 北朝鮮ミサイル問題 中国、独自決議案を安保理提示へ 日米に歩み寄り
221. 2006.07.13 ミサイル問題 中国の「北」説得難航
222. 2006.07.13 北ミサイル問題で中国が独自決議案 政府、一定評価 内容を慎重に吟味へ
223. 2006.07.13 北朝鮮ミサイル問題 日本の制裁姿勢、受け入れがたい／ロシア外相
224. 2006.07.14 北朝鮮ミサイル問題 国連の行動期待／ブッシュ米大統領
225. 2006.07.17 対北朝鮮決議を採択 全会一致、ミサイル開発放棄迫る／国連安保理
226. 2006.07.17 北朝鮮ミサイル問題 G8も非難声明 再発射「重大な懸念」／サミット
227. 2006.07.17 [対北・安保理決議] (上) 日本外交 強気の成果 (連載)
228. 2006.07.17 北朝鮮ミサイル発射をめぐる決議全文
229. 2006.07.18 サミットが閉幕 議長総括 北朝鮮拉致「早急な解決」要求 ミサイル
など懸念
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231. 2006.07.18 小泉首相、サミット終了会見 北朝鮮に「6か国」復帰要求
232. 2006.07.18 サミット議長総括 G8、対北朝鮮の連携確認 中東問題は米と欧の足
並み乱れ
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235. 2006.07.25 北朝鮮核問題 米「5か国結束で圧力」 ヒル次官補が意欲
236. 2006.07.28 北除く8か国外相会合 きょう、核・ミサイル協議
237. 2006.08.01 [緩話急題] 北朝鮮のミサイル発射 軍頼み“王様”の誤算
238. 2006.08.19 北朝鮮の核実験準備情報 米、即座にけん制声明 「6か国」で封じ込め狙う
239. 2006.09.02 北朝鮮核実験凍結へ6か国協議再開に意欲 中国次官、自民・山崎氏に示す
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242. 2006.09.12 北の核問題巡り多国間協議提案 米韓高官が会談
243. 2006.09.24 北朝鮮、譲歩狙い危機演出 核燃料棒取り出し、米との対立激化の恐れ
244. 2006.09.30 北朝鮮核問題 中韓首席代表、「6か国」再開論議
245. 2006.10.04 北朝鮮「核実験を行う」 時期・場所、言及せず 米の制裁を非難
246. 2006.10.04 北核実験声明 安保理が緊急協議 日本、議長声明の採択目指す
247. 2006.10.04 [社説] 「北」核実験表明 新たな段階に入った「核」の脅威
248. 2006.10.04 北核実験声明 米、対話拒否崩さず 「6か国中心で圧力」
249. 2006.10.04 核実験声明 中国、北に自制呼びかけへ
250. 2006.10.05 米中間選挙 北朝鮮とイラン、二つの核問題 共和党内に焦燥感
251. 2006.10.05 韓国 試練の対北融和策 盧大統領、核実験阻止に躍起
252. 2006.10.07 北核実験で安保理声明 「平和への脅威」、採択合意
253. 2006.10.08 [社説] 安保理議長声明 「北の核」阻止へ警告は発した
254. 2006.10.08 北朝鮮、制裁強化覚悟か 核実験強行の恐れ 安保理議長声明受け
255. 2006.10.08 北朝鮮の核実験巡る安保理議長声明 米、中国の影響力に望み
256. 2006.10.09 日中首脳会談 北朝鮮の核実験阻止で一致
257. 2006.10.10 北朝鮮核実験 国際包囲網作り全力 追加措置の時期を模索／政府
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259. 2006.10.11 [社説] 北朝鮮核実験 「危険な新たな核の時代」だ
260. 2006.10.11 北朝鮮核実験 中国、「中朝関係に悪影響」と北非難 米には自制呼びかけ
261. 2006.10.11 北朝鮮核実験 ブッシュ政権に“北風” 民主党・マスコミ「政策失敗」など批判
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264. 2006.10.11 北朝鮮核実験 緊急座談会＝特集
265. 2006.10.12 北朝鮮の核実験 政府が追加制裁決定 入港・輸入を全面禁止 入国禁止者拡大
266. 2006.10.12 北朝鮮の核実験 参院も非難決議
267. 2006.10.12 [分析・北核実験] 「6か国」遠い解決 尹徳敏・韓国外交安保研究院教授

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269. 2006.10.12 [論点] 核実験強行 米政権、対北政策で誤算 小此木政夫 (寄稿)
270. 2006.10.12 政府の対北朝鮮追加制裁措置全文
271. 2006.10.13 [挑発・北核実験] (下) 中露の戦略、揺らぐ (連載)
272. 北朝鮮核実験 「6か国」復帰なら制裁解除すべきだ/露副首相
273. [分析・北核実験] 中国、核武装に断固反対 蘇浩氏
274. 中国特使、金総書記と会談 核実験中止、対話促す/北朝鮮
275. 2006.10.21 北朝鮮が新たな核実験なら 中国、石油供給削減も
276. 2006.10.21 基礎からわかる「核問題」 北、なぜ「保有国」誇示? =特集
277. 2006.10.22 対北朝鮮制裁 ライス米長官、露に協力要請 露側は対話解決を主張
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280. 2006.10.28 [分析・北核実験] 対北政策、米も見直しを デービッド・ストラウブ氏
281. 2006.10.28 北の核 揺れる韓国世論 「融和策継続」4割 深まる日米との溝 (解説)
282. 2006.10.29 米議会 北朝鮮と直接交渉、望む声 「中韓連携と矛盾せず」 中間選挙にらみ
283. 2006.10.31 [分析・北核実験] 6か国協議再開、中国次第 ワシリー・ミヘーエフ氏
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288. 2006.11.02 日米、北朝鮮に核放棄表明要求へ 6か国協議再開後早期に
289. 2006.11.02 6か国協議再開へ思惑に差 北朝鮮「制裁解除」 米「核放棄」 協議難航必至
290. 2006.11.02 日英首相補佐官が会談 北朝鮮の核問題や拉致で協力
291. 2006.11.05 北朝鮮問題で緊急シンポ 核放棄、可能性少ない 米、軍事力行使を警告
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293. 2006.11.06 緊急国際シンポジウム「北朝鮮の核実験と東アジアの安全保障」 =見開き特集
294. 2006.11.07 [気流] 北朝鮮との協議、核放棄を譲るな 大学生・宮内勇輝 18
295. 2006.11.08 核実験1か月 対北朝鮮「圧力」に濃淡 韓露の消極姿勢に懸念
296. 2006.11.08 「北が核保有国」認めない方針確認/日米外相電話会談
297. 2006.11.18 APEC首脳会議・特別声明原案 北の核に「強い懸念」 制裁完全実施も強調
298. 2006.11.19 日米首脳会談 「北の核」具体的行動要求で一致 ミサイル防衛加速

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301. 2006.11.19 [社説] 「北」の核 5か国の結束をどう強めるか
302. 2006.11.20 A P E C 閉幕 「北の核」非難声明 域内 F T A、共同研究で合意
303. 2006.11.21 非核三原則「守るべき」8割 「核保有議論」は賛否二分／読売新聞世論調査
304. 2006.11.23 「6か国」日程、詰めの調整？ 北朝鮮高官が北京入り 「核保有国」の立場強調
305. 2006.11.25 「6か国」年内再開へ 「核放棄」へ難題山積、金融制裁解除が焦点 (解説)
306. 2006.12.19 再開「6か国」 米朝、入り口で対立 「核先行放棄を」「まず制裁解除」
307. 2006.12.20 6か国協議・米金融制裁問題 北、「核」盾に圧力 制裁解除の糸口探る
308. 2006.12.22 6か国協議 核放棄向け提案に優先順位つけず 米中、北に求める
309. 2006.12.22 北朝鮮、「核」実質討議を拒否 「金融制裁解除が先」と本国指示
310. 2006.12.23 [社説] 6か国協議 「北」の核廃棄へ制裁強化が必要だ
311. 2006.12.23 6か国協議 空回りの5日間 米が戦術見直しへ 「核保有国」北朝鮮は強気
312. 2006.12.23 「6か国」進展なく休会 北朝鮮、核協議応じず 再開日程は未定
313. 2006.12.26 米が金融制裁解除なら...北朝鮮「寧辺の核施設廃棄」 中国側説明
314. 2006.12.27 [気流] 若者ひろば 北朝鮮の核開発、わがままな行動 小学生・宮下智弘12
315. 2006.12.28 北朝鮮が核の監視受け入れ示唆 金融制裁解除なら
316. 2006.12.29 [潮流] 北朝鮮の核問題 一貫性ある外交を 「ウラン濃縮」注視必要 (解説)
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320. 2007.01.11 日・A S E A N 首脳会議演説 比大統領「拉致」言及へ 「北の核」に懸念表明
321. 2007.01.13 北の核放棄を求め明確なメッセージ 日中韓外相一致
322. 2007.01.13 A S E A N 議長声明案 「拉致」「核実験」触れず
323. 2007.01.15 日中韓首脳が共同声明を発表 北に「核」具体策を要求 投資協定交渉開始へ
324. 2007.01.18 [核の脅威] 20XX年 北朝鮮が... (2) その時、安保理に議席なし (連載)

325. 2007.01.22 次回6か国協議 核放棄への「初期措置」 協議開始で米朝合意／韓国報道
326. 2007.01.25 北の核で意見交換 韓国外相、きょうから訪中へ
327. 2007.01.25 北朝鮮、核凍結以上も可能 米朝会談で表明／韓国紙報道
328. 2007.01.25 [社説] 米大統領演説 「北」の核に影落とすイラクの重荷
329. 2007.01.25 北朝鮮代表、核放棄へ進展の可能性示唆 北京から帰国
330. 2007.01.26 6か国協議、拉致より核に集中を 韓国大統領が年頭会見で主張
331. 2007.01.28 北が6か国協議で核凍結期限約束か／韓国紙報道
332. 2007.01.31 6か国協議8日再開 北、見返り獲得に全力 食糧難深刻、核の譲歩は最小限に
333. 2007.01.31 [社説] 6か国協議 「北」の核廃棄以外あり得ない
334. 2007.02.01 北朝鮮核放棄へ行程表 露が提案へ
335. 2007.02.01 米朝金融会合閉幕 核交渉の行方、焦点に 米、6か国協議での解決へ意欲
336. 2007.02.01 北朝鮮核 6か国外相会議を検討 次回会合で具体的措置が前進なら開催
337. 2007.02.05 北朝鮮、「核保有」で要求拡大 重油供給 6か国協議合意、悲観論も
338. 2007.02.05 北朝鮮、重油50万トン超を要求 核施設停止の見返りに 経済制裁撤廃の確約も
339. 2007.02.07 北朝鮮の核問題 「初期的措置」焦点 6か国協議あす再開
340. 2007.02.08 [社説] 6か国協議 「北」の核に安易な合意は禁物だ
341. 2007.02.08 6か国協議きょう再開 北の核放棄 行動計画の策定目指す
342. 2007.02.09 6か国協議再開 北の核放棄、初期措置の必要性で一致 共同声明へ調整
343. 2007.02.11 6か国協議 核施設「停止」か「凍結」か 5か国VS北、合意文の表現巡り攻防
344. 2007.02.12 6か国協議 北「核保有」背景に強硬 「法外」要求次々
345. 2007.02.14 [社説] 6か国合意 「北」の核廃棄へ道筋が見えない
346. 2007.02.14 6か国協議合意 北の核施設「無能力化」 共同文書に残るあいまいさ
347. 2007.02.14 6か国協議、共同文書を採択 北朝鮮の核施設に停止合意 見返り重油5万トン
348. 2007.02.15 6か国協議共同文書 「核施設、臨時停止で重油100万トン」 北が意図的曲解
349. 2007.02.15 [核の脅威] 6か国合意の裏側(1) 北の本音「保有」に固執(連載)
350. 2007.02.16 対北朝鮮 米、エネルギー支援せず 核施設無能力化でも人道援助に限定
351. 2007.02.19 [核の脅威] 6か国合意の裏側(4) 対北、揺らぐ日米連携(連載)
352. 2007.02.20 [核の脅威] 6か国合意の裏側(5) 北の軍事力、日本標的(連載)
353. 2007.02.21 6か国協議合意したが...北の核「解決期待できぬ」79%／読売新聞社世論調査
354. 2007.02.22 北朝鮮の核放棄へ連携確認 米副大統領、安倍首相と会談 「拉致は共通の課題」

355. 2007.02.28 [気流] 「核」のみならず拉致問題解決を 入江重勝 (投書)
356. 2007.03.03 [社説] 南北閣僚会談 融和路線で核廃棄ができるのか
357. 2007.03.14 2007年版外交青書 北の核実験批判を明記 中国の軍事力「依然不透明」
358. 2007.03.14 朝鮮半島非核化部会は17日に北京で 19日からの「6か国」をにらむ
359. 2007.03.15 朝鮮半島非核化 今日から作業部会、北京で
360. 2007.03.16 金融制裁一部解除 米、「北の核」進展へ配慮 再発動は排除せず
361. 2007.03.16 [社説] 金融制裁解除 「北」の核廃棄にどう影響するか
362. 2007.03.16 金融制裁一部解除 米、「北の核」進展へ配慮 再発動は排除せず
363. 2007.03.16 [社説] 金融制裁解除 「北」の核廃棄にどう影響するか
364. 2007.03.19 [スキャナー] 6か国協議きょう再開 難題は核施設停止 具体策合意が焦点
365. 2007.03.20 凍結資金全額返還 北核施設停止へ前進 「次の段階」協議の焦点
366. 2007.03.20 6か国協議 凍結資金の返還確認後、北「核施設を停止」
367. 2007.03.21 6か国協議、北が揺さぶり 「入金確認」に固執 核廃棄議論の加速を警戒
368. 2007.03.22 6か国協議 拉致より核を優先／韓国次期駐日大使
369. 2007.03.22 6か国協議、会期を延長 北朝鮮の核問題討議拒否で
370. 2007.03.30 送金確認後30日で核施設の稼働停止 北朝鮮が独自日程を主張
371. 2007.04.05 北朝鮮の核停止「60日以内履行」絶望的 6か国協議中断で 「次の段階」影響も
372. 2007.04.07 ヒル米国務次官補、あすから日中韓歴訪 北朝鮮の核放棄で協議
373. 2007.04.10 北朝鮮の核施設停止 米次官補「期限内は困難」
374. 2007.04.10 北朝鮮の核施設停止「期限内は困難」／金桂寛外務次官
375. 2007.04.11 北朝鮮の核施設停止 麻生外相「期限内実施、極めて厳しい」
376. 2007.04.12 北朝鮮の核停止履行、大幅遅れも 合意期限14日の完了は絶望的に
377. 2007.04.12 核施設停止「着手は資金受領後」 北朝鮮、訪朝の米州知事に表明
378. 2007.04.12 日中首脳が会談 「戦略的互惠」を具体化 拉致・核で連携 ガス田具体策目指す
379. 2007.04.13 北朝鮮の核施設停止 初期段階の措置、5か国対応協議へ
380. 2007.04.14 北朝鮮、制裁解除の「証明」要求 期限内の核停止は絶望的に
381. 2007.04.15 6か国合意の核放棄初期措置期限 米、譲歩と誤算の連続 北、新たな要求も
382. 2007.04.15 核問題 「初期措置」期限切れ 中国、北朝鮮と協議
383. 2007.04.16 [社説] 6か国協議 「北」は約束を履行しなかった
384. 2007.04.16 米、北朝鮮に核停止促す ヒル次官補が数度メッセージ
385. 2007.04.20 南北協議、北朝鮮が退席 核停止「初期措置」要求に反発
386. 2007.04.23 韓国の対北コメ支援再開 「実利」で核放棄誘導へ
387. 2007.04.23 韓国、北朝鮮にコメ40万トン支援再開 核の初期措置履行条件に
388. 2007.04.24 韓国首席代表が米へ出発 北朝鮮核など協議へ
389. 2007.05.02 米テロ報告書 迫られる決断 日米同盟重視か、北の核放棄優先か

390. 2007.05.16 北朝鮮資金問題 「送金すれば核施設を停止」
391. 2007.05.16 [核の脅威] 国際包囲網 (2) 制裁履行、態勢整わず (連載)
392. 2007.05.17 [核の脅威] 国際包囲網 (3) 「まず融和」韓国突出 (連載)
393. 2007.05.18 [核の脅威] 国際包囲網 (4) 見下される I A E A (連載)
394. 2007.05.19 核施設周辺に対空砲 2 2 か所／北朝鮮・寧辺
395. 2007.05.19 [核の脅威] 国際包囲網 (5) 連携再構築が急務 (連載)
396. 2007.06.03 北は核放棄に向け措置を チャ元米次席代表「B D A問題は解決」
397. 2007.06.04 日中韓外相が会談 北の核解決へ連携 環境と文化でも協力
398. 2007.06.09 サミット首脳声明 北の核実験、強く非難
399. 2007.06.16 北凍結資金の送金完了 「核放棄」加速狙う米 ヒル次官補の訪朝も
400. 2007.06.16 [社説] 北朝鮮資金送金 核の脅威は何も変わっていない
401. 2007.06.17 北朝鮮、I A E Aを招請 送金にメド 核問題の初期措置手順協議へ
402. 2007.06.19 6 か国・初期措置 核施設封印、来月後半に 北の外交筋が見通し／露
通信社報道
403. 2007.06.19 北の核施設停止後、6 か国協議を再開 米韓が一致
404. 2007.06.20 6 か国協議再開は北朝鮮核停止後 ヒル氏が佐々江氏と会談 「送金問題
は決着」
405. 2007.06.21 北の核施設停止、7 月初めに実現 韓国統一相が見通し
406. 2007.06.23 [社説] ヒル次官補訪朝 核廃棄へ「北」の具体的行動迫れ
407. 2007.06.23 北朝鮮、核停止履行の用意 ヒル米次官補訪朝で確認 6 か国再開なお
曲折も
408. 2007.06.29 米韓外相会談 核放棄への措置、北に要求で一致
409. 2007.06.30 「稼働停止対象は5 か所」 I A E A代表団、寧辺の核施設視察終了／
北朝鮮
410. 2007.07.01 韓国、2 週間内に北朝鮮へ重油輸送 核停止に合わせ5 万トン
411. 2007.07.04 [核の脅威] ミサイル連射1 年 (上) 緊迫の6 分間 迎撃判断猶予は1
分 (連載)
412. 2007.07.04 北朝鮮、核物質の検証認めず I A E A報告書で明らかに
413. 2007.07.07 北朝鮮の核施設停止、1 4 日にも 韓国重油「第一便到着が条件」
414. 2007.07.10 北核施設の常駐監視へ I A E A、査察官派遣を承認
415. 2007.07.13 6 か国協議1 8 日再開 北に核施設の無力化など要求／政府方針
416. 2007.07.14 北の非核化協議、加速で一致 ヒル米次官補と佐々江氏会談
417. 2007.07.15 北朝鮮核計画申告に数週間から3 か月／ヒル米次官補
418. 2007.07.15 I A E Aの平壤入り 北朝鮮核停止、ヤマ場に 見返り巡り駆け引き
419. 2007.07.16 [スキャナー] 北の核放棄、実現遠く 施設稼働を停止 「次の措置」
焦点
420. 2007.07.16 核施設停止を北が表明 「初期措置」ようやく着手
421. 2007.07.17 [社説] 「北」の核 「無能力化」への圧力を緩めるな
422. 2007.07.19 6 か国協議 北朝鮮の非核化合意に暗雲 「次の措置」米と見解相違
423. 2007.07.19 6 か国協議開幕 北朝鮮「年内にも核無力化」 申告範囲など難航も
424. 2007.07.20 6 か国協議 北朝鮮が日本を批判
425. 2007.07.21 [社説] 6 か国協議 「北」の核廃棄へ楽観は禁物だ

426. 2007.07.22 北朝鮮、核施設解体条件に軽水炉を提示 6か国協議「次の段階」最大争点に
427. 2007.08.03 核施設 北「年内の無能力化困難」 「次の段階」副局長が見通し
428. 2007.08.03 A R F 会議が閉幕 「北の核施設停止を歓迎」 「拉致」間接的に言及／マニラ
429. 2007.08.09 [社説] 南北首脳会談 「北」の核廃棄へ前進できるのか
430. 2007.08.09 [スキャナー] 「核放棄」進展困難か 北の譲歩は望み薄、韓国単独支援は逆効果
431. 2007.08.11 北の「テロ国家」解除 米、核放棄の切り札に 「拉致」巡り日本と温度差も
432. 2007.08.11 「核無力化でテロ国家解除」 米、北へ1月に伝達 拉致進展関係なく
433. 2007.08.14 非核化作業部会、16日から瀋陽で／中国発表
434. 2007.08.14 米朝の首席代表、非核化巡り会談 6か国部会の事前調整
435. 2007.08.15 ヒル米次官補、中国と意見交換 北朝鮮の核問題で
436. 2007.08.16 核放棄どう具体化 「6か国」作業部会きょう開幕 技術的手段など議論へ
437. 2007.08.16 6か国協議 「核計画申告」と「施設無能力化」 政府、同時進行要求へ
438. 2007.08.17 非核化作業部会で日朝が接触
439. 2007.08.17 6か国作業部会 北の「ウラン濃縮」難航必至 日米に核無能力化先行論も
440. 2007.08.17 6か国協議非核化部会が開幕 「次の段階の措置」巡り隔たり
441. 2007.08.18 非核化作業部会閉幕 「無能力化」見返り焦点 北、改めて軽水炉要求
442. 2007.08.18 6か国協議非核化部会 日朝、短時間接触
443. 2007.08.18 6か国協議非核化部会閉幕 「次の段階」年内は困難 各国「宿題持ち帰る」
444. 2007.09.03 6か国協議の米朝作業部会 「核無能力化と完全申告」年内実施で合意
445. 2007.09.04 北朝鮮核施設の無能力化 「年内可能」外務次官表明
446. 2007.09.04 北朝鮮、米を揺さぶる狙いか 「テロ支援国解除を約束」発表で
447. 2007.09.06 「核実験の影響消えた」 対中国ビジネス、北朝鮮が積極攻勢
448. 2007.09.08 朝鮮半島の和平体制構築 米「北の核放棄が条件」／米韓首脳会談
449. 2007.09.11 米露中の核専門家きょう訪朝 「次の段階」へ現地調査 なお曲折も
450. 2007.09.16 「シリア、核に触手」 「北が協力」疑惑、米で次々報道 6か国協議に影響も
451. 2007.09.22 6か国協議「行程表」焦点に 「核無能力化」と「完全申告」
452. 2007.09.25 米、北朝鮮に重油5万トンを供与 月内にも到着 核放棄見返り
453. 2007.09.27 6か国協議 北の核「無能力化」米が軟化 ヒル代表、再開に「少なくとも1年」
454. 2007.09.27 北の核、米朝が直接会談 6か国協議に先立ち意見交換
455. 2007.09.28 北の非核化 年内履行、なお不透明 ウラン濃縮申告で米朝の対立解けず

456. 2007.09.28 6 各国協議、半年ぶり再開 ヒル米次官補「北の核、無能力化手順ほぼ合意」
457. 2007.09.29 6 各国協議 「核無能力化」費、一部負担を検討／日本政府
458. 2007.09.29 6 各国協議 「核無能力化」対立続く
459. 2007.09.30 [南北首脳会議・焦点] (4) 核不拡散の初志貫徹を 張レン瑰氏 (連載)
460. 2007.09.30 北の核問題 米、3段階で^{ほうきせま}、放棄迫る 6 各国協議で
こうていひょうていじ, 行程表提示／韓国紙報道

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461. 2003.09.01 次回 6 各国協議前に「拉致」で日朝交渉も／安倍副長官
462. 2003.09.14 日朝首脳会談 17 日で 1 年 「拉致」正念場の日本 「宣言」に明記なし、尾引く
463. 2003.09.17 日朝首脳会談から 1 年 拉致解決、最優先に 「北」の出方読めず
464. 2003.10.15 新聞週間特集 拉致の真実・制約の間で
465. 2003.12.03 拉致被害者家族の早期帰国を要望／新潟・柏崎市長ら

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466. 2004.01.08 6 各国協議「拉致も交渉を」 米上院外交小委員長が Y I E S で講演
467. 2004.01.14 北、拉致問題重荷に 外務省職員訪朝、6 各国協議にらみ受け入れ
468. 2004.02.15 日朝拉致協議 北、「6 各国」と分離狙う 協議継続、予断許さず
469. 2004.02.17 6 各国協議に「拉致」持ち出せば、日本の参加を拒否／朝鮮中央通信
470. 2004.02.17 6 各国協議で「拉致提起なら支援」 ボルトン米国務次官が言及
471. 2004.02.18 6 各国協議で拉致問題提起 政府、米韓に協力要請へ
472. 2004.02.20 「拉致はテロ行為」 ボルトン米国務次官が表明 6 各国協議で日本支援
473. 2004.02.23 6 各国協議議題に拉致を 蓮池透さん訴え
474. 2004.02.26 「拉致」平行線 政府、打開策模索・再接触も 北は原則論繰り返す／6 各国協議
475. 2004.02.29 6 各国協議閉幕 拉致解決、「北」のらりくらし 日朝、次回日程詰まらず
476. 2004.03.01 6 各国協議帰国報告 次回開催めど「一歩前進」、拉致協議「早い方がよい」
477. 2004.03.03 拉致被害家族と面会 外務省・藪中局長が謝罪
478. 2004.04.22 中朝、6 各国協議推進合意 「拉致」解決に結びつけたい／小泉首相
479. 2004.12.09 「遺骨」めぐみさんと別人 強まる北朝鮮制裁論 対話の限界、浮き彫り

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480. 2005.04.07 6 各国協議、5 月にも再開 政府「楽観できない」 「拉致」も対立深く
481. 2005.05.04 拉致解決へ日本を支持 ライス米長官、自民・安倍氏との会談で表明

482. 2005.05.25 朝鮮総連祝賀会で北の拉致など批判 小泉首相メッセージ
483. 2005.06.25 拉致問題に見えぬ打開策 家族ら「我慢限界」 北に経済制裁求め座り込み
484. 2005.07.12 6か国協議 「拉致」前進は不透明 中韓、核問題を最優先
485. 2005.07.12 6か国協議、次回以降も継続 拉致問題「日朝間で」／中国次官
486. 2005.07.14 6か国協議 拉致問題取り上げ、難色示す／ロシア
487. 2005.07.15 「6か国協議で拉致を議題に」 家族会など外相に要望
488. 2005.07.16 「拉致問題提起で中国一定の理解」 「6か国協議」で外務省局長
489. 2005.07.17 6か国や日朝での「拉致」議論に意欲／町村外相
490. 2005.07.19 自民・安倍氏「拉致問題を6か国協議の議題に」
491. 2005.07.21 「拉致」進展ない時経済制裁の発動を 自民対策本部、6か国での取り上げ要求
492. 2005.07.21 6か国協議で拉致問題の提起「当然」／細田官房長官
493. 2005.07.21 北朝鮮「日本を相手にせず」 6か国協議、「拉致」応じない姿勢
494. 2005.07.25 6か国協議前に対「北」制裁要求 北海道で拉致緊急集会
495. 2005.07.26 6か国協議実質開幕 拉致被害者家族ら、政府発言に注目
496. 2005.07.26 6か国協議 拉致取り上げに韓国も否定的
497. 2005.07.26 6か国協議 北、日本の孤立狙う 「拉致」取り上げに反発
498. 2005.07.27 6か国協議 日本の「拉致」提起を中国・人民日報が1面論評で批判
499. 2005.07.28 6か国協議 「拉致」に露の冷淡さ際立つ 「人道問題、存在しない」
500. 2005.08.03 「平壤宣言で日朝正常化」 日本人拉致問題、6か国共同文書で調整
501. 2005.08.09 6か国協議 「拉致解決 また待つしか…」 外務省、家族会に説明
502. 2005.09.14 6か国協議 日本、拉致問題解決探る 日朝会談の開催目指す
503. 2005.09.15 拉致問題の対応 北朝鮮「本国で検討中」
504. 2005.09.16 「あの工作人員、めぐみの教師役だった」 あの時、政府動けば... 5年前の送還悔し
505. 2005.09.16 北朝鮮拉致事件 被害者救出... 「一刻の猶予もない」 (解説)
506. 2005.09.17 6か国協議 中国が新草案提示「将来、軽水炉の可能性」 北のNPT復帰を条件
507. 2005.09.18 「拉致」未解決にいらだち 日朝首脳会談から3年 横田さん夫妻ら、秋田で講演
508. 2005.09.19 日朝会談 拉致「日本の立場理解」 北朝鮮、対話再開に前向き
509. 2005.09.20 6か国共同声明 「拉致」の進展予断を許さず 政府、日朝協議再開に全力
510. 2005.09.20 6か国協議 共同声明に「拉致」の言葉すらなく... 被害者家族、危機感強める
511. 2005.09.21 日朝対話、再開で合意 拉致・核問題など協議へ 外相「国交正常化交渉へ道」
512. 2005.09.21 日朝対話の再開合意 「懸案」進展、なお未知数 「拉致」限定せず... 政府が配慮
513. 2005.09.21 日朝対話再開合意 拉致問題の解決に横田さんら、期待と不安
514. 2005.09.22 [動くか「北」非核化] (下) 拉致 「6か国」ゆえの功罪 (連載)

- 515. 2005.10.01 拉致は6か国協議の障害にならず／ヒル米国務次官補
- 516. 2005.10.24 拉致問題「早期解決を」 曾我さん蓮池さん、官房副長官と面会
- 517. 2005.11.04 6か国協議 北朝鮮のテロ支援国家指定解除、拉致解決が条件／米特使
- 518. 2005.11.04 日朝、再び応酬 交渉7時間「拉致」平行線 日本「誠実な対応」迫る
- 519. 2005.11.09 日朝首席代表が会談 日本側、拉致解決の重要性強調
- 520. 2005.11.11 6か国協議の日本首席代表、「拉致」解決迫る 北朝鮮代表と会談
- 521. 2005.12.18 国連非難決議 「北朝鮮を包囲」政府評価 拉致前進へ国際連携
- 522. 2005.12.26 日朝正常化交渉再開へ 「来月末めど」合意 3年ぶり、拉致・核など
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- 523. 2006.02.01 ミサイル発射、北朝鮮に凍結継続要求へ タイ人拉致も提起 日朝協議
4日から
- 524. 2006.02.05 「拉致」きょう交渉 日本、最優先で解決図る／日朝協議スタート
- 525. 2006.02.08 日朝協議 拉致・安保進展なし 北、脱北支援のNGO非難
- 526. 2006.02.09 日朝協議終了 拉致、戦略練り直しも 制裁論、微妙に変化
- 527. 2006.04.03 米、人権で「北」へ圧力 6か国協議めど立たず 横田さんを議会に招
く
- 528. 2006.04.09 日朝代表が会談 拉致問題で北、姿勢変わらず？
- 529. 2006.04.12 拉致問題、日朝プラス韓へ波及 南北対話に影響も
- 530. 2006.04.17 [気流] めぐみさんの夫、真相解明を急げ 主婦・中田弘子65（富山
県氷見市）
- 531. 2006.04.20 韓国人拉致問題、南北対話の焦点に あすから閣僚級会談 韓国、見返
り提示へ
- 532. 2006.04.25 韓国人拉致、経済支援で「協力」迫る 南北協議で韓国側、世論高まり
に配慮
- 533. 2006.05.15 日韓外相が来週会談 5か月ぶり 北の核、拉致を協議
- 534. 2006.06.28 あすG8外相会合 麻生外相、「拉致」議題提起へ 「北ミサイル」協
力要請
- 535. 2006.07.03 サミット 議長総括に北朝鮮の核・拉致問題解決求める テロ対策文書
も採択へ
- 536. 2006.07.18 サミットが閉幕 議長総括 北朝鮮拉致「早急な解決」要求 ミサイル
など懸念
- 537. 2006.07.28 拉致問題「6か国」で議論も 中国外相が発言 日本側「見極める必
要」
- 538. 2006.11.01 北朝鮮の6か国協議復帰 与野党、歓迎と警戒交錯 政府、拉致問題改
めて主張へ
- 539. 2006.11.02 北朝鮮「6か国」復帰 安倍首相「拉致解決まで制裁」
- 540. 2006.11.02 日英首相補佐官が会談 北朝鮮の核問題や拉致で協力
- 541. 2006.11.03 曾我さん拉致で逮捕状 現在70—80歳、北の女工作員／新潟県警
- 542. 2006.11.05 6か国協議 政府、拉致解決を提起 北は反発、直接対話再開も困難か
- 543. 2006.11.06 「拉致理解深まった」 家族会帰国

- 544. 2006.11.21 松本京子さんの拉致認定、北朝鮮側に伝える／塩崎官房長官
- 545. 2006.11.24 「拉致」の日朝協議、「6か国」で目指す／塩崎官房長官
- 546. 2006.12.19 6か国協議 北朝鮮と米、見えぬ接点 日本は拉致置き去り懸念
- 547. 2006.12.21 [気流] 拉致問題解決へ、国際連携広げて 無職・岡林亨
- 548. 2006.12.23 「6か国」休会 協議有効性に疑問視も 「拉致」日本政府に長期戦の覚悟

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- 549. 2007.01.11 日・ASEAN首脳会議演説 比大統領「拉致」言及へ 「北の核」に懸念表明
- 550. 2007.01.13 ASEAN議長声明案 「拉致」「核実験」触れず
- 551. 2007.01.16 東アジア首脳会議閉幕 議長声明に「拉致」
- 552. 2007.01.26 6か国協議、拉致より核に集中を 韓国大統領が年頭会見で主張
- 553. 2007.02.01 安倍首相の主張する外交、理念先行 「米と距離」疑心生む 拉致「一本調子」
- 554. 2007.02.06 拉致問題の進展、北支援の前提／安倍首相
- 555. 2007.02.09 6か国協議 拉致進展が北支援条件 日本代表が基調演説
- 556. 2007.02.09 6か国協議 「拉致」進展に期待 安倍首相、予算委で表明
- 557. 2007.02.10 6か国協議 「拉致持ち出して日本が会談妨害」／朝鮮中央通信
- 558. 2007.02.10 6か国協議 安倍首相「拉致問題、前進を」
- 559. 2007.02.15 6か国合意 北支援の前提・拉致「進展」どう判断 安倍首相、作業部会に全力
- 560. 2007.02.17 拉致被害家族ら、外務省局長と面会 「6か国」説明受ける
- 561. 2007.02.19 北朝鮮拉致問題の協議、作業部会には限界／山崎・前自民副総裁
- 562. 2007.02.21 安倍首相と横田夫妻ら面会 拉致問題の優先取り組みを約束
- 563. 2007.02.22 北朝鮮の核放棄へ連携確認 米副大統領、安倍首相と会談 「拉致は共通の課題」
- 564. 2007.02.26 安倍首相、拉致被害者と面会 問題早期解決に決意／新潟
- 565. 2007.02.27 [点検・安倍政権] (5) 拉致問題、見えぬ完全解決 (連載)
- 566. 2007.02.28 [気流] 「核」のみならず拉致問題解決を 入江重勝 (投書)
- 567. 2007.03.01 日朝作業部会 政府、拉致問題を最優先 ハノイ開催、北が希望
- 568. 2007.03.01 「拉致、日朝は行程表を」 ヒル米次官補が議会証言 こう着、打破促す
- 569. 2007.03.05 日朝作業部会 対北支援、拉致再調査結果で是非判断／日本政府方針
- 570. 2007.03.06 スイス紙の批判に日本大使が反論 拉致問題で
- 571. 2007.03.07 米朝作業部会 米が拉致問題に言及、ヒル次官補明かす
- 572. 2007.03.07 日朝作業部会きょう「拉致」協議 「国交正常化」は8日に
- 573. 2007.03.09 北朝鮮、拉致再調査に難題要求 過去清算や制裁解除 次回作業部会は未定
- 574. 2007.03.10 「拉致進展なければ北支援に参加せず」／安倍首相
- 575. 2007.03.10 拉致問題で日米に意見の違いない／シーファー駐日米大使
- 576. 2007.03.11 日本の拉致対応で米と歩調に乱れも タイム誌が警告

577. 2007.03.11 ボルトン前米国連大使、6か国協議を語る 「米国は、拉致問題を見捨てた」
578. 2007.03.20 6か国協議 日朝「拉致」で批判の応酬
579. 2007.03.22 6か国協議 拉致より核を優先／韓国次期駐日大使
580. 2007.03.28 拉致家族会に6か国協議の内容報告／政府
581. 2007.04.12 日中首脳が会談 「戦略的互惠」を具体化 拉致・核で連携 ガス田具体策目指す
582. 2007.04.28 対北朝鮮「初期措置」の履行要求、拉致でも連携 日米首脳が確認
583. 2007.05.01 北朝鮮拉致問題対応で日本に疑問示す 前ソウル市長、自民2氏に
584. 2007.05.18 中国外務次官に「拉致問題は重大」／中山首相補佐官
585. 2007.05.20 拉致、ハイリゲンダム・サミットの議長総括に明記へ
586. 2007.05.28 拉致問題に中国が協力検討 被害者情報を日本に提供 ヘギョンさん受け入れも
587. 2007.05.31 北朝鮮拉致問題早期解決求める G8外相会合、議長声明発表
588. 2007.06.16 日米F T A締結に意欲 拉致は「6か国」で対処／シーファー米駐日大使
589. 2007.06.27 朝鮮半島和平4か国会合案 日本政府「拉致」の停滞警戒 米に慎重な対応要請へ
590. 2007.07.19 6か国協議 日朝直接対話、困難に 北に拉致協議の意思なく
591. 2007.08.03 A R F会議が閉幕 「北の核施設停止を歓迎」 「拉致」間接的に言及／マニラ
592. 2007.08.08 6か国協議作業部会 北朝鮮「投資型支援」を要求 日本は「拉致」重視強調
593. 2007.08.10 南北首脳会談 韓国人拉致も議題 スパイ送還など見返りに
594. 2007.08.11 北の「テロ国家」解除 米、核放棄の切り札に 「拉致」巡り日本と温度差も
595. 2007.08.11 「核無力化でテロ国家解除」 米、北へ1月に伝達 拉致進展関係なく
596. 2007.08.31 米朝「拉致」調整が焦点 テロ支援国解除なども あすからスイスで作業部会
597. 2007.08.31 日朝作業部会 国交正常化問題を拉致より先に議論
598. 2007.09.01 「拉致、米にとっても重要」 ヒル米次官補、具体的措置に期待感
599. 2007.09.03 米朝作業部会 「拉致」再調査案も浮上 テロ支援国解除巡り、日朝部会で検討へ
600. 2007.09.05 日朝作業部会 「過去の清算」協議検討へ 北が拉致被害者再調査なら／政府
601. 2007.09.05 長引く拉致問題余波 家族会と調査会、緊縮財政 経費節減迫られ事務所移転
602. 2007.09.06 6か国協議作業部会 拉致再調査、きょう要求 初日は「過去の清算」協議
603. 2007.09.18 自民総裁選 福田氏「拉致問題自ら解決」 置き去り懸念に配慮
604. 2007.09.25 北朝鮮のテロ支援国指定、拉致解決前に解除も／米国務長官
605. 2007.09.27 北朝鮮のテロ支援国指定「拉致解決なしに解除せず」／中山首相補佐官

606. 2007.09.29 拉致解決へ努力 日朝会談で確認